9911796707
TMI Blog1995 (3) TMI 476X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e teachers who failed to qualify, within a period of six months from the date of lifting of ban imposed by Govt. The Secretary (Education) put up a note with a suggestion to prefer appeals against the said judgment before the appellate Court. On 18-2-93, Minister approved the note of the Secretary. Thereafter, official notes had been exchanged and series of meetings were held. Besides, efforts were made for approval of the proposal to prefer appeals by the Law Department. 3. On August 23, 1993, Secretary (Education) put up a note in his file that the Addl. Government Advocate expressed his reluctance to file the appeals. Situated thus, after various notes, on 3-11-93 a decision was taken to convene a meeting with the Advocate General. Secretary (Law and Addl. Government Advocate. However, the meeting could not be held as the file was somewhere else. In between many orders had been issued directing the Government Advocate to file the appeals. Thereafter, on 5-5-94 it was decided to engage another counsel (Mr. Ashok Potsangbam) to prefer those appeals. Besides, Secretary (Education) also put up a note indicating that he was threatened in this matter. Again on 20-5-94 Secretary (La ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Governor of Delhi v. Const. Dharampal. 6. Mr. T. Nanda Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the responoents submits before us that the appeals were hopelessly barred and in the applications for condonation, delay has not been properly explained. In the said applications the applicant failed to give explanation whatsoever for the period from the date of judgment till 18-2-93 when the Education Minister approved the note of the Secretary. This was done after the expiry of the period. There has been no mention whatsoever about the action taken by the applicant in respect of preferring appeals against the said judgment. As the applicant failed to explain the period from 15-12-92 till 18-2-93, the subsequent explanation would not be a ground for condonation of delay. Regarding other contention of the Special counsel that the learned single Judge had already granted 15 days' time and within that period the appeals were filed, has no relevance in the facts and circumstances of the case. For preferring an appeal there is a prescribed statutory period within which appeal has to be filed. Beyond that period it is not within the competence of the court to extend further time subject, how ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk..... 10. In G. Ramegowda, Major etc., AIR 1988 SC 897 (supra), the Supreme Court held thus- In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sufficient cause. However, the Court should adopt a liberal and justice oriented approach. The expression sufficient cause referred to in Section 5 should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring an appeal are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides can be imputed to the parties seeking condonation of delay. However, all will depend upon facts and circumstances. If some sufficient cause is shown during which the applicant because of certain circumstances failed to approach the Court in time, delay can be condoned. However, that does not mean that mere prayer for condonation of delay is enough. It is also true that while dealing with the matter of condonation, Court should not be overstrict and hyper technical and the approach should not be viewed in pedantic manner. Besides, the applicant must show that the applicant failed to prefer the appeal within the prescribed time as he was prevented by sufficient cause. If, however, applicant fails to show sufficient cause for not approaching the Court within the prescribed period the cause shown ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
