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TMI Blog2005 (1) TMI 711X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... overlooked that from 1987 till this day, the State Government has not implemented the impugned Act and one of the reasons for non-implementation appears to us that the State Government was unable to provide the infrastructure including appointment of new Judges as per the recommendation of the High Court. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances which are existing in Bombay, in our opinion, it would not be in the interest of administration of justice as also in the interest of litigants or the institution to rush through in such a haste and implement the impugned Act by impugned notification dated 20th August, 1991 from 1st May, 1992. It is open to the State Government to apply to this Court seeking permission for implementation of the said Notification placing on record necessary material to show that there is adequacy of infrastructure and the requirements as to number of judges and court rooms etc. are satisfied. In this regard a report from the High Court is also required to be called as and when the State Government applies to this Court seeking permission for implementation of the said notification dated 20th August, 1991. As indicated in paragraph 18 of this judgment, it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not be implemented without further orders from this Court in the light of what is stated. In the result, Civil Appeal is dismissed subject to above observations as to the implementation of the impugned notification. Transfer Cases are dismissed. Another Civil Appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh is set aside and the writ petitions stand dismissed. X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sdiction to deal with the cases and that there was no legislative competence for passing such Act by the legislature of State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition No. 738 of 1992 was filed, as already indicated above, challenging the constitutional validity of the 1987 Act as well as the afore- mentioned notification of 20.8.1991 bringing the 1987 Act into force with effect from 1.5.1992. On 15.4.1992, rule was issued and permission was given for intervention among others to the Bombay Bar Association, Bombay Incorporated Law Society, the Indian Merchants' Chamber and the Bombay City Civil and Sessions Court Bar Association. After hearing the arguments at considerable length and dealing with the rival contentions, the Division Bench of the High Court passed the impugned judgment on 29.4.1992 in terms already mentioned in the beginning of this judgment. Civil Appeal Nos. 2592 of 1992 and 2530 of 1992 4. These two appeals are filed by Bombay City Civil and Sessions Court Bar Association and State of Maharashtra respectively aggrieved by the second part of the judgment dated 29.4.1992 passed in Writ Petition No. 738 of 1992, i.e., deferring the implementation of the Notification dated ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... I and Entry 46 of List III and the 1986 Act is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Further that a right of appeal is a substantial right and one appeal on facts and law is a necessary ingredient of the system of justice. Moreover, abolition of Letters Patent Appeals denies the litigants, on the original side of the High Court, the benefit of appeals statutorily provided for under various Central statues such as Contempt of Courts Act, the Companies Act, the Arbitration Act, etc. Civil Appeal Nos. 1222-24/85 7. These appeals are filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh questioning the validity and correctness of the impugned judgment dated 27.8.1984 passed by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. 8. A company petition No. 5/83 was filed by respondent Nos. 4-17 under Sections 397-398 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Company Judge substantially dismissed the said Company Petition. However, the learned Judge granted relief under Section 398(1)(b) by directing proportionate representation on the Board of Directors. Three Company Appeal Nos. 4, 5 and 7 of 1983 were filed, aggrieved by the order made in the company petition. In view of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ivil Court it was an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of statutory power vested in the Government to bring into operation the 1987 Act and hence the Government Notification dated 20.8.1991 bringing into operation the 1987 Act was illegal. He also added that the said Notification was issued by the Government under pressure for collateral and extraneous reasons only to appease a section of agitating lawyers who went on hunger strike etc. Elaborating his submission on point no. 1, he submitted that it is only the Parliament which has the exclusive legislative competence under Entry 78 of List I to make a law relating to "the constitution and organization of the High Courts". The State Legislature has, however, the concurrent legislative powers to legislate in respect of the constitution and organization of all courts excepting the Supreme Court and the High Courts as per Entry 11-A of List III; prior to 3.1.1977, the State had exclusive legislative competence to constitute and organize courts other than the Supreme Court and the High Courts under Entry 3 of List II which was amended to transfer it to Entry 11-A in List III by the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976. Acco ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ve legislative competence to make law relating to the constitution and organization of all courts except the Federal Court (under Entry 2 of List II of the Provincial List). Consequently, the Provincial Legislature had