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TMI Blog2018 (2) TMI 651X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to agree with the outcome of Pune Municipal Corporation (2014 (1) TMI 1643 - Supreme Court Of India). However, according to me the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (2014 (1) TMI 1643 - Supreme Court Of India) is not rendered in per incuriam. In view of the above, the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) may have to be reconsidered by a larger bench, inasmuch as Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was decided by a bench of three judges. The Registry is directed to place the papers before the Hon ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. Whether the conscious omission referred to in paragraph 11 of the judgment in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2014 (9) TMI 941 - Supreme Court Of India) makes any substantial difference to the legal position with regard to the exclusion or inclusion of the period covered by an interim order of the Court for the purpose of determination of the applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act? - Held that:- The conscious omission referred to in paragraph 11 of the judgment in Sree Balaji (supra) does not make any substantial difference to the legal position with regard to the exclusion or inclus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ON (C) No.9570 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15113 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.16438 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15119 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15126 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15125 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15118 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15124 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15112 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.11824 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15143 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15141 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15142 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.15213-15217 OF 2017, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.17324 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.38368 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.5182-5184 OF 2017, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.23846 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.23097 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.19804-19805 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.22127-22128 OF 2016, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.21997-21998 OF 2016, W.P.(C) No.602 OF 2017 And SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) .. Diary No.24901 OF 2017 , For the Appearing Parties : Mr.P.S.Patwalia,ASG., Mr.B.K. Satija, AAG, Dr.Sudhir Bisla, Adv., Mr.Sanjay Kapur, AOR, Ms.Me ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l Corporation Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [2014 (3) SCC 183] has been doubted. The main issue is interpretation of section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, the Act of 2013 ) and section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act of 1894 ). 2. In Yogesh Neema Ors. v. State of M.P. Ors. [S.L.P. [C] No.10742 of 2008] vide order of 12.1.2016, observing that other question, that may arise undoubtedly to be considered question Nos. IV and V have been referred. Following questions arises for consideration: I. What is the meaning of the expression paid'/ tender' in Section 24 of the Act of 2013 and section 31 of the Act of 1894? Whether non-deposit of compensation in court under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 results into a lapse of acquisition under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. What are the consequences of non-deposit in Court especially when compensation has been tendered and refused under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 and section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? Whether such persons after refusal can take advantage of their wrong/conduct? II. Mode of taking p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... st absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (emphasis supplied) 6. Section 17 deals with special powers in cases of urgency. The same authorizes the Collector to take possession before passing of the award as provided in section 17(1) of the Act of 1894, and on taking possession of any land, such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Section 17 is extracted hereunder: 17. Special powers in case of urgency (1) In cases of urgency whenever the [appropriate Government], so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, subsection 1). [take possession of any land needed for a public purpose]. Such land shall thereupon [vest absolutely in the [Government], free from all encumbrances. (2) Whenever owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing convenien ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 11, the excess may, unless refunded within three months from the date of Collector's award, be recovered as an arrear of land revenue]. [(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the [appropriate Government] may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time [after the date of the publication of the notification] under section 4, sub-section (1). (emphasis supplied) Before taking possession of the land, it is necessary under Section 17(3A) to tender payment of 80% compensation unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 31, and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section 31(2), except the second proviso, shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. As required under section 17(3A) and section 17(3B), the amount paid or deposited under sub-section (3A) shall be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation to be tendered under section 3 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount: Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under section 18: Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. (3) Notwithstanding anything in this section the Collector may, with the sanction of the [appropriate Government] instead of awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land-revenue on other lands held under the same title, or in such other way as may be equitable having regard to the interests of the parties concerned. (4) Nothing in the last foregoing sub-section shall be construed to interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into any arrangement with any person interested in the land and competent to contract in respect thereof. 9. The provision of section 31(2) makes it clear that only in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fully entitled thereto. It is with the purpose as provided in section 31 when the amount is tendered it can be accepted under protest and still a reference can be maintained. In case awarded amount has been accepted without protest, reference cannot be maintained under section 18. 11. In case of incompetency of a person to alienate the land in question, amount has to be deposited in the reference court under section 31(2), and when money of such person is deposited in Court, court may order the money to be invested in the purchase of another land to be held under the like title and conditions of ownership, as the land, in respect of which, such money shall have been deposited, was held, or if such purchase cannot be effected forthwith, money can be invested in Government or other approved securities as the court shall think fit and has to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions contained in section 32. Section 33 deals with an investment of money deposited in other cases. 12. In case money is deposited in court otherwise than as provided under section 32, any party interested can apply to the court for investing the same in Government or other approved securities, is the pu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... posited or as near thereto as may be. 13. The provisions contained in section 34 deals with the exigencies where the amount of compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land. The Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon @ 9% from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited; and if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest @ 15% per annum shall follow. Section 34 of 1894 Act is extracted hereunder: 34. Payment of interest - When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of (nine per centum) per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited: [Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date or expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n award, under the Act of 1894, has not been passed, then, as per Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013, all the provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; where, however, an award under section 11 of the act of 1894 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue,as per section 24(1)(b), under the Act of 1894, as if the said Act has not been repealed. 17. Section 24(2) begins with a non-obstante clause - as notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1). The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 24 shall, under the exigencies provided therein, have the overriding effect, i.e. in case of award, under Act of 1894, has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, but either the physical possession has not been taken, or compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. The proviso to section 24(2) lays down when the award has been made and compensation in respect of majority of holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, the acquisition would not lapse; however, all the beneficiaries shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry. 20. It is apparent, from the provisions contained in section 77 of the Act of 2013, that, the expression used in section 77 that the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation to landowners/interested persons, and the obligation is to pay it to them by depositing the amount in their bank accounts unless prevented by exigencies provided in section 77(2), are akin to section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. 21. In proviso to section 24(2), expression used is compensation has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, which may be deposited separately in treasury also; whereas, in section 77, of the Act of 2013 the deposit is required, in the bank account of beneficiaries, unless refused. The expression bank-account has not been used in section 31 of the Act of 1894 or in section 24(2) of Act of 2013. In proviso to section 24(2), the expression used deposited in account would mean deposited only in Treasury or with the Land Acquisition collector for payment. 22. It is pertinent to mention that section 80 of the Act of 2013 also imposes a liability of interest, akin to Section 34 of the Act of 1894, upon amount not being deposited; i.e . 9% for the first year and, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 24(1)(b) provides that where an award under section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed. However, in case physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed; and, in case of compensation with respect to a majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries i.e. landowners shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. 25. In section 24(2), the expression that has been employed is compensation has not been paid . The expression deposited , which occurs in the proviso to sub-section (2), has not been used in the main section 24(2). Its proviso uses the expression deposited in the account of the beneficiaries , meaning thereby, in the case with respect to the majority of land holdings amount has not been deposited in the account of beneficiaries, though the acquisition would not lapse, all beneficiaries would get benefit of the compensation under the Act of 2013. Thus, the consequence of non-d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt to make the payment complete; if expression deposited is included in expression payment under Section 24(2), inconsistency and repugnancy would be caused as between the proviso and the main sub-section; which has to be eschewed. The Court cannot add the word deposited to the expression paid / tender in Section 31 of Act 1894 or Section 24(2) of Act of 2013. 30. The proviso to section 24(2) of the 2013 Act deals with deposit' of compensation in treasury or with Land Acquisition Collector with respect to the majority of holding it does obviously contemplate that amount has not been paid' to landowners/ beneficiaries/ interested persons. Thus, when Scheme of entire section 24 is considered, the concept of paid' in the main section 24(2) is different than the deposit. If the deposit is included in word paid the proviso to section 24(2), which has the different consequence of no lapse, but only higher compensation would be otiose and become redundant and repugnancy would occur. 31. It is clear that expression paid in section 24 is different than deposit which is provided in its proviso. The word deposit is included in section 24 in word paid . Same is the position even un ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the background of what we have said above. The proviso lays down that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. It will be clear that two kinds of punishment are subject to the conditions of the proviso, namely, discharge or dismissal. Any other kind of punishment is not within the proviso. Further, the proviso lays down two conditions, namely (i) payment of wages for one month and (ii) making of an application by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken. It is not disputed before us that when the proviso lays down the condition as to payment of one month's wages, all that the employer is required to do in order to carry out that condition is to tender the wages to the employee. But if the employee chooses not to accept the wages, he cannot come forward and say that there has been no payment of wages to him by the employer. Therefore, though s. 33 speaks of payment of one month's wages it can only mean that the empl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... v. M/s. Air France , the employer had offered one month's wages to the workman before the order of dismissal against him came into force. The offer was held to be sufficient compliance of the said condition laid down in the proviso, [(1955) 1 SCR 998] Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Industrial Tribunal, Delhi was a case where the wages were remitted by money order but the workman purposely refused to receive them. It was held that the employer could not be said not to have complied with the condition laid down by the proviso. It is thus clear that the condition as to payment in the proviso does not mean that the wages have to be actually paid but if wages are tendered or offered, such a tender or offer would be sufficient compliance for the purposes of Section 33(2)(b) proviso. 36. The word paid means applied, settled or satisfied. The concept of paid has also been considered by this Court in The Benares State Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow, (1969) 2 SCC 316, in the context of section 14(2)(c) of Income Tax Act, 1922. This Court observed that the expression paid in section 16(2) does not contemplate actual receipt of the dividend by the membe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that a Court cannot add or subtract a word; the expression compensation has not been paid is used in section 24(2); it is not open to the court to add to these words, or to substitute the said expression with any further expression, such as deposit . In the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh (14th edition), it has been observed that court has to avoid addition or substitution of the words. Thus, when the word paid is there, it is not open to adding deposited , particularly when the scheme of the Act of 1894 also contains different provisions in section 31(1) with respect to tender is payment, while section 31(2)deals with deposit in the court; on non-deposit consequence in section 34, later is not a payment made to the landowner. The deposit is only in certain exigencies with a view to wiping off the liability of making payment of interest as provided in section 34. 