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TMI Blog1999 (3) TMI 631X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... story merely for personal gains to quench the lust for money and power. The case of respondent No.1 in this litigation is one of such persons who has done everything possible to utilise the forum of the Courts for the attainment of his personal benefits by attempting to utilise the alleged constitutional guarantees in his favour. A ruler of the yester years, the respondent No. 1, approached the High Court for issuance of the command to the State Forest Corporation by treating him equivalent to the Government of Himachal Pradesh with conferment of monetary gains which were permissible to the State Government on the basis of the decision of the Pricing Committee. The High Court granted prayer sought for by the judgment impugned in this appeal. The Maharaja was held, to have been equated with the Government and entitled to the relief claimed by him as according to the High Court he was found to have been deprived of the right to life as envisaged by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The High Court observed We have held that the petitioner is entitled to enforce his claim particularly the right to his livelihood through this writ petition. It was further held, he was, for all ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the right to graze their cattle. During the settlement operation of civil district of Kangra in 1869, Mr. James Lyall, Settlement Officer, had made a proposal vide the letter 12.2.1868 that the management of forests in four 'Tappas' be granted to the Raja of Kutlehar. The aforesaid proposal is claimed to have been accepted by the Government of Punjab not only with respect to four 'Jagir Tappas' but also for all 16 Tappas' including 12 Khalsa Tappas'. The predecessor-in-interest of respondent No.1 are stated to have started managing the Kutlehar Forest subject to the conditions contained in the approval dated 11.1 .1869. The then Government is stated to have started laying claims to the trees grown on the aforesaid land in the year 1915 which was resisted and resulted in the commencement of the fresh correspondence between the parties. The controversies are said to have been set at rest by the Lt. Governor of Punjab in the year 1916 vide letter dated 25.5.1916 by which it was made clear that All trees growing in the protected forests, subject to the right of 'Bartandars' and to the other conditions and exceptions hereinafter specified, belong to Gove ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent forests, thereafter, could be sold only to the Forest Corporation. Ever since its incorporation the respondent-corporation continued purchasing timber and other forest produces from respondent No.1 in accordance with the working plan. The said respondent alleged that in add-on to his entitlement of the sale price of the various forest produces sold by him out of the Kutlehar forest to the respondent-corporation, he was also entitled to share the interest on delayed payment, interest on interest and compensation for damages caused to the trees in the course of extraction of timber etc. The basis for his claim as pleaded In writ petition and noticed by the High Court was:- Firstly, the Government of Himachal Pradesh constituted a Committee of officers for determination of the price and terms and conditions of the supply of forest produce sold in favour of the second respondent (HP Forest Corporation) vide notification dated 18.5.1974 (Annexure-C) whereby the fourth respondent (Pricing Committee) on behalf of the Government In its wisdom had equated the petitioner with the Government and directed that the decision regarding the aforesaid payments taken in respect of the Governm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Himachal Pradesh vide Notification dated 19.1.1990 issued under Section 3 of the Punjab Resumption of Jagir Act, 1957. The Principal Chief Conservator of Forests was directed to take over management and possession of Kutlehar forest from respondent No.1 with the assistance of the Collector. Respondent No.1 filed a writ petition (WP No. 42/90) with respect to his pre-existing rights as also his entitlement to retain the forest by challenging the validity of the notification. Thereafter, he also challenged the Himachal Pradesh (Acquisition of Management) Act, 1992 by filing a writ petition(W.P. No. 707 /92). During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition No. 42/90, respondent No.1 filed C.W.P. No. 528/91 in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh claiming the relief on the basis of the decisions of the Pricing Committee being applicable to him. The claim of the respondent No.1 was resisted on various grounds including :- i) that the petitioner is not the owner of the forest; ii) that it is 3 case of enforcing contractual rights which can be done by way of a Civil Suit and not through this writ petition. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable, iii) that the deci ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the instant case, the High Court did not notice any special circumstance which could be held to have persuaded it to deviate from the settled proposition of law regarding the exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For exercise of the writ jurisdiction, the High Court pressed into service the alleged fundamental right to livelihood of the respondent which was found to have been violated by not making him the payment of the amounts claimed in the writ petition. It is true that Article 21 of the Constitution is of utmost importance, violation of which, as and when found, directly or indirectly, or even remotely, has to be looked with disfavour. The violation of the right to livelihood is required to be remedied. But the right to livelihood as contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be so widely construed which may result in defeating the purpose sought to be achieved by the aforesaid Article. It is also true that the right to livelihood would include all attributes of life but the same cannot be extended to the extent that it may embrace or take within its ambit all sorts of claim relating to the legal or contractual rights of the pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ees and other forest produce to be handed over by the Himachal Pradesh Forest Department to the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation Ltd. from time to time. However, there is nothing on the record to suggest that the said committee was constituted in exercise of any statutory power. Despite mentioning the provisions of State Forest Corporation Act of 1974, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 could not refer to any statutory obligation