9911796707
TMI Blog2006 (11) TMI 674X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1996 Act shall lead to anomalous and absurd results, one may not stick to the definition but we do not think that such a case has been made out. Section 42 of the 1996 Act refers to applications and not to appeals. Reliance placed by the learned counsel on M/s. Guru Nanak Foundation v. M/s. Rattan Singh and Sons [(1981) 4 SCC 634] is not apposite. Therein, the court was dealing with a provision of Sub-section (4) of Section 31 of the 1940 Act and as the appointment was made by the High Court, it was held that an application for setting aside of the award in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 31 of the 1940 Act would lie before this Court. There exists a distinction between an appeal and an application. Whereas Section 31(4) of the 1940 Act or Section 42 of the 1996 Act provides for an application, Sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the 1996 Act provides for a statutory appeal. A forum of an appellate court must be determined with reference to the definition thereof contained in the 1996 Act. We, therefore, see no reason to differ with the High Court. The appeal is dismissed. - S.B. Sinha Dalveer Bhandari JJ. JUDGMENT: S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted. T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd filed an application under Section 14 of the 1996 Act seeking termination of his mandate on the ground that the earlier Arbitrator has already given his award. The learned Arbitrator held that he had no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. A purported appeal was filed thereagainst by Appellant under Section 37 of the 1996 Act before the High Court. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court opined that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal as in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the 1996 Act, the appeal lay before the District Court. A review application filed thereagainst was also dismissed. It is not in dispute that in terms of Section 16 of the 1996 Act, the Arbitrator could have determined his own jurisdiction. The learned Arbitrator, nominee of the Chief Justice of the High Court, opined that there could not be two awards in one proceeding. It was held: 19. Thus, on a careful consideration of the submission made on behalf of the parties and after going through the papers filed by them, I hold that I have no jurisdiction to continue with this proceedings for the reasons, mentioned above. The High Court in passing the impugned judgment ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lso the 1961 Act. In the 1940 Act, no reason was required to be stated in the award unless otherwise agreed upon. In the 1996 Act, reasons are required to be stated unless agreed to otherwise by the parties. The court s intervention is sought to be minimized under the provisions of the 1996 Act not only having regard to the concerns expressed in the international community as regards delay in the arbitration proceedings but also in view of the fact that an award under the 1996 is to be a reasoned one. In a large number of judgments, this Court has emphasized that the extent of power of the court s intervention in relation to a reasoned award and unreasoned one would be different. Whereas in relation to an unreasoned award, the court s jurisdiction to interfere with the award was absolutely limited, a greater latitude had been given in relation to a reasoned award. After the 1996 Act came into force, under Section 16 of the Act the party questioning the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator has an obligation to raise the said question before the Arbitrator. Such a question of jurisdiction could be raised if it is beyond the scope of his authority. Such a question was required to b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Courts. The rules framed by the Patna High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 225 of the Constitution of India also do not authorize it to entertain a suit as a court of original jurisdiction. Section 37 of the 1996 Act reads as under: 37. Appealable orders.\027(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely: (a) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9: (b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34. (2) An appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal (a) accepting the plea referred to in subsection (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or taken away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court. An appeal in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 37 is a statutory appeal. It may be true that Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... attention has been drawn by the learned counsel appearing for Appellant, in the instant case has no application. The said provision reads, thus: 42. Jurisdiction.Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. An order passed by a Chief Justice or his nominee under Sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the 1996 Act may be a judicial order, as has been held by a Seven-Judge Bench of this Court in SBP Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another [(2005) 8 SCC 618] but the same does not take away the effect of the appellate jurisdiction to be exercised by a court under Subsection (2) of Section 37 of the 1996 Act. Section 42 of the 1996 Act refers to applications and not to appeals. Reliance placed by the learned counsel on M/s. Guru Nanak Foundation v. M/s. Rattan Singh and Sons [(1981) 4 SCC 634] is not a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tisfied the court other than the one envisaged in Section 14(2) or Section 31(1) will be the court in which Award will have to be filed. That is the effect of the non-obstante clause in sub-section (4) of Section 31. Sub-section (4) thus invests exclusive jurisdiction in the court, to which an application has been made in any reference and which that court is competent to entertain as the court having jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of reference and the arbitration proceedings shall have to be made in that court and in no other court. Thus sub-section (4) not only confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court to which an application is made in any reference but simultaneously ousts the jurisdiction of any other court which may as well have jurisdiction in this behalf. To illustrate the point, if an Award was required to be filed under Section 14(2) read with Section 31(1) in any particular court as being the court in which a suit touching the subject-matter of Award would have been required to be filed, but if any application in the reference under the Act has been filed in some other court which was competent to entertai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lity Certificate under para 3 of the Regulation. We are afraid the defined meaning of the expression management cannot be assigned to the expression management occurring in Section 64 of the Act. In the present case, the context does not permit or requires to apply the defined meaning to the word management occurring in Section 64 of the Act. In M/s. Raval and Co. v. K.G. Ramachandran and Others [(1974) 1 SCC 424], whereupon reliance has been placed by the leaned counsel, the question arose as to whether the landlord can file an application for fixation of fair rent under Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. In that context, it was held: As the object of the statute was to protect those inhabitants who had previously no access to the rates (which the churchwardens had), the meaning of the term inhabitants was limited to them. The same approach in interpretation must be adopted by us in the present case. We must not allow ourselves to be unduly obsessed by the meaning of landlord given in the definition or by its ordinary etymological meaning but we must examine the scheme of the relevant provisions of the statute, the contextual setting in w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