41(a). While interpreting a statutory provision, no addition to, or subtraction from, the Act is permissible. It is not open to Court to either add or subtract, a word. The legal maxim A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum means: from the words of law, there must be no departure. The learned author in Int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rmissible for the Court to reconstruct a statutory provision. In this case, the Constitution Bench prospectively overruled the decision of a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA , which had held that provisions of Part I would apply to international commercial arbitrations held outside India unless the parties, by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. x xxxx And, in construing section 14(f) of the U.P. Town Areas Act, 1914, which reads A tax on persons assessed according to their circumstances and property not exceeding such rate and subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed , the Supreme Court refused to read residence within the town area as a necessary part of the condition for imposition of the said tax. S.K. DAS, J. said, To do so will be to read in clause (f) words which do not occur there . Further, in interpreting section 6(a) and section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Supreme Court refused to read a further exception in section 43 excluding its operation in cases of transfer of spessuccessionis . VENKATARAMA AIYER, J. quoted with approval the observations of L ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... biguous construction has to be given without addition and substitution of the words. The temptation of substituting words by explaining what it thought legislation is endeavoring is to be discouraged. Court has to consider what has been said and what has not been said. It is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for the words of the statute. When literal reading produces an intelligible result it is not open to read words or add words to statute. Making any generous addition to the language of the Act would not be a construction of the statutory provision; rather, would be an amendment thereof. While interpreting the provision the Court only interprets the law. The intention of the legislation must be found by the words used by the legislature itself. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. When language of the provision is clear, there is no scope for reading something into it. The scenario that thus emerges in relation to an interpretationof a statute can be explained as follows. It is a salutary principle that it is not open to the Court to add or substitute some words in place of the words of the statute. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ayment of interest as envisaged under section 34 of the 1894 Act, and no more; deposit in Court is not tender to landowner. Once the amount has been tendered and not accepted, obligation to pay is discharged, as envisaged under section 31(1); no penal consequences can follow and, the person who has refused to accept cannot be permitted to take an advantage of his own wrong, or in case his conduct is of filing litigations, delaying the passing of the award or obtaining stay of the proceedings; such action would tantamount to refusal to accept compensation, and the person then may not even be entitled to higher rate of interest as envisaged under section 34. 44. While making statutory interpretation, inconsistency and repugnancy is to be avoided and harmonious construction has to be adopted. The construction to be adopted should be such, as would make the statute as a whole, a consistent enactment. Such a construction would have the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy, either within a given section or as between a particular section on the one hand and other parts of the statute on the other. It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash , as held in Raj Krushna ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2 All ER 109 at 115. There is no accidental omission as to the concept of payment in section 24(2) or section 31(1) of the aforesaid Acts. Thus, it is not permissible to supply the word deposited to include in the expression payment . 49(a). Rule of literal construction lays down that words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases, and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning. The learned author G.P. Singh, in Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th edition), at Page 91 onwards, has observed: ..Natural and grammatical meaning. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. The true way , according to LORD BROUGHAM is, to take the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those Words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, contr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further . The rules stated above have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court . (emphasis supplied) 49(b). This Court, in Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India , AIR 2002 SC 1351, at 1354 has observed thus : Legislature does not waste its words. Ordinary, grammatical and full meaning is to be assigned to the words used while interpreting a provision to honour the rule -- Legislature chooses appropriate words to express what it intends, and therefore, must be attributed with such intention as is conveyed by the words employed so long as this does not result in absurdity or anomaly or unless material -- intrinsic or external -- is available to permit a departure from the rule. (emphasis supplied) 50. Thus, in the instant case, when we give the plain, natural and grammatical meaning to the word paid / tender , which has been used in contradistinction to the words deposited in court , it is clear that tendering payment would not include deposit in court, in that it is only when payment is refused, that the same is deposited in court; obligation to pay is over as soon as amount is ten ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... refore in Zenith Steel Tubes v. Sicom Ltd, (2008) 1 SCC 533 : AIR 2008 SC 451 case referred to a larger Bench; D.L.F. Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana, 2003 AIR SCW 1046, p. 1057: AIR 2003 SC 1648: (2003) 5 SCC 622 (The expressions at his own cost and at its cost , used in one section given different meanings) (emphasis supplied) 51(b). The author has referred to the decisions in Brighton Parish Guardians v. Strand Union Guardians , 1891 QB 156, Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall , AIR 1956 SC 35 at p.38, and CIT v. East West Import Export (P) Ltd., Jaipur , (1989) 1 SCC 760, in that case this Court has observed : 7. The Explanation has reference to the point of time at two places: the first one has been stated as at the end of the previous year and the second, which is in issue, is in the course of such previous year . Counsel for the Revenue has emphasised upon the feature that in the same Explanation reference to time has been expressed differently and if the legislative intention was not to distinguish and while stating in the course of such previous year it was intended the convey the idea of the last day of the previous year ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eposit is made in the court or revenue treasury only upon happening of various exigencies as provided in Section 31, and there can be several other exigencies which are not covered under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 and in the statutory rules/orders. 52. In section 24 of the Act of 2013, brooks no lethargy on the part of authorities, the expression possession of the land has not been taken indicates a failure on the part of authorities to take for five years or more. 53. When we consider the intendment of the beneficial provisions of the Act of 2013, it addresses the concern of farmers and of those whose livelihood is dependent upon the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for myriad reasons, including urbanization, rural electrification et al. , in a timely and transparent manner. The legislature has not brook the delay of five years or more on part of authorities in completing the acquisition. When it says timely ,it would mean without delay on the part of authorities, not delay due to dilatory tactics and conduct of land owners/interested persons. EFFECT OF RULES FRAMED UNDER SECTION 55 OF 1894 ACT AND ORDERS ISSUED BY STATE GOVERNMENTS 5 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Acquisition (Kerala) Rules, 1990 were framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894 provided that the payment relating to an award shall be made or the amount credited to the court or Revenue deposit (Treasury) within one month from the date of award. 56. The state of Assam has also framed the rules dealing with deposit in exercise of power under Section 55 of the Act of 1894. Rule 9 whereof provides that on failure to collect the compensation if landowner/interested person does not appear, and do not apply for a reference to the civil court under section 18, the Collector shall after making endeavour to secure their attendance or make payment that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid into the Treasury as revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are respectively due, and vouched for in the form prescribed or approved by Government from time to time. He shall also give notice to the payee of such deposits, specifying the Treasury in which the deposits have been made. When no reference is sought for amount has to be deposited in treasury only. Rule 9 of Assam Rules is extracted hereunder: 9. In giving notice of the award under section 12(2) and tendering pay ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... notice of the award Under Section 12(2) and tendering payment Under Section 31(1) to such of the persons interested as were not present personally or by their representatives when the award was made, the officer shall require them to appear personally or by representatives by a certain date to receive payment of the compensation awarded to them, intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them if they fail to appear, if they do not appear and do not apply for a reference to the civil court Under Section 18, the officer shall after any further endeavours to secure their attendance that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid to the treasury as revenue deposited payable to the persons to whom they are respectively due and vouched for in the Form marked E below. The officer shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, specifying the treasury in which the deposit has been made. When then payees ultimately claim payment of sums placed in deposit, the amounts will be paid to them in the same manner as ordinary revenue deposit. The officer should, as far as possible, arrange to make the payments due in or near the village to which the payee belong in order ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... resort, the money is then to be deposited in the treasury. In any case, such deposit in the treasury is referable only to Section 31(1) and cannot ever be a substitute for deposit before the reference court as provided Under Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, which applies in the circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid Sub-section. We agree with aforesaid part of Sukhbir Singh (supra) related to section 31(1), however, not with respect to part relating section 31(2). 60. It is apparent from rules that when no reference is sought on refusal to accept, amount is to be deposited in treasury. Rules have to be harmonized with the provision in the Act, thus, it would be necessary to deposit in court when reference is sought. Thus, under section 31(2) provision of deposit in court on refusal would be attracted, when reference had been sought, as provided in rules. Section 31(2) does not come in play at all in cases of refusal to accept amount when reference has not been sought and deposit in treasury would be valid deposit even otherwise where reference is sought and person refuses to accept it only liability of non-compliance of deposit in Court would be higher interest under s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the rules framed under section 55 of Act of 1894 by various State Governments in case the amount has been deposited as per the proviso to section 24(2) in the treasury or with the Land Acquisition Collector with respect to majority of the holding the provisions contained in proviso to section 24(2), in our opinion, would be fully complied with. 63. A perusal of Section 24(2)of the Act of 2013 shows that the expression paid does not include deposit in it. The expression deposit would include deposit in terms of the rules also. Section 24(2) does not, in any manner, lay down that the amount cannot be said to have been deposited even when a deposit is made in terms of the mandatory rules, or in accordance with the applicable instructions. Deposit-in-treasury is stipulated under the rules made with reference to a constitutional provision, so also framed under Section 55 of the 1894 Act, as well as under other statutory or administrative powers. The deposit in treasury is not, in any manner, invalid. If the deposit is valid, there is no reason to hold that the said deposit has to be ignored. Government finances, after all, have to be handled as per the applicable rules. The deposit in t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ompensation time and again, once amount is deposited in treasury during the pendency of litigation. In case of landowner interdict, initial offer/ tender by refusal or otherwise by questioning the land acquisition itself would mean they do not want to accept the compensation, is reflected by their conduct in the litigation. In case of interim stay also authorities cannot offer the compensation as that would tantamount to violation of court's order and after interim stay ceases to operate, it is for the landowners to apprise the authorities of their intention not to take the litigation further and their willingness to accept compensation. Section 24(2) does not provide cover to such litigation. The intent of 2013 Act has been discussed in DDA v. Sukhbir Singh (supra) thus: 13. The picture that therefore emerges on a reading of Section 24(2) is that the State has no business to expropriate from a citizen his property if an award has been made and the necessary steps to complete acquisition have not been taken for a period of five years or more. These steps include the taking of physical possession of land and payment of compensation. What the legislature is in effect telling the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed in the Treasury as provided in statutory rules framed under section 55 of Act of 1894 and other standing order issued by State Governments, and there were decisions of this Court which have simply laid down that in case landowner is not responsible for delay in payment, at the most he may be entitled to interest on such amount, in case it has not been tendered/paid to him when possession has been taken. Similar provisions are made under sections 77 and 80 of the Act of 2013. All of a sudden it would not be appropriate considering the statutory rules which have been framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894 and order to invalidate all such land acquisitions which have taken place in various States in the country by laying down that once amount has not been deposited in the court but in treasury, acquisitions would lapse under section 24. It will be a very harsh operation of law as old Act never provided for such a consequence since 1894 the Act was enacted till new 2013 Act came into force. Same is not consequence in case acquisition is made under Act of 2013 is apparent from conjoint reading of sections 77 and 80 thereof. When there were such anomalous situation, the statutory ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ated in the Act of 2013 and invalidate acquisitions that have taken place in 1912, 1950s and 1960s onwards and have attained finality, as are sought to be reopened under the guise of 2013 Act taking advantage of the aforesaid technical aspect. Courts are duty-bound to thwart all such attempts as the land which has been acquired long back, it would not be possible to make payment of compensation as of the rate as provided in the Act of 2013 to undeserving persons at the cost of public revenue, and it would not be appropriate to interpret the provisions in such a manner to entertain stale and dead claims and to revive them on the ground of technical and procedural defaults, if any, and created by landowners conduct. The intendment of section 24 is that acquisition to be completed early. If authorities for no good cause fail to take steps for five years or more on their own the lapse of acquisition under section 24 to follow. 