the legislative competence to constitute a court including a High Court and to legislate in respect of its jurisdiction. This being the position, this Court in Narothamdas Jethabhai (supra) upheld the validity of the Act as validly made under Entry 1 List II of the Govt. of India Act, 1935. He also drew our attention to certain passages in the case of Narothamdas Jethabhai relating to word "constitution" of a court. He stated that the words "constitution of court" as explained in Narothamdas Jethabhai was followed in a subsequent judgment of this Court in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee representing undertrial prisoners etc. vs. Union of India and others . Thus, according to him, Parliament alone could make law abolishing the general original civil jurisdiction of an existing High Court as it directly and substantially related to its constitution which is a subject falling in exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament under Entry 78 of List I of the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 7; 50,000/-. According to him the City Civil Court has been unable to cope with the load of its existing criminal jurisdiction. The High Court also specifically stated that 110 Judges were required for City Civil Court in addition to necessary infrastructure if the Act is to be brought into force. In the absence of infrastructure and the required number of Judges, Civil Court can not cope with the workload and it cannot be functional. submitted that because of the agitation by a section of lawyers, the Notification dated 20.8.1991 was issued out of pressure and other considerations which according to him cannot be sustained. If it is allowed to stand, it will lead to difficulty and anomalous situation resulting in greater hardship to the litigants and even administration of justice will suffer. Instead of a speedy disposal, the cases may be pending considerably for a long time in City Civil Court. 15. Mr. K.K. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Bombay City Civil & Sessions Court Bar Association, made submissions supporting the impugned judgment upholding the constitutional validity of 1987 Act. According to him, Entry 77 in List I deals with the constitution, organizat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt having regard to Articles 2, 3 and 4 and other relevant Articles of the Constitution. He added that the expression "administration of justice' has a wide meaning and includes administration of civil as well as criminal justice and is complete and self-contained Entry. The words `administration of justice' are of widest amplitude and are sufficient to confer upon the State Legislature the right to regulate and provide for entire machinery connected with the administration of justice in the State. The State Legislature being an appropriate body to legislate in respect of the administration of justice and to invest all courts within the State including the High Court with general jurisdiction and powers in all matters civil and criminal it must follow that it can invest the High Court with such general jurisdiction and powers including territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and also to take away such jurisdiction and powers from the High Court. Conferring unlimited jurisdiction on civil court or taking away the same from the High Court does not amount to dealing with the constitution and organization of the High Court. Under Entry 11-A List III, State Legislature was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n did not confer any power on the State Legislature to legislate or tinker with their jurisdiction; therefore, law passed by the State Legislature concerning the jurisdiction of the High Courts having wider ramifications affecting or taking away other jurisdictions already vested in the High Courts would be ultra vires of the State Legislature; the powers in this regard lie only with the Parliament; the expression 'administration of justice' has to be so construed so as to exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts from its purview. 20. Dr. N.M. Ghatate, learned senior counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh [Appellant in C.A. No. 1222-1224/85] made additional submissions supporting the constitutional validity of the Adhiniyam. He contended that the view taken by the Bombay High Court in upholding the constitutional validity of the 1987 Act is correct. Provisions of the 1986 Act being similar to the Adhiniyam, constitutional validity of the Adhiniyam may be upheld and the Full Bench judgment of the High Court may be reversed. 21. We have carefully considered the rival contentions advanced on behalf of the parties and Additional Solicitor General. 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing testamentary, intestate or matrimonial Jurisdiction, or (b) by the High Court for the relief of insolvent debtors, or (c) by the High Court under any special law other than the Letters Patent; or (d) by the Small Cause Court; Provided that the State Government may, from time to time, after consultation with the High Court, by a like notification extend the jurisdiction of the City Court to any suits or proceedings which are cognizable by the High Court as a court having testamentary or intestate jurisdiction or for the relief of insolvent debtors. 4. [Power of State Government to enhance jurisdiction of city court] deleted by Mah. 46 of 1977, S.3] xxx xxx xxx xxx 12. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, the High Court shall not have jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings cognizable by the City Court; Provided that the High Court may, for any special reason, and at any stage remove for trial by itself any suit or proceeding from the City Court." 