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TMI Blog1970 (3) TMI 35X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4, assessed the estate of the deceased at Rs. 2,99,765 and imposed a duty of Rs. 20,546.16. Since the petitioners had paid Rs. 1,491.83 by way of advance, the balance was paid by them on August 13, 1964. They were, however, not satisfied with the order of the assessing authority. Therefore, they preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Estate Duty. The appellate authority, by its order dated September 19, 1965, gave some reliefs, the chief among which was a relief to the extent of Rs. 21,312 from the principal value of the estate towards maintenance allowance to the petitioners' widowed mother. The principal contention before the appellate authority was whether the property is joint family property or was the self-acquired property of the deceased. That contention was negatived by the assessing authority as well as the appellate authority. Against that order of the appellate authority, the petitioners preferred an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal in its order dated June 1, 1967, gave substantial reliefs. It found that several of the properties were not self-acquired but were joint family properties. While the matter stood thus, the petiti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the account or of omission to include therein any property which ought to have been included, or of assessment at too low a rate or otherwise-, he may at any time subject to the provisions of section 73-A, require the person accountable to submit an account as required finder section 53 and may proceed to assess or reassess such property y as if the provisions of section 58 applied thereto." The contention on the basis of section 59 is that unless the notice specifies the property in regard to which the allegation is made that it has escaped assessment, the notice would not be valid. The argument was elaborated with the assistance of section 53 of the Act. We are, however, not impressed with this argument. Section 59 merely empowers the Controller to reassess the property which has escaped assessment to duty under the Act. Under the governing clause of that section, the Controller has to merely require the person accountable to 'Submit an account as required under section 53. Section 53 relates to the persons accountable and their duties and liabilities. It has no bearing on the question as to what should be the contents of a notice to be given under section 59 for the purpos ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he proceedings will be quashed on the ground that the matter was decided without providing them a fair and full hearing. But that is altogether a different matter. On that basis it cannot be validly contended that the notice under section 59 itself must necessarily state what property, according to the Controller, had escaped assessment. We are, therefore, satisfied on a fair reading of sections 53 and 59 that the contention raised before us and no force. The second contention in regard to limitation may be considered at this stage because it is closely connected with the first question already considered. According to section 73A, clause (b), the period of limitation in the case of reassessment is fixed at three years and its commencement is the date of assessment is fixed at three years and its commencement is the date of assessment would be barred by limitation. But we are not inclined to accept this argument as correct. We have already held that the notice dated January 31, 1967, is a notice under section 59 and there can be no doubt in regard to its validity effectiveness. Moreover, the later letter dated February 19, 1969, is not a notice under section 59 at all. The lette ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nal facts or the primary facts oil the decision of which depends the assumption of jurisdiction by the Controller. Section 59 does not make the Controller the final arbiter of these basic facts. It is open to a court to examine whether there was any information in his possession and that that information was rationally connected with the formation of opinion or belief by the Controller that any property has escaped assessment. It is only in this limited field that the court can make enquiries. It is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the information nor it has jurisdiction to consider whether the information in the possession of the Controller is adequate or sufficient to constitute reasonable belief. It is for the Controller to consider those questions. If there is information and it is relevant to the formation of the opinion required by that section, then the enquiry by this court ends and it cannot probe any further into that jurisdictional question. In this case, our attention was drawn to the note by which the Controller commenced the reassessment proceedings. In so far as relevant it reads: " According to the settlement deed executed on January 4, 1942, b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ok before him when he passed the original assessment order. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention that the Controller had before him the information which he is now trying to rely upon. In regard to the second piece of information, it can hardly be doubted that it could not have been before the Controller who passed the original assessment order. It is from this original assessment order that an appeal was preferred and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner passed the order in appeal. It is in the appeal that the appellate authority found that the house belonged to the deceased and that is why the deduction in regard to the rent which was made by the petitioners was disallowed by the appellate authority. It is also not doubted that on a further appeal to the Tribunal the claim of rent was disallowed even by the Tribunal finding that the house belonged to the deceased. The short question, therefore, for our consideration is whether these facts found by the higher Tribunals amount to information within the meaning of section 59 of the Act. In this connection, it must be remembered that there is a material difference between a power to act on information under sect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y of a partner. It was only after the Tribunal and the High Court gave their decision in the proceedings for assessment to tax of Bisesar House that the Income-tax Officer came to know that the interest was not being received by the assesee-firm in the capacity of a partner, but in its capacity of a financier advancing moneys to Bisesar House as a banker. It is true that, if the facts had been properly considered at the time of the first assessment, the Income-tax Officer might have discovered the correct position and might have come to the conclusion that the assessee-firm was not receiving interest as a partner, but this circumstance that such decision could have been arrived at does not mean that, at the time when the Income-tax Officer started proceedings under section 34(1)(b), he was not acting on the information received from the decisions of the Tribunal and the High Court in the assessment proceedings of Bisesar House. It was not a case where the Income-tax Officer on his own initiative and on the material which was before him at the time of the first assessment changed his opinion and came to a different conclusion. The correct conclusion was brought to his notice by the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ny difference at all between the two provisions of law. they are in pari materia and consequently the decision of the Supreme court first referred to above applies squarely to the facts of the present case. The recent Supreme Court decision referred to above in this behalf held : " It has not been disputed and can indeed not be disputed that the provisions of section 59 are in pari materia with section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and section 47 of the Income-tax Act, 1961." The two pieces of information thus are information within section 59(b) of the Act and it can hardly be doubted that the information which came into the possession of the Controller for the first time after he had parted with the case are relevant for the purpose of forming a reasonable belief that some property chargeable to estate duty has escaped assessment. Thus, the basic requirements to assume jurisdiction under section 59 are thoroughly satisfied in the present case. We do not, therefore, find any substance in this contention also. Our attention was then drawn to the question that there is no valid ground to revise the decision arrived at by the Tribunal in regard to maintenance. But it would no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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