TMI Blog1943 (4) TMI 11X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... amed as early as in November 1933, and yet, for some reason or another, the suit did not become ripe for trial for several years--a feature by no means uncommon in Indian litigation, however much we may regret it. In the meanwhile came the separation of Burma; and, in November 1938, the contesting defendants filed an additional statement contending that the Court had thereafter no jurisdiction to deal with the Burma properties. An additional issue (No. 33) embodying this question was framed in June 1940, and after hearing arguments thereon, the trial Court gave a finding, in August 1940, to the effect that the Court had no longer jurisdiction to try the suit regarding the moveables and immovables situated in Burma. 2. On a revision petition filed by the plaintiff against this order of the trial Court, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the plaintiff's right to continue the pending action had not been taken away by the Constitution Act and that the combined effect of the relevant provisions of the law was to reserve to the Trichinopoly Court jurisdiction to try the suit See ('42) 29 AIR 1942 Mad. 614. The decision was based on the ground that Article 10, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on, takes the case out of the domain of private international law. If, for instance, Section 46, Constitution Act, had expressly provided that notwithstanding the separation of Burma from British India, suits pending at the time in British Indian Courts would be heard and disposed of by those Courts though they might include lands in Burma it could not be said that this provision would conflict with any rule of private international law or would be in excess of the legislative authority of Parliament even tested by the generally accepted principles of private international law. The position could not be different if the same result as to pending suits should be reached as a reasonable inference from the application of well-known rules of statutory interpretation. The question has accordingly to be determined mainly as a matter of interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. Even in ordinary circumstances the question what jurisdiction can be exercised by the Courts of any country according to its municipal law cannot be conclusively determined by a reference to principles of international law, but in considering what jurisdiction our Courts possess, and have claime ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t acquired under the repealed enactment and that the paragraph cannot be invoked in cases where the substantive right is not taken away by the repealing Act, but the forum for or the method of enforcing it is changed. It has, on the other hand, been maintained that a right to obtain relief in a suit pending at the time when the repealing enactment comes into operation is itself in the nature of a substantive right. As we consider that the third ground of decision adopted by the High Court, namely, the principle of the ruling in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (1905) 1905 AC 369 is sufficient to support the decision of the High Court, we prefer to rest our decision on that ground. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (1905) 1905 AC 369 was sought to be distinguished on behalf of the appellant on the ground that a right of appeal against a decree stands on a different footing from a right to continue a suit to its normal termination. This may be a difference in the facts, but we are unable to see any distinction in principle between the two cases. Their Lordships' pronouncement emphasises the limitation to be placed upon the rule, sometimes broadly stated, that all alterat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... also sufficient to divest the Court of jurisdiction to try suits pending at the time, we will be ignoring the presumption against retrospective operation in respect of pending suits. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the principle that every statute is to be so interpreted and applied as not to be inconsistent with the established rules of international law (Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, Edn. 8, p. 130). This is merely the former argument in a different form. As the context in Maxwell's book and the whole discussion from page 126 onward shows, this limitation comes into operation only when the Legislature would, on a different interpretation, be exceeding its jurisdiction. As we have already pointed out, no question can arise in this case of Parliament exceeding its jurisdiction. 9. It was next contended that the British Indian Court should not proceed with the trial of the suit, so far as it related to the Burma properties, if the Burma Courts were likely to hold that the British Indian Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree in respect of those properties; and three decisions of the High Court at Rangoon were relied on as showing the view tak ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s decided was that in such a suit, the plaintiff could not claim relief in respect of immovable property situated in British India. None of these cases touches the point arising for decision in this appeal and there is nothing in them to warrant the contention that the Courts in Burma are likely to treat a decree passed by the British Indian Court in the present case as one passed without jurisdiction so far as it may relate to the properties situate in Burma. 11. Our attention was drawn to Article 18 of the Aden Colony Order dated 26th September 1936, and it was argued that the absence of a similar provision in the Orders-in-Council relating to India and Burma supported the appellant's contention. There is no force in this argument. That order followed the lines indicated in Section 288, Constitution Act, and para. (c) of Sub-section (3) of that section mentioned provision for the validity and continuance of proceedings already commenced as one of the matters to be provided for. The order had to make elaborate provision for the constitution of the Colony, since there was no Constitution Statute in respect of Aden, corresponding to the Government of India Act or the Govern ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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