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TMI Blog1962 (3) TMI 103X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... consignments however did not reach Jagadhari. The appellant made inquiries and when no delivery was made he made a claim on the railway on November 30, 1947, for the price of the goods not delivered. Later, on January 22, 1948, the appellant gave notice to the railway under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure in which it was said that the goods booked under the two railway receipts had not been delivered in spite of repeated reminders and demands from the officials concerned. It was further said that the value of the goods booked was ₹ 24,189/4/- and that the railway was liable for this loss which was due to the negligence of the railway. It was further stated that the cause of action arose on August 21 and 30, 1947 and on subsequent dates when the appellant met with refusal. It was finally said that if the amount was not paid a suit would be brought against the railway. It seems however that in spite this notice correspondence went on between the appellant and the railway and on December 1, 1948, the railway informed the appellant that the two consignments were still lying at Gujranwala and that their despatch had been withheld by the North Western Railway due to restrictio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... goods ought to have been delivered at the most within five or six months of the booking and therefore the suit was barred by limitation as it was brought in December 1949, the period of limitation being only one year. The High Court therefore allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit. It however ordered the parties to bear their costs. As the case involved a substantial question of law the High Court granted a certificate to the appellant; and that is how the matter has come up before us. Article 31 reads as follows ____________________________________________________________ Description of suit Period of imitation Time from which period beings to run x x x x x x x x x 31-Against a carrier One year When the goods for compensation for ought to be delivered. non-delivery of, or delay in delivering goods. Its interpretation has been the subject of a number of decisions by various High Courts in India and the question that has been considered in these decisions is as to the time from which the period begins to run. Under the Article, the time begi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ee what these words in Art. 31 mean on a plain grammatical construction. It would be noticed that Art. 31 as it now stands after the Limitation Act of 1877 and 1909, governs two class of cases, namely, (i) where there has been no delivery of goods and (ii) where there has been delay in delivering goods. In both class of cases the time begins to run from the date when the goods ought to be delivered. These words therefore in column three of the Article must have a meaning which will apply equally to the two situations envisaged in column one. Whether there has been nondelivery or there has been delay in delivery, in either case limitation would run from the date when the goods ought to be delivered. Now it is not in dispute that if there is a term in a contract of carriage fixing when the goods have to be delivered that would be the time when the goods ought to be delivered within the meaning of the words used in the third column of Art. 31. The difficulty however arises in that class of cases where there is no term in the contract of carriage, whether express or im. plied, from which the date on which the goods have to be delivered, can be inferred. It is in these cases that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... usal to accept . Again in Art. 131 which provides for a suit to establish a periodically recurring right, the limitation begins to run when the plaintiff is first refused the enjoyment of the righe . Therefore, if the legislature intended that in case of non-delivery, the limitation would start on the final refusal of the carrier to deliver, such a case would have been provided for by a separate article and we would have found appropriate words in the third column thereof. The very fact that Art. 31 deals with both cases of non-delivery of goods and delay in delivering the goods shows that in either case the starting point of limitation is after reasonable time has elapsed for the carriage of goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination. The fact that what is reasonable time must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the further fact that the carrier may have to show eventually what is the- reasonable time for carriage of goods would .in our opinion make no difference to the interpretation of the words used in the third column of Art. 31. Nor do we think that their could be generally speaking any question of estoppel in the matter of the starting point of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tation, when that correspondence only showed that the railway was trying to trace the goods. The period that might be taken in tracing the goods can have no relevance in determining the reasonable time that is required for the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination. In Bengal and North Western Railway Company v. Maharajadhiraj Ramhwar Singh Bahadur A.I.R. (1951) Cal. 462 it was held that the defendants (i.e. Railway) by a deliberate process of ignoring the plantiff s repeated requests for attention to his claim misled him into delaying his suit and it is not open to them (1) (1933) I.L R. 12 Pat. 67, 77. now to contend that the suit has been brought too late. This case seems to be based on estoppel. But here again we find it difficult to understand how the starting point of limitation under.Art. 31 could be changed because the railway ignored the plaintiff s requests for attention to his claim. In Jai Narain v. The Governor-General of India (1) it was held that the time when the goods ought to be delivered within the meaning of Art. 31 is not the time when they should have been delivered in the normal course, it least in a case where t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... if there is anything in the correspondence which has a bearing on the question of reasonable time and the railway wants to go back on that, to that extent the railway may be estopped from denying that. But the correspondence can only be taken into account to determine what would be the reasonable time and not to show that because of the subsequent conduct of the railway the reasonable time got extended by the time taken by the railway in tracing the goods. Where however the correspondence provides material from which reasonable time in a particular case may be found out the .correspondence would be relevant to that extent. For example, take a case where the correspondence ,shows that a certain bridge between the place of despatch and the place of destination has been destroyed on account of floods and that is the reason why the goods have not reached the place of destination. In such a case the correspondence may well be taken into account to find out the reasonable time for the carriage of the goods in the circumstances. This will show that reasonable time will depend upon the facts of each case and that in the absence of any special circumstances the reasonable time would pra ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the date on which they were sent, namely, August 5, 1947. This is also home out by the fact that the appellant gave notice on January 22, 1948 i.e. about 5-1/2 months after the goods had been consigned. In the circumstances the suit which was brought in December 1949 would be clearly barred by time, for we cannot take the reasonable time within which the goods ought to have been delivered in the circumstances of this case beyond January 22, 1948, when the notice under s. 80 was given. As to the correspondence between the parties it in enough to say that there is nothing in the correspondence which has any bearing on the reasonable time taken for the carriage of goods from Gujranwala to Jagadhari. It is true that on December 1, 1948, the appellant was informed by the Railway that the goods were still lying in Gujranwala because of the restrictions imposed by the Pakistan Government and he was asked to get the necessary permits from that Government ; but that in our opinion has nothing to do with the question of reasonable time to be taken for the carriage of goods from Gujran wala to Jagadhari. In the circumstances, the High Court was right in holding that the suit was barred by lim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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