68. It would be appropriate to refer to maxim - Omnis Innovatio Plus Novitate Perturbat Quam Utilitate Prodest i.e. Every innovation made has to be, ultimately, adjudged from stand point of the events that follow it ; and, when we consider the after-effects of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... well established that mere non-examination or defective examination Under Section 342 of the 1898 Code is not a ground for interference unless prejudice is established, vide, K.C. Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin 1956 CriLJ 444, Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta and Anr. v. State of West Bengal 1969 CriLJ 654...... Similar view of the matter is taken in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thakkidiram Reddy , (1998) 6 SCC 554; Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh , AIR 1956 SC 116; Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh , (2010) 10 SCC 259; State of Punjab v. DavinderPal Singh Bhullar , AIR 2012 SC 364; and Bahamans v. State of Karnataka , (2012) 9 SCC 650. CONSEQUENCE OF NOT DEPOSITING THE AMOUNT UNDER SECTION 31 OF THE 1894 ACT : 71. The expression used in section 31 is not paid , it is only tender payment and there is obligation to pay compensation unless prevented by a cause under sub-section (2) of section 31. In case there is dispute as to person entitled to compensation or its apportionment in between person interested or person was not even competent to make alienation of property that has been acquired it would not be necessary to tender amount as it may not be so done du ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 34. 6. In the circumstances, the High Court was right in stating that interest was due and payable to the landowner. The High Court was justified in directing the necessary parties to appear in the executing court for determination of the amount. 73. In Kishan Das Ors. v. State of U.P. Ors . (1995) 6 SCC 240 this Court has laid down that in case the landowners have themselves delayed in disposal of acquisition proceedings, cannot claim higher rate of interest as that would amount to payment of premium for dilatory tactics. Even the interest under section 34 cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In case a person is indulging in litigation for adopting dilatory tactics, no divesting of land is provided under the Act of 1894 in case it is not deposited in court. Neither it is so provided in section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. The obligation to pay is discharged as soon as it is tendered unconditionally and made available to the landowners. Thereafter there is no further obligation to deposit it in court so as to save the acquisition. Only to save acquiring body from liability to pay interest at exorbitant rates, it may be deposited in court in certain cases where reference court comes i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e taken. In various States, Financial Code/Order/Rules deals with Government money and as such amount is required to be deposited in the Treasury by opening separate accounts of landowners/beneficiaries/claimants that would be full compliance of the proviso of section 24(2) of new Act. In Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh Ors . also, this court has rightly held that deposit in treasury by Land Acquisition Collector is permissible mode of deposit under section 31(1). 77. In Mahavir Ors. v. Union of India , [SLP [C] No. 26281/2017] this Court has held: 9. Section 31(1) of the Act requires tender of compensation which is tendered in terms of section 12 of the Act. Section 12 provides a mode of informing claimants as to compensation. Section 31(2) of the Act requires Collector to deposit amount in court in case it is not received by the persons interested or there is some dispute. Under the Act, the deposit is required only with a view to avoiding liability to pay interest. Deposit in the Court is not a payment made to the owner. It is only to avoid liability to pay interest that too at higher rates on the failure of deposit. Once it is deposited the liability to pay interes ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n there is absolute vesting of the land in the State under the provisions of the Act of 1894 whether it can be divested by virtue of the provisions made in section 24 of 2013 Act. The concept of absolute vesting in the State under Act of 1894 is well settled and on award being passed, possession being taken, compensation being offered but refused, section 24 would not apply in such a situation to divest the State if the land is acquired. No different intention appears from section 24 to divest the land once it has absolutely vested in the State in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1894. Merely by obtaining interim order or keeping the litigation pending or filing it afresh that too by way of stale and belated claim after the Act of 2013 has come into force, no divesting of land is contemplated. It is only in exigencies provided deemed lapse take place either when possession not taken or compensation not paid as provided in Section 24(2) and where award has not been passed, the provisions of section 24 of Act of 2013 applies. In a catena of decisions, this Court has laid down that as provided in section 16 of the Act of 1894, when an award is passed and possession is take ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urchased the land had improved upon the land and is, therefore, entitled to be an equitable owner of the land. We wholly fail to appreciate the view taken by the High Court. The learned Judge had net referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and law. It is an undisputed fact that consequent upon the passing of the award under Section 11 and took possession of the land, by operation of Section 16 of the Act, the right, title and interest of the erstwhile owner stood extinguished and the Government became absolute owner of the property free from all encumbrances. Thereby, no one has nor claimed any right, title and interest in respect of the acquired land. Before the possession could be taken, the Government have power under Section 48(1) of the Act to denotify the land. In that event, land is required to be surrendered to the erstwhile owners. That is not the case on the facts of this case. Under these circumstances, the Government has become the absolute owner of the property free from all encumbrances, unless the title is conferred on any person in accordance with a procedure known to law, no one can claim any title much less equitable title by remaining in possession. The tr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hile owner of the land after publication of the notification under Section 4(1), do not bind either the State Government or the beneficiary for whose benefit the land was acquired. The purchaser does not acquire any valid title. Even the colour of title claimed by the purchaser was void. The beneficiary is entitled to have absolute possession free from encumbrances. In U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and Anr. v. M/s. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow, and Ors. [1996] 1 SCC 124, this Court had further held that the purchaser of the property, after the notification under Section 4(1) was published, is devoid of right to challenge the validity of the notification or irregularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the declaration under Section 6. As regards laches in approaching the Court, this Court has been consistently taking the view starting from State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai and Ors. [1964]6SCR261 wherein a Constitution Bench had held that it is not either desirable or expedient to lay down a rule of universal application but the unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner, the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, ce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... laid down in the aforesaid decisions. Of course, the procedure of vesting can be looked by court if questioned and once entry is handful, it vests absolutely in State and the Act of 2013 does not reopen and divest State Government of the land. 2013 Act would come only in the cases where vesting of land has not taken place in the State Government. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust , AIR 1957 SC 344, this Court has observed thus: 25. That the word vest is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, s. 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that such property shall thereupon vest in the receiver. The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... diary in the estate to which the declaration applied, shall stand vested in the State free from all encumbrances. Section 6 does not have the effect of divesting the State of the vested right, title and interest of the intermediary. One of the rights is the right to take possession of the land held by the intermediary. The section excluded the operation of Sections 4 and 5, viz., the interest of the respondent to retain khas possession was saved subject to his making the application in the prescribed form. It was held that the fishery rights stood vested in the State. 18. In Brighu Nath Sahay Singh v. Mohd. Khalilur Rahman the appellants were proprietors of certain lands in Touzi (new) No. 8655 in Saraunja village in District Begusarai in Bihar which was sought to be declared as private lands in a civil suit. The courts granted the decree but the High Court reversed the decree. On appeal, this Court had held that on publication of the notification under Section 3, the lands stood vested in the State. The pre-existing right, title, and interest held by the appellants stood ceased. They cannot, therefore, claim khas possession of the lands in occupation of the tenants. 19. In Labanya ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e rendered impossible of fulfillment due to change in law by the Legislature. Besides this, such a settled expectation or the so-called vested right cannot be countenanced against public interest and convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the law. (Vide: Howrah Municipal Corpn. and Ors. v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. and Ors. (2004) 1 SCC 663. 22. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any contingency. Such a right can arise from a contract, statute or by operation of law. A vested right can be taken away only if the law specifically or by necessary implication provide for such a course. 82. On proper reading of section 24, it is clear that no divesting is contemplated under the provision. Provisions of section 24 when award is passed, possession is taken, compensation has been tendered, vesting takes place. There is no deemed lapse under section 24 in such a case. In case of urgency also before award is passed as provided in section 17(1), 17(3A) vesting takes place on fulfillment of conditions. 83. It is settled law that accrued rights cannot be taken away by repealing statutory provisions. The repealing law must provide for taking away such rights expressly or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aken Compensation tendered but not accepted under section 17(1) of the Act or section 16 of Act of 1894 vesting takes place. IN RE: QUESTION NO.II: MODE OF TAKING PHYSICAL POSSESSION AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 24(2) OF ACT OF 2013 AND THE ACT OF 1894: 86. Intrinsically connected with Question No.1 is the question of taking physical possession as contained in section 24(2) of Act of 2013 when it can be said that possession has been taken. When we consider the same, question arises what is the meaning of physical possession not taken in section 24(2) when the State is involved in taking possession of the property acquired it can take possession by drawing a Panchnama. The normal rule of State possessing the land through some persons would not be applicable in such cases. On open land, possession is deemed to be of owner. When the State acquired the land and has drawn memorandum of taking possession that in the way the State take possession of large chunk of property acquired as State is not going to put other persons in possession or its police force or going to cultivate it or start residing or physically occupy it after displacing who were physically in possession as in the case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities, as that would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it. 87(b). In Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A.Viswam (Dead) by LRs. , (1996) 8 SCC 259, this Court has held that recor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document. v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilized in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the Court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken. 87(d). In State of Tamil Nadu Anr. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal Ors . (1996) 7 SCC 269, this Court has held: Possession of the acquired land would be taken only by way of memorandum, Panchnama which is a legally accepted form. This Court observed: 9. It is well settled law that publication of the declaration under Section 6 gives conclusiveness to public purpose. Award was made on September 26, 1986 and for Survey No. 2/11 award was made on August 31, 1990. Possession having already been undertaken on November 24, 1981, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion of the land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession . 5. Under these circumstances, merely because the appellant retained possession of the acquired land, the acquisition cannot be said to be bad in law. It is then contended by Shri Parekh that the appellant-Institution is running an educational institution and intends to establish a public school and that since other land was available, the Government would have acquired some other land leaving the acquired land for the appellant. In the counter-affidavit filed in the High Court, it was stated that apart from the acquired land, appellant also owned 482 canals 19 marlas of land. Thereby, it is seen that the appellant is not disabled to proceed with the continuation of the educational institution which it seeks to establish. It is then contended that an opportunity may be given to the appellant to make a representation to the State Government. We find that it is not necessary for us to give any such liberty since acquisition process has already been completed. (emphasis supplied) 87(f). In P. K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka Ors . (2005) 12 SCC 489, this Court hel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ailable in the paper book. It is settled law that where possession is to be taken of a large tract of land then it is permissible to take possession by a properly executed Panchanama. [videSita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Govt. of NCT, Delhi (2009) 10 SCC 501]. 