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TMI Blog1976 (11) TMI 197X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in Panna Mamirpur, Narela 11. In September, 1967, he was assigned the work of teaching certain subjects to both the sections of Class V. In section A of Class V, there was at that time a student named Surinder Kumar, son of Dhan Raj. On September 6, 1967, Dhan Raj made a written complaint to the Education Officer of the Corporation, a copy of which he endorsed to the Head Master of the School, alleging therein that the appellant bad sensually misbehaved with his son, Surinder Kumar in the School Premises during the recess time on 2nd and 4th September, 1967. On October 5, 1967, the Education Officer suspended the appellant. On April 15, 1968, the Assistant Education Officer, Rural North Zone, was directed by his superior to prepare a charge sheet against the appellant whereupon a charge sheet was drawn up and served on the latter on November '16, 1968. Therefore, the Director of Inquiries, who was deputed to enquire into the matter proceeded to hold the enquiry and on consideration of the evidence adduced before him, he submitted a report on May 20, 1969, holding that the charge levelled against the appellant had been established. On receipt of the report and perusal thereof, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt at considerable length but rejected the appeal by an elaborate order dated January 5, 1972. The appellant thereupon filed writ petition No. 179 of 1972 in the High Court of Delhi challenging the order dated July 30, 1969 of the Deputy Commissioner, Education, as well as the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 5, 1972. This petition was, as already stated, summarily dismissed without the issue of a notice to the respondents. The appellant then made an application to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court but the same was also rejected. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Ramamurthi has vehemently contended that the appointing authority of the appellant being the Commissioner under section 92 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act'), his dismissal from service by the Deputy Commissioner (Education)--an authority subordinate to the Commissioner is illegal. The counsel has next urged that regulation 7 of the Regulations and the Schedule referred to therein conferring power on the Deputy Commissioner to dismiss a municipal officer or other employee drawing a monthly salary of less than ₹ 350/- being incon ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... employee specified in the order. It is admitted by the appellant that in: exercise of the power conferred on him under section 491 of the Act, the Commissioner had vide his order No. (1)58 Law Corp-1 dated April 7, 1958, directed that all the powers conferred on him under the various provisions of. the Act would be exercised also by the Deputy Commissioner subject to his supervision, control and revision. Regulation 7 of the Regulations and the Schedule referred to therein read as under:-- Regulation 7: The authority specified in column 1 of the Schedule may impose on any of the municipal officers. or other municipal employees specified there against in column 2 thereof any of the penalties specified there against in column 3 thereof. Any such officer or employee may appeal against the order imposing upon him any of those penalties to the authority specified in column 4 of the said Schedule. SCHEDULE Description of posts Authority Penalties Appellate competent Authority to impose penalties Posts whose minimum Deputy All Commissioner monthly salary (exclu- Commissioner sive of allowances) is less than three hundred and fifty rupees. Do. Any municipal officer (i) (ii ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cher was actually made by the Commissioner, the Deputy Commis- sioner was. not competent to dismiss him from service. What was asserted by him at that stage is contained in ground No. VI of the petition and' may be reproduced below for facility of reference:-- Because in any. case, respondent No. 3 has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Under section 92 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, the petitioner could be appointed only by the Commissioner and under section 95 of the said Act, he should be the dismissing authority. In the present case, however, the Commissioner had by notification under section 491 of the said Act, delegated his power to the Deputy Commissioner under Circular NO. 4(1)/8-Law Corp. 1 dated 7.4.1958. The dismissing order was made by the Deputy Commissioner as delegatee i.e. as exercising the powers of the Commissioner. The Commissioner, therefore, could not sit in appeal on such an order. Only the Standing Committee of the Corporation could have heard the appeal. The omission to make the aforesaid averments in the writ petition regarding the incompetence of the Deputy Commis- sioner to pass the impugned order of dismissal from service and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent was to be deemed to have been appointed by the General Manager (Transport). The respondent in that case thus being re- quired by fiction of law to b,e taken to have been appointed by the General Manager, he could not have been removed from service in May, 1963 by the Assistant General Manager--an authority subordinate to the General Manager--in view of the first.proviso to sub-section (1) of section 95 of the Act despite the fact that the functions of the General Manager had been delegated to the Assistant General Manager in May, 1961. In that case, it was made clear by this Court that the only consequence of the delegation order was that if after 1961, the Assistant General Manager had made the appointment of respondent No. 2, he would have no doubt been entitled to remove him from service but the position had to be deter- mined with reference to the time, when he was absorbed in the Corporation which was in January, 1958. The judgment of this Court in. