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TMI Blog1902 (1) TMI 1X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sued by the President under the bye-laws, on payment of a fee which should not exceed the following rates: Timber ₹ 5 per ton; firewood Re. 0-6-0 per ton." 3. There is nothing in the section to limit the liability of Government timber, though exemptions in favour of Government are found in several other sections of the Act. The prima facie inference is that the Legislature intended to make the section applicable to such timber. The learned Advocate-General, however, contests this inference, and contends that the conviction is bad on three grounds, viz.: 1. Because the Magistrate ought to have held that the provisions of Section 341 as to taking out a license for importing wood are merely ancillary to the provisions of Section 338 as to taking out a license for storing wood and that the exemption in favour of Government in Section 338 applies also to Section 341. 2. Because, if as held by the Magistrate, the license fee leviable under Section 341 is to be treated as a tax on importation it amounts to a toll, and Government property is expressly exempted by Section 174 from payment of tolls. 3. Because the Crown is not bound by the taxing provisions of a Statute unl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rown, is not bound by the taxing provisions of a Statute unless there be express words to bind the Crown, or in the absence of express words, unless the inference that it was intended to bind the Crown, is manifest and irresistible, and that such intention is not to be found in the City of Madras Municipal Act. He contended that no intention to render the Crown liable under Section 341 can properly be inferred from the fact that in other sections of the Act Government is expressly exempted from liability and he quoted a number of English cases in support of his contention. There is, no doubt, abundant authority to show that in England the Crown is by virtue of its prerogative exempt from the payment of tolls, but it is also clear from the Indian Councils Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. cap. 67) that it is competent for the Indian Legislatures to make laws which may cut down the prerogative of the Crown in certain matters, This is clear with regard to the Governor-General in Council from Section 24 which provides that "no law or regulation made by the Governor-General in Council (subject, to the power of disallowance by the Crown as hereinbefore provided) shall be deemed invalid by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rnor in Council of this Presidency and of Bombay is defined and limited in Sections 42 and 43 of this Act. Under Section 42 the Governor in Council of this Presidency may "make laws and regulations for the peace and good government" of the Presidency provided they shall not "affect any of the provisions of this Act or of any other Act of Parliament in force or hereafter to ho in force in such Presidency." Section 43 then specifies certain matters which are not to be dealt with by the local Legislature save with the previous sanction of the Governor-General. In neither section is there any general limitation in regard to matters affecting the prerogative. The limitations imposed on the Governor-General in Council by the latter part of Section 22 must necessarily be held to apply to the subordinate Legislatures of this Presidency and of Bombay, but, subject thereto and to the restrictions imposed by Sections 42 and 43, a law passed by the Legislature of this Presidency for its "peace and good government" is not, in my opinion, invalid by reason only that it affects the prerogative of the Crown, The City of Madras Municipal Act is such a law, and even if ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Municipal Taxation Act, 1881" passed by the Governor-General in Council. It gives the Governor-General in Council power by an order in writing to prohibit the levy by a Municipal Committee of any specified tax payable by the Secretary of State for India in Council, but provides that in such case "the Secretary of State in Council shall be liable to pay to the Municipal Committee, in lieu of such tax," such sums (if any) as an officer appointed by Government may, in all the circumstances of the case, determine, to be fair and reasonable. The preamble to this Act does not allege that the imposition of a tax payable by the Secretary of State to a Municipal authority is opposed to the prerogative of the Crown. It assumes that such taxation is legal. The Act, in effect, is an acknowledgment by the supreme legislative authority in India that Municipal taxes may be legally and properly payable by the Secretary of State for India in Council. We have not been referred to a single Local or Municipal Act in which Government or the Secretary of State is expressly named as liable to taxation. If such liability did not exist or if it depended, as the Advocate-General contends that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Besides the general tax on buildings and lands, there were special taxes leviable on buildings and lands as a water rate, and as a lighting rate. In regard to neither was the Government generally exempt, but buildings and land in Fort St. George, which all belong to Government, were exempt from the lighting tax, though not from the water tax. This is notable as showing that the Legislature had in mind the question of exemption of Government buildings and lands and expressly gave that exemption in part, though not generally. Military officers were not exempt from the tax on salaries, but gun carriages, ordinance carts and waggons, cavalry horses and vehicles and animals belonging to Government were exempt from the vehicle and animal taxes, and it was provided that no tolls should be paid "for the passage of troops, Government stores, Government vehicles or animals or any other Government property." Government was also exempt from the provisions of the sections which required persons exercising certain dangerous and offensive trades, keeping stables, cart-stands, &c., and places for the storage and sale of wood and other inflammable substances, to take out licenses and pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f legislation in India and the Acts which have from time to time been passed in pari materia. 