25. By Section 3 of Letters Patent (Amendment) Act, 1948, clause 12 of the Letters Patent was amended. The amended portion reads:- ".......the High Court shall not have such original jurisdiction ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... empowered to issue a notification for implementation of the said Act. The High Court of Bombay dismissed the writ petition No. 738/92 filed by the present appellant in C.A. No. 2452/92 having regard to various aspects and in particular relying on the decision of this Court in Narothamdas (supra). It may be noted that the validity of 1948 Act was upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay as early as in 1949. Notification issued enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the city civil court from ₹ 10,000/- to ₹ 25,000/- was upheld by this Court reversing the judgment of Bombay High Court in Narothamhas. Further, by Act No. XLIV of 1977, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the city civil court was enhanced from ₹ 25,000/- to ₹ 50,000/-, the validity of which was not challenged. Thus, from time to time, the pecuniary jurisdiction of city civil court was enhanced. Such enhancement of jurisdiction was either challenged unsuccessfully or not challenged. In particular, it may be kept in mind that the very contention which is sought to be advanced now had been advanced before this Court in Narothamdas which was rejected. On earlier occasions enhancement of pe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ; As a result of the same, the City Civil Court could exercise unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Although 1987 Act was passed in 1987, the State Government did not issue notification to enforce it till August 20, 1991 appointing the 1st May, 1992 to be the date on which the provisions of the 1987 Act shall come into force. By virtue of the said notification, all suits and other proceedings of civil nature arising within the Greater Bombay subject to exceptions contained in Section 3 were required to be filed in the City Civil Court at Bombay. This resulted in the position that suits and other civil proceedings of civil nature filed in the High Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent would not be received and tried on the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. In the Transferred Cases (C) 8-11/89, constitutional validity of 1986 Act i.e. "Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986 was challenged as being beyond the competence of the State Legislature and also violative of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons to this Act, it is clearly stat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ight; merely because appeal is not provided, an enactment otherwise having legislative competence cannot be rendered invalid; right of appeal is a statutory right which may or may not be provided by a statute. In other words, it is not a constitutional right. 33. Para 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of 1987 Act reads:- "4. After having sufficient experience of the working of the various Courts in the State and having regard to the increase in the value of property, and in the trading and commercial activities, in all urban areas, Government considers that the administration of justice in Greater Bombay as well as in the mofussil should now follow a uniform pattern. There appears no reason why every litigant in Greater Bombay, whose suit or other proceeding is above a certain pecuniary limit, should be made to go to the High Court in the first instance. The High Court, as in most other States in India, should ordinarily be a Court of Appeal, and the time of its highly paid and specialized Judges should not be consumed in hearing original cases, some of which may be of a small value compared with the enormous increase in the value of property or may be of an unimpor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to officers and servants of High Courts; persons entitled to practice before the High Courts. 79. Extension of the jurisdiction of a High Court to, and exclusion of the jurisdiction of a High Court from, any union territory." "95. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List; admiralty jurisdiction." List II State List "3. Administration of justice, Constitution and organization of all courts, except the Supreme Court and High Courts" (prior to 3.1.1977.) "65. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list." List III (Concurrent List) "11A. Administration of justice; constitution and organization of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts." "13. Civil Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of this Constitution, limitation and arbitration." "46. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List." 37. As is clear from the Entries extracted a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ncurrent List. One of the matters in the Concurrent List is the Civil Procedure Code. The combined reading of Entry 11A, Entry 13 and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List makes the position clear that the 1987 Act is not beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature when it deals with pecuniary jurisdiction of civil courts. 