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TMI Blog1962 (9) TMI 78X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the assessee under section 66(1) of the Act on the 7th of July, 1950, whereupon the assessee made an application to this court under section 66(2) of the Act some time in 1951. That application was allowed on the 11th of December, 1957, and the Tribunal was directed to submit a statement of case and refer some questions of law. Mr. Gulati has invited our attention to clause (8) of section 66 of the Act as amended by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order, 1956. That provision reads as under: 66. (8) For the purposes of this section, 'the High Court' means- (a) in relation to any State, the High Court for that State; (b) in relation to the Union territories of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh, the High Court of Punjab; (c) in relation to the Union territories of Manipur and Tripura, the High Court of Assam; (d) in relation to the Union territory of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the High Court at Calcutta, and (e) in relation to the Union territory of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands, the High Court of Kerala. It is contended that in 1956, Ajmer, from which place the present case comes, has been included within the territorial limit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that still requires consideration is as to whether that is so even with regard to references called for by this court and pending before it. In our opinion, such an inference is not deducible from the language of section 52. That is a general provision conferring jurisdiction on the Rajasthan High Court in respect of all cases arising out of the areas constituting the State of Rajasthan but does not deal with the specific matter relating to the decision of pending cases. For pending proceeding, the States Reorganisation Act (hereinafter referred to as Act No. XXXVII) has made separate provisions. It may be noticed that whereas section 64 of Act XXXVII clearly provides for the transfer of certain pending proceedings relating to the areas which were included in the State of Bombay and were by Act XXXVII to merge in the State of Rajasthan to the High Court of Rajasthan, there is no such provision with regard to the income-tax proceedings pending in this court. It would contribute to a clear understanding of the point if we reproduce section 64 of Act XXXVII of 1956 in extenso: 64. Transfer of proceedings to Rajasthan High Court.-(1) As from the appointed day, the High Court of B ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry the question relating to jurisdiction of the court shall be governed by that provision. The view that we are taking finds support from the decision of the Federal Court in Venugopala Reddiar v. Krishnaswami Reddiar A.I.R. 1943 F.C. 24. In that case a suit was filed in an Indian court in respect of certain properties some of which were situated in Rangoon. The litigation was still pending when the Burma Independence Act came into force and the question arose whether an Indian court should decide even in respect of properties situate in Burma. It was contended before the Federal Court that under the municipal law a court of one State cannot decide in respect of the properties situated in another independent State. But their Lordships held that in view of the fact that the Burma Independence Act did not contain any provision which extinguished the jurisdiction of the Indian courts in respect of suits already filed relating to properties in Burma, the Indian courts had jurisdiction in the matter. We have already said above that there is nothing in Act XXXVII which requires either the transfer of the present case or dismissal of the present proceedings on the ground that we have no j ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onding court, Tribunal, authority or officer. Two things emerge from the perusal of these two statutory provisions. Firstly, that in connection with all legal proceedings pending on the appointed day, in cases in which the State is a party, substitution shall take place in order to replace the State which has lost jurisdiction by the State which has acquired jurisdiction in respect of the territories to which that proceeding relates, and, secondly that all proceedings in a court other than a High Court shall stand transferred from the Tribunal or authority where they were pending to the corresponding Tribunal or authority of the State to which the areas are being transferred. It is noteworthy that though a suit or an appeal has been expressly included in the expression proceeding , nothing has been said about a reference under the Act. Neither of these two sections, therefore, apply to proceedings like the one before us. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the objection of the department is misconceived and this court has jurisdiction to continue the hearing of this reference. We accordingly overrule the preliminary objection. Coming to the merit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ad become bad debt in the year of assessment or in the earlier year. The Income-tax Officer held that the debt had become bad towards the end of Samvat year 1997 and should have been claimed in the relevant assessment year 1931-32. Dissatisfied with the order of the Income-tax Officer the assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who did not give him any relief in respect of this matter. The assessee then filed an appeal before the Tribunal but there also he got no relief in respect of this particular item. Mr. R.S. Pathak who has appeared for the assessee has strenuously