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1961 (12) TMI 97

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..... tor Vehicles Act). All these four have been heard together because of a common point raised regarding the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the appeals and the petitions. It is manifest that the preliminary point about the jurisdiction of this Court should have first to be considered before dealing with the merits of the contentions raised in the appeals and petitions. It might be convenient to state a few facts to appreciate the context in which the questions debated before us arise and the point concerned in the order now passed. Sivarama Reddiar the appellant in Civil Appeal 43 of 1961 and the petitioner in Writ Petition 298 of 1960, is a citizen of India and is engaged in the business of motor transport. By a notification dated December 27, 1958 in the Official Gazette of Pondicherry the State Transport Commission of Pondicherry invited applications for the grant of stage carriage permits to be submitted before February 27, 1959, including the route from Pondicherry to Karaikal, the latter being another former French possession. In response to this notification, Sivarama Reddiar as well as one Gopal Pillai who is the second respondent to the appeal and the second re .....

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..... others including the respondent Gopala Pillai. Though the Motor Vehicles Act which had been extended to Pondicherry included s. 64, whereby persons aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority could file appeals against such order, no appellate authority had been constituted by the Chief Commissioner. This situation was remedied by a notification by the Chief Commissioner dated May 4, 1960 whereby he constituted himself under s. 68 of the Act as the appellate authority for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under s. 64 thereof. Several of the aggrieved operators including Gopala Pillai preferred appeals to the Chief Commissioner. By an order dated September 5, 1960 the Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry allowed the appeal of the respondent Gopala Pillai, set aside the order of the State Transport Authority granting the permit to the appellant Sivarama Reddiar and directed that the permit for the route Pondicherry to Karaikal be issued in favour of the respondent Gopala Pillai. Writ Petition 293 of 1960 has been filed to secure the setting aside of this order of the Chief Commissioner on the ground that the order violates the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioner .....

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..... unsel pointed out that for the purpose of the exercise of this Court's powers under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the fundamental rights its jurisdiction was not limited to the authorities functioning within the territory of India but that it extended also to the giving of directions and the issuing of orders to authorities functioning even outside the territory of India, provided that such authorities were subject to the control of the Government of India. This submission appears to us well-founded and that the powers of this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution are not circumscribed by any territorial limitation. It extends not merely over every authority within the territory of India but also those functioning outside provided that such authorities are under the control of the Government of India. The power conferred on this Court by Part III of the Constitution has, however, to be read in conjunction with Art. 142 of the Constitution which reads: 142 (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction may pass such decree or makes such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any dec .....

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..... this Court by the exercise of their powers of control over the authority outside the territory of India. Such an order could be enforceable by virtue of Art. 144, as also Art. 142. But in a case where the order of the outside authority is of a quasi-judicial nature, as in the case before us, we consider that resort to such a procedure is not possible and that if the orders or directions of this Court could not be directly enforced against the authority in Pondicherry, the order would be ineffective and the Court will not stultify itself by passing such an order. In these circumstances it becomes imperative that we should ascertain the constitutional and political status of Pondicherry in relation to the Union of India. Certain documents have been placed before us and in particular an agreement dated October 21, 1954 entered into between the Government of India and of France by which the administration of Pondicherry was ceded to the Government of India. Mr. Viswanatha Sastri learned Counsel for the appellant-petitioner contended that on the terms and conditions contained in this agreement, Pondicherry was a part of the territory of India. On the other hand, Mr. Chari-learned Cou .....

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..... e territory of India. In our opinion, however, though this might be very strong evidence that the territory has not been acquired and so not part of the territory of India , it is still not conclusive. In this state of circumstances two courses would be open to us: (1) to decide for ourselves on the material that has been placed before us in the shape of the agreement between the two Governments etc. Whether Pondicherry has been acquired so as to become part of the territory of India, or (2) to invoke the assistance of the Government of India by inviting them to state whether the territory has been acquired within Art. 1(3) of the Constitution and whether Pondicherry is thus now part of the territory of India . We originally proposed to avail ourselves only of the procedure indicated in s.6 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1947 which enacts: 6. (1) If in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in a Court established in India or by the authority of the Central Government outside India, any question arises as to the existence or extent of any foreign jurisdiction of the Central Government, the Secretary to the Government of India in the appropriate department shall, on the appli .....

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..... Fagernes L. R. 1927 Probate 311). Besides, the learned Solicitor- General agreed that the Government would assist us by answering our reference. In view of the matters set out above we direct that the following questions shall be forwarded to the Union of India under the seal of this Court for the submission of their answers: (1) Whether Pondicherry which was a former French Settlement is or is not at present comprised within the territory of India as specified in Art. 1(3) of the Constitution by virtue of the Articles of the Merger Agreement dated October 21, 1954 between the Governments of India and France and other relevant agreements, arrangements, acts and conduct of the two Governments. (2) If the answer to Question 1 is that Pondicherry is not within the territory of India, what is the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the Union Government over the said territory and whether it extends to making all and every arrangement for its civil administration, its defence and in regard to its foreign affairs. The Government of India might also state the extent of jurisdiction which France possesses over the area and which operates as a diminution of the jurisdiction ceded .....

