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TMI Blog1915 (4) TMI 1X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s fashion; it is recognised in Section 8 of the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891, and the provisions now in question must be taken to have been enacted with reference to it. In Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subbaraya Ayyar I.L.R. (1915) Mad. 101, it was held with reference to this Act that the six years' period applicable under Article 116 to a registered contract continued to apply to a suit for rent under the Madras Estates Land Act which would otherwise have become barred by the coming into force of that Act at a time when the period of limitation prescribed by it for suits of this nature had already expired, In the present case the claim for rent was not barred at the date of the passing of the Act as it was kept alive under Section 7 of the Limitation Act owing to the minority of the plaintiff. Sections 210 and 211 enact rules of limitation for suits under the Act, and Section 211 expressly provides that Section 7 and certain other sections of the Limitation Act shall not apply to suits under this Act. Thus the result of the passing of the Act, which came into force two days after it received the Viceroy's assent, was to leave no opportunity for the exercise of the plaintiff&# ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... July. Section. 189 of the Act enacts that suits for arrears of rent shall be instituted in the Revenue Courts, and removes such cases for [from] the cognisance of Civil Courts. Section 211 provides that certain sections of the General Limitation Act shall not apply to suits instituted under the Act. The minority Section (7) is one of them. The present suit was instituted by the appellant in the Revenue Court after the Estates Land Act came into force. It is conceded that the suit would be barred, if Section 7 of the Limitation Act did not apply. I am forced to the conclusion that the suit is barred. The pre-existing right, which carried with it the benefit of the Limitation Act, was to institute the suit in the Civil Court. That right could not have been sued upon under the old law in the Revenue Court. The new forum is the creature of the statute. It was designed to afford a speedy remedy to the parties. The plaintiff has chosen to avail himself of that advantage. He is also bound by the disabilities which the law imposes on such persons. I can follow the argument which claims for the plaintiff the right, to institute his suit in the ordinary Civil Courts with the attendant advan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ay some rights confer others which are no less important. See also Ex parte Dawson (1875) L.R. 19 Eq. 433. On the ground that Section 211 is express, and on the further ground that the principle of retrospective extinguishments of vested rights does not arise in this case, I hold that the decision in Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subbaraya Ayyar (1915) 38 Mad. 101 does not affect this case. In Munjhoori Bibi v. Akel Mahmud (1912) 147 C.L.J. 316, Budhu Koer v. Hafiz Husain (1914) 18 C.L.J. 274 and Gopeshwar Pal v. Jiban Chandra (1914) 41 Calc. 1125, there was no express provision as in Section 211 of the Estates Land Act. Moreover in all those cases, a completed pre-existing right was -sought to be put an end to by implication. 6. On the other hand, where the statute provides for a new procedure for the enforcement of rights, it is always retrospective; per Lord Blackburn in Gardner v. Lucas (1887) 3 A.C. 582. In the present instance it is the procedure by which the arrears are to be recovered that is changed. The plaintiff is directed to seek redress in a Revenue Court instead of in the Civil Court. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Soni Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal (1913) 35 All. 227 la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der Section 77 of the Madras Estates Land Act, held that Section 211 of the Act applied and that the suits were barred as the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of Section 7 of the Limitation Act. The District Judge taking the same view confirmed the decrees of the Deputy Collector. In Second Appeal Mr. Justice Sankaran Nair held that Section 211 of the Estates Land Act applied retrospectively and barred suits which would have been in time but for the Estates Land Act; while Mr. Justice Sadasiva Ayyar was of a contrary opinion. 9. The question raised in this appeal is whether Section 211 id retrospective and bars suits which would have been in time if the ordinary law of limitation were applied. The point is not free from difficulty, but I am of opinion that both on principle and on the balance of authority the section ought not to be applied so as to kill causes of action that were alive on the date of the passing of the Act. 10. It is a well-known rule of construction that retrospective operation ought not to be given to a statute so as to take away vested rights unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment and that exc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ostponed the coming into operation of the Act on 1st January 1909. In Sundaramaiyah v. Muthu Ganapathegal (1912) M.W.N. 652 Justice Miller who was a party to Arayil Kali Amma v. Sankaran Nambudripad (1911) 34 Mad. 292, was of opinion that Section 210 of She Estates Land Act cannot be retrospective. As the assent of She Governor-General was received only about three days before the Estates Land Act came into operation and as it is doubtful if the public know of the assent before 1st July 1908 it cannot be said that the public had due notice. It cannot be said that they, were bound to assume that consent was a mere matter of form and would be given as a matter of course especially as petitions had been sent by landlords against the measure. 12. The question as to the retrospective operation of Section 210 was discussed in Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subbaraya Ayyar (1915) 38 Mad. 101, where it was held that the rule of limitation in Madras Act I of 1908 was inapplicable to cases when the period of three years provided by it had expired before the Act came into force. The judgment of Benson and Sundara Ayyar, JJ., deals exhaustively with the whole question and I see no reason to dissent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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