86. It is not in dispute that the Panchnama has not been questioned in any proceedings by any of the appellants. Though it is stated that Chanakyapuri Cooperative Society is in possession at one stage and ShriVenkateshawar Enterprises was given possession by the owners and possession was also given to Golden Hill Construction Corporation and thereafter it was given to the purchasers, the fact remains that the owners are not in possession. In view of the same, the finding of the High Court that the possession was taken by the State legally and validly through a Panchnama is absolutely correct and deserves to be upheld. 87(j). In M. Venkatesh Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority etc . (2015) 17 SCC 1, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has opined: 17. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in Ajay Krishan Shinghal v. Union of India, Mahavir v. Rural Institute , Gian Chand ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t and DVDs. and CDs were seen to hold that landowners were in possession. District Judge, Indore, recorded the statements of the tenure-holders, which were referred to by this Court in the said judgment. Said decision has to be treated as confined to its own facts, as the mode adopted for determining the possession by the help of Commissioner is doubtful. The Commissioner could not have determined the factum of possession. It is the function of the court and this cannot abdicate to Commissioner its function. Even under Order XXVII CPC function of Commissioner is not to determine possession and once possession has been taken, whether there was re-entry or trespass had not been examined in the said case. However, statements recorded by the District Judge were also taken into consideration in Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra). The decision in said case is to be taken as confined to the facts and cannot be said to be of universal application. Subsequent DVD/CD are not going to establish whether possession, in fact, was taken earlier. Such mode of determining the possession by subsequent material is not of much value as there can be re-entry in possession after possession had been taken. I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... instances, been made as far back as the first and the second decade of the 20th century or decades before, are being routinely urged before various courts, including this Court and is involved in several instant cases. To that end, proceedings are being filed anew, even though everything appertaining the concerned acquisition proceedings, including several rounds of legal challenge to the same, has attained finality decades ago. The question is whether it is permissible to assert for resuscitation of such claims, placing them under the umbrella of the provisions of Section 24. 92. An instance of such a claim, put forth before this Court, was argued and decided within the confines of the case titled as Mahavir Ors. v. Union of India Anr., numbered as SLP (C) No. 26281/2017, decided on 8.9.2017. This was a petition filed with respect to an area known as the Raisina Hills , located in the Lutyens Zone of New Delhi. 93. The question arose as to whether the court can interfere in such cases? The Court s discussion on the legal aspects involved in Mahavir s case (supra), and its decision thereon, is summarized hereunder. The petition was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, holdi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Dharappa v. Bijapur Co-operative Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd. [(2007) 9 SCC 109], had an occasion to consider the effect and operation of section 10(4A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; the section had been inserted via an amendment made to the Act. With regard to the same, the Court observed that delay, if has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost or rendered unavailable, would be fatal. It was held that the time limit of 6 months, prescribed by section 10(4A), should be interpreted so as not to revive stale and dead claims, for it would not be possible to defend such claims due to lapse of time and due to material evidence having been lost or rendered unavailable. In Dharappa (supra), it was observed; 29. This Court while dealing with Section 10(1)(c) and (d) of the ID Act, has repeatedly held that though the Act does not provide a period of limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10(1)(c) or (d), if on account of delay, a dispute has become stale or ceases to exist, the reference should be rejected. It has also held that lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would be fatal if it has resulted i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se it for want of adequate time to enforce it, though they have a cause of action or right as on the date when the new remedy or relief comes into effect. 31. Section 10(4A) does not, therefore, revive non-existing or stale or dead claims but only ensures that claims which were live, by applying the six month rule in Section 10(4A) as on the date when the Section came into effect, have a minimum of six months time to approach the Labour Court. That is ensured by adding the words or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, which is later to the words within six months from, the date of communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination. In other words all those who were communicated orders of termination during a period of six months prior to 7-4-1988 were deemed to have been communicated such orders of termination as on 7-4-1988 for the purpose of seeking remedy. Therefore, the words within six months from the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later only enables those who had been communicated order of termination within six months prior to 7-4 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Corporation of Athani,(1969) IILLJ651SC, which has stood overruled, the order of the High Court is unsustainable. This position is also supported by the reasoning in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma , 1977] 1 SCR 996. It may be seen that under the Central Act sans the Karnataka amendment there was no right to approach the principal civil court of original jurisdiction to compel a reference and no time limit was also fixed for making such an approach. All that was required of a claimant was to make an application for reference within six weeks of the award or the notice of the award, as the case may be. But obviously the State Legislature thought it necessary to provide a time frame for the claimant to make his claim for enhanced compensation and for ensuring an expeditious disposal of the application for reference by the authority under the Act fixing a time within which he is to act and conferring an additional right on the claimant to approach the civil court on satisfying the condition precedent of having made an application for reference within the time prescribed. 10. A statute can, even while conferring a right, provide also for a repose. The Limitation Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aims once over again. Once Panchnama has been drawn and by way of drawing the Panchnama physical possession has been taken, the case cannot be reopened under the guise of section 24 of Act of 2013. 99. Section 24 is not intended to come to the aid of those who first deliberately refuse to accept the compensation, and then indulge in ill-advised litigation, and often ill-motivated dilatory tactics, for decades together. On the contrary, the section is intended to help those who have not been offered or paid the compensation despite it being the legal obligation of the acquiring body so to do, and/or who have been illegally deprived of their possession for five years or more; in both the scenarios, fault/cause not being attributable to the landowners/claimants. 100. We are of the view that stale or dead claims cannot be the subject-matter of judicial probing under section 24 of the Act of 2013. The provisions of section 24 do not invalidate those judgment/orders of the courts where under rights/claims have been lost/negatived, neither do they revive those rights which have come barred, either due to inaction or otherwise by operation of law. Fraudulent and stale claims are not at all ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ect elaborately discussed by this Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N. (2002) 3 SCC 533. 12. Even in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, the legislature had brought about amendment in Section 6 through an Amendment Act of 1984 to add Explanation I for the purpose of excluding the period when the proceeding suffered stay by an order of the Court, in the context of limitation provided for publishing the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. To a similar effect was the Explanation to Section 11-A which was added by Amendment Act 68 of 1984. Clearly, the legislature has, in its wisdom, made the period of five years under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act absolute and unaffected by any delay in the proceedings on account of any order of stay by a Court. The plain wording used by the legislature are clear and do not create any ambiguity or conflict. In such a situation, the Court is not required to depart from the literal rule of interpretation. In Shree Balaji (supra) a Division Bench of this Court has opined that their conscious omission made by the legislature in section 24(2) of Act, 2013 to exclude the period covered by the interim order of the Court staying the acquisition pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r proceedings etc., there is no justification for authorities to proceed any further with respect to payment of compensation or otherwise as these obligations are intertwined in the scheme of land acquisition. Everything stands still till the interim order is vacated. There are cases also in which we have come across that the High Court in writ petition has illegally set aside the acquisition on impermissible reasons and during the pendency of the writ appeal or matter before this Court, the provisions of Act of 2013 have come into force. Such matters have to be decided on their own merits and the benefit of any illegal quashment of land acquisition by the High Court cannot come in the way of adjudication of the dispute on merits considering situation when it was filed as Act does not cover cause of illegal order, in view of the provisions contained in repeal and saving in section 114 of the Act of 2013 read with and section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act and no different intention appears in such matters in view of provisions contained in section 24 of the Act of 2013. 105(a). In Abhey Ram (Dead) by LRs. Ors. v. Union of India Ors . (1997) 5 SCC 421, this Court considered the ext ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be applicable to others also who had not obtained stay in that behalf. We are not concerned with the correctness of the earlier direction with regard to Section 5-A enquiry and consideration of objections as it was not challenged by the respondent union. We express no opinion on its correctness, though it is open to doubt. (emphasis supplied) 105(b). In Om Parkash v. Union of India Ors . (2010) 4 SCC 17, this Court observed thus : 72. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted in one of the matters of the landowners would put complete restraint on the respondents to have proceeded further to issue notification under Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued the said notification during the period when the stay was operative, then obviously they may have been hauled up for committing contempt of court. The language employed in the interim orders of stay is also such that it had completely restrained the respondents from proceeding further in the matter by issuing declaration/ notification under Section 6 of the Act. (emphasis supplied) 105(c). In Shiv Raj (supra), it was noted by this Court that there was stay of dispossession when the writ petition was pending but this Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . A Constitution Bench of this Court in Shyam Sunder Ors. v. Ram Kumar Anr . (2001) 8 SCC 24, held that substantive rights of the parties are to be examined on the date of the suit unless the legislature makes such rights retrospective. This Court observed: 28. From the aforesaid decisions the legal position that emerges is that when a repeal of an enactment is followed by a fresh legislation such legislation does not affect the substantive rights of the parties on the date of suit or adjudication of suit unless such a legislation is retrospective and a court of appeal cannot take into consideration a new law brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered because the rights of the parties in an appeal are determined under the law in force on the date of suit. However, the position in law would be different in the matters which relate to procedural law but so far as substantive rights of parties are concerned they remain unaffected by the amendment in the enactment. We are, therefore, of the view that where a repeal of provisions of an enactment is followed by fresh legislation by an amending Act such legislation is prospective in operation and does not af ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e complainant is required to resort to the Court within one year of the discovery of the offence if he is to have the benefit of proceeding under the Act. That means that if the complaint is presented within one year of such discovery, the requirements of Section 15 are satisfied. The period of limitation, it should be remembered, is intended to operate against the complainant and to ensure diligence on his part in prosecuting his rights, and not against the Court. Now, it will defeat the object of the enactment and deprive traders of the protection which the law intended to give them if we were to hold that unless process is issued on their complaint within one year of the discovery of the offence, it should be thrown out. It will be an unfortunate state of the law if the trader whose rights had been infringed and who takes up the matter promptly before the Criminal Court is, nevertheless, denied redress owing to the delay in the issue of process which occurs in Court . (emphasis supplied) 105(g). This Court in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases , (2014) 2 SCC 62, relied upon decision in DauDayal (supra) and observed: 29. Section 473 reads as under: 473. Extensi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or do anything further, as such the consequences of interim orders cannot be used against the State. It is basic principle that when a party is disabled to perform a duty and it is not possible for him to perform a duty, is a good excuse. It is a settled proposition that one cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The doctrine commodum ex-injuria sua Nemo habere debet means convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. No person ought to have advantage of his own wrong. A litigant may be right or wrong. Normally merit of lis is to be seen on date of institution. One cannot be permitted to obtain unjust injunction or stay orders and take advantage of own actions. Law intends to give redress to the just causes; at the same time, it is not its policy to foment litigation and enable to reap the fruits owing to the delay caused by unscrupulous persons by their own actions by misusing the process of law and dilatory tactics. 