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TMI Blog1995 (12) TMI 392X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the country and the phenomenal growth of the population with its sprawling residential colonies without proper layouts and without thd conveniences of life, as far back as in November 1955, the Central Government had set up a Delhi Development (Provisional) Authority and in December 1955, the Town Planning Organisation was set up and was placed under the administrative control of the Delhi Improvement Trust to advice on all matters pertaining to the planning in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. (3) In September 1956, an Interim General Plan, which was intended to provide an outline for planned development during a period of two to three years till preparation of a comprehensive long range plan, was prepared. (4) It was also noticed that about 70000 people have been migrating to Delhi from rural areas every year and it was necessary to have suitable sites in several zones where very low income group people may be able to put up cheap houses but layouts have to be in accordance with standards. It is not necessary to elaborately deal with the various objects which were sought to be achieved by having a planned development of Delhi as same can be culled out from the Mas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y the Supreme Court in case of Uday Ram Vs. Union of India A.I.R. 1968 Supreme Court 1138. (8) In respect of the aforesaid Notifications issued from time to time and Declarations issued on the basis of the said Notifications, the notices under Section 9 and 10 of the Act came to be issued in the year 1980 and 1981. The writ petitions came to be filed challenging the acquisition proceedings again and one of the writ petitions filed in this Court Ved Prakash Vs. Union of India, C.W.P. No. 963/80 was dismissed in 1980. However, Special Leave Petition was admitted by the Supreme Court as per Civil Appeal No.2630/80 and some of the writ petitions challenging the said acquisition proceedings were directly admitted for hearing in the Supreme Court in the year 1981. (9) It is not out of place to mention that in most of the writ petitions, a mention has been made about the Special Leave Petition having been admitted by the Supreme Court and various writ petitions also having been admitted to hearing by the Supreme Court and thus, this Court also admitted the present writ petitions and granted the order of status quo with regard to the possession in all these cases. (10) Reference t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s the writ petitions and had granted 12% additional interest after the expiry of two years from August 23, 1974 in respect of the cases in which awards had been made prior to the amendment of Section 23 of the Act by incorporating Section 23(1)(A) which came into force on 30th April 1982 by which the awards made after 30th April 1982, the Parliament itself provided for grant of additional compensation of 12% per annum and in respect of the cases where the award had been given prior to April 30, 1982, the Supreme Court granted additional compensation of 12% keeping in view that there had taken place unexplained unreasonable delay in completing the acquisition proceedings by the authorities which would have otherwise persuaded the Courts to have struck down the acquisition proceedings on the basis of the writs Filed under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court and under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. (13) WE-MAY mention at this stage that Section 11-A was introduced in the Land Acquisition Act by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984 which prescribes for the limitations in which the award has to be made. Now, it is evident that in respec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the acquisition proceedings since the date of issuance of notification under Section 4. and declaration under Section 6 of the Act and thus the acquisition proceedings have become illegal and the same amounts to abuse of the power in most arbitrary manner. It was pleaded that if this land stood designated for compulsory acquisition, in view of the Master Plan, then the land should have been acquired without any unreasonable delay and particularly in the period prescribed in Section 55 of the Act. It was also pleaded that before the enforcement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1967, the Jegal position was quite evident that more than one declaration could not have been issued in respect of the land subject matter of one notification issued under Section 4 of the Act. It has been also averred in the writ petition that taking of more than two years period from the dale of the declaration for making the award is by itself unreasonable delay and Parliament had also made this position clear by introducing the amendment in the Land Acquisition Act in 1984 and earlier to that various States have themselves introduced amendments by prescribing the maximum period of two years for maki ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ase. (18) The first question to be decided in all these cases is whether the land acquisition proceedings arc liable to be quashed on account of unreasonable unexplained delay taking place in completing the acquisition proceedings. (19) The learned counsel for the petitioners had taken us through various provisions of the Master Plan and had referred to a number of judgments in support of their contentions that this unusual and unexplained delay in completing the acquisition proceedings amounts to abandonment of the acquisition proceedings and at any rate would make the act of the authorities illegal as it would amount to fraud on the power and also abuse of the powers to the determent of the petitioners, whose lands are sought to be acquired on prices pegged to the dales of the Notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act. (20) The Master Plan of Delhi, which came into force in September 1962, had envisaged the development which was to lake place in Delhi in accordance with the said Master Plan in the coming 20 years which indicates as to. what developments are to take place for First 10 years of the period of the plan and Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act also r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ounds for judicial review of administrative law. This principle was approved by the Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India, . (24) It is urged that by taking no action for such a long period, the land acquisition proceedings should be deemed to have come to an end on the principle of desuetude. In Craies On Statute Law, Seventh Edition at page 7, it is mentioned desuetude is the process by which an Act of Scottish Parliament may lose its force without express repeal. It docs not consist merely of obsolescence or disuse; there must also be contrary practice. Moreover, the contrary practice must be of some duration and general application. We do not see how the principle of desuetude can apply to the facts of the present case because there has been no contrary practice brought about. (25) In support of the contention that administrative action or administrative decision should be taken in a reasonable time and for what should be reasonable time in this context, reference has been made to definition of 'reasonable time' appearing at page 375 in-Words and Phrases Permanent Edition Volume 36 which means such time 'as a prudent man could exercise or employ in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to afford justice to the individual. (29) Reference can be also made to Jaichand Lal Vs. State of West Bengal, wherein it has been laid down that a malafide exercise of power does not necessarily imply any moral turpitude as a matter of law. It only means that the statutory authority is exercised for purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended. (30) In State of Punjab Vs. Gurdial Singh the malafide act was