9911796707
TMI Blog1945 (4) TMI 18X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1st August 1942, and not on 81st July 1942. It is true that, if a lease is made for a period of one month, commencing on the first day of the month, that lease will, by reason of the provisions contained in Section 110, T. P. Act, expire at midnight on the first day of the following month. In other words, if, in law, there was a re-letting of the house to the defendant on 1st July 1942, and if there were no other provision in the T. P. Act besides s. no which applied, the argument put forward by the learned advocate for the appellant would be unanswerable. Neither of these assumptions can, however, be made. 2. In the first place, a letting to a monthly tenant is not a letting which expires at the end of the first month or at the end of e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s was a lease for four years expressed to be from 1st June 1921. By reason of the provisions contained in Section 110, T. P. Act, this lease came to an end at midnight on 1st June 1925. The monthly tenancy, therefore, commenced on 2nd June 1925, and any notice determining it had therefore to expire on the first day of a month. It is quite clear from the judgment of Lord Tomlin that, in determining when the original tenancy came to an end and the periodic tenancy commenced, regard had to be had to the provisions of Section 110; but that, in determining when the notice terminating the periodic tenancy had to expire, regard had to be had to Section 106, T. P. Act. In my judgment, therefore, the notice which was given to the defendant was a v ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , prior to the coming of the Bihar House Rent Control Order into operation, had not merely been determined but against whom a decree in ejectment had been passed, and who, if he was still in possession of the house, was in possession merely because the civil Court had stayed the execution of the decree. The word tenant in Section 13 must, in my judgment, be confined to persons who are either tenants under a tenancy agreement or are statutory tenants by reason of the provisions contained in either Section 4 or Section 12 of the Order itself. To' put the enlarged construction on the word tenant, for which Mr. Bhattacharyya contends, would lead, in one case at least, to the most anomalous consequences. 5. Sections 4 and 12 of the Or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e landlord had forcibly and, without the intervention of the Court, dispossessed him. The plaintiff sued for recovery of possession, and the Court of Appeal took the view that, if by reason of the provisions contained in the Act he would have been entitled to retain possession of the premises, he must be entitled to recover possession of them from the landlord. 6. Scruttcon L. J. relied on the decision of Lord Reading C. J., in an earlier case, Dobson v. Bichards (1919) 147 L. T. 96. In that action the plaintiff sued to eject a tenant on whom he had served a notice to quit prior to the date on which the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1919, had come into operation. The ground on which the action was dismissed w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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