40. From careful reading of Entries 77 and 78 of the Union List it is clear that Entry 77 not only deals with the 'constitution' and 'organisation' but also with 'jurisdiction' and powers' in respect of Supreme Court falling within the exclusive domain of the Parliament. Entry 11A in the Concurrent List deals with the 'administration of justice' in all the courts and the `constitution and organization' of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Thus, it is clear that the Parliament is the sole repository of powers as far as the 'constitution', 'organisation', 'jurisdiction' and 'powers' of the Supreme Court is concerned. Conscious omissions of the words 'jurisdiction' and 'powers' in Entry 78, looking to the said words included in Entry 77, it is cl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s that under Entry 11A State Legislature has no power to constitute and organize Supreme Court and High Courts. It is an accepted principle of construction of a constitution that everything necessary for the exercise of powers is included in the grant of power. The State Legislature being an appropriate body to legislate in respect of 'administration of justice' and to invest all courts within the State including the High Court with general jurisdiction and powers in all matters, civil and criminal, it must follow that it can invest the High Court with such general jurisdiction and powers including the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and also to take away such jurisdiction and powers from the High Court except those, which are specifically conferred under the Constitution on the High Courts. It is not possible to say that investing the city civil court with unlimited jurisdiction taking away the same from the High Court amounts to dealing with 'constitution' and 'organisation' of the High Court. Under Entry 11A of List III the State Legislature is empowered to constitute and organize city civil court and while constituting such court the State Legisla ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... II read: " .the administration of justice; constitution and organization of all courts except the Federal Court .". Entry 2 of List II read: "Jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List .". The contention urged before this Court was that the words "administration of justice and constitution and organization of courts" occurring in Entry 1 of the Provincial List should be read as exclusive of any matter relating to jurisdiction of courts. Rejecting the arguments, the Court observed: - "It is to be noted that the right to set up courts and to provide for the whole machinery of administration of justice has been given exclusively to the Provincial Legislature. Under Section 101 of the North America Act, the Parliament of Canada has a reserve of power to create additional courts for better administration of the laws of Canada but the Indian Constitution Act of 1935 does not give any such power to the Central Legislature. Courts are to be established by the Provincial Legislature alone. The word 'court' certainly means a place where justice is judicially administered. The app ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... il cases on a "cause of action" giving rise to a civil liability, and in criminal cases on the provisions made in the Code of Criminal Procedure as to the venue of the trial and other relevant matters. Fazal Ali, J. observed: - "It seems to me that the Government of India Act, 1935, did not contemplate any drastic change in the existing system of administration of justice, but what it contemplated was that that system should continue subject to future legislation by the proper Legislature, Central or Provincial, barring the jurisdiction of courts or conferring jurisdiction or power on special courts with regard to the matters included in the appropriate Legislative Lists, should there be any occasion for such special legislation." He further observed: "in my opinion, there is nothing in the Act of 1935 to show that there was any intention on the part of its framers to affect the machinery so drastically as to confine it to the administration of a mere partial or truncated kind of justice relating only to matters specified in List II." 47. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, attempts to distinguish this judgment by pointing out that whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e speech made by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on the floor of the Constituent Assembly, the learned Single Judge summarized the resultant legal position thus, in our opinion correctly, in Paragraph 24: "24. In my opinion the present position may be summarized as follows:- (1) The 'constitution and organization, jurisdiction and powers' of the Supreme Court, are Union subjects, (2) While 'jurisdiction and powers' of the Supreme Court have been expressly included in Entry 77 of List I, these words have been deliberately left out in Entry 78 of the same List, in respect of the High Courts. This omission is not supplied by Entry 95 because that Entry only enables jurisdiction and powers to be given in respect of the matters enumerated in List I. To speak of 'jurisdiction and powers' of the High Courts in respect of 'constitution and organization' of the High Courts would be meanineless. (3) If nothing else was to be found relating to the subject, in any other part of the Constitution, then it might have been necessary to imply that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the concept of 'jurisdiction and powers' within t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... concerned, there can be no question that the State Legislature is competent to constitute such a Court and vest it with general jurisdiction, since that comes specifically and plainly within the scope of Entry No.3 or Entry No.3 read with Entry 65 in List II. The question is as to whether it can at the same time take away any part of the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court. (10) It has been argued that the setting up of the City Civil Court, with a specified jurisdiction, and the taking away of the same jurisdiction from the High Court, was nothing more or less than doing something which affected the 'constitution and organisation' of the High Court. This again depends on the answer to the question as to whether the words 'constitution and organization' necessarily include the concept