defined by the Supreme Court to mean that if the use of the power is for the fulfillment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. (31) In Donald W.Agins Vs. City of Tiburon, 65 Lawyers Edition 2nd U.S.Supreme Court Reports 106, it was observed that the emphasis is on the words 'extraordinary delay' to indicate that if-there is extraordinary delay in the exercise of the eminent domain a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... judgment, the power to acquire private properly for public use as an attribute of sovereignty which is essential to the existence of a Government and the power of eminent domain of the sovereign Stale to acquire the property of a citizen for public good without the owners consent were highlighted. In para 5, it was emphasised that the framers of the Land Acquisition Act enjoin that after publication of notification under Section 4, further proceedings should betaken as early as possible. (34) In this judgment, reference was made to case of Stale of Gujarat Vs. Palel Raghav Natha, wherein it was held that if for exercise of power no lime limit has been Fixed, the authority who has to exercise power can exercise the same at any time but such lime must be reasonable lime and the length of the reasonable lime must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised, and reliance was placed on Mansarani Vs. S.P.Pathak, 1984 (1) Supreme Court Cases 125. Reference was also made to Ambalal Purshottam Vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, where also emphasis was that land acquisition proceedings should be completed without any unreasonable delay. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ired with reference to the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 at the rate prevalent 15-21 years prior to the date of making of the award cannot be in compliance of the mandate regarding payment of the market value of the land so acquired under the Constitution and the Act. (38) In para 25 of the judgment, the Court then found force in the contentions of the petitioners that the object of the respondents was to peg the prices of the land acquired from the different cultivators to a distant past and not to proceed further because if the award had been made soon after the declarations under Section 6, the respondents had to pay or tender the compensation to the claimants, which for some compulsion, respondents were not in a position to pay or tender them. But, nonetheless, the exercise of power in the facts and circumstances of the cases by the respondents has to be held to be against the spirit of the provisions of the Act, tending towards arbitrariness. (39) The Supreme Court then laid down that in such a situation, the Supreme Court, in exercise of power under Article 32 and the High Court under Article 226 could have quashed the proceedings. But instead of quas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt, in public interest, had chosen not to quash the proceedings but to mould the relief in order to grant additional compensation to the aggrieved persons, whose lands arc being acquired. (43) Hence, we have no difficulty in holding that the respondents have been guilty of unreasonably delaying the acquisition proceedings which would amount to abuse of the power. But we are considering the question as to whether to quash these proceedings or whether this Court should also mould the relief, as was done by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases. (44) Learned counsel for the petitioners have vehemently argued that this relief has been moulded by the Supreme Court by taking resort to power given under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which power is not available to the High Courts. It is true that this Court does not enjoy the powers conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution on the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in the aforesaid case, has not changed the date of notification for determining the market value but has moulded the relief under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and has categorically laid down that the High Court also has power to mould the relie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... issued under Section 6 dated June 2, 1966. The award was made on June 19, 1980. The challenge before the Supreme Court was sought to be raised that the acquisition proceedings should be quashed inasmuch as there has taken place delay in making the award. The Supreme Court held that the question of delay making the award on which the appeal had been mainly supported need not be gone into as the grounds on which the writ petition was filed were rejected by the High Court rightly. It was pleaded that no notice had been received by the petitioner under Section 12 of the Act and thus, the proceedings ought to be quashed. This ground was also negatived and it was held that that notice was required to enable the petitioner to make reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for enhancement of compensation and no prejudice would be deemed to have been caused for non-service of prior notice. (48) However, Writ Petition No.1100-1108/81, Bharat Singh Vs Union of India, came to be decided by the Supreme Court on July 30, 1993. The challenge was to the notification issued under Section 4 on April 16,1964 and the declaration issued on June 15, 1965 and the award made on February 6, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gs the award giving compensation on the basis of the market value of the date of publication of notification under Section 4 -of the Act is illegal and is liable to be set aside. The challenge was negatived and it was held that the Parliament has amended the statute and has given the necessary compensation to the land owners because of such delayed acquisition and thus, validity of the acquisition cannot be challenged on the ground of laches. The Special Leave Petitions were filed against these judgments which are Special Leave Petition Nos.11232, 11396, 11397, 11398 11399 of 1987 in which notices were issued, confined to the question as to whether the petitioner should be given enhanced amount of compensation in view of inordinate delay in making the award but later on all these SLPs came to be dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated May 4, 1995. (52) It is not necessary for us to refer to various other judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of their contentions that there has taken place inordinate unexplained delay in completing the acquisition proceedings. We have already held that there has taken place inordinate delay in completing ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rcising the power within the prescribed time would not atleast be accused of inaction or tethering and therefore, such exercise of power could not be said to be bad or invalid on the only ground that there was unreasonable delay in the exercise of power. It was further observed that the very prescription of time inheres a belief that the nature and quantum of power and the manner in which it is to be exercised would consume atleast that much time which the statute prescribes as reasonable and therefore, exercise of power within that time could not be negatived on the only ground of unreasonable delay. Same ratio was laid by the Supreme Court in the cases of Stale of Gujarat Another Vs Patel Naranbhai Nathubai Others, and Kaliyappan Vs State of Kerala, . (54) It was also urged on behalf of the respondent that mere fact that issuance of notification results in freezing the land of the owners is not fatal by itself if the land is needed for a public purpose. In Leela Devi Vs Union of India, It was held that the fact.that the notification had the effect to freeze the price of the land of the owner would not in any way affect the validity of the notification. (55) The learned ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d, the relief could be moulded by taking resort to Article 32 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court