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..... India should be approached to enlighten us about it. The learned Solicitor General, appearing for the Government, has not objected to this procedure being adopted. With regard to the Petitions under Art. 32, it was contended that the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry was a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution as under that article any authority under the control of the Government of India outside the territory of India was a State for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution. On this basis it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the petitions under Art. 32 asking for certain writs to quash the orders of the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry were also competent. A further question then arises as to whether in view of Art. 142 of the Constitution the writs, if issued, could be enforced against an authority under the control of Government of India at Pondicherry, if Pondicherry was outside India and if they could not, whether the Court should issue the writs as it would only be stultifying itself by doing so. It seems to us that it is unnecessary to decide these questions at this stage, for we are going to ask the Government to inform us whether .....

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..... the Union of India under the seal of this Court for submission of their answers. On receipt of the answers to the questions the appeals will be posted for further hearing. The Judgment of Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered by Ayyangar J. The Judgment of Sarkar and Das Gupta, JJ., was delivered by Sarkar J. AYYANGAR, J.- In compliance with our directions the two questions were forwarded to the Union Government and they submitted their answers to them in the following terms: Question No. (1)-Whether Pondicherry which was a former French Settlement is or is not at present comprised within the territory India as specified in Article 1(3) of the Constitution by virtue of the Articles of the Merger Agreement dated October 21, 1954 between the Governments of India and France and other relevant agreements arrangements, acts and conduct of the two Governments. Answer-The French Settlement (Establishment) of Pondicherry is at present not comprised within the territory of India as specified in clause (3) of Article 1 of the Constitution by virtue of the Agreement dated the 21st October, 1954, made between the Government of France and the Government o .....

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..... India consistent with the said Agreement. Accordingly a large number of Acts in force in India have already been extended to Pondicherry. The Government of India hold the view that the sole responsibility in regard to arrangements for the defence of Pondicherry devolves on themselves. Pondicherry has no foreign relations of its own. No claims have been made by the Government of France in this matter nor have the Government of India recognized the existence of any such claim. The Government of France do not possess any de facto jurisdiction over Pondicherry which would imply any diminution of the jurisdiction exercised by the Government of India. The appeals and the writ petitions were thereafter posted for further hearing before us on October 9, 1961. Mr. N. C. Chatterji-learned Counsel for Shri Masthan Sahib, appellant in Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1961 and petitioner in writ petition No. 297 of 1960, urged before us two contentions. The first was that the answer to the second question clearly established that the French establishments including Pondicherry were part of the territory of India, having been acquired by the Union Government within the meaning of A .....

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..... e briefly the circumstances in which we felt it necessary to frame the two questions that we did. At the stage of the hearing of the petitions on the first occasion, notice was issued to the Union Government and the learned Solicitor General appearing in response to the notice did not convey to us any definite views on the part of the Government as to whether Pondicherry was or was not considered by them to be part of the territory of India but invited the Court to decide the question on the materials that might be placed the parties before us. At that stage therefore we were not quite certain whether Government would be prepared to make a formal statement about their views on this question. If therefore the Government were inclined still to leave the matter to the Court, we desired to have complete information as to the factual position regarding the government of the territory. It was was framed. It was, of course, possible that Government might communicate their views to the Court and with a view to enable this to be done we framed Question No. 1. In these circumstances nothing is gained by reference to the passage in our judgment dated April 28, 1961. The passage extracted is c .....

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..... on a matter which is peculiarly within his cognizance. Lord Sumner said: Where such a statement is forthcoming no other evidence is admissible or needed. There is one other decision of the House of Lord to which reference may usefully be made-Government of the Republic of Spain v. Arantzazu, Mendi. The question for decision was whether it was General Franco's Government that was the Government in Spain or the Republican Government. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had, in a formal communication to the Court in reply to a letter forwarded under the direction of Bucknill J., stated that His Majesty's Government had recognised the Nationalist Government as the Government which had administrative control over a large portion of Spain and particularly over the Basque Provinces wherein the ship, title to which was in question, had been registered. Lord Wright in his speech said: The Court is, in my opinion, bound without any qualification by the statement of the Foreign office, which is the organ of His Majesty's Government for this purpose in a matter of this nature. Such a statement is a statement of fact, the contents of which are not open to .....

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..... unison with the Government of the King, this Court invited the Attorney General to attend at the hearing of the appeal and at the conclusion of the arguments asked him whether the Crown claimed that the spot where the collision occurred was within the territory of the King. The Attorney- General in answer to this inquiry, stated that he had communicated with the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, who had instructed him to inform the Court that the spot where this collision is alleged to have occurred is not within the limits to which the territorial sovereignty of His Majesty extends. In view of this answer, given with the authority of the Home Secretary upon a matter which is peculiarly within the cognizance of the Home office, this Court could not, in my opinion, properly do otherwise than hold that the alleged tort was not committed within the jurisdiction of the High Court . Bankes L.J., though he agreed with his colleagues in allowing the appeal, however struck a slightly different note saying: This information was given at the instance of the Court, and for the information of the Court. Given under such circumstances, and on such a subject, it does not in my opin .....