of 'jurisdiction and powers' meaning thereby, general jurisdiction and powers relating to the administration of justice. So far as these words are used in Entry 78 of List I, the answer must clearly be in the negative. The constitution and organization of High Courts has been made a Central subject in this limited sense because: (a) It was necessary to have uniformit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ovinces had been functioning for several years and there was no consistency in their established practices, it was proposed to bring all the High Courts in the States under the jurisdiction of Parliament so that there was some uniformity in the organization of the different High Courts in India. As the judgment of the Calcutta High Court correctly points out, Entry 3 (prior to 3.1.1977) (or Entry 11A after 3.1.1977) read with Entry 65 of List II ("administration of justice") is a State subject and the jurisdiction and powers of all courts in the State, including the High Courts, in respect of administration of justice, which must include "general jurisdiction" is a State subject. 52. It is true that the Calcutta High Court noticed the curious result that followed from the Constitutional entries as were available at the material time. It noticed that while under Entry 78 of List I, Parliament was given power to set up the High Courts, but did not have power to invest them with general jurisdiction, but had power to invest them with special jurisdiction under Entry 95 of List I. The State Legislature would have the jurisdiction to invest the High Courts, set up b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to "constitution and organization of the High Court". 55. It is true that there are several provisions in Articles 216, 217, 221, 222, 223 and 224 wherein the President of India and the Government of India alone have been given powers, in the matters stated therein. This by itself does not militate against the view that we are inclined to take. 56. The observations in State of Maharashtra v. Kusum Charudutt Bharma Upadhye , (Para 7) were pressed in service in support. All that the Bombay High Court said is: "......under the Constitution, Parliament has by ordinary law the power to constitute and organize, that is, to create, new High Courts as also to enlarge or abridge the jurisdiction of all High Courts, including the High Courts which were in existence at the commencement of the Constitution". 57. These observations were made in connection with the questions before the Special Bench of the Bombay High Court, whether an appeal would lie under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent from the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in a petition filed on the Original Side or the Appellate Side of the High Court; and, whether ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nstead of challenging the view taken by the Delhi High Court before this Court. 59. The reference to Section 30 of the Andhra Act, 1953 or to the provisions of Section 49 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 is of no avail. The investment of power in such cases, where a High Court is set up in a reorganized State, is referable to Article 4 of the Constitution, which is an independent power not referable to Entry 78 of List I. 60. In O.N. Mohindroo v. The Bar Council of Delhi & Ors. after analyzing Entries 77, 78, and 95 of List I, Entry 65 of List II and Entry 46 of List III, this Court observed: "The scheme for conferring jurisdiction and powers on courts is (a) to avoid duplication of Courts. Federal and State Courts as in the Constitution of the United States, (b) to enable Parliament and the State Legislatures to confer jurisdiction on courts in respect of matters in their respective lists except in the case of the Supreme Court where the legislative authority to confer jurisdiction and powers is exclusively vested in Parliament. In the case of the Concurrent List both the legislatures can confer jurisdiction and powers on courts except of course the Supreme Court depen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tters in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935 but also in regard to matters in List I such as promissory notes in item 8 of List I. Rejecting the contention it was held that the impugned Act was a law with respect to a matter enumerated in List II and was not ultra vires as the power of the Provincial Legislature to make laws with respect to "administration of justice" and "constitution and organization of all courts" under item 1 of List II was wide enough to include the power to make laws with regard to the jurisdiction of courts established by the Provincial Legislature; that the object of item 53 of List I, item 2 of List II and item 15 of List III was to confer such powers on the Central and the Provincial Legislatures to make laws relating to the jurisdiction of courts with respect to the particular matters that are referred to in List I and II respectively and the Concurrent List, and that these provisions did not in any way curtail the power of the Provincial Legislature under item 1 of List II to make laws with regard to jurisdiction of courts and to confer jurisdiction on courts established by it to try all causes of a c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... about a change in the prevailing position obtaining under the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court." In the same judgment, this Court further observed thus: "A similar challenge as in the present dispute had also been raised before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Amarendra Nath Roy Chowdhary vs. Bikash Chandra Ghosh [AIR 1957 Cal. 535] and a learned Single Judge relying on the decision of Constitution Bench referred to above had held that the Act was intra vires the State Legislature. We are of the view that the decision of the Constitution Bench is a clear and binding precedent against the appellant's stand." (emphasis supplied) 62. Having observed thus, this Court approved the aforementioned judgment in Amarendra Nath Roy Chowdhary (supra). 