107. In Suresh Chandra v. Gulam Chisti (supra), it has been laid down that no man can be made to suffer because of court's faults or court's delay in disposal of suits. It was held that in case it could not be the argument that if t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , it would not mean that in the provisions of section 24, there is casus omissus it is not to be readily inferred. In the provisions contained in section 19 of the Act of 2013 there is prescription of the period of limitation in which a declaration has to be issued, it was equivalent to section 6 of the Act of 1894, as such the provision of exclusion has been made alike the previous provision, so also in section 69. Section 24 as couched did not contemplate providing cover to the litigation and its fruits to be reaped. The absence of provision for excluding the period of stay/ injunction of a Court order does not at all affect the provision of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. It intended that authority should not keep pending acquisition due to laxity on their part for five years or more. It never intended to apply in case they were not able to perform obligation due to court order or conduct of landowners. Obviously the legal provisions have to be interpreted in the light of the settled principles of common law unless they are excluded, and in case a person is litigating for several decades, non-acceptance of compensation and questioning the acquisition, cannot be permitted to as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah's case (supra). In Nanjudaiah's case (supra), the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Court's order. Such a view cannot reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only Clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. 15. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole - appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (supra), held that such a view could not be reconciled with the language of section 6(1), and in this regard, further observed, that explanation to section 6 excluded only that period during which any action or proceeding, initiated in pursuance of the notification issued under section 4 (1), had been stayed by an order of a court. When the legislature has specifically provided for the periods covered by the order of stay and injunction, the Court observed no other period could be said to be intended to be excluded, by providing time period to run from date of service of the High Court s order; in that, it was not open to the court to add to that period. 112. The question for consideration in Padma Sunder Rao (supra) was entirely different from what we are concerned with. In the instant case, the question is not of the exclusion of period, but is of the application of the Common Law maxims, and of what it is that section 24 of the Act of 2013 intends; the issue before us is not as to add to the period of limitation, with which the Court in the case of Padma Sunder Rao (supra) was concerned. Thus, the ratio of the said decision has a different field to operate on, and consequently, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... plication. 115. The afore-extracted observations in respect of the principle of interpretation that if something is expressed in a provision, anything contrary is impliedly excluded, are themselves based on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius . This maxim has been held to have limit of operation and is not of universal application in Mary Angel v. State of Tamil Nadu (1999) 5 SCC 209. Thus, mere fact that in some of the provisions there is a mention about period of stay being excluded, cannot be taken to be conclusive that in other provisions with respect to the effect of stay not to be considered or common law maxims have no applicability in the context of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The Court in Mary Angel has observed : 19. Further, for the rule of interpretation on the basis of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius , it has been considered in the decision rendered by the Queen's Bench in the case of Dean v. Wiesengrund (1955) 2 QBD 120. The Court considered the said maxim and held that after all it is more than an aid to construction and has little, if any, weight where it is possible, to account for the exclusiounius on grounds other than intention ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e against an assessment at any other time in the circumstances of a case like the one before us where no assessment , as it is understood in Jaw, took place at all. On the other hand, Rule 10A indicates that there are residuary powers of making a demand in special circumstances not foreseen by the framers of the Act or the rules. If the assessee disputes the correctness of the demand an assessment becomes necessary to protect the interests of the assessee. A case like the one before us falls more properly within the residuary class of unforeseen cases. We think that, from the provisions of Section 4 of the Act read with Rule 10A, an implied power to carry out or complete an assessment, not specifically provided for by the rules, can be inferred. No writs of prohibition or mandamus were, therefore, called for in the circumstances of the case. Thus, the Common Law principles, as discussed by us, cannot be ousted, to do complete justice to parties and to prevent miscarriage of justice, within purview of section 24 of the Act of 2013. DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILITY 117. In several cases it is often seen that the landowners are not ready to accept the compensation even though they have been ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... possibly be performed by owing to the adamant attitude and conduct of such landowners; it is a settled proposition of law that law does not expect a party to do the impossible. It was urged that the maxim impossibilium nullaobligatio est would come to the rescue of State authorities in such cases. The doctrine has been dealt with by this Court in Chander Kishore Jha v. Mahabir Prasad (1999) 8 SCC 266 thus: 13. In our opinion insofar as an election petition is concerned, proper presentation of an election petition in the Patna High Court can only be made in the manner prescribed by Rule 6 of Chapter XXI-E. No other mode of presentation of an election petition is envisaged under the Act or the Rules thereunder and therefore, an election petition could, under no circumstances, be presented to the Registrar to save the period of limitation. It is a well-settled salutary principle that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. [See with advantage: Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. State of Vindhya Pradesh 1954 CriLJ 910 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh and Ors. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the compensation their right to question the acquisition would stand wiped off. They could not even claim higher compensation in Reference Court, in case they accept the compensation without protest. It is only after accepting the compensation under protest that they can seek reference under section 18 of the Act of 1894. 121. Learned Counsel has relied upon decision in Industrial Finance Corporation of India Ltd. v. Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. (2002) 5 SCC 54 in which the Court observed: 30. The Latin Maxim referred to the English judgment lax non cogit ad impossibilia also expressed as impotentia excusat legem in common English acceptation means, the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. There ought always thus to be an invincible disability to perform the obligation and the same is akin to the Roman Maxim nemo tenetur ad impossibilia In Broom's Legal Maxims the state of the situation has been described as below:- It is, then, a general rule which admits of ample practical illustration, that impotentiaexcusatlegem; where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uses Act should be applied in cases where it does not otherwise in terms apply. The principles underlying are lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel a man to do the impossible) and actus curiae neminem gravabit (the act of Court shall prejudice no man) . Above being the position, there is nothing infirm in the orders passed by the Forums below. However, the rate of interest fixed appears to be slightly on the higher side and is reduced to 9% to be paid with effect from 03.12.2001, i.e., the date on which the letter was received by HUDA. (emphasis supplied) 123. In Re: Presidential Poll , (1974) 2 SCC 33 this court has observed: (v) The maxim of law impotentia excusat legem is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legem is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses, The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him. Therefore, when it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... himself of such refusal; for, although the debtor still remains liable to pay whenever required so to do, yet the tender operates in bar of any claim for damages and interest for not paying or for detaining the debt, and also of the costs of an action brought to recover the demand (y). A tender of the amount to be paid operates as a bar upon any claim for damages and interest. 127. Thus, in the context of the factual and legal scenario of the land acquisition proceedings, and of the conduct of the landowners/claimants, with which we are presently concerned, when once tender of the amount had been made, in any of the prescribed modes, which met with refusal to accept it and/or by the conduct of indulging in incessant litigation which, in some instances, culminated into a stay/interim order, the party which thus refused to accept the amount, indulging instead in the theater of the absurd , cannot turn around and contend that the other party should now be visited with the penalty for non-payment. The author Broom, in regard to the maxim, has remarked thus: Further, we may remark that the maxim which precludes a man from taking advantage of his own wrong is, in principle, closely alli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hall gain an advantage; and (3) the gaining should be in derogation of the right of the other persons interested in the property. The section, read with illustration , clearly lays down that where an obligation is cast on the mortgagee and in breach of the said obligation he purchases the property for himself, he stands in a fiduciary relationship in respect of the property so purchased for the benefit of the owner of the property. This is only another illustration of the well-settled principle that a trustee ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of the trust. The same principle is comprised in the latin maxim commodum convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. To put it in other words, no one can be allowed to benefit from his own wrongful act .. (emphasis supplied) 130. It was submitted on behalf of the landowners that once the court finds prima facie case and interim order is granted, the litigant couldn t be said to be at fault. A merit ultimately examined finally in the case and is found to be meritless. In such circumstances the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit comes to the rescue of the opposite party who has suffered due to interim order and was un ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... yed by an interim order of the High Court in the writ petition. While dismissing the writ petition and revoking the Stay order, the High Court directed the appellant to pay interest at 17.5% per annum from the date of the order of Stay till recovery. This Court reduced the rate of interest to 12% per annum and on the facts and circumstances directed that this amount should be recovered from 1st of January, 1985 till payment, this being the year in which the matter was Finally decided by this Court as a result of which the writ petition came to be dismissed by the High Court. (emphasis supplied) 131(b). This Court in Jaipur Municipal Corpn. v. C.L. Mishra (2005) 8 SCC 423 has observed that interim order merges in final order, it cannot have independent existence, cannot survive beyond is. Thus, no benefit of interim order can be taken. 131(c). This Court in Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P. (1992) 2 SCC 620, relying upon earlier decision in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta (1980) 2 SCC 191, held that no one can suffer from the act of the court and in case an interim order has been passed and petitioner takes advantage thereof and ultimately petition is found to b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... entitled to a relief, assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated in the same manner in which the parties would have been if the interim order of the Court would not have been passed. The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the Court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost. 11. In the facts of this case, in spite of the judgment of the High Court, if the appellants would not have persuaded this Court to pass the interim orders, they would not have been entitled to operate the mining leases and to raise and remove and disposed of the minerals extracted. But for the interim orders passed by this Court, there is no difference between the appellants and any person raising, without any lawful authority, any mineral from any land, attracting applicability of Sub-section (5) of Section 21. As the appellants have lost from the Court they cannot be allowed to retain the benefit earned by them under the interim orders of the Court. The High Court has rightly held the appellants liable to be placed in the same position in which they would have been if this Court wo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... avowed object of speedier trial the case of the appellant had been transferred to the High Court but on grounds of expediency of trial, he cannot be subjected to a procedure unwarranted by law, and contrary to the constitutional provisions. The appellant may or may not be an ideal politician. It is a fact, however, that the allegations have been brought against him by a person belonging to a political party opposed to his but that is not the decisive factor. If the appellant Shri Abdul Rehman Antulay has infringed law, he must be dealt with in accordance with the law. We proclaim and pronounce that no man is above the law, but at the same time reiterate and declare that no man can be denied his rights under the Constitution and the laws. He has a right to be dealt with in accordance with the law and not in derogation of it. this Court, in its anxiety to facilitate the parties to have a speedy trial gave directions on 16th February 1984 as mentioned hereinbefore without conscious awareness of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Courts under the 1952 Act and that being the only procedure established by law, there can be no deviation from the terms of Article 21 of the Constitu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itution Bench in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases , (2014) 2 SCC 62, has considered the aforesaid maxim; it observed: 39. As we have already noted in reaching this conclusion, light can be drawn from legal maxims. Legal maxims are referred to in Bharat Kale, Japani Sahoo and Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.). The object of the criminal law is to punish perpetrators of crime. This is in tune with the well known legal maxim 'nullum tempus aut locus occurritregi', which means that a crime never dies. At the same time, it is also the policy of law to assist the vigilant and not the sleepy. This is expressed in the Latin maxim 'vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt'. Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides limitation period for certain types of offences for which lesser sentence is provided draws support from this maxim. But, even certain offences such as Section 384 or 465 of the Indian Penal Code, which have lesser punishment may have serious social consequences. Provision is, therefore, made for condonation of delay. Treating date of filing of complaint or date of initiation of proceedings as the relevant date for compu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce within the period mentioned in Section 7(2) of the New Act. The State did not endeavour to obtain appropriate orders to surmount the difficulties by reason of the injunction against taking steps within the time contemplated in Section 7(2) of the New Act. The State is guilty of default. The State had remedies open to take steps by asking for modification of the order. The State had to assert the right that the State was entitled to demand taxes and the respondent was liable to pay the same. The State followed the policy of inactivity. Inactivity is not impossibility. The order injunction is not to be equated with an act of God or an action of the enemy of the State or a general strike. In the aforesaid case, there was the fault on part of the State. The State failed to assert rights. The State was guilty of defaults and did not take steps within time contemplated under section 7(2) of the said Act. The case turned on its own facts. 133. Reliance has also been placed in this regard on Neeraj Kumar Sainy Ors. v. State of UP Ors. , (2017) SCC Online SC 258, wherein this court has observed: 31. It is noticeable from the aforesaid passage that the interpretation was made in accordanc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . 135. The common law principles are in fact rules of equity, justice, and sound logic. In the absence of there being prohibition in the law, these principles would be attracted. The efficacy and binding nature of such common law principles cannot be diminished or whittled down in the absence of any express prohibition in law. They are interpretation of section 24 of Act of 2013. 136. The question then arises as to what the position would be in case State authorities were, by an order of the court, restrained from taking possession, though they would have otherwise taken the possession in the absence of such an order; and, ultimately, there is no merit found in the lis in which challenge to acquisition had been raised and interim order had been passed. The question is whether the provisions of Section 24 (2) contemplate such a situation, and whether such period is to be excluded from within the purview of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, where the authorities have been, during the interregnum of a litigation, brought at the instance of landowner/beneficiary, restrained by the act of the court, interdicting the steps which would have been taken by the authorities but for such an inter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution or decree or order or the court or indirect consequence of a decree or order (See Zafar Khan and Ors. v. Board of Revenue, U.P., and Ors., : [1985] 1 SCR 287. In law, the term 'restitution' is used in three senses; (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another. (See Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, p.1315). The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari Joseph M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that 'restitution' is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging of something which has been taken and at times referring to compensation for injury done. Often, the result in either meaning of the term would be the same. ..... Unjust impoverishment, as well as unjust enrichment, is a ground for restitution. If the defendant is guilty of a non-tortuous misrepresentation, the measure of recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution, such factors as relative fault, the agreed upon risks, and the fairness of alte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court under Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved. Cairns, L.C., said in Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, (1871) L.R. 3: One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors and when the expression, the act of the Court is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case . This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it, A.A. Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami, (1971) 1 MLJ 220 . In the exercise of such inherent power the Courts have applied the principles of restitution to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced, we are, therefore, or the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the court withholding the release of money had remained in operation. (emphasis supplied) 140(b). The doctrine of restitution in common law principle lies in conscience of court, it had also been discussed in State of Gujarat v. Essar Oil Ltd ., (2012) 3 SCC 522; it was held that: 61. The concept of restitution is virtually a common law principle and it is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust benefit. The core of the concept lies in the conscience of the Court which prevents a party from retaining money or some benefit derived from another which he has received by way of an erroneous decree of Court. Such remedy in English Law is generally different from a remedy in contract or in tort and falls within a third category of common law remedy which is called q ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt judgments are reproduced hereunder: 170. This Court in Grindlays Bank Limited v. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta (1980) 2 SCC 191 observed as under: When passing such orders the High Court draws on its inherent power to make all such orders as are necessary for doing complete justice between the parties. The interests of justice require that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court, by the mere circumstance that it has initiated a proceeding in the court, must be neutralised. The simple fact of the institution of litigation by itself should not be permitted to confer an advantage on the party responsible for it. 171. In Ram Krishna Verma and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 620 this Court observed as under: The 50 operators including the Appellants/ private operators have been running their stage carriages by blatant abuse of the process of the court by delaying the hearing as directed in JeevanNathBahl's case and the High Court earlier thereto. As a fact, on the expiry of the initial period of grant after Sept. 29, 1959, they lost the right to obtain renewal or to ply their vehicles, as this Court declared the schem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng prolixity, at every stage providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay, unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage and person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is also known fact that after obtaining a decree for possession of immovable property, its execution takes long time. In such a situation for protecting the interest of judgment creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate order so that reasonable mesneprofit which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property. In appropriate cases, Court may appoint Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property to act as an agent of the Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty amount fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to the Plaintiff in whose favour decree is passed and to protect the property including further alienation. 174. In Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh CM (Main) No. 449 of 2002 decided by the Delhi High Court on 6.11.2008, the court held as u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , the obvious wrongdoers, use one after another tier of judicial review mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that dice is always loaded in their favour, since even if they lose, the time gained is the real gain. This situation must be redeemed by the Courts . 184. In Ouseph Mathai and Ors. v. M. Abdul Khadir (2002) 1 SCC 319 this Court reiterated the legal position that: (SCC p.328, para 13) 13. [the] stay granted by the Court does not confer a right upon a party and it is granted always subject to the final result of the matter in the Court and at the risk and costs of the party obtaining the stay. After the dismissal, of the lis, the party concerned is relegated to the position which existed prior to the filing of the petition in the Court which had granted the stay. Grant of stay does not automatically amount to extension of a statutory protection. 188. In a relatively recent judgment of this Court in Amarjeet Singh and Ors. v. Devi Ratan and Ors. (2010) 1 SCC 417 the Court in para 17 of the judgment observed as under: (SCC pp.422-23) 17. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... justice must adopt a pragmatic approach and in appropriate cases realistic costs and compensation be ordered in order to discourage dishonest litigation. The object and true meaning of the concept of restitution cannot be achieved or accomplished unless the courts adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with the cases. (emphasis supplied) 140(d). In Krishnaswamy S. Pd. Anr v. Union of India Ors ., Civil Appeal Nos.3376-3377 of 2000 decided on 21.02.2006 this Court has considered the question of restitution. This court has relied upon Eastern Coalfield s case (supra) and observed: The maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit ' i.e. an act of Court shall prejudice no man is an important one. The maxim is founded upon justice and good sense, and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law , said Cresswell J. in Freeman v. Tranah (12 C.B. 406). An unintentional mistake of the Court which may prejudice the cause of any party must and alone could be rectified. The maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit : an act of court shall prejudice no man, is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. 144. Thus, section 6 of the General Clauses Act provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force. Section 6(b) provides that it would not affect any previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Section 6(e) provides that it will not affect any investigation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... red under Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. Reliance was also placed on the decision in Prem Nath Kapur (supra) wherein this Court had observed : 13. Thus we hold that the liability to pay interest on the amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) continues to subsist until it is paid to the owner or interested person or deposited into court under Section 34 read with Section 31. Equally, the liability to pay interest on the excess amount of compensation determined by the Civil Court under Section 26 over and above the compensation determined by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 subsists until it is deposited into court. Propriovigore in case of further enhancement of the compensation on appeal under Section 54 to the extent of the said enhanced excess amount or part thereof, the liability subsists until it is deposited into court. The liability to pay interest ceases on the date on which the deposit into court is made with the amount of compensation so deposited. As held earlier, the computation of the interest should be calculated from the date of taking possession till date of payment or deposit in terms of Section 34 or deposit into court in ter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sion in Pune Municipal Corpn. (supra) has been followed. A Circular of Government of India, Ministry of Urban Development has also been quoted to clarify the statutory provisions of the Act of 2013. A Circular issued by the Government on advice of its law officer cannot be said to have force of law. It was based on certain legal opinion. The circular issued cannot be said to have any binding force with respect to actual legal position. As already discussed there is no discussion in said case with respect to the impact of the interim order of stay or litigation which has prevented the authorities from taking action in Shiv Raj (supra). 145(g). In Magnum Promoters Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India Ors . (2015) 3 SCC 327, Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) and Pune Municipal Corpn . (supra) had been followed, for the reasons mentioned above, and apart from that, it was found by the court that possession of the building was not taken and the record did not indicate that it was ever taken. 145(h). In Karnail Kaur Ors. v. State of Punjab Ors . (2015) 3 SCC 206 the Amendment Ordinance to amend the Act of 2013 came up for consideration. The second proviso to section 24(2) to be i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gh Ors . (2016) 12 SCC 504, the award was not passed when the Act of 2013 came into force. Thus, it was rightly held by this Court that the acquisition proceedings would continue but with a rider that the award will have to be passed and compensation determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act. This Court has passed the aforesaid orders in view of the provisions contained in section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013. There is no dispute with the proposition. 145(l). In Sharma Agro Industries v. State of Haryana Ors. , (2015) 3 SCC 341, decisions of this Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. (supra), Bimla Devi (supra), Shree Balaji Residential Association (supra) and Shiv Raj (supra) have been followed. It proceeds on the same reasoning as that of Pune Municipal Corpn . (supra). 145(m). In Pawan Kumar Aggarwal v. State of Punjab Ors . (2016) 7 SCC 614, decision in Karnail Kaur (supra) has been followed. In that case, there is not much discussion. Only the fact has been mentioned that the appellant has not been dispossessed, as such protection under section 24(2) was available. PRINCIPLE OF PER INCURIAM : 146. The concept of per incuriam signifies those decisions rendered in ignorance or for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [1944] 2 AER 293. Also see the observations of Lord Goddard in Moore v. Hewitt [1947] 2 A.E.R. 270-A and Penny v. Nicholas [1950] 2 A.E.R. 89. per incuriam are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the Court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong. See Morelle v. Wakeling [1955] 1 All E.R. 708. Also, see State of Orissa v. The Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. [1985]3SCR26 . We are of the opinion that in view of the clear provisions of Section 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, these directions were legally wrong. 47. In support of the contention that a direction to delete wholly the impugned direction of this Court be given, reliance was placed on Satyadhvan Ghoshal v. Deorajini Devi [1960] 3 SCR 590 . The ratio of the decision as it appears from pages 601 to 603 is that the judgment which does not terminate the proceedings, can be challenged in an appeal from final proceedings. It may be other ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... judicial administration precedents which enunciate rules of law form the foundation of the administration of justice under our system. Therefore, it has always been insisted that the decision of a coordinate bench must be followed. (Vide: Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Patel and Ors . AIR 1968 SC 372; Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability v. Union of India and Ors . (1992) 4 SCC 97; and State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Association and Ors . (1998) 5 SCC 637). 18. In Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Anr. v. Harish Kumar Purohit and Ors. (2003) 5 SCC 480, this Court held that a bench must follow the decision of a coordinate bench and take the same view as has been taken earlier. The earlier decision of the coordinate bench is binding upon any latter coordinate bench deciding the same or similar issues. If the latter bench wants to take a different view than that taken by the earlier bench, the proper course is for it to refer the matter to a larger bench. 