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..... ne what the position would be in the contingency visualized, but assuredly it is not suggested that the case before us falls within that category. The proposition laid down in the English decisions that a conflict is not to be envisaged between the Executive Government and the judiciary appears to us to rest on sound reasoning and except possibly in the extreme cases referred to by the learned Counsel, the statement of the Government must be held binding on the Court and to be given effect to by it. There is one other matter which was specially pressed upon us during the course of argument to which is necessary to refer. The submission was that the answer by the Union Government to the two questions were really contradictory and that whereas the answer to the second question made it out that the French establishments had been acquired and were part of the territory of India, the Government had in relation to the first question made a contradictory answer. We do not consider this argument well-founded. In cases where the only fact available is the de facto exercise of complete sovereignty by one State in a particular area, the sovereignty of that State over that area and the area .....

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..... ia. It is unnecessary to consider what the position would have been if the Union Government had, notwithstanding the terms of the Treaty, treated the former French establishments as having become part of the territory of India. There was one minor submission made by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri to which a passing reference may be made. He suggested that the term territory of India in Art. 142 might not represent the same concept as 'the territory of India' within Art. 1(3) and that in the context of Art. 142 the term 'territory of India might include every territory over which the Government of the Union exercised de facto control. We are not impressed by this argument. The term 'territory of India' has been used in several Articles of the Constitution and we are clearly of the opinion that in every Article where this phraseology is employed it means the territory of India for the time being as falls within Art. 1(3) and that the phrase cannot mean different territories in different Articles. We have already dealt with the question as to what the effect on the maintainability of the appeals and the petitions would be if Pondicherry were not part of the territor .....

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..... d (b) if it is not, the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the Union Government over it and the jurisdiction which France still possesses in regard to it. These questions were put because considerable doubt was felt as to the real status of Pondicherry. If it was a foreign territory, no appeal could lie to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution from any tribunal in Pondicherry and two of these matters were such appeals. The other two matters were petitions asking for writs against certain authorities in Pondicherry and the majority held that no writ could issue to a foreign territory in view of Art. 142 of the Constitution and therefore for the purposes of these petitions also it was necessary to ascertain the status of pondicherry. We however then felt some difficulty about the question whether we could refuse to issue writs to an officer of the Government of India outside the territory of India and expressed our inability to concur in the opinion of the majority. We said that the proper time to discuss that question would be when on receipt of the Government's answers to our questions, it had to be held that Pondicherry was a foreign territory and reserved our fin .....

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..... But it is said that if a writ was issued in the present case, it could not in view of Art. 142 which says that an order of this Court shall be enforced throughout the territory of India, be enforced Pondicherry. Let us assume that is so. Then it is said that if the Court were to issue the writ it would only be stultifying itself and should not therefore issue it. We are unable to accede to this contention. If a party has been given by the Constitution a fundamental right to a writ, there is no power in the Court to refuse that right. Supposed practical considerations of incapacity to in force the writ issued cannot be allowed to defeat the provisions of the Constitution. No authority has been cited to us in support of the proposition that when a party in entitled as of right to an order, a court can refuse to make that order on the ground that it would thereby be stultifying itself. So far as we have been able to ascertain orders are refused on this ground when the matter is one for the discretion of the Court. Such cases have, for instance, frequently occurred in proceedings relating to the issue of injunctions, to grant or not to grant which is well known, in the discretion of .....

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..... Majesty's Privy Council for Great Britain. Speyer and Cassel were naturalised British subjects and the question was whether under certain statutes they were not disqualified from being appointed to the Privy Council. One of the arguments on behalf of the respondents was that the court would be powerless to enforce a judgment of ouster for it could not prevent the immediate reinstatement of the names of these persons in the roll of Privy Councillors if the King though fit to alter it. The answer that Reading C.J. gave to this argument was Although it may be interesting and useful for the purpose of testing the propositions now under consideration to assume the difficulties suggested by the Attorney-General, none of them would in truth occur. This is the King's Court; we sit here to administer justice and to interpret the laws of the realm in the King's name. It is respectful and proper to assume that once the law is declared by a competent judicial authority it will be followed by the Crown. The other members of the Bench also took the same view, Lush J. observing, The consequences he suggests are argumentative and not real, and we cannot regard them as fettering the .....

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..... chaos and we cannot be a party to it. We may say that by a treaty. as in the present case, India may acquire full jurisdiction over a foreign territory which under the same treaty may nonetheless remain a foreign territory. It was contended that this would be absolute surrender to the executive Government; that such a view would enable the Government when it so liked, to disown a territory which was patently a part of India so that it might act therein as it liked in complete disregard of the laws and without any check from any court including this Court. This contention, to use the words of Luch J. in Speyer's case is argumentative and not real . We cannot imagine that in a democracy any Government would ever act in the way suggested and we are sure no Government of this country will ever do so. Furthermore, the contention has no foundation whatever and is wholly imaginary. It is the duty of a court to take judicial notice of the extent of the territory of its own State. Section 57 of the Evidence Act requires that. Therefore, if the fact is patent that a certain territory is within India, the courts will take judicial notice of it and there will be no occasion to r .....

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