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TMI Blog1961 (2) TMI 77X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or the construction of the new Capital for East Pun ab. No action was, however, taken in pursuance of this notification. Meanwhile the Punjab Legislature passed the East Punjab Requisition of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 48 of 1948. Under the provisions of this Act the Government requisitioned the land in question for the purpose of resettling the persons who were likely to be evicted from their fands as a result of the construction of the new Capital. The said land was actually acquired on May 20,1951. This land forms part of a Jagir known as Singh Purian and comprises the areas of villages Mataur, Dhirpur, Saneta and Giddarpur in the District of Ambala. It appears that these villages originally formed part of the area covered by the Cls Sutlej States. S. Amrao Singh was entered as owner of the land thus acquired. His wife is Sardarani Gurdial Kaur and his son is Satinder Singh. The estate of Amrao Singh was at the relevant time being managed by the Court of Wards. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act compensation was assessed by the estate officer and was accordingly offered by the State Government to the Court of Wards. The Court of Wards agreed to the amount o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t or by award of the arbitrator, either in money or in kind or partly in money and partly in kind, and where there is no person competent to alienate the property, or there is a person with limited interest in such property, or there is any dispute as to the persons entitled to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment thereof, the arbitrator shall make an award in such a manner or make an arrangement in such a way as may be equitable having regard to. the interests of the persons concerned; in other words, the principle of equitable apportionment which had been recognised by s. 32 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has in effect been added by this amending Act. In 1953 the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953 (XI of 1953), came into force. Section 24 of this Act repeals the two earlier Acts of 1948 and 1951, and after this Act came into force it was the provisions of this Act that governed the proceedings relating to the requisitioning, and acquisition of immovable properties in Punjab. The equitable principle which was inserted in the Act of 1948 by the amending Act of 1951 has been retained in the present Act under s. 8 (3). Section 23 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... no jurisdiction to hold any enquiry on the claim put forward by Satinder Singh. The arbitrator, however, rejected Amrao Singh's pleas, and held that he was entitled and bound to hold the proceedings and to consider the merits of the pleas raised by Satinder Singh. The arbitrator then proceeded to examine the merits of the rival contentions. He found that the property in suit was a part of Cis Sutlej States and so Amrao Singh had only a limited interest in it and had no right to alienate it. As a result of this conclusion the arbitrator held that Satinder Singh, who was the next heir, was entitled to contest the amount of compensation and was also entitled to claim a share in the distribution of the amount. In regard to Dhirpur land he held that Sardarani Gurdial Kaur was entitled to retain the possession of the village for her maintenance under a compromise decree and that both Amrao Singh and Satinder Singh were bound by the said decree. In the result the arbitrator determined the amount of compensation and directed that the entire amount of compensation in regard to Dhirpur should be invested in Government Securities in the name of the holder of Manauli Estate with a charg ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e High Court. In the appeals preferred by Satinder Singh the High Court rejected his plea that the valuation fixed by the arbitrator in respect of certain properties was inadequate. It also rejected his plea that the amount of compensation ordered to be divided between him and his father Amrao Singh should be deposited in Government Securities. The High Court held that though equitable considerations would be relevant in deciding the question of apportionment, it would be inexpedient to direct that the amount should be deposited in Government Securities because in that case no one will ever be absolutely entitled to it. The High Court also thought that since the State in whose favour the estate may finally lapse owing to escheat did not object to the apportionment made by the arbitrator there was no reason to interfere with the actual order. as to apportionment between father and son which the arbitrator thought was reasonable. In dealing with this question the High Court took the view that the alleged reckless extravagance of the father on which the son relied was not relevant. In the result the three appeals filed by Satinder Singh were dismissed. The High Court then dealt wit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Amrao Singh as respondent 1, the State of Punjab as respondents, and Sardarani Gurdial Kaur as Sardarani. Logically then the first point which we must consider is the nature of the property and the title of respondent 1 in relation to it. That is the principal point which Mr. Viswanatha Sastri sought to raise before us in the appeal filed by respondent 1. This question has been considered both by the arbitrator and the High Court elaborately and they have concurred in making a finding against respondent 1. As the judgment of the High Court points out the fact that the lands in question originally formed part of the domain of S. Budh Singh or of the Cis Sutlej States was not seriously disputed before the High Court. This implied concession naturally makes Mr. Sastri's task very difficult. Besides, we are not satisfied that there is any substance in the plea which Mr. Sastri has raised before us on this point. The history of the property has been considered by the arbitrator, and the arbitrator as well as the High Court have placed considerable reliance on the relevant statements made in the Punjab Land Administration Manual compiled by Sir James Mac. Douie and revised in 193 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... phasised the inalienable character of the Jagirs and referred to the opinion expressed by the Court of Directors whereby the said character was clearly and unambiguously notified. We should have supposed , said the Court of Directors, that there could be no necessity for notifying this as a rule, since it follows from the very nature of a Jagir, which cannot be alienated and can only be attached for the life of the holder. There is thus no doubt that the statements in the authorised publications to which we have just referred and on which the High Court and the arbitrator have relied conclusively show