149. It was contended on behalf of the landowners that since the decisions of Pune Municipal Corporation as well as of Shivraj case (supra) are of Three Judges bench then propriety requires that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was no subsisting acquisition and award. When Act of 2013 came into force thus no question could have been raised as to non-compliance with section 24 for five years or more. Thus, there was no question of taking possession or payment of compensation as per provisions contained in section 24(2). The provisions contained in section 24 could not be said to be applicable after quashing/lapse of the proceedings. Thus, when the provisions of section 24 were not attracted to the fact situation of the case in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), the decision cannot be said to be an authority on a question which, in fact, did not arise for consideration of this court. Thus, the decision rendered on a question which was not germane to the case cannot be said to be a binding precedent it is obiter dicta and thus has to be ignored. 151. When the High Court has quashed the land acquisition in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), as we have held that period of interim stay has to be excluded once the High Court has quashed the land acquisition in case it was illegally quashed, the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit would come to the rescue for the acquiring body and it could not have said that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for consideration which uses different expression deposited' than paid' in main section 24(2) which carry a different meaning. 7. What is the meaning of expression paid' as per various binding decisions of this court when the obligation to pay is complete as held in Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v. Gobind (supra), Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi Anr . (supra), Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayan Bhoumik (supra) and the Benares State Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow, (supra) and other decisions were not placed for consideration. 8. The binding decisions of the court as to the consequence of non-deposit in Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi Anr . (supra), Kishan Das Ors. v. State of U.P. Ors . (supra) and Seshan Ors. v. Special Tehsildar Land Acquisition Officer, SPICOT, Pudukkottai (supra) etc. were not placed for consideration while deciding the case. 9. The maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria i.e. no man can take advantage of his own wrong of filing litigation and effect of refusal to receive compensation was not placed for consideration while deciding the aforesaid c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of 1894 and not lapse of acquisition. Once the amount of compensation has been unconditionally tendered and it is refused, that would amount to payment and the obligation under section 31(1) stands discharged and that amounts to discharge of obligation of payment under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 also and it is not open to the person who has refused to accept compensation, to urge that since it has not been deposited in court, acquisition has lapsed. Claimants/landowners after refusal, cannot take advantage of their own wrong and seek protection under the provisions of section 24(2). Q. No. II :- The normal mode of taking physical possession under the land acquisition cases is drawing of Panchnama as held in Banda Development Authority (supra). Q. No. III :- The provisions of section 24 of the Act of 2013, do not revive barred or stale claims such claims cannot be entertained. Q. No. IV :- Provisions of section 24(2) do not intend to cover the period spent during litigation and when the authorities have been disabled to act under section 24(2) due to the final or interim order of a court or otherwise, such period has to be excluded from the period of five years as provided in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ). To understand the real controversy to be determined in this question, it is better to have the facts set out in brief, as hereunder: The Indore Development Authority ( the IDA ), acquired land for the purpose of constructing a Ring Road and Link Road on the outskirts of Indore city. A notification under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, of 1894 (for brevity 1894 Act ) was issued on 23.12.1994. The compensation was deposited by the IDA with the Land Acquisition Collector. The landowners were informed to collect it, but they refused and did not take the compensation. Enquiry under section 5A was dispensed with. Declaration under section 6 was published on 17.3.1995 under the 2013 Act. Award was passed by the LAO on 14.03.1997. W.P. No.1182 of 1997 was filed seeking quashing of the acquisition proceedings. It was allowed on 28.8.1998 holding that the scheme lapsed on expiry of three years, and that enquiry under section 5A was illegally dispensed with. Letters Patent Appeal No.480 of 1998 was preferred before the Division Bench and on 29.01.2000 an order of status quo was passed. The LPA was dismissed as not maintainable. However, this Court in a S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holding has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ppears that the land in respect whereof the same was awarded belonged to any person who had no power to alienate the same, the Court shall- (a) order the money to be invested in the purchase of other lands to be held under the like title and conditions of ownership as the land in respect of which such money shall have been deposited, was held, or (b) if such purchase cannot be effected forthwith, then in such Government or other approved securities as the Court shall think fit; and shall direct the payment of the interest or other proceeds arising from such investment to the person or persons who would for the time being have been entitled to the possession of the said land, and such moneys shall remain so deposited and invested until the same be applied- (i) in the purchase of such other lands as aforesaid; or (ii) in payment to any person or persons becoming absolutely entitled thereto. (2) In all cases of moneys deposited to which this section applies, the Court shall order the costs of the following matters, including therein all reasonable charges and expenses incident thereon, to be paid by the Collector, namely: - (a) the costs of such investments as aforesaid; (b) the costs ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 013 Act, the State deposited the compensation amount in the Treasury. The Court, on examining the rival contentions, interpreted Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act in light of Section 31 of the 2013 Act to hold that where the landowners do not accept compensation pursuant to the Collector s award, the compensation is paid only when it is deposited in Court . If compensation is not deposited in Court in such a case, it will not be considered as having been paid as per Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, and the acquisition proceedings lapse (provided that the award was made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act). The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder, 17. While enacting Section 24(2), Parliament definitely had in its view Section 31 of the 1894 Act. From that one thing is clear that it did not intend to equate the word paid to offered or tendered . But at the same time, we do not think that by use of the word paid , Parliament intended receipt of compensation by the landowners/persons interested. In our view, it is not appropriate to give a literal construction to the expression paid used in this sub-section [sub-section (2) of Section 24]. If a literal constr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a, (2011) 11 SCC 506 , which interpreted Section 34 of the 2013 Act in light of Prem Nath (supra) to hold that interest accrues on a deposit in the revenue account of the State until such compensation amount is deposited in Court. It held thus, 22. In the light of the abovesaid principle, we are of the view that the contentions of the respondents cannot be accepted. The Act requires that the interest be deposited in court, and the same has been upheld in Prem Nath Kapur (supra). 23. In the present case, the respondents did not deposit the amount in court, but in their revenue account and utilized the same. Even if the respondent State does pay the compensation to the claimants directly, and the same is not collected, the respondent State cannot then keep the said money with itself and utilize it. In such cases, after a reasonable period, if the claimants do not come forward to collect compensation, then it should be deposited in court by the State. Allowing the State to keep the compensation with itself and utilizing it cannot possibly be permitted being contrary to the provisions of the Act and the law laid down in Prem Nath Kapur (supra). Hence, the judgment of the High Court is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e land and have not paid the compensation to the appellant or had deposited the said compensation before an appropriate forum. The same rationale was adopted in Bimla Devi Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2014) 6 SCC 583 . In Vijay Latka v. State of Haryana, (2016) 12 SCC 487 , this Court extended the ratio of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) to mean that the land owner is not required to come and receive the payment in cases of compulsory acquisition. It held as follows, 5. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents is that whoever approached the Haryana Urban Development Authority or the competent authority has been paid compensation and since the appellants failed to approach the quarters concerned for the compensation, they cannot be granted any relief. We find this contention difficult to appreciate. When a land is compulsorily acquired, it is for the requisitioning authority to make the payment and does not require the landowner to come and receive the payment. 6. As and when land is taken over by way of acquisition, the landowner has to be compensated with the amount of compensation duly determined under the Act. In case there is any dispute as to who is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... roper place. 3. Must conform to the terms of obligation. 4. Must be made at the proper time. 5. Must be made in the proper form. 6. The person by whom the tender is made must be able and willing to perform his obligations. 7. There must be reasonable opportunity for inspection. 8. Tender must be made to the proper person. 9. It must be of full amount. 14. We are not entitled to read the words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be formed within the four corners of the Act itself. However, a statute is to be read as a whole. A statute has to be understood by making construction on all the parts together and not of one part only by itself. Every clause in a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act,as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. An intention to produce unreasonable result is not be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available. Where, to apply words literally would defeat the obvious int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ble conclusion that the word payment as found in sub-section 2 of Section 24 has a strong link or co-relation with the word deposit . A reading of sub-section 2 of Section 24 along with the proviso would make it clear that even if the compensation in respect of minority of the land holdings is deposited in the account of such minority beneficiaries, the acquisition does not lapse. At the most, every land-loser is entitled to the higher compensation as per the provisions of the 2013 Act. Since the proviso does not refer to the words payment of compensation and as the main provision i.e. sub-section 2 of Section 24 does not refer to the word deposit , the only interpretation that is possible is that, if either deposit is made in the Treasury in the name of minority holders or payment is made at least to minority holders, the acquisition does not lapse. If the word paid as found in sub-section 2 of Section 24 is not treated as deposited in the account of beneficiaries, then the proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 24 would become otiose. It is well settled that no provision under the act can be rendered nugatory or otiose. 16. Section 31 of the 2013 Act is akin to Section 77 of the 201 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... positing the amount in Court as mandated in sub-section 2 of Section 31 may not result in extreme consequence of lapsing of acquisition. 18. Article 283(1) of the Constitution of India mandates that matters pertaining to custody of the Consolidated Fund of India and the Contingency Fund of India, the payment of moneys into such Funds, the withdrawal of moneys therefrom, the custody of public moneys other than those credited to such Funds received by the Government of India etc. shall be regulated by law made by the Parliament.Article 283(2) of the Constitution of India mandates that similar matters of the States Consolidated funds etc. are to be regulated by law made by the State Legislatures. States have framed rules pursuant to Article 283(2) of the Constitution of India as to how the public moneys are to be handled. Section 55 of the 1894 Act empowers the State to make rules for guidance of officers. Pursuant to Article 283(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 55 of the 1894 Act, various States, such as, Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Kerala, West Bengal, Delhi and Punjab have framed rules to govern the mode of payment of compensation. All of them provide for deposit into the Trea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... form (marked E). The officer shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, the Treasury in which the deposits specifying have been made. .. . The Uttar Pradesh Rules for the Payment of Compensation for Land Taken Up Under the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 read as follows, 6. In giving notice of the award under section 12(2) and tendering payment under section 31(1) to such of the persons interested as were not present personally or by their representatives when the award was made, the special officer shall require them to appear personally or by representatives by a certain date, to receive payment of the compensation awarded to them intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them if they fail to appear. If they do not appear, and do not apply for a reference to the Civil Court under section 18, the officer shall after any further endeavour to secure their attendance that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid in the Treasury as revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are respectively due, and vouched for in form E. The officer shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, specifying the Treasury in which the deposits have bee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... officer shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, specifying the treasury in which the deposit has been made. .. 20. The Punjab Standing Order No. 28 of 1909 was considered by this Court in the case of Sukhbir Singh (supra) , wherein it was observed that the said Standing Order provides for five modes of payment of compensation. The last one, namely, the payment of compensation into the Treasury, is for cases where the landowners fail to appear to receive their compensation. When such payment is made into the Treasury, the landowners for whom the deposits are made are required to be served with a notice of the deposits as well as the Treasury in which such deposits are made. The same provision with respect to issuing of notice to non-appearing landowners is made in the State Rules for Bihar, Orissa, Assam, West Bengal and Kerala. 