9911796707
TMI Blog2016 (7) TMI 714X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pondent under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 (hereinafter called the TNVAT Act) and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the CST Act), has filed this writ petition challenging the assessment order as well as the consequential orders passed under the provisions of the CST Act for the assessment year 2014-15. 3. The short ground, on which, the impugned orders have been challenged is by contending that Form I declarations produced by the petitioner were refused to be accepted by the respondent and that the respondent has proposed to revise the order of assessment solely on the ground that the declarations have been submitted belatedly, as they were not submitted along with returns. 4. In the impugne ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction 8(4) is sufficient cause which appeals to the mind of the authority concerned, and which enables it to allow further time without bothering about any onus on the assessee. The proviso to Rule 12(7), however, is a study in contrast. The power to allow further time under this rule is severely circumscribed by the language of its proviso. This proviso is more or less fashioned after Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Under the requirement laid down by the rule-making authority, the burden is on the assesse to make out sufficient cause by explaining why he did not file, and what prevented him from filing, the C forms before the completion of the assessment. What is more, it is for the assessing authority to be satisfied about the existence ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ovisos to Section 8(4). In this statutory format, with Parliament clearly expressing its mind on the subject, the Central Government must be held to possess no authority whatever to make any rule as respects the power to allow further time, let alone prescribe the conditions subject to which any such power could be exercised. In this sense, the proviso to Rule 12(7) must be held to be ultra vires the rule-making power, to the extent that it is inconsistent with, or lays down tests or standards different from, the proviso to Section 8(4). It is quite clear that the proviso to Rule 12(7) is both superfluous and badly drafted. The indifferent drafting is all the more regrettable when the remember the legislative history which brought into the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on the excuse that there is not express provision either in the statute or in the statutory rules for reopening the assessment. When the power is there and the facts are there demanding its exercise, the implementation must be done as a matter of course, on the doctrine of implied or ancillary powers. Where there is a power, and where there is a will, there will be a way. It is, however, unnecessary to pursue the line of discussion further, because the particular problem we are concerned with in the two cases before us is quite different. What we are asked to consider, and what we have been engaged in discussing so far, is whether an appellate authority has the same power as the assessing authority to allow further time for accepting C form ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
