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Issues Involved:
1. Retrospective application of statutes 2. Vested rights of suit 3. Limitation periods under new legislation 4. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts vs. Revenue Courts Detailed Analysis: 1. Retrospective Application of Statutes: The primary issue concerns whether Section 211 of the Madras Estates Land Act should be applied retrospectively, thereby affecting the vested rights of suit. The Chief Justice, John Edward Power Wallis, emphasized that the principle to be applied is that where an Act contains provisions for the limitation of suits that take away a vested right of suit without providing an equivalent remedy, such provisions must be considered to have been enacted subject to the implied exception that they do not extend to such vested rights. This rule of construction is recognized in Section 8 of the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891. The Chief Justice referenced the case of Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subbaraya Ayyar, where it was held that the six years' period applicable under Article 116 to a registered contract continued to apply to a suit for rent under the Madras Estates Land Act. The Chief Justice concluded that the appeals must be allowed, and the decrees of the lower Courts be reversed, as the provisions of Section 211 should be read subject to an implied exception. 2. Vested Rights of Suit: T.V. Seshagiri Iyer, J., differed from the Chief Justice's conclusion, arguing that the vested rights should not be taken away by implication. He noted that Section 211 of the Estates Land Act expressly provides that certain sections of the General Limitation Act, including the minority Section (7), shall not apply to suits instituted under the Act. Seshagiri Iyer emphasized that the new forum (Revenue Court) created by the statute was designed to afford a speedy remedy, and the plaintiff, having chosen to avail himself of that advantage, is also bound by the disabilities imposed by the law. He concluded that the suit is barred by limitation and that the principle of vested rights does not apply in this case due to the express prohibition in Section 211. 3. Limitation Periods Under New Legislation: C.V. Kumaraswami Sastri, J., discussed whether Section 211 is retrospective and bars suits that would have been in time if the ordinary law of limitation were applied. He highlighted the well-known rule of construction that retrospective operation ought not to be given to a statute so as to take away vested rights unless unavoidable. He referenced several cases, including Reid v. Reid and Lauri v. Renard, to support the view that new laws should interfere as little as possible with vested rights. Kumaraswami Sastri argued that the Estates Land Act should not be applied retrospectively to destroy causes of action that were alive on the date of the Act's passing. He concluded that the decisions of the lower courts should be reversed, and the suits remanded for disposal. 4. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts vs. Revenue Courts: Before the passing of the Estates Land Act, suits for arrears of rent were cognizable only by the ordinary Civil Courts and governed by the Indian Limitation Act. The new Act removed such cases from the cognizance of Civil Courts and placed them under the jurisdiction of Revenue Courts. Seshagiri Iyer pointed out that the pre-existing right to institute the suit in the Civil Court, with the benefit of the Limitation Act, could not be sued upon under the old law in the Revenue Court. He argued that the plaintiff could not claim the advantage of the new law without submitting to its restrictions. Kumaraswami Sastri, however, noted that Section 77 of the Estates Land Act gave the plaintiff no option as to the forum, and there was neither election nor benefit for the plaintiff in this regard. Conclusion: The judgment presents a complex interplay between retrospective legislation, vested rights, and procedural changes in jurisdiction. The Chief Justice and Kumaraswami Sastri, J., favored protecting vested rights from retrospective application of new limitation periods, while Seshagiri Iyer, J., emphasized the express prohibition in Section 211 and the procedural changes brought by the new forum. The appeals were ultimately allowed, and the suits remanded for disposal according to law, with costs to be paid by the respondents.
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