also laid down that High Court has the power under Article 226 of the Constitution also to mould the relief in the similar manner. Thus, there is no legal bar in this court also moulding the relief in the similar manner by taking resort to Article 226 of the Constitution as has been done by the Supreme Court by taking resort to Article 32 of the Constitution. (57) In view of the above discussion, we conclude that the acquisition proceedings in these cases are not liable to be quashed on the ground of inordinate delay but following the ratio given in the case of Ram Chand (supra) we, while upholding the acquisition proceedings, have to give the same relief as has been given in the case of Ram Chand (supra) i.e. the petitioners in whose cases the awards have been made prior to 1982 would be entitled to have additional interest of 12% per annum commencing from two years after the decision given in Aflatoon's case till the date of the award but such additional benefit would not be available in the cases where awards have been made subsequently. (58) However, we may mention ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof. (61) The contention of the learned counsel is that in the present case the petitioners are having their small holdings which arc part of the estate and thus, the compensation to be given to the petitioners could not be less than the market value and where the acquisition proceedings have protracted because of lapses of the respondents, giving market value of the date on which notification under Section 4 was issued 15-18 years back would be not the market value as envisaged in the above provision of the Constitution and thus, he has urged that Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act should be read down to mean that where the proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution is applicable, there Section 23 should mean that the market value has to be paid not on the market rate prevalent at the time of the i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gitated before us is as to whether the Land Acquisition Act contemplates making of more than one award in respect of the land, subject of the declaration issued under Section 6. Prior to the Amendment of 1967 introduced in the Land Acquisition Act, there was no provision. enabling the authorities to issue more than one declaration in respect of the land notified under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act. (66) Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act lays down that whenever it appears to the Government that land in any locality is likely to be needed for any public purpose a notification to that effect is to be issued and published in the official gazette. Thereafter the officers can enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality and perform acts like setting out boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and also carry out the survey. Section 4 does not contemplate issuance of a notification in respect of any particular land. After hearing objections, if any, under Section 5A filed by any interested person with regard to Section 4 notification the Government is entitled to issue a declaration under Section 6 of the Act under which the particular land is to be ind ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... otification under Section 4 followed by a notification under Section 6. The Supreme Court also laid down that as the Act is an expropriatory Act, that interpretation of it should be accepted which puts the least burden on the expropriated owner. (68) It has been contended before us by Sh.P.N.Lekhi, Sr.Advocate on behalf of some of the petitioners, followed by other counsel in whose cases same points of challenge have been raised, that the reasoning given by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case should also be applied to the legal proposition now raised before us that Section 6 declaration cannot be used as a reservoir for making one award after another award and as soon as one award has been made in respect of some land subject-matter of one declaration issued under Section 6 .of the Act, the acquisition proceedings with regard to the said declaration should be deemed to have come to an end and no more awards can be made in respect of any remaining land subject-matter of Section 6 declaration if one award has been already made in respect of some portion of the land out of the same declaration. (69) We are afraid that analogy of Sections 4 6 cannot be made applicable to th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r sub-section (2) shall not, in any way, affect the determination of compensation in respect of other land in the same locality or elsewhere. Section Ii itself contemplates making of more than one award in respect of the land notified under Section 6 declaration. Section 11 prescribes the two years limitation for making of the award from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period the entire proceedings shall lapse. (71) The aforesaid provisions make it evident that award cannot be made in respect of any particular land till inquiry contemplated by Section 11 has been gone through. Where there are different land holdings and different land owners of the land notified under Section 6 obviously notices have to be issued to all of them and also to the persons having interest in the said land. It is, hence, not possible to say that Collector can make only one award in respect of the holders of land particularised in Section 6 declaration. The language of Section Ii does not contemplate making of only one award in respect of the land notified under Section 6 of the Act. As already mentioned Section 11 contemplates making of more than one ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d is valid from the same declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act. (75) In the Corporation of Calcutta Vs Omeda Khatun Bewa, , the Division Bench of the said High Court had held that as the true area of land under the ownership of different persons and the compensation to be allowed to different persons must be different according to the nature and extent of their interest, there can be no doubt that where the land declared under Section 6 belongs to different persons the Collector is required to make different awards in respect of each. It was further laid down that it is also possible to conceive of cases where though the land is under the ownership of a single individual the acquiring authority is, after the acquisition of a portion of the land has been completed, prevented by an injunction of a competent court or by a decision of a superior court from proceeding with the acquisition of the remainder. One of the reasons given for holding that separate awards are possible was that it is only when the claims have been received that it may transpire that different parts of the land are held in different ownerships or to put it in another way, separate groups of interests ar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat more than one award is possible has been culled out from a judgment given by the Calcutta High Court in Omeda Khatun Bewa (supra) which is as follows: The real point in the objection against piecemeal acquisition, however, is not that it involves a plurality of awards, but that it involves a succession of awards, each relating to a portion of the same land held in the same ownership for which there is no warrant in the Act. Nor is there any warrant for successive acquisitions by successive proceedings of different portions of the land covered by a declaration under Section 6, although such portions may belong to different owners. There maybe, and indeed have to be separate award cases and separate inquiries with regard to claims concerning different parcels of land belonging to different owners, where the land covered by the declaration comprises such parcels. Such separate inquiries may also be needed in respect of separate holdings owned by the same person. But such separate cases