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TMI Blog1979 (4) TMI 170X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Proceedings came within the limits of Hubli-Dharwar Municipal Corporation and used by the lessees, admittedly, for industrial purposes, the lessee having, in terms of and enabled by the lease deed, erected buildings and structures thereon for industrial purposes. Eviction was sought on grounds of alleged sub-letting. 3. The facts leading up to the refer are set out in the order of references dated 12th Dec, 1977, and' it is Dot necessary to set them out in extenso again here, Very briefly stated, they are these: The predecessors in title of the petitioners granted a lease of the land in question in flavor of the first respondent. under the deed dated 14th December, 1887. On 29th July, IBM the lessee surrendered a portion of the land covered by the original lease but then on 7th March, 1904 the portion so surrendered, was leased again in flavor of the first respondent. In 1907, the property was permitted to be converted into nonagricultural user by the Revenue Authorities and it is common ground that the property has been, in fact, so used ever since One of the grounds on which petitioner has been non-suited by the Courts below is that the land in question, having been, an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this aspect may not become apposite in the context of the decision of the question referred for opinion and that aspect as become purely academic inasmuch as the question of choosing between two mutually conflicting views of the Supreme Court, does not, in our opinion, arise here. As the effect of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Subhadra's case and Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi's case under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Act 57 of 1947) are pressed into service by the learned counsel during the arguments it is necessary first to examine the relevant provisions of the Bombay Act in relation to corresponding provisions of the Karnataka Act and the question falling for determination in said two cases. In Section 5(8) of Bombay Act (Act 57 of 1947) the expression "premises" is defined inter alia to mean, unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context, "any land not being used for agricultural purposes", Section 3 (n) of the Karnataka Act defines the premises to mean: "(i) A building as defined in clause (a); (ii) any land not used for agricultural purposes." Section 6(1) of the Bombay Act (Act 67 of 1947) provides: ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the plot to appellant Subha All the deeds provided that the lessees may construct buildings on the demised land. As on the dates of all the three lease the plot was assessed for agricultural purpose, sanction for non-agricultural user of the plot was accorded by the Collector of Ahmedabad only on 14th November, 1949. Thereafter i.e. on 27th October, 1950, Subhadra applied to the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad, for fixation of standard rent of the plot under Section 11 of the Bombay Act 57 of 1947. The Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the High Court in this behalf, held that the plot could not be regarded as 'premises' inviting the application of the Part 11 of the Act and that an application for fixation of standard rent was therefore maintainable Shah J. as he then was observed: "...........In the year 1947, the plot was undoubtedly lying fallow, but on that account, the user of the land cannot be deemed to be altered. User of the land could only be altered by the order of the Collector granted under Section 7 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code There is no dispute that Part 11 applied to the area in which the plot is situated; but before the appellant could main ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Supreme Court by special leave. The Supreme Court reversing the decision of the High Court and restoring that of the Court of Small Causes observed: (Per Shah, J.) "4. The expression "premises" in Section (8) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947 does not include premises used for agricultural purposes. By Section 6 of that Act, the provisions of Part II which relate to conditions in which orders in ejectment may be made against the tenants and other related matters apply to premises let for education, business, trade or storage. It is plain that the Court exercising power under the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947, has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for possession of land used for agricultural purposes, Again ascertaining whether the land demised is used for agricultural purposes, the crucial date is the date on which the right conferred by the Act is sought to be exercised; Miss. Subhadra v. Narsaji Cbennaji Marwadi, . "8. In the present case the question whether the Court of Small Causes had jurisdiction to entertain the suit against Munshi depended upon the interpretation of the terms of the agreement of lea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o be dealt with. 7. Sri W. K. Joshi, however, sought to maintain that while the observations of the Supreme Court were clear in Subhadra's case the observations in Para 4 in Vasudev's case cannot be taken to detract from the position obtaining in Subbadra's case. The reasons for these, according to Sri Joshi, are two: The first is that Vasudev's case was decided by 3 Judges, and did not have the effect of overruling Subhadra's case. Secondly, according to Sri. Joshi, the observations in Para 8 in Vasudev's case clearly detract from and are irreconcilable with the earlier observations in Para 4. Sri Jigjinni endeavoured to maintain that there was no such discordance in the ideas in para 4 of Vasudev's judgment on the one hand and Para 8 on the other, inasmuch as, according to Sri Jigjinni, in Para 8 the Supreme Court was dealing with that part of the contention of the tenant Munshi as to the non-applicability of the provisions of Parts II and III to the land in question, a contention which would turn on the question whether the requirements of Section 6(1) were satisfied or not. It appears to us unnecessary in the present case to examine the merits of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t to be used for the purpose of residence after constructing buildings thereon, the letting of the open land can reasonably be called to be letting for residence ........." "(8) It seems to us that when people speak ordinarily of land being let for business, they are only thinking that the ultimate purpose behind the letting is that business will be carried on and they are not thinking whether the business will be carried on the land in its present state or by the construction of temporary sheds or by putting up permanent buildings. Similarly, when a man says that he will take lease of a plot of land for storage of his goods, what he has in mind is that by taking lease of the land he will achieve the object of storing goods, irrespective of whether for such storage he will have to put up a structure or not in the same way we think that when land has been let for the purpose of constructing buildings for residence, people will say that it is being let for residence, just as they will say that the land has been let for residence if the lessee intends to use it as caravan site so that the people may live on the open land in caravans". From what emerges from the above passages, Sri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and advance the remedy. In this task the interrelation between interpretation clause and the other substantive provisions also require to be so harmnised as to integrate with the objects eatable value?. Is the of the legislation. Ascertainment of the initial date of the letting, or is it the question whether the condition or quality date when possession is sought by the of the land accords with the requirement landlord of clause 3 (n) with reference to, any in any judgment, the test of rateable point of time other than the point at value under the old control is to be which either protection granted by the determined when the landlord' seeks to statute is asserted or the right conferred enforce his by it is sought to be enforced, would his. The time when become divorced of the purpose and these proceedings were brought the rate seem unrelated to the objects of the able value of this woodland or caravan legislation. This, in our opinion, is the site was F.9 and the rateable value of key to the enfoldment of the under the cottage was F.4; therefore, the whole standing of the clause 3 (n). Thus under ceases to be within the Rent Restrictions stood, it becomes clear that the point ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that on a plain understanding of Section 3. (n) it would be clear that the relevant point of time at which requirement of Section 3 (n) must be shown to exist is the point of time at which either the protection granted by the statute is sought to be asserted or a right conferred by the statute is sought to be enforced. The view of Shah, J., in Vasudev's case in relation to Section 5(8) of the Bombay Act accords with and supports our view. 12. It is, however, to be emphasized that the nature of the user of the property let must, with reference to the date 'of assertion of the protection or enforcement of the right under the Acts not be an unlawful or impermissible one. 13. The view taken in Rudrayya's case proceeding, as it) case on the footing that the pronouncement of Shah, J., in Vasudev's case conflicts with Subha case and ought not to be followed cannot be said to have laid down the correct law. With great respect, we are unable to bring ourselves to agree with the conclusion reached by the Division Bench. Accordingly, overruling the decision in Rudrayya's case, we express the opinion that a property which was an agricultural land at the time of letting a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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