9911796707
TMI Blog1985 (5) TMI 251X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... its title to the suit land admeasuring 3.55 acres being a portion of Survey No. 114 and for an injunction restraining the State of Tamil Nadu (Defendant-Appellant) from interfering with its possession and enjoyment of the same. The Plaintiff-Madam claimed title to the suit land on the basis of its long and uninterrupted possession since prior to 1938 as also under an Order of Assignment (Ex. A-1) dated 29.1.1938 issued in its favour by the Zamindar of the erstwhile Sivaganga Estate whereby the Kudi right (i.e. right to cultivate) in that land was granted to it subject to the payment of a nominal nuzzur of Re. 1 per acre and an annual rent of Re. 1 per acre beside cesses and a Teervapat Cowle Patta was directed to be issued in favour of its trustee Sutha Chaithya Swamigal. It appears that the plaintiff-Madam applied on 25.11.1953 for a Ryotwari Patta in respect of this land after the abolition of the Sivaganga Estate under the Act and the Additional Settlement Officer merely informed the Plaintiff-Madam that its petition would receive consideration when s. 11 inquiry would be taken up. But subsequently, without reference to the Plaintiff-Madam the Additional Settlement Officer passe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Division Bench further held that the plaintiff's suit was not for obtaining a ryotwari patta in its favour (which matter lay within the powers and jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer) but the suit was for injunction restraining the defendant from disturbing plaintiffs' possession and enjoyment of the suit land on the basis of its title and long and uninterrupted possession and such relief the Civil Court could obviously grant. In the other matter (Civil Appeal No. 1633 of 1971) also, after an adverse order had been passed by the Settlement Officer to the effect that the land in question was neither a ryoti land en Ramnad Zamindari nor the private property of erstwhile Zamindar, the plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration of their title to the suit land (based on a registered sale deed) and for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession. In that suit one of the issues raised pertained to the nature or character of the suit land, whether it was a ryoti land in the erstwhile Ramnad Zimindari which had been taken over under the Act or a Poromboke (communal property) and the plea was that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of- (a) all ryoti lands which, immediately before the notified date, were properly included or ought to have been properly included in his holding and which are not either lanka lands or lands in respect of which a land- holder or some other person is entitled to a ryotwari patta under any other provision of this Act; and (b) ... ... ... ... It is thus clear that before a ryotwari patta can be had under s. 11 (a) two conditions must be satisfied (a) the applicant must be a ryot in an estate and (b) the land in respect of which the patta is sought must be ryoti land . The expression 'estate' has been defined in s. 2(3) of the Act to mean-a 'Zamandari' or an under-tenure or an inam estate. But the expressions 'ryot' and 'ryoti land' have not been defined in the Act but their definitions given in s. 3 of the Tamil Nadu Estate Lands Act, 1908 have been adopted for the purpose of the Act. Section 3(15) of the T.N. Estate Lands Act, 1908 defines 'ryot' thus: 'Ryot' means a person who holds for the purpose of agriculture ryoti land in an estate on condition of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The principles bearing on the question as to when exclusion of the Civil Court's jurisdiction can be inferred have been indicated in several judicial pronouncements but we need refer to only two decisions. In Secretary of State v. Mask and Company,(1) the Privy Council at page 236 of the Report has observed thus: It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh(2) Hidayatullah, C. J., speaking for the Court, on analysis of the various decisions cited before the Court expressing diverse views, culled out as many as 7 propositions; out of them the first two which are material for our purposes are these: (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunal the civil courts' juri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tlement, the acquisition of the rights of the land-holders in permanently settled and certain other estates in the State of Tamil Nadu and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates ; in other words the avowed object or purpose of the Act was to repeal the permanent settlement and acquire the rights of the land- holders i.e. all intermediaries like Zamindars, Jagirdars, under-tenure holders etc. on payment of compensation and convert the land holdings in such estates into Ryotwari settlements. Section 3, which seeks to abolish all the estates under the Permanent Settlement, provides that with effect on and from the notified date (which in relation to an estate means the date on which the provision of the Act shall come into force in that estate) the entire estate (including all communal lands, porombokes, other non-ryoti lands, waste lands, pasture lands, lanka lands, forest mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks, ooranies (including private tanks and ooranies) and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free from all encumbrances and the T.N. Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 and the T.N. Irrigat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... case may be, and decide in respect of which lands the claim should be allowed. (2)(a) Against a decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1), the Government may, within one year from the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion) into Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1954, or from the date of the decision, which-ever is later; and any person aggrieved by such decision may, within two months from the said date, appeal to the Tribunal. Provided that the Tribunal may, in its discretion, allow further time not exceeding six months for the filing of any such appeal: Provided further that the Tribunal may, in its discretion, entertain, an appeal by the Government at any time if it appears to the Tribunal that the decision of the Settlement Officer was vitiated by fraud or by the mistake of fact. (b) The decision of the Tribunal on any such appeal shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law. Section 16 deals with the liability to pay assessment, etc. for lands held under Ryotwari Pattas to the Government and it runs thus: 16. Liability to pay assessment, etc. to Government.-(1) Every person, whether a land-holder or a r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 's decision to grant or refuse to grant a Patta to a ryot under s. 11 is subject to be revised by the Director of Settlement under s. 5(2) as also by the Board of Revenue under s. 7(c) and the relevant Rules in that behalf and the decision of the Director of Settlement in revision is further revisable by the Board of Revenue under s. 7(d) of the Act. Then comes s. 64-C which accords finality to the orders passed by the Government or other authorities under the Act which we have earlier quoted in extenso. Now turning to the question raised in these appeals for our determination (it is true that s. 64-C of the Act gives finality to the orders passed by the Government or other authorities in respect of the matters to be determined by them under the Act and sub-s. (2) thereof provides that no such orders shall be called in question in any court of law. Even so, such a provision by itself is not, having regard to the two propositions quoted above from Dhulabhai's case (supra), decisive on the point of ouster of the Civil Court's jurisdiction and several other aspects like the scheme of the Act, adequacy and sufficiency of remedies provided by it etc., will have to be cons ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sion it is clear that any order passed by the Settlement Officer either granting or refusing to grant a ryotwari patta to a ryot under s. 11 of the Act must be regarded as having been passed to achieve the purposes of the Act, namely, revenue purposes, that is to say for fastening the liability on him to pay the assessment or other dues and to facilitate the recovery of such revenue from him by the Government; and therefore any decision impliedly rendered on the aspect of nature or character of the land on that occasion will have to be regarded as incidental to and merely for the purpose of passing the order of granting or refusing to grant the patta and for no other purpose. Secondly, the principle indicated in the second proposition enunciated in Dhulabhai's case (supra) requires that the statute, when it creates a special right or liability and provides for its determination, should also lay down that all questions about the said right or liability shall be determined by the Tribunal or authority constituted by it, suggesting thereby that if there is no such provision it will be difficult to infer ouster of the Civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate all other questi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be different but that question is not before us. Thirdly, having regard to the principle stated by this Court while enunciating the first proposition in Dhulabhai's case (supra) it is clear that even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the special tribunal the civil court's jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the special tribunal one will have to see whether such special tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which Civil Court would normally grant in a suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of Civil Court's jurisdiction. Now take the case of an applicant who has applied for a ryotwari patta under s. 11 staking his claim thereto on the basis of his long and uninterrupted possession of the ryoti land but the Settlement Officer on materials before him is not satisfied that the land in question is ryoti land; in that case he will refuse the patta to the applicant. But can he, even after the refusal of the patta, protect the applicant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lled in question in any Court of law the Civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such dispute has been excluded. Relying upon these decisions, counsel for the appellant urged before us that the civil court's jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the issue of real nature or character of the land should be held to have been excluded under s. 64-C of the Act which also accords finality to the Settlement Officer's order refusing to grant the ryotwari patta to a ryot under s. 11 of the Act on the ground that the land in question is not ryoti land. It is not possible to accept this contention for the two decisions are clearly distinguishable. In the first place s. 56 with which the Court was concerned in those cases does not contain the words for the purposes of the Act which occur in s. 64-C; and presumably in view of the absence of those words in the section this Court in M. Chayana's case observed that there was no warrant for taking the view that the Settlement Officer's decision under s. 56 (1) (c) on the question as to who was the lawful ryot of holding was only for the purpose of indentifying the person liable to pay the arrear of rent. Secondly under s. 56 ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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