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Pratap Singh (1) C.A. No. 2249 (N.) of 1969 decided on 8-1-1976. is also not helpful to the appellant as in that case, the appointment was in fact made by the Commissioner white the dismiss ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In Bimal Kumar Pandit's case (supra) while, reversing the judgment and order of the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent against his reduction in rank on the ground that the notice served upon him under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution was void as it did not expressly and specifically indicate either the conclusions of the dismissing authority or the findings recorded by the enquiring officer or that the dismissing authority accepted the findings of the enquiring officer and unless that course was adopted, it would not be clear that the dismissing authority had applied its mind and had provisionally come to some conclusion both in regard to the guilt of the public officer and the punishment which his misconduct deserved the Constitution Bench of this Court observed: It may be conceded that it is desirable that the dismissing authority should indicate in the second notice its concurrence with the conclusions of the enquiring officer before it issues the said notice under Article 311(2). But the question which calls for our decision is it the dismissing authority does not expressly say that it has accepted the findings of the enquiring officer agai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he dismissing authority, proved. In order to give the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause under Art. 311(2), it is essential that the conclusions provisionally reached by the dismissing authority must, in such cases, be specified in the. notice. But where the dismissing authority purports to proceed to issue the notice against the delinquent officer after accepting the enquiry report in its entirety, it cannot be said that the dismissing authority must say that it has so accepted the report. As we have already indicated, it is desirable that even in such. cases a statement to that effect should be made. But we do not think that the words in Art. 311 (2) justify the view that the failure to make such a statement amounts to. contravention of Art. 311(2) ....... There is no doubt that after the report is received, appropriate authority must apply its mind to the report and must provisionally decide whether the findings recorded in the report should be accepted or not. It is only if the findings recorded in the report against the Government servant are accepted by the appropriate authority that it has to provisionally decide what action should be taken against him ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 6) 2 S.C.W.R. the Constitution Bench this Court while repelling the contention advanced on behalf of the respondent that the State Government's order compulsorily retiring him from service was bad as it did not give reasons for accepting the findings. of the enquiring tribunal and imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement observed as follows:-- Mr. Setalvad for the respondent attempted to argue that the impugned order gives no reasons why the appellant accepted the findings of the Tribunal. Disciplinary proceedings taken against the respondent, says Mr. Setalvad, are in the nature of quasi- judicial proceedings and when the appellant passed the impugned order against the respondent, it was acting in a quasi-judicial character. That being so, the appellant should have indicated some reasons as to why it accepted the findings of the Tribunal, and since no reasons are given, the order should be struck down on that ground alone. We are not prepared to accept the argument. In dealing with the question as to whether it is obligatory on the 524. State Government to give reasons in support of the order imposing a penalty on the delinquent officer, we cannot overlook the fact th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... should always and in every case give reasons in support of its decision. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India Ors.( S.C.R. 466-A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671.) this Court repelled the contention of counsel for the appellant that every order appealable under Article 1,36 of the Constitution must be a speaking order and the omission to give reasons for the decision is of itself a sufficient ground for quashing it and held that an order of an administrative tribunal rejecting a revision application cannot be pronounced to be invalid on the sole ground that it does not give reasons for rejection. While distinguishing the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala(1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 339. where the Central Government reversed the decision of the State Government without giving reasons for reversal, this Court pointed out that there was a vital difference between the order of reversal by the appellate authority and the order of affirmance by the revising authority and that if the revising authority re- jects a revision application stating that there was no valid ground for interference with the order of the subordinate authority in such a case, it could not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent concerned. We would also like to point out that the observations in Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) that in Bhagat Raja v. The Union of India Ors. (supra)., this Court in effect overruled the judgment of the majority in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India Ors. (supra) seem to have crept therein through some oversight. A careful perusal of the decision in Bhagat Raja v. The Union of India Ors. (supra) would show that this Court did not make any observations therein which can be interpreted as overruling the. majority judgment in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of1 India Ors. (supra). It is also worthy of note that in Bhagat Raja's case (Supra), the amendment of rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules,1960 introduced in July, 1965 laid down a special procedure in regard to revisions. It required the Central Government to send copies of the application for revision to all the impleaded parties including the person to whom a lease had been granted calling upon them to make such comments as they might like to make within three months from the date of the issue of the communication and on receipt of the comments from any party to se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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