under the said Act requiring the appointment of the Pricing Committee. The argument appears to be afterthought and contradictory to the pleadings. In his writ petition, the respondent No.1 referred to Clause 51 of the Memorandum of Association of Articles of Association and submitted:- That in exercise of the powers conferred by clause 51 of the Memorandum, the Government of Himachal Pradesh vide Notification No.10-26/72-SF, Shimla dated16.5J4 constituted a committee of officers to determine the price and terms and conditions for the supply of resin, resin blazes, standing trees and other forest produce to be sold to the Himachal Pradesh Forest Corporation Ltd. from time to time. A copy of the said notification is annexed to this peti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tribunal constituted by the State Government in exercise of its statutory as welt as plenary executive powers can also not be accepted in the light of the functions assigned to the Committee. Quasi-judicial acts are such acts which mandate an officer the duty of looking into certain facts not in a way which it specially directs out after a discretion, in its nature judicial. The exercise of power by such tribunal or authority contemplates the adjudication of rival claims of the persons by an act of the mind or judgment upon the proposed course of official action as to an object of the corporate power, for the consequences of which the office will not be liable, although his act was not well-judged. A quasijudicial function has been termed to be one which stands midway a judicial and an administrative function. The primary test is as to whether the authority alleged to be a quasi-judicial, has any express statutory duty to act judicially in arriving at the decision in question. If the reply is in affirmative, the authority would be deemed to be quasi-judicial, and if the reply is in the negative, it would not be. The dictionary meaning of the word 'quasi' Is, not exactly . ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der an express provision of the statute or by implication and determination of particular facts on which its jurisdiction to exercise its power depends or if there is a proposal and an opposition the authority is under a duty to act judicially. As stated in paragraph 115 of Halsbury's Laws of England Volume 11 page 57, the duty to act judicially may arise in widely differing circumstances which it would be imposible to attempt to define exhaustively. he question whether or not there Is a duty to act judicially must be decided in each case in the light of the circumstances of the particular case and the construction of the particular statute with the assistance of the general principles laid down in the judicial decisions. The principles deducible from the various judicial decisions considered by this Court in 1950 SCR 621 : (AIR 1950 SC 222 ) at page 725 (of SCR) : (at p. 260 of AIR) were thus formulated namely:- (i) that if a statute empowers an authority not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s were applicable to the respondent No.1 in so far as Kutlehar Forest was concerned. It is admitted that the Committee dealt with various items of disputes between the State of Himachal Pradesh and the Forest Corporation such as handing over of charging of extension fee, fixation of rates for resin blazes for the year 1988-89. 1989-90, adjustment of rebate, royalty rates for timber Sots (deodar, kail fir and chil, sat lots, Eucalyptus Lots, shisham, sain and tuni, khair lots, interest on belated payments, damages in geltu lots, interest on interest, royalty for private trees and levy of extension fee. it is not disputed before us that on the basis of the arrangement prevalent before the constitution of the corporation, respondent No.1 was entitled to a share of 75 per cent of the sale profits of the forests. In other words, it is conceded that respondent No.1 was entitled to 75 per cent of the royalty received from the Kutlehar Forest. It is also not disputed that respondent No.1 has already been paid his due share of royalty on the basis of the price fixed by the Pricing Committee from time to time. The dispute is with respect to item Nos. XI, pertaining to interest on belated pay ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the term royalty as used in item No.VIII of the proceedings of the Pricing Committee. The respondent No.1 as already noticed could not be equated with the State Government of Himachal Pradesh, and had no basis to claim the ownership in the trees grown in the Kutlehar forest after he accepted his appointment as a Forest Superintendent in the year 1958 under Section 2(2) of the Forest Act. The acceptance of his position as a Forest Superintendent in law, 'a forest officer' appointed under Section 2(2) of the Forest Act clearly established that the respondent No.1 had accepted the State Government to be dominant owner of the property-and that he was merely an officer appointed by the Government in exercise of its sovereign power. But for his position as a forest Officer, he had no jurisdiction to deal with the forest or even enter into 'it. The arrangements made earlier in the form of conferment of rights upon his forefather stood extinguished and merged with his position as a Forest Officer of the State Government. He was entitled only to such benefits to which the forest officer is entitled. His entitlement in the present case was restricted only to the exten ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his Court had held or referred to that the item like extension fee, interest, interest on interest, and payment for damage caused could be included within the ambit of the term 'royalty'. The aforesaid payments were thus recoverable only on the basis of the contract or the statutory provisions. In Inderjeet Singh Sial and Anr. Vs, Karamchand Thapar and Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 166 it was held: In its primary and natural sense 'royalty', in the legal world, is known as the equivalent or translation of jura regalia or jura regia. Royal rights and prerogatives of a sovereign are covered thereunder. In its secondary sense the word 'royalty' would signify, as in mining leases, that part of the reddendum, variable though, payable in cash or kind, for rights and privileges obtained. It is found in the clause of the deed by which the grantor reserves something to himself out of that which he grants. But What is In a name? A rose by any other name would smell as sweet. So said Shakespeare. The Court further held that the commodity goes by its value and not by the wrapper in which it is packed. If the thought is clear, its translation in words, spoken or written ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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