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TMI Blog1945 (9) TMI 4X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e depends. The deed itself was executed in favour of Alangarammal, his wife. The executant says: I am now nearly 62 years of age and have become old. Since you are my wife and on account of love and affection which I have towards you, I am bound to maintain you till your lifetime and further since I have made arrangement to take in adoption on 29th Ani of this year (13th July, 1930), Parthasarathi, minor son of Gomatam Krishnaswami Aiyangar, aged about ten years, and since I have for similar reasons decided as it is necessary that an arrangement should be made, during my lifetime itself, for your food, clothe, etc., expenses, I have in pursuance thereto, executed wholeheartedly in your favour this settlement deed. 2. It is recited t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... econd defendant (second appellant) in 1934 and eventually died in April 1941. The third defendant is not a material party. The suit out of which the present appeal arises was filed in July, 1941, by the adopted son against the surviving widow and the natural born son for recovery of possession of the property covered by the settlement deed. In the written statement the defendants pleaded that the alleged deed of settlement read with the deed of adoption conferred upon the plaintiff only such rights as he would have as a member of a joint family and therefore on the death of Thiruvengadachariar the plaintiff would have to share the property with the defendants. In paragraph 5, it was also pleaded that the settlement deed was a maintenance ar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... xecutant thought that he would die first and so provides that the property shall be enjoyed by his wife during her lifetime. But at the same time he also contemplates the contingency of the wife predeceasing him and provides for that event, as follows, namely, in the event of her death during his lifetime he shall enjoy the aforesaid house and site subject to the conditions aforesaid. Reading the entire document it is clear that the executant did not intend that the adopted boy should have any right or interest in the property so long as he or his wife was alive. He obviously intended that the boy whom he was going to take in adoption should succeed to the property with absolute rights according to the ordinary rules of devolution. One thin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... roperty and therefore on the birth of the second defendant he had to share the property with him. He cited for this proposition the well-known decisions in Magalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar (1901)11MLJ210, Janakiram Chetty v. Nagamony Mudaliar (1925) 50 M.L.J. 413: I.L.R. 49 Mad, 98 and the recent decision in Velayudhan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR1945Mad195 . The general proposition is well established in Madras but the fallacy underlying the argument of Mr. Raghava Rao is that when the decisions describe the property in the hands of the son as ancestral, they do so with reference to the descendants of the son who acquire by birth a right in the paternal estate. If the settlement deed did confer a vested remainder ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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