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TMI Blog1958 (9) TMI 84X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ew holdings was transferred to the petitioners in June 1956. A notice had been published on 19-9-1955 by which objections were invited against the repartition. On 26-9-1955 the tenants filed their objections which were dismissed by the Consolidation Officer. An appeal was preferred by the tenants under Section 20(3) of the Pepsu Consolidation Act against the order of the Consolidation Officer This appeal was dismissed on 25-5-1956 by the Settlement Officer. Against the order of the Settlement Officer the tenants filed an appeal before Shri Balvindar Singh, Settlement Officer, Faridkot, to whom powers had been delegated of hearing appeals under Section 20 (4) of the Pepsu Consolidation Act. The said officer made a reference to the Settlement Commissioner who exercised the powers of the State Government under Section 41 of that Act. The Settlement Commissioner remanded the case to the Settlement Officer for making an enquiry on the spot. On 7-2-1957 the Settlement Officer. Faridkot, submitted a report to the Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab. The Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act (which for the sake of brevity will be referred to as th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . It is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Punjab Consolidation Act. Section 42 runs as follows: The State Government may at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by any officer under this Act call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit: Provided that no order shall be varied or reversed without giving the parties interested notice to appear and opportunity to be heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration. Section 41, which deals with delegation of powers, is as follows: 41 (1) The State Government may for the administration of this Act, appoint such persons as it thinks fit, and may by notification delegate any of its powers or functions under this Act to any of its officers either by name or designation. (2) A Consolidation Officer or a Settlement Officer (Consolidation) may, with the sanction of the State Government, delegate any o its powers or functions under this Act to any person in the serv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Harnam Singh J., on 13-5-1952 a doubt was expressed with regard to the power of the rule-making authority to make a rule which could be given retrospective effect. Weston C. J. was of the following view: I must confess that I can see no justification for the proposition that an authority to whom rule-making powers have been given can proceed to make rules and to direct that the operation of those rules shall have effect not from the time they are made but for all previous time whether or not earlier rules have up to that time been in force. In Modi Food Products v. Commissioner Sales Tax, AIR 1956 All 35, and M. L. Bagga v. Murhar Rao, (S) AIR 1956 Hyd 35, there are certain observations which support the view of Weston G. J. But it appears that there is also authority for the view that if a clear intention is expressed in a rule it can operate retrospectively (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 42, Section 101). In the instant case, no question arises of any rule having been made with retrospective effect and it is unnecessary to decide which view is correct. 4. The notification of 12-2-1958 by which powers were delegated to the Additional Director does not fall within the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... essly conferred. Even in respect of such a legislation according to Griffith C. J. in Federated Engine Drivers and Fire-men's Association of Australasia v. The Broken Hill Proprietary Co., Ltd., (1913) 16 CLR 245 at p. 259, it would indeed require very clear and explicit words to validate retrospectively supposed judicial proceedings which were wholly null and void when taken. 5. The order which the State Government makes under Section 42 of the Punjab Consolidation Act is quasi-judicial and the powers under it have to he exercised in a quasi-judicial manner. It was so held by me in Fauja Singh v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings AIR 1958 Punj 305. It is urged on behalf of the petitioners that by the exercise of the aforesaid powers it is possible to affect vested rights of the right holders whose lands are being consolidated. It is suggested that the petitioners had been allotted certain lands on repartition in pursuance of a scheme which had been duly confirmed, and possession had passed to them. These lands became their property under the law. The Additional Director by making the order on 21-7-1957 revoked the scheme which had the effect of depriving the petitioner ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t where, by any Punjab Act a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having for the time being power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed whether by itself or any other authority by it in exercise of that power. Sections 18 and 19 are in the following terms: 18. Where, by any Punjab Act, a power to issue any notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law is conferred, then expressions used in the notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, shall, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, have the same respective meanings as in the Act, conferring the power. 19. Where, by any Punjab Act, a power to issue notifications or make orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued or made. It is significant that specific provisions had to be made in the General Clauses Act with regard to powers which can be exercised under statutory en ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... adesh Act, any power was conferred on the State Government, that power might be exercised from time to time as occasion required, and it was contended that the Governor had the power to enlarge the time for making of the award even after the award had actually been made. This contention was repelled with the following observations: Under Section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act the State Government may exercise the power conferred on it by Sections 3, 4 and 6 that is to say, it can from time to time make orders referring dispute to an adjudicator and, whenever such an order of reference is made, to specify the tune within which the award is to be made. This power to specify the time does not and indeed cannot include a power to extend the time already specified in an earlier order. Another argument that was addressed on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh in that case, which was based on Section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 (equivalent to Section 21 of the Indian General Clauses Act and Section 19 of the Punjab General Clauses Act), was rejected thus: It is true that the order of April 26, 1950, does ex facie purport to modify the order of 18-2-1950, b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Additional Director could exercise the functions and powers of the State Government under Section 42, after the notification of 12th February was issued. The question, however, is whether the Additional Director could exercise such powers on 21-7-1957 when the impugned order was made. To such a situation, the facts and the decision in the Straw-board Manufacturing Co. case, 1953 SCR 439: (AIR 1953 S. C. 95), are more apposite. 8. The Deputy Advocate General did not appear to rely much on the decision of Bishan Narain J. in Civil Writ No. 520 of 1956, D/-10-5-1957 (Punj) for the obvious reason that this point was not examined at any length by the learned Judge. In that case the respondents had relied on a notification issued by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu on the 26th October, 1956 by which the status of the Managing Director of the Patiala State Bank had been fixed as that of a Secretary for the purposes of issuing a certificate under the Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act, 1945. The notification had been made specifically retrospective in effect. Bishan Narain J. was of the view that the aforesaid notification was obviously an executive order and had been issued by the Rajpramukh as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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