that the holder of property which was a part of Cis Sutlej States did not own the property absolutely but held it as a limited owner. The Kaiflat Taluka of Singh Purian family which has been produced in these proceedings supports the same conclusion. Mr. Sastri, however, wanted to contend that the evidence on the record was insufficient to justify the conclusion that the lands under acquisition formed part of the original estate of S. Budh Singh; but he fairly conceded that respondent 1 had not gone into the witness box and had not purported to justify his plea that any of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der acquisition. The argument is that since respondent 1 was not entitled to alienate the property and was under an obligation to keep the corpus in tact for the benefit of the reversioners the compensation amount payable in respect of the acquisition of the said property should be similarly treated and saved for the benefit of the reversioners; in other words, it is urged that the compensation amount should be treated as a conversion of the corpus of lands and the same should not be distributed as directed by the High Court. Section 32 deals with cases where the land acquired belonged to any person who had no power to alienate the same; and since respondent 1 was not entitled to alienate the property the principle enunciated by s. 32(1) (b) is pressed into service as an equitable principle which should be applied to the present case. In support of this argument the learned Attorney- General has relied on decisions of different High Courts where this principle has been extended to watan property (Shri Somashekhar Swami v. Bapusaheb Narayanrao Patil A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 176., to the property belonging to an idol (K. C. Bannerjee, Official Receiver, In re A.I.R. 1928 Cal 402.), to the pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... etween the two; and so it confirmed the apportionment made by the arbitrator. This decision, however, suffers from one serious infirmity. The High Court thought that the conduct of respondent 1 which was characterized by the appellant as the conduct of a reckless spend. thrift and squanderer was wholly irrelevant in determining the shares to which the appellant and, respondent 1 were respectively entitled. In our opinion, in deciding the question of apportionment on equitable grounds it is relevant and material to take, into account the grievance made by the appellant that the money which would be left with respondent 1 would be frittered away by him and no part of it would reach the reversioner. In support of this contention, the appellant relied on the past conduct of respondent 1. Several alienations made by him are cited and attention is invited to the fact that after respondent 1 became a major his estate has been taken over by the Court of Wards for management under s. 5(2) (b) of the Court of Wards Act, 1903, from 1928 to 1938, 1939 to 1947, 1948 to 1954. It has also been urged that since 1954 respondent 1 has made several unauthorised alienations. We do not propose to consi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ned under it. In support of this conclusion the High Court has referred to the fact that s. 5(e) of the Act specifically makes applicable the provisions of s. 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, and that, it is said, inevitably leads to the inference that ss. 28 and 34 of the Act which deal with the payment of interest are not intended to apply to the proceedings under it. In our opinion, this conclusion is not wellfounded. It would be legitimate to hold that by the application of s. 23(1) in terms the provisions of s. 23(2) are by necessary implication excluded. If the Legislature has provided that only one part of s. 23 should be applied it would be reasonable to hold that the other part of s. 23 was not intended to be applied; but we do not see how it would be reasonable to hold that by the application of s. 23(1) the principles under- lying the provisions of ss. 28 and 34 are also excluded. Therefore, it is necessary to examine this question on general grounds and principles without assuming that the application of these general considerations is excluded by any of the provisions of the Act. What then is the contention raised by the claimants? They contend th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the owner is deprived of his property in this case as much as in the other, and the rule has long been accepted in the inter- pretation of statutes that they are not to be held to deprive individuals of property without compensation unless the intention to do so is made quite clear. The right to receive the interest takes the place of the right to retain possession and is within the rule. It would thus be noticed that the claim for interest proceeds on the assumption that when the owner of immovable property loses possession of it he is entitled to claim interest in place of right to retain possession. The question which we have to consider is whether the application of this rule is intended to be excluded by the Act of 1948, and as we have already observed, the mere fact that s. 5(3) of the Act makes s. 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 applicable we cannot reasonably infer that the Act intends to exclude the application of this general rule in the matter of the payment of interest. That is the view which the Punjab High Court has taken in Surjan Singh v. The East Punjab Government A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 265, and we think rightly. It is, however, urged by Mr. Gopal Singh f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this connection we may incidentally refer to Interest Act, 1839 (XXXII of 1839). Section 2 of this Act confers power on the Court to allow interest in cases specified therein, but the proviso to the said section makes it clear that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law. In other words, the operative provisions of s. 1 of the said Act do not mean that where interest was otherwise payable by law Court's power to award such interest is taken away. The power to award interest on equitable grounds or under any other provisions of the law is expressly saved by the proviso to s. 1. This question was considered by the Privy Council in Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. v. Buttanji Ramji (1938) L.R. 65 I.A. 66. Referring to the proviso to s. 1 of the Act the Privy Council,observed this proviso applies to cases in which the Court of equity exercises its jurisdiction to allow interest. We have already seen that the right to receive interest in lieu of possession of immovable property taken away either by private treaty or by compulsory acquisition is generally regarded by judicial decisions as an equitable right; and so, the proviso to s. 1 of the Inter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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