are all parts of one acquisition proceedings, stemming out there from after the stage of Section 9 of the Act, carried on simultaneously as far as possible and covering between themselves the entir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... where there are more than one holdings subject-matter of one declaration, we see no reason to hold that there ought to be only one award in respect of the said holdings. Hence, we negative this contention raised before us. (80) Another important point which is common in some of the cases is with regard to the interpretation of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act 1957 in L.P.A. No.16/78 which is filed by Union of India against the judgment of a Single Judge of this Court, the decision of the Single Judge has been challenged on the ground that the same is not in consonance with law. The Single Judge, while interpreting Section 55 of the Act, has held that if the land is sought to be acquired for the planned development of Delhi, the provisions of Delhi Development Act immediately come into play and the development of such land can take place only in accordance with the Master Plan and Zonal Plans to be framed under the Delhi Development Act. Issuance of a notification seeking to acquire a land for the planned development of Delhi under action 4 of the Land Acquisition Act read with the Master Plan prepared under the Delhi Development Act 1957 and also taking into consideratio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ter Plan is to define the various zones into which Delhi may be divided for the purpose of development and indicate the manner in which the land in each zone is proposed to be used (whether by carrying out thereon of development or otherwise) and the stages by which any such development shall be carried out and shall serve as a basic pattern of framework within which the Zonal Development Plans of the various zones may be prepared. The Master Plan can provide for any other matter which is necessary for the proper development of Delhi. The Master Plan was prepared under the said provision and was put into force w.e.f. 1st September 1962. (84) SH.P.N.LEKHI, senior counsel, has urged before us that looking to the various pages of the Master Plan, particularly page Iii and pages 3, 5, 10 to 22, 38, 39, 42, 71 and 86, it would be quite clear as to what land was required for compulsory acquisition for carrying out the development and thus any notification issued either prior to the enforcement of the Master Plan or after the enforcement of the Master Plan for acquiring the land for the planned development of Delhi would mean that the said land stands specified in the Master Plan for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y such designation being made in the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan and if no such* designation had been made, the land canned be acquired for planned development of Delhi. (86) It may be also emphasised that notification issued in 1959 for planned development of Delhi was upheld by the Supreme Court in case of Aflatoon and it was noticed that some interim plan had been prepared in respect of development in Delhi and land so sought to be acquired as per notification issued in 1959 would be needed for the development of Delhi in accordance with the said interim plan. But that would not mean that the land so notified under the Land Acquisition Act would be deemed to be designated for compulsory acquisition in the Master Plan itself. Unless and until in the Master Plan itself the land is designated meaning thereby is specified, particularised, earmarked or pointed out, provisions of Section 55 would not come into play at all and such designation should be also indicated in the Master Plan itself that it was for compulsory acquisition (87) MR.LEKHI has also urged before us that the scheme of the Master Plan, the Delhi Land Restriction on Transfers) Act 1972 would indicat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hould hold that acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, although for the purpose of planned development of Delhi, still it should be inferentially held that the land is so designated for compulsory acquisition in the Master Plan. If the Legislature intended that such a meaning to be given to the notifications being issued under Section 4 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Legislature could have easily indicated its mind by using appropriate language in Section 55 of the Act itself. It may be also mentioned that earlier the provisions of the Delhi Development Act itself contemplated acquisition of land for the purposes of development in accordance with the Master Plan and procedure prescribed in the Delhi Development Act was more expeditious then the procedure prescribed in the Land Acquisition Act. But later on the Parliament amended the law and left the acquisition to be carried on under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act even for the purpose of the planned development of Delhi, as contemplated by provisions of the Master Plan framed under the Delhi Development Act. (90) It is also significant to mention that under Section 55, the language used is that if ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e into play on service of a notice. This judgment is of no help in deciding the question whether a particular Master Plan. designates a particular land for compulsory acquisition or not. (94) Reference was also made to Mahanshi Dayanand Co-operative Group Housing Society Limited Vs. Union of India, . In the cited case, a notification was quashed by the Court as the land was not acquired within six months of issuance of a notice, as contemplated by Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, and another notification was issued for acquiring the land for the same purpose of planned development of Delhi. The Division Bench held that repeated notification cannot be issued for the same purpose when the first notification had been quashed. A question was sought to be raised with regard to the interpretation of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act. The Court has declined to go into this question as previous notification had been quashed in an earlier writ petition and which decision was not challenged by the Government by filing any appeal against that judgment. So, this judgment would not help us in deciding this point with regard to the interpretation of Section 55 of the Act. (95 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it would result in completely defecting the object for which the land is to be utilised i.e. for proper development of Delhi in accordance with the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plans to be prepared under the provisions of the Delhi Development Act. It is urged that if the word 'or' is not read as 'and', an absurdity would also result because once the land has been released from compulsory acquisition or it being not acquired within the stipulated period of service of the notice on the expiry of 10 years from the date of the enforcement of the Master Plan, then even though in the Zonal Development Plan same land is also specified or designated for compulsory acquisition, even then such land cannot be acquired again by issuing a subsequent notification under Section 4 for acquiring the land for planned development of Delhi. (97) In support of his argument that word 'or' can be read as 'and' in a particular provision in order to avoid the absurdity of interpretation of a particular provision in the statute, he has referred to Rao Shig Bahadar Singh Vs. The Stale of Vindhya Pradesh, in which it has been laid down that it is incumbent on the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the intention and purpose of the legislature. The expression *and* has generally a cumulative effect, requiring the fulfillment of all the conditions that it joins together and it is the antithesis of 'or. (103) If the Legislature intended that the land should be only specified in a Master