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TMI Blog1953 (9) TMI 25X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... our persons of Guntur town. It was further stated that the petitioner had sent a letter to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range, Masulipatam, on an inland postal cover with something written in Tamil of which the English handwriting forming the address of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range, has been certified to be that of the petitioner by officers who knew his handwriting in the usual course of business. For confirming this fact the letter had been forwarded to the handwriting Expert, Madras, and further enquiries had to be made about it. Therefore, pending enquiry into these allegations, the petitioner was placed under suspension and was told that he will draw eligible subsistence allowance and dearness allowance during suspension period. On 19-3-1952 the petitioner sent a memorial to the Inspector General of Police, wherein he stated that the suspension was illegal and was the result of misunderstanding and enmity and there was a request that the Inspector General should take the necessary action and do the needful justice by issuing express orders." On 7-4-1952 he made another representation to the Deputy Inspector General of Police ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ring D. O. No. 511/52 issued from the office of the District Superintendent of Police, Guntur, suspending the petitioner as Sub-Inspector of Police, Rasoolpet Police Station, Guntur, and also directing the Government to forbear from continuing, or enforcing, the said order of suspension. 2. A preliminary objection is taken by the Government Pleader, who appears for the respondent State, that though the order of suspension was passed on 15-3-1952, the petitioner has taken a year to file the writ application in the High Court. Therefore, the inordinate delay in the filing of this petition will, by itself, disentitle the petitioner to any relief. In other words, the learned Government Pleader's contention is that the petitioner has not moved this court within a reasonable time of the serving of the order of suspension on him and that he cannot be allowed to take his own time and file a writ petition about a year later. The argument on behalf of the State is that an application for a writ of certiorari is in the nature of an extra-ordinary remedy and should therefore be invoked, or taken advantage of, as early as possible. It is further urged that since in the case of an appeal, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nds that the delay of one year was due to the fact that the petitioner was exhausting all the departmental remedies he could have availed of. He has unsuccessfully petitioned to the D. I. G. of Police as well as to the Inspector General of Police. He made a representation to the Government for which no reply was received. In such circumstances, having 'bona fide' resorted to the departmental remedies available to him, he should not be blamed for the delay in moving this Court for, if he had not approached his departmental superiors for the cancellation of the suspension, that fact itself might be pointed out against him as a reason for refusing a relief in this Court on the ground that he has not taken advantage of other proper & more efficacious remedies. The learned counsel contends that when once finally the charges were framed on 6-2-53 and served on him on 18-2-1953 he was conscious of the fact that he could get no redress at all from the departmental authorities and so perforce was compelled to seek a remedy in this court. It seems to me that there is something to be said for this argument. I would certainly have refused to entertain an application for the issue of a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s appointed to such services; and any such rule so made shall have the effect subject to the provisions of any such Aci. It is conceded that the Madras Legislature has passed no such Act, but that the Governor has made certain rules regarding the conditions of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State. The Discipline and Appeal Rules made by the Governor are in pursuance to this power and Order 98 of the Madras Police Standing Orders is in the following terms: "93(1) Under the proviso to Rule 2 (e) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules (Annexure III), the penalty of suspension should be resorted to only when it is necessary in the public interest to suspend an officer pending enquiry into grave charges against him. When suspension is ordered for such reason it should not be necessary to observe the procedure laid down in Order No. 90." It is contended that in this case there are no grave charges against the petitioner and that it was unnecessary, in the public interests, to suspend him pending enquiry. Therefore, the procedure laid down by Order 90 ought to have been followed and not having done so, the order of suspension cannot be justified. The lear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. 2. No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him," We are not concerned here with the provisos to Clause (2) and as such the same are not read. Mr. Narasaraju wants the court to hold that when a person is suspended and relieved of his duties he is precluded from performing any of the functions that are attached to the office which he has been holding and therefore suspension is tantamount to reduction in rank; in which case the officer suspended should be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. That the petitioner is a person employed in a civil post under the State has not been disputed. Thai he is Suspended is obvious. Therefore if suspension is "reduction in rank" then he should be given an opportunity of showing cause, which has not been done in this case, with the result that the order dated 15-3-1952 is repugnant to clause (2) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dictionary meaning of the word "suspend" as "to debar usually, for a time, from any privilege from the execution of an office or from the enjoyment of an income". He disagreed with the opinion of Vivian Bose J. in the Nagpur case that suspension is equivalent to reduction in rank. Suspension connotes the non-doing of the service while reduction connotes the doing of service in an inferior capacity. When a person is suspended from an office, though strictly he retains in himself the right to hold office and all its essentials, he is temporarily precluded by the order of suspension from doing the duties attached to the office and receiving the emoluments. But when it is a case of reduction it means that the officer is denoted to a lesser, or lower, category, or class of the office; but at the same time he is bound to perform certain duties attached to that lower office. This is the view taken by H. K. Bose J. of the Calcutta High Court. The observations of the learned Judge at page 770 of the report may be read with profit: "It is temporary privation of office, or privilege. By reason of suspension the person suspended does not lose his office nor does he s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... enquiry, or is merely suspension pending an enquiry, there is one important difference between them, namely that if an officer is exonerated as a result of the enquiry he will be given his arrears of pay for the interim period of suspension. If an officer could not be suspended pending an enquiry under Rule 56 without being given an opportunity to show cause against this action, it would really mean that two enquiries would have to be held against him, and it was in my opinion for this reason that suspension was omitted from Article 311(2)." I am in entire concurrence with the views expressed by the Calcutta and Punjab High Courts. But the matter does not rest there alone. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in--'Satischandra Anand v. Union of India', AIR 1953 SC 350 (F) Vivian Bose J. in delivering the judgment of the Constitution Bench has not adverted to the view he took earlier in 'AIR 1949 Nag 118 (C)'. At pp. 251-252 of the report occur the following observations : "The services in India have long been afforded certain statutory guarantees and safeguards against arbitrary dismissal or reduction in rank. Under Section 240, Government ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to different sets of circumstances. I am therefore of opinion that the contention of the learned counsel that suspension is tantamount to reduction in rank is unacceptable. If that is so, there was no necessity for any opportunity being given to the petitioner, before he was suspended, to show cause why he should not be suspended. 6. The learned Government Pleader also relied upon certain observations contained in -- 'Dr. Krishnamoorthi v. State of Madras', (G), where Rajamannar C. J. was of opinion that the fact that rules are made to safeguard the rights of a civil servant in matters of disciplinary action does not mean that the High Court has jurisdiction to quash orders of Government dismissing a civil servant because one or other of the rules has been contravened. From these observations he argues that even if, in the order of suspension, any rule made by the Government has been contravened, still this court would not have any jurisdiction to issue a writ. I do not think that these observations would be of any material help, for the Bench there was considering the effect of certain rules made by the Government with regard to Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal. What we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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