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TMI Blog1952 (10) TMI 39X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to convene a special meeting of the Board to consider a resolution for the dismissal of the plaintiff. A special meeting of the Board was convened on the 17th December, 1939. Twelve charges were framed against the plaintiff and he was required to furnish his answers to them. A special meeting of the Board was thereafter convened on the 20th January, 1940. The resolution for the dismissal of the plaintiff was on the agenda but the meeting had to be adjourned for want of -quorum to the 29th January, 1940. At the adjourned meeting of the 29th January, 1940, twenty-five out of the twenty seven members of the Board were present. The charges against the plaintiff were gone into and eleven out of the twelve charges were held proved. Two resolutions were consequently passed by the Board at this meeting, one being a resolution for his dismissal, and the other being a resolution for his suspension till the matter of his dismissal was decided under section 71 of the U.P. District Boards Act, X of 1922, on an appeal if any preferred by the plaintiff to the Government. The plaintiff preferred an appeal to the Government against the resolution for his dismissal and this appeal was dismissed by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... course dismissed with costs. The heirs and legal representatives of the plaintiff obtained leave to appeal to the Federal Court against this decision of the High Court and the appeal was admitted on the 5th November, 1948. Both the Courts below having found that there was no irregularity, impropriety or illegality in the procedure followed and the steps taken when the two resolutions in question were passed by the Board the only question that survived for consideration by this Court was whether the resolution for suspension of the plaintiff was valid and binding on the plaintiff or in other words whether it was competent to the Board to pass the resolution for the suspension of the plaintiff after it had passed the resolution for his dismissal under section 71 of the Act. Section 71 of the Act provides for the dismissal and punishment of the secretary: A board may by special resolution punish or dismiss its secretary: Provided, firstly, that such resolution is passed by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of the board for the time being: Provided, secondly, that the secretary of a board shall have a right of appeal to the State Gover ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , whether subject to the sanction of any other authority or not, is conferred by this Act, it shall be deemed to include a power to suspend any person against whom the power of dismissal might be exercised, pending enquiry into his conduct or pending the orders of any authority whose sanction is necessary for his dismissal. (4) Where suspension is ordered pending inquiry or orders, and the officer suspended is ultimately restored, it shall be at the discretion of the authority ordering his suspension whether he shall get any, and, if so what, allowance during the period of suspension; but in the absence of any order to the contrary he shall be entitled to the full remuneration which he would have received but for such suspension. The suspension which has been thus provided for is of two categories, (1) suspension as a punishment and (2) suspension pending enquiry or orders. In the case of a suspension falling within the latter category the only power of suspension which is provided is that of suspending any person against whom the power of dismissal might be exercised pending enquiry into his conduct or pending the orders of any authority whose sanction is necessary for h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... part from those specified could be ordered and that therefore the resolution for suspension of the plaintiff was ultra rites the Board. The High Court in appeal realised the difficulty of the position. It came to the conclusion that section 90 as it stood was in close conformity with the provisions of the old section 71 of the Act which provided for the resolution for dismissal passed by a vote of not less than one-half of the total number of members being required to be sanctioned by the Local Government. The sanction was expressly provided there. But when that section came to be amended by the U.P. Act I of 1933, the provision for sanction was deleted and it provided for the resolution not taking effect until the period of one month had expired within which the secretary could exercise his right of appeal or until the Government had passed orders on the appeal ii any preferred by him. When this amendment was made in the old section 71 of the Act the provision made in section 90 in regard to the power of suspension was lost sight of and no corresponding amendment was made in section 90, sub-section (1)(b), sub-section (3) or subsection (4) which would bring the provisions of 145 s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rs of suspension vested in the Board to read, as the High Court purported to do, the power of suspension of the type in question into the words the orders of any authority whose sanction is necessary . It was unfortunate that when the Legislature came to amend the old section 71 of the Act it forgot to amend section90 in conformity with the amendment of section 71. But this lacuna cannot be supplied by any such liberal construction as the High Court sought to put upon the expression orders of any authority whose sanction is necessary . No doubt it is the duty of the court to try to harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act. Reading the present, section 71 of the Act along with section 90 of the Act we are of the opinion that the power of suspension of the nature purported to be exercised by the Board in the case before us was not the power of suspension contemplated in section 90 sub-section (3) of the Act. If the plaintiff allowed the period of one month to expire without preferring an appeal against th ..... 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