Plan for compulsory acquisition and not in the Zonal Development Plan, then the Legislature would have used some different expressions in Section 55 of the Act. By having mentioned both,, the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan, in Section 55, the intention of the Legislature is obvious that if a particular land has been designated for compulsory acquisition in the Master Plan, the same would normally be also designed so in the Zonal Development Plan which is a more detailed plan specifying various purposes for which a particular land in that particular zone is to be used. The Master Plan only generally indicates the different zones for purposes of various activities like residential, industrial, residential-cum-commercial or commercial and for institutional purposes. So, the Land Use Plan, which is prepared under the Master Plan, indicates generally the purposes for which land so i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Maharashtra, , Shiv Ram Anand Vs Radha Bai Shanta Ram, , S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and another ,, and Stale of Kerala Vs Mathai Verghese 1986(1) Scc 746), Keeping in view the plain language of Section 55. it has to be held that the Master Plan itself if indicated particular land for compulsory acquisition, only then Section 55(2) would be applicable. (106) The authorities had deliberately not shown any particular land in the Master Plan for compulsory acquisition although notifications have been issued from time lo time for compulsory acquisition of the land for purposes of pl Ranned development of Delhi which, of course, has to be in accordance with the Master Plan or the Zonal Development Plan as the case may. But it cannot be said that once the notifications have been issued under Section 4 and declarations under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land subject-matter of such notifications and declarations would be deemed to be shown in the Master Plan as designated for compulsory acquisition. Looking to the constraints of limitation prescribed under Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act the authorities might have advisably thought fit not to show any particular l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... petitions to show that in fact the due compliance of the provisions of statutes were made in issuing notification under Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act. It is urged that in the petitions it has been averred that no such notifications were given publicity in the local areas at all and records having been not produced in that respect the inference could be drawn that averments made by the petitioners in the writ petitions arc correct. It is correct that in case notifications have not been published under Sections 4 6 of the Act in accordance with the provisions of the statute the said notifications arc void ab initio. (110) The question which arises for consideration is whether such a challenge could he allowed to be made belatedly by the petitioners when these notifications were published in the official gazette many years ago. (111) It is not possible to countenance that the petitioners in the present cases would not have come to know about the issuance of such notifications which have been admittedly published in the official gazette. It has been held by the Supreme Court in a number of judgments and by this Court in quite a few judgments that if the challenge to the n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tions 9 10 which are meant only for taking proceeding for determining compensation even then the same would not affect the acquisition proceedings. (114) It appears that in most of the cases the awards have been made after the filing of these writ petitions. About 211 awards came to be made just a day before the time of two years was to elapse from the enforcement of the Amendment Act of 1984. The Act gave two years time for completing the acquisition proceedings for giving the award in all those cases where notifications had been issued prior to the said amendment. A number of points have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners particularly Mr.P.N.Lekhi, Senior Advocate, that making of the awards in such a hasty and on one particular day is a fraud on the exercise of power. He has pointed out that there have been many errors in the awards as is apparent from a perusal of the details of the awards given by counsel for the respondents in the shape of a compilation and it is urged that there has been non-application of mind not only by the Collector who made the awards but also by the authorised officer who was to give the prior consent for making the awards. It h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s been no application of mind by the Collector in making the award. Because the making of the award does not in any manner prejudice the rights of the persons to whom the offer is to go in the shape of the award for accepting the compensation and if they choose not to accept the same, they are only to seek reference to the court concerned for enhancement of the compensation. We find merit in these contentions. (116) In Ezra Vs Secretary of Slate for India in Council, and Others, (1905) L.R. 32 Indian Appeals 93, it was laid laid down that the Collector under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act while determining the compensation is holding administrative proceedings and although the award is conclusive against the Government but it is subject to the land owner's right to have the matter referred to the court. It was held that the award cannot be declared void merely because the Collector had availed himself of information supplied to him without the land owner's knowledge and even not disclosed during the inquiry being held by him for determining the compensation. (117) In Asstt.Development Officer Vs Tayaballi Allibhov Bohori Air 1933 Bombay 361, it was held th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of seeking reference under Section 18, the consideration would arise as to when the making of the award was known to the parly concerned actively or constructively. This judgment does not lay down any proposition of law as was sought to be canvassed before us that unless the award is communicated to the person concerned, there is no award in fact in existence. We may refer to Kaliyappan Vs State of Kerala, , where the Supreme Court has clearly held that under Section 11A of the Act, the words the Collector shall make the award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration mean that the Collector is empowered to make an award till the expiry of the last date of the period of two years irrespective of the date on which the notice of the award is served upon the person interested in the land. It was emphasized that to make an award in this Section means to sign the award. The judgment given in the case of Raja Harish Chander (supra) was also referred by the Supreme Court and was distinguished. So it was made clear that giving of a notice of the award under Section 12 is meant for a different purpose and it is not to be confused with the words appe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the award by the Collector and before that by the authorised officer on behalf of the Government in giving prior approval would not mean that the awards have not been made within the stipulated period because if the awards are not acceptable to the aggrieved persons, they can always seek reference to the courts concerned for enhancement of the compensation. The awards so made which come into existence on signing of the awards by the Collector are valid and enforceable against the Government whose authorised officer had appended his signatures on the award giving the prior approval. That in our view would meet with the requirements of law and the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the awards on the ground that prior approval has been given in a mechanical manner and the awards have been signed by the Collector