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TMI Blog2005 (8) TMI 691X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de available to the defendant to challenge the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to contest the same on merits. The law ostensibly does not contemplate at any stage when the objections can be raised, and also does not say in express terms about the filing of a written statement. Instead, the word shall is used clearly implying thereby that it casts a duty on the Court to perform its obligations in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Rule 11, even without intervention of the defendant. In any event, rejection of the plaint under Rule 11 does not preclude the plaintiffs from presenting a fresh plaint in terms of Rule 13. When the averments in the plaint are considered in the background of the principles set out in Sopan Sukhdeo [ 2004 (1) TMI 726 - SUPREME COURT] , the inevitable conclusion is that the Division Bench was not right in holding that Order VII Rule 11 CPC was applicable to the facts of the case. Diverse claims were made and the Division Bench was wrong in proceeding with the assumption that only the non-execution of lease deed was the basic issue. Even if it is accepted that the o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the building was completed in the year 1984. Appellant claimed to have written a letter dated 4.11.1984 calling upon the respondent to execute the lease deed in its favour. Admittedly no lease deed has been executed. The suit was filed in July, 1990, inter alia, with the following prayers: (a) Declaration that the plaintiff alone is entitled to let out the ground floor, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th floor and the roof of the said premises shortly referred to have as the Builders Block and realize all rents, issues and profits therefrom without any interference by the defendant. (b) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from executing any lease or other documents in favour of persons in occupation of any portion of the builders block referred to in prayers (a) or in relation to any part or portion of the said block in consideration of any sum or from realizing any rent issues or profit therefrom incumbent or otherwise deal with and exercise any control or dominance over the same; (c) Decree for ₹ 18,84,500/- (Rupees Eighteen lacs eighty four thousand five hundred) only as pleaded in paragraphs 18 and 25 of the plaint. (d) Alternatively, an account of what is due and payable ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... laims made in the plaint revolve round the nucleus i.e. focal point of the execution of lease deed which was to be done sometimes in 1985 and as the suit was filed in 1999, it was clearly barred by limitation. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the approach of the Division Bench is clearly erroneous. The High Court proceeded on the basis as if the only claim related to execution of the lease deed. In fact, there were several other reliefs like claim for damages, unauthorized collection of amounts in respect of the building which admittedly were to be in possession of the present appellant with full liberty to let out the premises. Clause 12 of the agreement clearly stipulated that the appellant had the authority to let out the building without any objection and without requiring consent from the respondent-Association. The Receiver appointed by the Court on the interlocutory application filed by the applicant clearly noted that the defendant i.e. the respondent-Association had executed lease deeds on 3.4.1988, 16.7.1988 and 19.4.1999. Prayer in the plaint was to pass a decree of ₹ 18,84,500/- which was the amount collected by the respondent. The suit was by n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ime, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So, a life-span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of time. (See N. Balakrishanan v. M. Krishna Murthy (1998 (7) SCC 123). 9. Clause (d) of Order VII Rule 7 speaks of suit, as appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Disputed questions cannot be decided at the time of considering an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII applies in those cases only where the statement made by the plaintiff in the plaint, without any doubt or dispute shows that the suit is barred by any law in force. Order VII Rule 11 of the Code reads as follows: Order VII Rule 11: Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases :- (a) where it d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 12. The trial Court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X of the Code. (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr. (1977 (4) SCC 467) 13. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill (1982 (3) SCC 487), only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected. 14. In Raptakos Brett Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property (1998 (7) SCC 184) it was observed that the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII was applicable. 15. There cannot be any compartmentalization, dissection, segregation and inversions of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... suit itself, irrespective of his right to contest the same on merits. The law ostensibly does not contemplate at any stage when the objections can be raised, and also does not say in express terms about the filing of a written statement. Instead, the word shall is used clearly implying thereby that it casts a duty on the Court to perform its obligations in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Rule 11, even without intervention of the defendant. In any event, rejection of the plaint under Rule 11 does not preclude the plaintiffs from presenting a fresh plaint in terms of Rule 13. 20. The above position was highlighted in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. v. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Ors. (2004 (3) SCC 137). 21. When the averments in the plaint are considered in the background of the principles set out in Sopan Sukhdeo s case (supra), the inevitable conclusion is that the Division Bench was not right in holding that Order VII Rule 11 CPC was applicable to the facts of the case. Diverse claims were made and the Division Bench was wrong in proceeding with the assumption that only the non-execution of lease deed was the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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