1979 (4) TMI 170 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Definition of "Premises" under Section 3(n) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961.
2. Applicability of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 to lands initially leased as agricultural but later used for non-agricultural purposes.
3. Interpretation of conflicting judgments from the Supreme Court regarding the relevant date for determining the nature of the property.
4. Harmonization of statutory interpretation with the objectives of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Definition of "Premises" under Section 3(n) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961:

The central question referred to the Full Bench was whether a property that was agricultural land at the time of letting but had ceased to be agricultural land by the date of the eviction petition qualifies as "premises" under Section 3(n) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. The court noted that Section 3(n) defines "premises" to include "any land not used for agricultural purposes."

2. Applicability of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961:

The eviction proceedings were initiated under Section 21(1) of the Act, which pertains to the eviction of tenants. The court had to determine if the property, initially agricultural but later used for industrial purposes, could be considered "premises" under the Act. The court emphasized that the nature of the property should be assessed at the time the right conferred by the statute is sought to be enforced, not at the initial date of letting.

3. Interpretation of Conflicting Judgments from the Supreme Court:

The Division Bench had conflicting views based on two Supreme Court judgments: Subhadra v. Narsaji Chenaji Marwadi and Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman. The former emphasized the date of letting as the relevant date, while the latter focused on the date when the statutory right is sought to be enforced. The Full Bench clarified that the High Court should follow the decision of the larger bench when there is a conflict. However, it found that the two Supreme Court decisions were not irreconcilable, as they addressed different contexts under the Bombay Act, which has a similar definition of "premises."

4. Harmonization of Statutory Interpretation with the Objectives of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961:

The court underscored the need to interpret the Act in a manner that advances its remedial objectives. The Act aims to provide protection to tenants and regulate landlord-tenant relationships. Therefore, the interpretation should not be rigidly tied to the initial date of letting but should consider the current use of the property at the time the statutory right is invoked.

The court referred to the case of Davies v. Gilbert, where the Court of Appeal in England held that the relevant time for determining the nature of the property is when the landlord seeks to enforce his rights. This principle was applied to the present case, concluding that the relevant date for determining whether the land is "premises" is when the eviction petition is filed, not the initial date of letting.

Conclusion:

The Full Bench overruled the decision in Rudrayya's case, which had followed the earlier Supreme Court judgment in Subhadra's case. It held that a property which was agricultural land at the time of letting but ceased to be agricultural land by the date of the eviction petition is "premises" within the meaning of Section 3(n) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 21 of the Act. This interpretation aligns with the remedial objectives of the Act, ensuring that the statutory protections are effectively applied based on the current use of the property.