also in a mechanical manner without application of mind. A large number of judgments lay down that non-service of notices under Sections 9, 10 or under Section 12 of the Act do not vitiate the acquisition proceedings. (See Ezra Vs Secretary of State (supra ),Kasturi Pillai Vs Municipal Council Air J 920 Madras 417, ShivdevSinh Vs State of Bihar Others, , Prasan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Calcutta 67, Jehanagar Bomanji Others Vs C.D. Gaikwad, ,) (125) In a recent judgment in the case of Sharadchandra Ganesh Mulcy Vs Stale of Maharashtra Others, , the Supreme Court has laid down that.signing of the award on a particular date is conclusive evidence of making of the award. So, service of notice under Section 12 is not mandatory and even if no notice is served under Section 12 the award would remain valid and only limitation for seeking reference for enhancement of the compensation would commence when the aggrieved person comes to know about the making of the award. (126) In some of the cases it was urged before us that as awards have not been made even within two years from the date of the amendment of the Land Acquisition Act prescribing the limitation under section 11A of the Act, the land acquisition proceedings should be quashed. However, under Section 11A the limitation gets extended because as per Explanation given in that Section in computing the period of two years the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of the court shall be excluded. In all these cases where the orders regardin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ecause there were no funds available with the Government for paying the. compensation and he has referred to the minutes of the meetings held on 14th March 1986, 1st May 1986 and 10th June 1986 of which copies have been furnished by the learned counsel during the course of the arguments. These meetings were held between the officers of the various Departments of the Government in order to meet the deadline for making of the awards in respect of the notifications already issued before the 1984 amendment and in nutshell the minutes of these meetings show that the departments were finding it difficult to have the necessary funds which may have to be deposited with the Collector on the making of the awards. (128) It is urged by learned counsel that frantic efforts were being made by the authorities to raise the huge funds in order to make the awards before the limitation was to expire and thus, he would like us to hold that, in fact, funds were not available with the authorities at the time the awards were made in 1986 and he has referred to Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act which makes it incumbent for the Collector to tender the payment of compensation to the interested perso ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Article 311(2) and Article 166 of the Constitution. Under Article 166 the point was as to when it was to be deemed to be the order of the State Government. It was held that under Article 166, the order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor and before a particular opinion of the Minister can amount to a decision of the Government, it must be communicated to the person concerned. (134) Then, reliance was placed on the judgment given incase of Raja Harish Chandra (supra). In case of Kaluyappan (supra) as far as making of the award is concerned, it has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court that it is the date of the signing of the award which amounts to making of the award and communication of the award is not sine qua-non for making of the award. So, nothing more need be said on this point. (135) It was also urged on behalf of the petitioners that large tract of land already acquired by the D.D.A. have been encroached by unauthorised persons and the D.D.A, which docs not have the machinery to protect its land, should not clamour for having more land for development purposes. It was urged that if the authorities are serious in carrying out the development in accor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hi. The provisions of the Delhi Development Act, particularly Section 15(2) to 15(7) before amendment of the Delhi Development Act were examined along with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and also the provisions of the Indian Works of defense Act and the conclusion was reached that the land could be acquired for planned development of Delhi de hors the provisions of the Delhi Development Act. We need not repeat the reasoning given in this judgment with which we entirely agree. (139) Reference may be also made to Gandhi Gruh Nirman Sahkari Sumiti Ltd Vs. State of Rajasthan Others, , where provisions of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act came up for consideration and it was held that it is not necessary for the State Government to frame a detailed scheme or development plan before exercising powers under Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act. It was laid down that it is sufficient if a decision in that respect is taken and the detailed scheme is left to be worked out at the stage of the execution of the plan. Under Section 52 of the said Act, land could be acquired lor making improvements. The Supreme Court has held that mere taking a policy decision to a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ection 4 notification. So, this contention has no merit. (143) It was also urged before us that the Government had taken a decision vide a Circular D.O. No.F9/l/86-L B/LA/6482 dated August 19, 1986 that built up area would not be acquired unless there is a vacant land of hectare or above available in the built-up area then such land could be acquired on priority basis. (144) This circular was no doubt acted upon by one of us (P.K.Bahri,J) incase of Birla Cotton Spinning Weaving Mills Lid. Vs. Union of India, quashing the acquisition proceedings but this judgment was not approved by the Division Bench in case of Sh.Bhagwan Vs. Union of India 1991 (2) Delhi Lawyer 59 where it was discovered as a fact that the circular was not acted upon by the authorities. In detailed discussion, it was held I hat question of promissory estop el does not apply and such inter-department instructions could always be withdrawn by the authorities and no vested right had accrued to the persons whose land was sought to be acquired on the basis of such a circular. (145) We are of the view that reasoning given by the Division Bench in this judgment is quite sound and does not call for any interf ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is not based on any reasons particularly when the land is sought to be acquired for planned development of Delhi and with regard to the same notification issued under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6, there are other land owners who have also filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition proceedings in respect of whom no such order has been made under Section 48 of the Act. (148) It is contended before us that an order under Section 48 of the Act could come into play only when the same is published in the official gazette in the same manner in which notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 had been published in view of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. So, it is urged that as no such order has been published in the official gazette even if it is inferred that some order has been made withdrawing from acquisition in respect of the land in question even then the same is of no effect. (149) Section 48 of the Act lays down that Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. The original record in which the Minister concerned had made the order was produced before us w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt from the Delhi Development Authority was still awaited and a reminder was required to be issued. On May 19, 1995, the noting shows that response has been received from the Delhi Development Authority and the Delhi Development