63. This Court in Narothamdas and Indu Bhushan De (supra) clearly laid down that power of legislature to confer or take away general jurisdiction of all courts excepting the Supreme Court is a separate topic and forms part of the "administration of justice" and not part of `constitution' and `organisation' of High Courts. 64. In first round in Mulchand Kundanmal Jagtiani vs. Raman Hiralal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed on the ground that the subject was covered by Entry 78 of List I. In Indo- Mercantile Bank Ltd v s. Commissioner, Quilon Municipality , the Kerala High Court held that the State Legislature was fully competent to pass the Act by virtue of its powers under Articles 225, 246(3) read with Seventh Schedule List II Entry 3 of the Constitution. 66. A Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in Shivarudrappa Girimallappa Saboji & Anr. vs. Kapurchand Meghaji Marwadi & Ors. held that Sections 19 and 29(2)(c) of the Mysore Civil Court Act, 1964 were constitutionally valid as the same were within the competence of the State Legislature under Entry 3 of List II i.e. "Administration of Justice" observing thus:- "........If the core of Administration of justice is the exercise of judicial power which is also understood as the exercise of jurisdiction, any legislation on the exercise of such judicial power or jurisdiction is legislation on "administration of justice" and is therefore, what is authorized by the 3rd Entry of the said List. If Legislation on "administration of justice" in the High Court is as already explained also within the field of that Ent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the Supreme Court in respect of any statute. Therefore, the State legislature has the power to make law with respect to jurisdiction and powers of the High Court." 69. In Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. vs. Arabinda Bose & Anr. , Mukhkerjea J. in para 57 has observed that ".........Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute and very little attention is paid to it by English Courts. ......When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation." 70. In our view Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court was right in giving emphasis and meaning to semi colon in Entry 3 of the List after the words `administration of justice' in Rajinder Singh (supra). Semi colon after the words `administration of justice' in Entry 11-A, in our view, has significance in dealing with the topic whether `administration of justice' includes conferring general jurisdiction on High Court in addition to the subordinate courts within the State. 71. A Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in K.Kumarswamy Kumandan & Bros. vs. Premier Electric Co. has proceeded on simil ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tuting and organizing High Courts without conferring jurisdiction to deal with the matters on them does not serve any purpose, cannot be accepted. The Constitution itself has conferred jurisdiction on High Courts, for instance, under Articles 226 and 227. This apart, under various enactments both of Central and State, certain jurisdiction is conferred on High Courts. The High Courts have power and jurisdiction to deal with such matters as are conferred by the Constitution and other statutes. This power of "Administration of Justice" has been included in the Concurrent List after 3.1.1977 possibly to enable both Centre as well as States to confer jurisdiction on High Courts under various enactments passed by the Centre or the State to meet the needs of the respective States in relation to specific subjects. Thus, viewed from any angle, it is not possible to agree that the 1987 Act and 1986 Act are beyond the competence of the State Legislature. 74. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no merit in the contention that the State Legislature did not have competence to enact the two legislations, the constitutionality of which has been challenged before us. 75. Two ot ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in All India Judges Association vs. Union of India in which the Supreme Court has referred to the duty of the State to provide infrastructure which includes residential accommodation to the judicial officers in the subordinate judiciary. The said judgment refers to this aspect as duty cast upon the State Government to give suitable residential accommodation to the Judges." 79. Dealing with the contention that a writ could not be issued to the Government to bring or not to bring the law into force, relying on the decision in A.K. Roy vs. Union of India , the High Court noticed the facts in that case. That was a case in which one of the questions considered with regard to Central Government issuing a notification for bringing the provisions of Section 3 of the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 into force. This Court on the facts of that case observed, "The Parliament having left to the unfettered judgment of the Central Government the question as regards the time for bringing the provisions of the 44th Amendment into force, it is not for the Court to compel the Government to do that which according to the mandate of the Par ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... reasonable facilities and conveniences are now provided. We are also satisfied that the traders have been making one desperate attempt after another to avoid moving into the new markets and they have been successful in stalling the notification from becoming