contended before us that the question No. 1 should be answered in favour of the assessee because the Tribunal has based its findings on no material or at any rate it has failed to notice a lot of relevant and material evidence. Our attention was invited to two letters, annexures A and B . Annexure A is a letter dated 10th March, 1937, addressed by Ramjasmal Navrangrai to the assessee. That letter reads as follows: To Bhai Champalalji Ramswarup at Bombay, read Jai Gopal of Ramjasmal Navrangrai of Bhiwani. Received your letter for ₹ 1,03,176-14-3 which are due to you we have given ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Read Jai Gopal of Ramjasmal Navrangrai from Bhiwani. We had dealings with your Bombay shop some time back. Settlement in respect thereof was made for ₹ 10,000, in words ten thousands, and we handed over to you ornaments of about ₹ 10,000. Our idea was to get back the ornaments on payment of your moneys but we have not got money. Therefore we are unable to send the moneys so please sell our ornaments and credit the sale proceeds to our account and square up our account. From now there is nothing due from us to you. Dated Magh Vad. 5th S.Y. 2002. Please read Jai Gopal of the writer Marulal with best respects. The Tribunal has taken into consideration the following circumstances in concluding that the debt had become bad or unrecoverable much earlier; 1. Nothing had been recovered from the debtor for ten years; and 2. No interest was debited to the debtor's account ever since Samvat year 1997. The Tribunal has specifically referred to the statement of Tulsi Ram, the letter dated Phagun, Samvat year 1993, and the statement of Motilal, the assessee. On the basis of the circumstances and the material mentioned above, the Tribunal recorded a finding tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g whether or not the orders passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Officer are correct. The difference between the approach of an appellate court from that of a trial court was explained by their Lordships of the Federal Court in Suraj Narain Anand v. State of North West Province A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 3, 6, where their Lordships observed as follows: In theory as well as in practice, there is a well marked difference between a decision given by an officer who acts in the consciousness that he is primarily responsible for investigation and decision of the case and the act of one who is expected only to satisfy himself that another officer who had the primary responsibility has properly dealt with the case. It would appear from the judgment of the Tribunal that they have referred to such documents or evidence to which their attention was invited. They have observed as follows while dealing with the evidence of Tulsi Ram and Motilal, assessee: Our attention has been drawn to the evidence of Tulsi Ram and also to the evidence of N.S. Motilal. No affidavit has been filed before us either at section 66(2) application stage or the present stage tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oint out that it has been held that if a point does not find place in a judgment the presumption is that it was not argued before the court, which gave the judgment (see Lakhmichand Baijnath v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1959] 35 I.T.R. 416 ; [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 415). We may also mention that in Bhaichand Amoluk Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1962] 44 I.T.R. 511 (S.C.), their Lordships after referring to the earlier decision in Omar Salay v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1959] 37 I.T.R. 151 (S.C.) were pleased to emphasise that even though the order of the Tribunal must show that it has considered all the points in favour and against the assessee, it is not necessary for it to have examined minutely sentence by sentence so as to discover a minor lapse here or an incautious opinion there to be used as a peg on which to hang an issue of law. In our opinion the order of the Tribunal passed in the present case fulfils the requirements of both the decisions, i.e., Omar Salay [1959] 37 I.T.R. 151 (S.C.), and Bhaichand [1962] 44 I.T.R. 511 (S.C.) cases. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that question No. 1 should be answered in the affirmative. We would now ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e system and instal lights, etc. When the plots were sold the purchaser paid only a portion of the purchase price and undertook to pay the balance in instalments. The appellants in its turn undertook to carry out the developments within six months but time was not of the essence of the contract. In the relevant accounting year the appellant actually received in cash only a sum of ₹ 29,392 towards the sale price of lands, but in accordance with the mercantile system of accounts adopted by it, it credited in its accounts the sum of ₹ 43,692 representing the full sale price of lands. At the same time it also debited an estimated sum of ₹ 24,809 as expenditure for the developments it had undertaken to carry out even though no part of that amount was actually spent. The department disallowed the expenditure. The Tribunal confirmed that finding. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the sum of ₹ 24,809, the estimated sum of expenditure, could be claimed. Their Lordships held that it could be claimed though the amount had not been received. Their Lordships observed as follows: Turning now to the facts of the present case, we find that the sum of &# ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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