9. In this view the conviction was right and the revision petition must be dismissed. Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. 10. The petitioner is the Superintendent of the Gun Carriage Factory at Madras and in his official capacity caused to be brought within the City of Madras on the 7th November 1900 and the 4th February 1901,21 logs of timber of the aggregate weight of 141 tons without obtaining a license from the Municipality of Madras, on payment of the fee prescribed by Section 341 of Madras Act I of 1884. It is admitted that the timber so brought was the property of Government and was required for the purpose of building gun carriages for His Majesty's forces and that if the same were liable to duty under Section 341, such duty will have to be paid out of the Public Indian Revenue. 11. The petitioner, having been convicted and fined by the Chief Presidency Magistrate for having brought the timber into the City without obtaining a license from the Municipality of Madras, this revision petition has been preferred for the purpose of determining whether the license prescribed by Section 341 is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... find out if the occupier of such place of storage, if it be not in the occupation or under the control of Government, has obtained the license prescribed by Section 338. The primary object of Section 341 is the levy of import duty and that is entirely independent of Section 338, Incidentally, no doubt, provision is made in Section 341 in view to check the evasion of Section 338 in cases to which that section is applicable. Timber or firewood imported by Government may or may not be stored in a place in the occupation or under the control of Government. It is impossible to connect Section 341 and Section 338 in such a way as to justify the engrafting on the former, of the exemption in favour of Government contained in the latter. exemption in favour of Govern- 13. The second ground urged proceeds upon the assumptions that the scope of Section 174 is much wider than it really is and that the duty leviable under Section 341 can be regarded as a "toll." A reference to Section 98, particularly to Clause 9, shows that tolls leviable under the Act are only in respect of vehicles and animals entering the Municipal limits. Such tolls are dealt with in Sections 170--178 under the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Sheppard's definition--(ails within the definition. Is seems to me that the definition quoted above from the Century Dictionary succinctly expresses the idea conveyed by the definition in Sheppard's 'Abridgment.' I may here refer to the definition of "tolls" given in the Indian Tolls (Army) Act II of 1901, Section 2 (h), which, while more comprehensive than "tolls" referred to as such in Madras Act I of 1884, expressly excludes customs-duties and octroi-duties or town-duties on the import of goods. 15. The learned Advocate-General bases his contention chiefly on the third ground. The substance of his argument is that the Crown is not bound to pay the duty imposed by Section 341 because Government is neither expressly nor by necessary implication included within the purview of that section; and that the express exemption of the Crown from taxes imposed under several other sections of the Act cannot legitimately lead to the necessary implication that the Crown is liable to pay taxes imposed by Section 341 and certain other sections in regard to which there is no similar exemption. The question was argued on both sides with reference to certain Eng ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ons which shall in any way affect any prerogasive if the Crown, or the authority of Parliament or the constitution or rights of the said Company or any part of the unwritten laws or constitution of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland whereon may depend in any degree the allegiance of any person to the Crown of the United Kingdom or the sovereignty or dominion of the said Crown over any part of the said territories." By Section 59 of the same Statute it was provided that the Provincial Governors in Council were no longer to have the power of making laws except in case of urgent necessity and then only until the decision of the Governor-General of India in Council should be signified thereon. It will be noticed that by Section 43 the Governor-General in Council was prohibited from making any law affecting the prerogative of the Crown. This provision, however, was modified by 16 & 17 Vict., cap. 95, Section 26, which provided as follows: "No law or regulation made by the Governor-General in Council shall be invalid by reason only that the same affects any prerogative of the Crown, provided such law or regulation shall have received the