Authority appears to be showing no interest in acquisition of this particular land and it was indicated that reference has been made in the representation that land belonging to Hamdard Dawakhana, which was subject-matter of the same notification, had been already released. However, the noting of the Director shows that he opined that perhaps the reply of the Delhi Development Authority is not clear as it has not given any categorical comments whether the land was required or not required for planned development of Delhi. Mr.J.P.Singh has then made a noting on the file mentioning that previous note be considered and then he had added with hand that the Hon'ble Minister has the power to release the land under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Then the matter was sent to the Private Secretary of the Minister who made the following noting which was approved by the Minister on July 7, 1995 UAEM has observed that even though the Delhi Development Auth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d immediately. It would mean that the Minister had not herself passed the order for releasing the land from acquisition. If the Minister wanted to pass such order the language oi the aforesaid noting would have been different and it appears that Minister was perhaps taking the prima facie view that land should be released from acquisition and left the decision to be made in this respect with the Govt. of.NCT Delhi. It is true that the noting in the File further shows that when the draft Order was prepared the same was checked by the officers and corrections were also made before it was issued and on August 4, 1995 the noting of the Additional Secretary, Shri M.P.Singh shows that objections were raised by an officer of the Delhi Development Authority with regard to withdrawing from acquisition oi the land in question and thus, it was noticed that a mistake has been made in sending the communication to the petitioner when in fact no specific order had been made in the file by the Minister directing the release of the land. So, the communication sent to the petitioner was withdrawn. It appears that there has taken place some confusion in construing the order made in the file by the Mi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te authority to issue an order for withdrawing from the acquisition proceedings. If there has been no such power conferred under Section 48 of the Act, then the question would have arisen that if notification is to be cancelled, should the same be cancelled only in the manner it was published in view of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. (157) Section 48 by itself does not require publication of such an order in the Official Gazette. As a matter of fact, there is no repugnancy between the provisions of Section 48 of the Act as read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The purpose of issuance of publication of notifications and declarations under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act in Official Gazette are that public at large should become aware of the factum that the land so notified is to be acquired for public purpose so that people at large should not suffer any monetary loss or any other inconveniences in entering into any deals in respect of such land, subject matter of compulsory acquisition. As an analogy of the purpose enshrined in notification issued under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6 for their publication in Official Gazette is also, in our view, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s Section 6(2) of the Bengal Act and that power had to be exercised within the limits circumscribed by Section 6(2) and for the purpose for which it was conferred and thus , was held that for interpreting the Section 6(2) of the Bengal Act, provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked. However, in the present case, as already discussed above, keeping in view the object for which notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 are issued and the object for which an order under Section 48 is made, we reach the conclusion that an order under Section 48, which amounts to withdrawal from the acquisition proceedings, must be in the same manner published in Official Gazette as notifications under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 are published in the Official Ga/.ette. (162) A Division Bench of this Court in case of Union of India Vs. Lachmi Narain, 1972 (J) I.L.R. (Delhi) 475 rightly held that Section 21 gives power to the Central Government to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notification, etc. provided the power to do so does not run counter to the policy of the legislature or affect any change in its essential features. There is no su ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... atya Vs. Stale of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1984 Bombay 77. We Find that this judgment does not deal with the question which we have to decide in the present case. (168) When we find no repugnancy between the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and provisions of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act and also keeping in view the provisions of Sections 4 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the object for which they arc published, we have come to the conclusion that if any withdrawal from land acquisition proceedings is to lake place by taking resort to Section 48 of the Act, then such an order must be published in the Official Gazette in order to be valid in the same manner as notifications under Sections 4 and 6 are required to be published in the Official Gazette. (169) We need not express any view on the submission made by learned counsel for Union of India that every order of the authorities must be leased on reasonableness as unchannelled and arbitrary discretion is patently violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution which principles have been enunciated by the Supreme Court in large number of judgments namely P.N.Kaushal V's. Union of India Maneka G ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion because the appeal was brought against Kirpa Ram who died and his legal representatives, one of whom was Meer Singh, were brought on record. With the death of one of the said legal representatives i.e. Meer Singh, the appeal cannot be considered abated as the estate is well represented by other legal representatives of Kirpa Ram-respondent. (176) Another plea raised in the writ petition was that the constructions have been raised in the land. So, the said constructions should be regularised. We have already dealt with this point, which arises in other writ petitions as well. (177) In view of the reasons already given with regard to interpretation of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, the judgments given in the writ petitions Nos.621/74, 721/74 and 1347/73 dated December 5, 1977, of the Single Judge are liable to he set (178) LPAS are allowed and judgments of the Single Judge in all these mailers are set aside and we hold that the acquisition proceedings are not liable to quashed on any of the grounds raised in writ petitions. (179) C.W.NO.1280/80 Besides raising common points for challenging the acquisition proceedings which we have dealt with in earlier part of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arned counsel for the Central Government has placed on record the copies of declaration pertaining to the land of the petitioner and we find that these two khasra numbers stand duty notified in the declaration issued under Section 6 and admittedly they were also mentioned in Section 4 notification. No other point arises for consideration in this writ petition. So, the acquisition proceedings are not liable 16 be quashed. (181) C.W.I 753/80 C.M.8269/93 Most of the points raised in this writ petition arc common with the main points already discussed by us. However, Mr.G.L.Sanghi, Senior Advocate, who appeared for the applicant in C.M .8269/93 has urged that the land