21. It is clear that as per these State Rules, payment into the Treasury is nothing but a residuary mode of payment after efforts as per Rules have been made by the authorities to secure the attendance of the person entitled to compensation. The existence of such express provision in the rules, and the fact that this Court did not consider an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the Court will be charged off as expenditure in the public works accounts of the Collector, and the ultimate payments to the persons interested under the award shall be arranged for by the Court under the rules for the payment of Civil Court Deposits. Thus, it is not the position that a deposit in Court is the only legal form of deposit under the 1894 Act. Compensation was being credited to the Treasury in the past, even after the same was deposited in Court. Thus, the issue where the compensation is deposited is a matter of procedure. 24. When the State Rules and High Court rules permit deposits in the Treasury, it falls to reason that under the scheme of the 1894 Act, failure to pay or deposit in Court under Section 31(2) only had the effect of attracting interest payment as per Section 34 of the 1894 Act. 25. In Hissar Improvement Trust v. Rukmani Devi and Anr. (1990) Supp. 1 SCC 806 , this Court held that where compensation has not been paid or deposited on time in Court, the Collector is liable to pay interest to the landowners as per Section 34. It stated thus, 5. It cannot be gainsaid that interest is due and payable to the landowner in the event of the compensation not be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion to compensate the affected persons. It may not always be the case that persons who do not appear on the appointed date are refusing to accept compensation. It may also be that such affected persons had consented to receive compensation, but simply could not appear or could not be traced for some reason or the other. There may be thousands of such beneficiaries. In such a case, the Collector cannot hand over compensation to each beneficiary in person, but also cannot keep the money with him. He has to keep it in the Treasury. In fact, the State Rules have been framed to give notice to the landowners that their compensation has been deposited in the Treasury instead of the Court. In light of this, there is no harm done or prejudice caused if the State deposits compensation in the Treasury when landowners do not appear. In fact, as mentioned supra the compensation deposited in Courts is often kept in the Treasury. It is merely a matter of procedure as to where the landowners who do not appear on the appointed date, or the landowners who refuse to receive compensation, shall take their compensation from the Treasury. 29. The objective of directing a deposit of compensation in Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ught to the notice of the court or if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger bench; or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the views of the Supreme Court. A judgment that was decided perincuriam does not have to be followed as precedent by a court. 33. The doctrine has been examined at length by us. As per A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 , the doctrine of per incuriam is defined as follows: 42. per incuriam are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong. 34. In SiddharamSatlingappaMhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 ,this Courtdid not follow the decision of co-ordinate Benches which were opposed to the decision of an earlier Constitution Bench. The doctrine of per incuriam was explained as follows: 128. Now we deem it imperative to examine the issue of per incuriam raised by the learned counsel for the parties. In ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sonance with the relevant line of decisions rendered by this Court earlier.Having gone through the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) , it cannot be said that the said judgment is through want of care or inadvertence. 38. In view of the discussion made supra, I conclude that I respectfully differ with the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and agree with the conclusion reached by my learned brothers. However, I may not subscribe to the views of my learned brothers that the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) is rendered per incuriam . 39. Hence, the proper course for me in light of my reasoning and opinion is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. In Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd., (2010) 13 SCC 336 this Court observed as under: 17. A coordinate bench cannot comment upon the discretion exercised or judgment rendered by another coordinate bench of the same court. The rule of precedent is binding for the reason that there is a desire to secure uniformity and certainty in law. Thus, in judicial administration precedents which enunciate the rules of law form the foundation of the administration of justice under our sys ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... laced persons was a prerequisite to submerging any of the villages in the dam. Thus, such a situation did indeed warrant urgency under Section 17 (1); further, there was an apprehension that the acquisition of land would get delayed by the operation of S. 5A; that there was clear application of mind to the invocation of the urgency clause. The High Court thus dismissed the writ appeals. Being aggrieved, the landowners appealed to this Court. Pending appeal, the 2013 Act came into force. 42.A two-judge bench of this Court on 12.01.2016 referred the matter to a larger bench, on the abovementioned Question Nos. 2 and 3. 43. On one hand, it was contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the landowners that periodof interim stay could not be excluded from the calculation of the period of five years or more under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The statute is a beneficial legislation. The Court could not supply casus omissus , as the intention of the Legislature in omitting it was evident. While it amended other provisions to exclude stay period, it did not amend Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 44. On the other, it was submitted by the learned counsel on behalf of the State that period ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... unaffected by any delay in the proceedings on account of any order of stay by a court. The plain wordings used by the Legislature are clear and do not create any ambiguity or conflict. In such a situation, the court is not required to depart from the literal rule of interpretation. 46. In Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu,(2002) 3 SCC 533 this Court held that a Court cannot supply casus omissus into Section 6 of the 1894 Act. After the High Court quashes a declaration made under Section 6, there is no provision for a further limitation period of one year for a fresh Section 6 declaration to run from the date of receipt of the High Court order. It stated that the limitation period must necessarily run from the date of the Section 4 notification as per clause (i) of the proviso to Section 6. The reasoning of this Court was as follows, 12. The rival pleas regarding re-writing of statute and casus omissus need careful consideration. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. An intention to produce an unreasonable result , said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878), is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available . Where to apply words literally would defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result , we must do some violence to the words and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C. (1963 AC 557) where at p. 577 he also observed: this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges .] 16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , the advisory seeks to clarify that the new law shall apply only if the situation of pendency continues unchanged for a period that equals to or exceeds five years. In my view, it should be further clarified that in none of the cases the period of five years would have elapsed pursuant to an award made under Section 11 from the date of commencement of the Act and that the benefit of Section 24(2) will be available to those cases which are pending and where during pendency, the situation has remained unchanged with physical possession not being handed over or compensation not having been accepted and the period equals to or exceeds five years. 4. Limitation: As regards this item relating to the period spent during litigation would also be accounted for the purpose of determining whether the period of five years has to be counted or not, it should be clarified that it will apply only to cases where awards were passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, 5 years or more prior to 1.1.2014 as specified in Section 24(2) of the Act, to avoid any ambiguity.Since this legislation has been passed with the objective of benefiting the land-losers, this interpretation is consist ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court as they have been in possession of the acquired land. The above contentions of the learned Solicitor General cannot be accepted by us as the said principle of law laid down by this Court in the above referred case has no application to the fact situation on hand in view of the clear statement of law laid down by this Court in the above referred cases after interpreting the provisions of the 2013 Act and therefore, the reliance placed upon the said decision is misplaced. 21. In Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra), it was opined that after adverting to the decisions of the Privy Council and this Court, that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not exclude any period during which the land acquisition proceedings might have remained stayed on account of stay or injunction or status quo order regarding possession of the land granted by any court. It was conclusively held that the Legislature has consciously omitted to extend the period of five years indicated in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, even if the proceedings had been delayed on account of an order of stay or injunction granted by a court of law or for any reason. 49. Various High Courts have followed suit, such ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ants therein. In this case, it is seen that though the notification was issued in September 1976, the writ petitions came to be filed in the High Court immediately thereafter in 1977 and obviously further proceedings were stayed. Accordingly, the Land Acquisition Officer delayed the award. After the dismissal of the writ petitions, the appellants came to this Court and obtained status quo. Obviously, the Land Acquisition Officer was not in a position to pass the award immediately. Thereafter, it would appear that he passed the award on 22.3.1983. Section 34 of the Act obligates the State to pay interest from the date of taking possession under the unamended Act @ 6 per cent and after the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 at different rates mentioned therein. The liability of the State to pay interest ceases with the deposit made as per Section 34 of the Act. Further liability would arise only when the court on reference under Section 18 enhances the compensation under Section 28 of the Act. Similarly, in an appeal under Section 54 of the Act if the appellate court further increases the compensation, then again similar obligation under Section 28 arises. (emphasis supplied) Clearly, stay ord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tical and ordinary sense of the words in the statute must be adhered to unless it would lead to absurdity, repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument. One of the earliest cases that discussed supplying casus omissus in cases of necessity was CIT v. National Taj Traders, (1980) 1 SCC 370 where a two-Judge bench of this Court held as follows, 10. Two principles of construction-one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole-appear to be well settled. In regard to the former the following statement of law appears in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) at page 33: Omissions not to be inferred - It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express. Lord Mersey said: 'It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do.' 'We are not entitled,' said Lords Loreburn L.C., 'to read words into an Act of Parliament unless cl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... held that casus omissus may be supplied when there is clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself . This means that while casus omissus must not be readily inferred, all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This applies squarely to the facts of the case on hand. Casus omissus must be supplied to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act due to the necessity and the need for consistency. Undoubtedly, the power to legislate remains with the Legislature. If a provision of the Act is inconsistent or ambiguous, the same needs to be clarified for bringing the meaning of the said provision consistent with the rest of the Act, if need be, by supplying meaning to such provision. In the present case, there are many provisions in the 2013 Act which exclude periods of interim stay, such as Section 19(7) and the Explanation to Section 69(2) of that Act. It only makes the statute more consistent if Section 24(2) is read in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... applied this principle to land acquisitions. 59. It is often the case in proceedings against land acquisitions that the affected parties seek an interim stay of the acquisition proceedings until the matter has attained finality. An interim stay prevents the State from acquiring the land and following subsequent procedure under the Act, be it the publication of notifications, making of the award, taking possession of the acquired land, or paying and depositing of compensation. If the State does not adhere to the stay order, it will be held up for contempt. In such a situation, it may take months and indeed years before the matter attains finality, during which the State is prevented from carrying out the acquisition proceedings. In a given case, it may take five to ten years or more before the case passes through the Single Judge of the High Court, the Division Bench of the High Court, and finally the Supreme Court, or even sent back to the High Court to be decided afresh on some point. It may well be years before possession is taken and compensation is paid to the landowners. As stated earlier, the State is precluded from taking possession for no fault of its own. 60. Failing to s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s before the Hon ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. II QUESTION NO. 2 AND QUESTION NO. 3 : For the aforementioned reasons, I am unable to persuade myself to agree with Sree Balaji (supra) , and the samestands overruled. Question No. 2 and Question No. 3 posed by the reference stand answered as follows: i The conscious omission referred to in paragraph 11 of the judgment in Sree Balaji (supra) does not make any substantial difference to the legal position with regard to the exclusion or inclusion of the period covered by an interim order of the Court for the purpose of determination of the applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. In fact, excluding such periods of interim stay from the calculation of the time period of five years under S. 24(2) makes a reading of the Act more consistent. ii The principle of actus curiae neminemgravabit , or that the act of the court should not prejudice any parties, would be applicable in the present case to exclude the period covered by an interim order for the purpose of determining the question with regard to taking of possession as contemplated in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. ORDER We unanimously agree to the answers giv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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