previous sanction of the Cr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... considered unnecessary that the exceptions covered by the last paragraph of Section 22, should be engrafted on Section 42 inasmuch as Section 42 empowers Provincial Governors in Council to make laws only for the "peace and good government" of the province, and that such power cannot possibly extend to any of the matters comprised in the last paragraph of Section 22. Whether this is so or not, it is obvious that matters excepted from the legislative authority of the Governor-General in Council cannot be within the powers of subordinate provincial Legislatures. It is true, as pointed oat by Sir C. Ilbert, that there is on section, with respect to the laws passed by provincial Legislatures corresponding to Section 24 which relates only to laws passed by the Governor-General in Council affecting the prerogative of the Crown. Does this warrant the inference drawn by Sir Courtenay Ilbert that the provincial Legislatures do not possess the power which the Governor-General in Council has, of making laws which may affect the prerogative of the Crown? If the power of the Governor-General in Council to pass such a law was conferred by Section 24, no doubt the inference would be irr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd to affect persons out of New Zealand, that moment the local limitations of the jurisdiction were exceeded and the attempt was nugatory. Their Lordships of the Privy Council overruled the objection, it being in their opinion "clear that it is for the peace, order and good government of New Zealand that the Courts in New Zealand should in any case of contracts made or to be performed in New Zealand have the power of judging whether they will or will not proceed in the absence of the defendant" and that whether a foreign Court will or will not enforce a judgment passed in the absence of the defendant under such circumstances, it is sufficient for trying "the validity of New Zealand laws in New Zealand to say that the peace, order and good government of New Zealand are promoted by the enforcement of the decrees of their own Courts in New Zealand." Though no question of prerogative being affected by the colonial Legislature was involved in either of the above cases, they afford illustrations of the liberal interpretation which has been placed by the Judical Committee of the Privy Council on the expression "peace, order and good government." 19. In Gushi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... btaining such sanction. It was for the same reason that Act VI of 1856 (an Act for granting exclusive privileges to Inventors), passed by the Legislative Council of India, was disallowed by the Court of Directors on the advice of Her Majesty's law officers (vide Preamble to Act XV of 1859) that the exclusive privilege of the Crown to grant patents for inventions was affected by the Act. The Act VI of 1856 was accordingly repealed by Act IX of 1857, but was virtually re-enacted as Act XV of 1859, after having obtained previously the sanction of Her Majesty as required by Section 26 of 16 & 17, Vict., cap. 95. 21. The Indian Councils Act, however, removed such limitation of the powers of the Indian Legislature. In that Act itself there is internal evidence that there is no such limitation even in respect of the powers of the provincial Legislatures, for Section 43 contemplates provincial legislation, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General, for regulating coins and patents or affecting the relations of Government with foreign princes or states. A reference to Sections 19 and 33 will show that both in the Governor-General's Council and in the Provincial Councils, b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed by Section 92, as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed or could bestow. Within these limits of subjects and area, the local Legislature is supreme and has the same authority as the Imperial Parliament." This principle was approved of and followed in an appeal from New South Wales in Powell v. Apollo Candle Company L.R. 10 App. Cas. 282. The same doctrine virtually finds legislative declaration in Section 45 of 3 & 4 William IV, cap. 85. 23. In my opinion, therefore, there can be no reasonable doubt as to the competence of provincial Legislatures to pass laws within the area of their powers--which is narrower than the area of the powers of the Governor-General in Council--though such laws may affect the prerogative of the Crown. If it were otherwise, the powers of the provincial Legislature to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the province would be unduly hampered. There is no small degree of uncertainty as to the extent of the prerogatives of the Crown in India and the validity of no few enactments of the provincial Legislature will be called into question in Courts on the ground that they directly or indirectly affect the roy ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this right is an incident of sovereignty, observe as follows: "Besides, if reference be made to the prerogative of the English Crown, that prerogative in other particulars is of as high a nature, being given for the same purpose of protecting the State, and it is not contended that those branches are extended to Bengal. Mines of precious metals, treasure-trove, royal fish are all vested in the Crown for the purpose of maintaining its power and enabling it to defend the State. They are not enjoyed by the sovereign in all or even in most countries and no one has said that they extend