9911796707
TMI Blog2018 (9) TMI 815X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... SS hence were under bonafide belief that having deposited an amount directed by the High Court, they were covered by the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 is also a feeble ground for the simple reason that on receipt of order-in-original, they should have preferred an appeal before the 1st Appellate Authority as per the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act 1944 which mandates statutory period for filing an appeal with the 1st Appellate Authority within 60 days and further 30 days by seeking application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before the 1st Appellate Authority, and the litigation entered by them is not directed against adjudication order. The principles laid down u/s 14 of Limitation A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... isposal on three different dates and adjournments were granted on the request of the applicants and finally decided on 19.07.2017. 4. Learned counsel Shri C.V. Narasimhan after giving the overall picture of the issue involved in these two appeals, submitted that the applicant herein were under bonafide belief that the abortive litigation entered into by filing a Writ Petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana against the order on rejection of KVSS Scheme, no appeals were preferred by them against order-in-original dated 29.01.1999. He would submit that the delay in filing the appeal before the 1 st Appellate authority was due to legal proceedings pending before the Hon'ble High Court and the Bench has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... needs to be considered by this Bench in its correct perspective. It is his further submission that in the alternate, the impugned order of the 1 st Appellate Authority be set aside and the matter be remanded back as he has not considered the various aspects of this case, more specifically the submissions of the appellants before him regarding the pendency of legal proceedings before the Higher Courts. 5. Learned D.R. submits that the applicant herein had never approached the Higher Courts against the order-in-original that confirmed the demands which is in appeal before the 1 st Appellate Authority and the appeals were dismissed for being hit by limitation. It is his submission that on reading the judgement of the Apex Court in the cas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... High Court of A.P on 22.03.1999 against the rejection of KVSS application and an interim order was passed by the High Court on 31.03.1999 permitting the appellant to make payment as declared by him under KVSS, pending final disposal of writ petition which was complied with. The said writ petition was finally dismissed by the Hon'ble High Court in 2015 and an SLP was preferred before the Apex Court which was also dismissed on 12.05.2015. Subsequently, applicant/appellant preferred appeal against the order-in-original received by them on 29.01.1999 before the 1 st Appellate Authority on 26.05.2015. The 1 st Appellate Authority had dismissed these appeals as being time barred before him against which appeals preferred by them were also ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fide belief that having deposited an amount directed by the High Court, they were covered by the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 is also a feeble ground for the simple reason that on receipt of order-in-original, they should have preferred an appeal before the 1 st Appellate Authority as per the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act 1944 which mandates statutory period for filing an appeal with the 1 st Appellate Authority within 60 days and further 30 days by seeking application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before the 1 st Appellate Authority, and the litigation entered by them is not directed against adjudication order. iii) Thirdly as regards the ratio in MP Steel Corporation Ltd., I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an appeal before the Supreme court which allowed the Departmental appeal vide judgement dated 12.03.2003 by holding that the CEGAT had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since the appellant should have filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) against the Supdt letter dated 02.04.1992. e) And it is in the above circumstances that it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that principles laid down u/s 14 of Limitation Act, 1963 will apply. f) The ratio of the above said Supreme Court judgement will not apply in the present case inasmuch as there was no confusion at all, in the present case, as compared to the confusion in the case of M.P. Steel Corporation. Appellant preferred a Writ Petition against the order of reject ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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