effective for quite a number of years." (Emphasis supplied) 81. It is clear from para 15 extracted above that if the facilities were not to be provided at New Bombay then the Court could have certainly interfered with and they would have passed appropriate orders as demanded by the situation. Further, in the same paragraph, it is clearly stated that in cases where some facilities and conveniences have been provided, but not some others, which are necessary, the court may, instead of quashing the notification, give appropriate time-bound directions for providing necessary facilities and conveniences. The High Court on facts in the present case found inadequacy in infrastructure and shortcomings in meeting the requirement as to court rooms and number of Judges to deal with the transfer of jurisdiction to city civil court. In this regard, the High Court in paras 44 and 45 has stated thus:- "44. Mr. Singhvi submitted ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1 from 1st May, 1992." 82. Looking to what is found by the High Court on facts in relation to infrastructure, and keeping in view the position of law as stated in the judgments of this Court aforementioned, we have no good reason to take a different view. In other words, in this regard we concur with the view expressed by the High Court in deferring the implementation of the impugned Notification to a future date and giving liberty to the State Government to apply. The High Court deferred the implementation of the impugned Notification till 2.10.1992. 83. This Court on 23.9.1992 passed the following order:- "An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State Government to show the infra- structural facilities for the new courts intended to deal with fresh cases. In certain essential aspects, facilities are in the form of proposals for action. The appointment of the requisite minimum number of judicial officers is also said to be under process. Admittedly, there are no extant facilities for the functional operation of even the sixteen new courts proposed by the State Government. The question of implementation of the amendments would arise only after these infra-struc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eeking permission for implementation of the said Notification placing on record necessary material to show that there is adequacy of infrastructure and the requirements as to number of judges and court rooms etc. are satisfied. In this regard a report from the High Court is also required to be called as and when the State Government applies to this Court seeking permission for implementation of the said notification dated 20th August, 1991. As indicated in paragraph 18 of this judgment, it is open to the State of Maharashtra to take necessary steps to amend Section 3 of the 1986 Act for providing an appeal. 86. Merely because an appeal is not provided in any statute, that by itself does not render a statute constitutionally invalid. It is well settled that the right of appeal is to be provided by a statute. In other words, right of appeal is statutory and not a constitutional right. This apart, if a statute does not provide an appeal in respect of certain matter, the party still will have remedy in approaching the High Court or this Court, as the case may be, in exercise of power of judicial review including under Article 136 of the Constitution. Moreover the difficulty in the cas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a fore-bidden sphere. Hence, the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee, whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its pith and substance or its true nature and character for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that." 90. In para 37 of the same judgment, it is stated that "Subjects must still overlap and where they do, the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and in what list is its true nature and character to be found. If these questions could not be asked, much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth, and many of the subjects entrusted to Provincial Legislation could never effectively be dealt with" 91. This Court yet in another judgment in Bharat Hydro Power Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Anr. , touching the same question, in para 18 has observed thus:- "18. It is likely to happen from time to time that enactment though purporting to deal with a subject in one list touches also on a subject in anot ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... consequential." 92. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Association of Natural Gas & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. has observed that "Entries in the List are themselves not powers of legislation, but fields of legislation. An Entry in one List cannot be interpreted so as to annul or obliterate another Entry or make another Entry meaningless and that in case of apparent conflict or any Entry overlapping the other, every attempt shall be made to harmonise the same". Para 15 of the judgment reads:- "15. Although Parliament cannot legislate on any of the entries in the State List, it may do so incidentally while essentially dealing with the subject coming within the purview of the entry in the Union List. Conversely, the State Legislature also while making legislation may incidentally trench upon the subject covered in the Union List. Such incidental encroachment in either event need not make the legislation ultra vires the Constitution. The doctrine of pith and substance is sometimes invoked to find out the nature and content of the legislation. However, when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two legislations, the Central legislation shall preva ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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