to the East Indian possessions of the British Crown." In the Advocate-General of Bengal v. Ranee Surnomoye Dossee 9 M.I.A. 391 at p. 428 Lord Kingsdown, after adverting to the introduction and establishment of the English Criminal Law in India and its application to Natives as well as Europeans with reference to the prerogatives of the Crown (pages 428--30), to forfeiture of the personal property of persons committing suicide in Calcutta, arrived at the conclusion that the English Law of 'felo de se' and forfeiture of goods and chattels did not extend to a native Hindu, though a British ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the King, in such case the King shall not be bound unless the Statute is made by express terms to extend to him." The Master of the Rolls after observing that that is the general rule and that the point came before the Court of Exchequer in Attorney-General v. Donaldson 10 M.& W. 117 : 11 L.J. (Ex.) 338 and there Baron Alderson, in delivering the judgment of the Court, said: "It is a well-established rule, generally speaking, in the construction of Acts of Parliament that the King is not included unless there be words to that effect," held that although the Crown was named in some of the sections of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, it was not bound by the other provisions of the Act so as to deprive it of its undoubted prerogative of "Extent." This is one of the cases which the learned Advocate-General relies upon. A reference to the judgment of the Master of the Rolls will show that the decision is based not only upon the general canon of interpretation, but also upon the positive conclusion he arrived at from the wording of the sections that the Legislature intended not to deprive the Crown of its undoubted prerogative. 26. Adverting to the first portion of Lor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n an appeal from the Superior Court of Quebec in Canada, while holding in that particular case that the Crown had not the prerogative of admitting an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court under the "Quebec Controverted Elections Act, 1875," affirmed the general principle of construction in the following words: "Their Lordships wish to state distinctly that they do not imply any doubt whatever as to the general principle that the prerogative of the Crown cannot be taken away except by express words; and that they would be prepared to uphold, as often has been held before, that in any case where the prerogative of the Crown has existed, precise words must be shown to take away that prerogative." 28. This emphatic statement of the rule being founded upon general principles of construction is undoubtedly applicable as much to Indian enactments as to Colonial or Imperial Statutes; and if general words of an Indian enactment are such as a cording to their literal interpretation would divest the Crown of, or take away from it, any prerogative, right, title or interest, they would certainly have to be construed in a limited sense so as not to produce such a resu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rom the Governor of Portsmouth to one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, which was not on any private business whatever, but wholly related to the public concerns of this kingdom. It was held that it was not exigible. Lord Kanyon, delivering the judgment of the Court, says 'Now, although there is no special exemption of the King in this Act of Parliament (25 Geo. 3, cap. 51) yet I am of opinion that he is exempted by virtue of his prerogative in the same manner as he is virtually exempted from the 43rd Bliz. and every other Act imposing a duty or tax on the subjects.' There may well be expressions in an Act imposing a duty or tax on the subjects, such as to show that the intention of the Legislature was to impose the duty on some property belonging to the Crown. But I do not think it made out that there is any such intention shown in the Income-tax Act. Reliance was placed in the argument on the general words of the rule 'which rule shall be construed to extend to all lands, tenements and hereditaments or heritages capable of actual occupation of whatever nature and for whatever purpose occupied or enjoyed.' But I do not think this can be construed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the country, became exempt from liability to the poor-rate.' Lord Cranworth Mersey Docks v. Cameron 11 H.L.C. 443 at p. 508; 35 L.J. (M.C.) 1 by using the words 'more or less sound,' seems to me to guard against being supposed to decide that those cases which proceeded on this ground were all right in deciding that the purposes were those of the public government, to such an extent as to bring them within the principle of The King v. Cook 3 T.R. 519, but he certainly does not at all impeach them. The Scotch cases on the Scotch poor law proceed on a similar ground. It has been pointed out that in the Scottish poor law, half the poor-rate is imposed on the owner in respect of property, and so far the case is more closely analogous to that of the income-tax; but, I think, that whether the rate is exigible in respect of property, or in respect of occupation, the ground of exemption must be the same, viz., as said by the Lord Chancellor (Cairns) in Greig v. University of Edinburgh L.R. 1 H.L. (Sc.) 350 at p. 354 the Crown not being named in the English or Scotch Statutes on the subject of assessment, and not being bound by Statute when not expressly named, any property whi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sted