in question has been developed into a sports complex and modern amenities have been provided and it would be national waste in allowing such constructions to be demolished. (182) It is urged that the applicant has acquired this land in 1969 before coming into force of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 and thus, there was no bar in the transferee raising constructions. However, it is admitted fact that all these constructions have been raised after issuance of the notification under Section 4 of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on 6 after lapse of 15 years. So, on the ground of delay and laches, the challenge to the validity of Section 6 declaration has to be negatived, So, in this writ petition also, the acquisition proceedings are not liable to be quashed. (185) Civil Writ Petition No.6/81 In this case, the additional point urged before us was that the land, subject matter of this writ petition, was sought to be acquired for the purpose of Indian Spinal Injuries Centre and, in fact, that Centre has already come into existence in the adjacent land and the land of the petitioner is no longer required for the purposes of the said Centre. An affidavit has been filed by Ram Sarup Kathuria dated July 1995 along with the photographs of the said Centre. (186) However, it has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that the public purpose for which the land in question has been sought to be acquired, still subsists and there has not taken place any change in the public purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired. Mere fact that main building of the Centre has come into existence in the adjacent land cannot lead us to hold that the public purpose for which the land of the petitioner is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ged that the public purpose of planned development of Delhi has not ceased to exist. We are of the opinion that mere fact that the authorities, at the present, are not considering setting up any Botanical Garden in the area in question would not mean that the public purpose i.e. planned development of Delhi for which the land of the petitioners is sought to be acquired no longer subsists. So, the acquisition proceedings are not liable to be quashed in these cases as well. (193) Civil Writ Petition No-783/81 In this Petition, the notification under Section 4 is dated 13th November 1959 and declaration under Section 6 is dated 2nd January 1969. The award had been given on 17th January 1983. The land use prescribed in the Master Plan is zonal park and in the revised plan is District Park. In the original notification dated 13th November 1959, it Is mentioned that it would not cover the evacuee land. The petitioner, had purchased this property from its previous owner on 6th August 1962. However, on the date of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, this land was evacuee property and vested in the Custodian and stood excluded from the said notification. The time of the previ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... were taken in respect of those notifications. A Section 4 notification was then issued in 1959 which according to the petitioners did not include the land of the petitioners. The notifications which had been issued under Section 4 in 1959 only had given the blocks which have been delineated on the map attached with the notification. (200) The learned counsel for the petitioner has pinpointed the land of the petitioners from the map furnished by him which makes it clear that this land of the petitioners is not covered by any of the blocks mentioned in the maps published along with Section 4 notification. (201) Hence, we come to the conclusion that the notification in question issued under Section 4 of the Act did not pertain to the land of the petitioners and thus sub-sequent declaration issued under Section 6 and the award made on the basis of the said declaration are null and void and thus these writ petitions are liable to be allowed and the acquisition proceedings of the said land of the petitioners are liable to be quashed. (202) C.W.P.NOS.377/83,2256/83 1543/82 In the first two cases, the notification under Section 4 had been issued on 13th November 1959 while in C. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tition Filed in Court for challenging the such arbitrary release of land in favor of Hamdard Dawakhana. So, this Court cannot quash the said release of the land in favor of Hamdard Dawakhana as no such prayer has been made in the writ petition and Hamdard Dawakhana has not been made one of the respondents in this case. (206) The question which arises for decision is whether an illegal release of a land in favor of a particular party could furnish any good ground for getting released any land of another party which is similarly situated. An illegality, in our view, committed by the authorities could not be the basis for granting a relief to another parly on the same lines, as granted to the other party, by the authorities by illegal exercise of discretion. It is quite evident that the public purpose i.e. planned development of Delhi has not ceased to exist, so it cannot be held that because the land has been released in favor of Hamdard Dawakhana which is adjacent to the land of the petitioner and as the land of the petitioner is also from the same Hamdard Dawakhana's ownership, so the Court should quash the notification and release the land of the petitioner. (207) 'R ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 are to be revoked or cancelled or the land is still to be acquired for the public purpose indicated in the notification and the declaration or not. So, nothing turns on this plea of the petitioner that petitioners' land is liable to be released from acquisition proceedings. (212) Civil Writ Petition No. 1967/87 It appears that the notification under Section 4 was issued on 14th July 1980 whereas the petitioner had purchased this land in October 1979 after obtaining some no objection under Sections 3 and 4 of the Delhi Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act 1972. It is not understood how such a No Objection Certificate would affect the notifications issued subsequently under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6 afterwards for the same public purpose of planned development of Delhi. (213) We have already come to the conclusion that' this planned development of Delhi is a continuous process and it has not been extinguished by lapse of so many years. Hence, it cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed in this case as well. (214) Civil Writ Petition No. 1136/82 In this writ petition and in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... case of Gandhi Grah Nirman Samili (supra), the Supreme Court has already held that acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed on the sole ground that the land owners have raised illegal constructions on the kind, subject matter of acquisition, after issuance of Section 4 notification. So, in the present proceedings, we are of the view that acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed on such a plea. The petitioners are at liberty to take appropriate steps, as indicated above, for getting proper relief from the Government at the first instance and challenge the decision of the Government, if any, if the same is adverse and illegal by filing any proceedings in Court of law as they may feel advised. (218) C.W.P. N08.783/81, 1399/82, 88/83, 377/83, 1543/82 and 2256/83 These writ petitions arc allowed and rule is made absolute and acquisition proceedings arc quashed. Parties arc left to bear their own costs. (220) We have already come to the conclusion that the land acquisition proceedings are not liable to he quashed in respect of the land, subject matter of these petitions. However, in view of the judgment given by the Supreme Court in case of Ram Chand (supra), where the award has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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