is not strictly accurate, because as has been pointed out by my noble and learned friend, the Court in The King v. Cook 3 T.R. 319 gave effect to the privilege of the Crown not in the case of a local but of a general tax, holding that such privilege extended not only to the Act of Elizabeth, but to every Act imposing a tax upon the subjects of the Crown. But I should have been prepared to hold, apart from the authority of that case, that the appellant's contestation upon this point is untenable. The exemption of the Crown from the incidence of rating Statutes is a general privilege and is nowise dependent upon the local or imperial character of the rate. It takes effect in all cases when the Crown is not named in the Statute, or I should prefer to say, in all cases where the enactments do not take away the privilege, either in express terms or by plain and necessary implication. There is not, in my opinion, one kind of Crown exemption from the Statute of Elizabeth and another kind of Crown exemption from the Income Tax Acts, (page 76) .... Lord Bramwell.--The poor-rate is local. Whatever exempts part of the property in a rated locality, adds to the burden on the rest, and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ts real sense. Similarly the privilege of the Crown to use an invention without compensation to the patentee, notwithstanding the grant of a patent for the exclusive right to the use of the invention and the implied exemption of the Crown from payment of tolls, notwithstanding a grant, by itself, of a right to levy tolls, are referred to as prerogatives of the Crown, though such privilege and exemption are only the result of the rule applicable to the interpretation of Crown-grants, the grant in either case being made in the exercise of one and the same branch of the royal prerogative Feather v. The Queen 35 L.J. (Q.B.) 200. 33. In the Mayor, do., of Weymouth v. Nugent 34 L.J. (M.C.) 81 : 6 B. & S. 22 on which the learned Advocate-General specially relies, Cockburn, C.J., explained as follows the immunity enjoyed by the Crown from payment of tolls: "It may be said that the doctrine of the immunity enjoyed by the Crown from payment of tolls arose in times when tolls were levied by virtue of a grant from the Crown or under prescription which presumed a prior grant from the Crown, and therefore it might well be assumed that where tolls were granted by the Crown, it was not inten ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s-of-war did not by implication, render post office packets, which some years after the passing of the Act became the property of the Crown, chargeable with toll. 35. These three cases proceed on one and the same principle and they relate to the implied exemption of the Crown from payment of tolls; in each of them it was held that such implication was not negatived by the mere fact that certain exemptions in favour of the Crown were expressly made none of which covered the exemption claimed. 36. It is unnecessary to refer specially to the Mersey Dooks case 11 H.L.C., 443 at p. 508; 35 L.J., (M.C.), 1 which is the leading authority on the implied exemption, from rates and taxes, of Crown property occupied by or on behalf of the Crown for purposes connected with any department of the Government, as that decision has been followed and fully explained in the later decision of the House of Lords in Coomber v. Justices of Berks L.R. 9 App. Cas. 61, already referred to and quoted from. 37. The cases of Perry v. Eames [1891] 1 Ch. 658 and Wheaton v. Maple & Co. 1893] 3 Ch. 48 which are also referred to, are not very much in point. Those oases turned upon Sections 2 and 3 of the Prescrip ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... costs in the suit, by mere process of execution, instead of by a separate suit and it cannot, therefore, be construed as taking away by implication the priority which the claim of the Crown has by virtue of its prerogative. West, J., states the canon of construction applicable to such a case as follows: "It is a universal rule that prerogative and the advantages it affords cannot be taken away except by consent of the Crown embodied in a Statute. This rule of interpretation is well established and applies not only to the Statutes passed by the British, but also to the Acts of the Indian Legislature framed with constant reference to the rules in England. And the rule as applied to the present case is not an unreasonable one.'' This decision was approved of and followed by the High Court of Allahabad in Collector of Moradabad v. Muhamad Daimkhan I.L.R. 2 All. 196. I may here refer to Section 212 of the Indian Companies Act, 1882, which corresponds to and substantially reproduces Section 183 of the Act of 1866, with a proviso that nothing in that section applies to proceedings by Government and also to Section 411 of the present Code of Civil Procedure (XIV of 1882) whic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g on the Crown--it may be inferred from the circumstance that this Act contains provisions prescribing a limitation to the Government for the institution of suit and presentation of Criminal appeals, that the Legislature contemplated that the Crown should be bound by the provisions of the Act and should enjoy a privilege to the extent expressed and no further--expression facit cessare tacitum" (pages 156--157). The same view was taken by the High Court of Bombay in Venubhai v. Collector of Nasik I.L.R. 7 Bom. 552, foot-note. 43. In the Secretary of State v. Virarayan I.L.R. 9 Mad. 175 the question as to how far the Crown was bound by the earlier laws of limitation prior to Act IIX of 1871, in which the Crown was not at all mentioned, was raised, but not decided (page 185). 44. Adverting to the English maxim of interpretation that the Crown is not bound by a Statute unless expressly named, Mr. Sedgwick, an American author, observes: "But in this country generally I should doubt whether this construction could be safely assumed as a general rule. The English precedents are based on the old feudal ideas of royal dignity and prerogative; and where the terms of an Act are sw ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mary suit may be brought by a person dispossessed, without his consent, of immoveable property otherwise than in due course of Law. Section 45'-- The Secretary of State for India in Council, the Government of India and the Local Governments are exempted from writs of Mandamus to be issued by the High Court. Section 56 (d)-- exempts the various departments of the Government of India and of the Local Governments from writs of injunction. Indian Registration Act, Section 90--exempts from the operation of the Act various documents issued by Government. Indian Easements Act, Section 2 (a) and (b)--exempts certain prerogatives and customary rights of the Crown from the operation of the Easements Act. The Crown Grants Act, XV of 1896--exempts Crown grants from the operation of the Transfer of Property Act, both retrospectively and prospectively. The Civil Procedure Code, Sections 295 (proviso), 356 (b) and 411--preserve the precedence of Crown-debts. 616 (a)--exempts from the operation of the chapter relating to appeals to the Queen in Council, the prerogative rights of Her Majesty to receive and admit appeals. The Indian Companies Act, Section 212 (proviso)--exempts proceed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he control of Government from the operation of those respective sections and the necessity for obtaining licences on payment of fees. India Act XI of 18S1 has a most important bearing upon the question immediately under consideration. Section 3 provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment for the time being in force, the Governor-General in Council may by an order in writing prohibit the levy by a Municipal corporation of any specified tax payable by the Secretary of State for India and Section 5 provides that so long as any order thus made under Section 3 is in force, the Secretary of State shall be liable to pay to the Municipal corporation in lieu of such tax such sums as an officer from time to time appointed in this behalf by the local Government may, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, from time to time determine to be fair and reasonable. There is no provision in any of the Municipalities Acts I am aware of, which expressly subjects the Government to any tax or duty payable under the Act. And if the contention on behalf of the petitioner that it is not liable to pay any tax or duty, unless there be express provision imposing the same o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the previous state of the law for the purpose of aiding in the construction of the provisions of a Code and that, for example, if a provision be of doubtful import, such resort would be perfectly legitimate, or again, if in an enactment words be found which have previously acquired a technical meaning or been used in a sense other than their ordinary one, the same interpretation might well be put upon them in the new enactment, and that he gave these merely as illustrations, not as exhausting the category. 48. This rule of interpretation was followed in Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Railway Company [1892] A.C. 481 at p. 487 in regard to the construction of section in the Civil Code of Lower Canada and recently in an Indian case in Norendra Nath Sircar v. Kamalbasini Dasi L.R. 23 I.A. 18 at p. 26 : I.L.R. 28 Calc. 563 in construing Section 111 of the Indian Succession Act, which section was incorporated in the Hindu Wills Act. In the last-mentioned case it was held that a Statute intended to embody in a Code a particular branch of the law must be construed according to the natural meaning of the language used and not on the presumption that it was intended to leave the existing law ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... said rule, based like other cognate rules of construction upon the maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant" is not really a prerogative of the Crown, though such rule as well as the rule relating to the construction of Crown-grants are dealt with in treatises under the head of "prerogatives of the Crown" and also loosely referred to as such in some English decisions; (v) the English law as to the exemption of the Crown and Crown property from payment of tolls, poor-rates and other taxes, local or imperial, imposed by Statutes rests partly upon historical reasons and principally upon judicial decisions which do not proceed upon a course of reasoning or principle which will be binding on Indian Courts; (vi) exemption from payment of tolls, rates and taxes is not in reality a prerogative of the Crown, but depends solely upon the right construction to be put upon the Crown-grant or the Statute in question; (vii) since the passing of the Indian Councils Act, 1861, not only the Viceregal Council but also the Provincial Councils can, without obtaining the previous sanction of the Crown, make laws affecting the prerogatives of the Crown, when such prerogatives h ..... 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