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TMI Blog1986 (4) TMI 362X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... plaint on file and issued summons to the accused to appear on 6.1.1972. On 6.1.1972 neither the complainant nor the accused were present and therefore, the Magistrate passed the following order : Accused not present. None present for the complainant also. The complaint is hereby dismissed in default and for want of prosecution. On 13.1.1972, the complainant filed an application for restoration of the complaint. On 20.1.1972, the Magistrate passed the following order : I heard Shri T.S. Sodhi. The complaint be restored. Summon accused for 21/2. On 21.2.1972, the accused petitioners moved an application before the Magistrate stating that the order dated 20.1.1972 was without jurisdiction since the Magistrate had become functus officio, by his order dated 6.1.1972. This application was rejected by the Magistrate by his order dated 8.5.1972. He was of the view that he had inherent powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure to review and re-call his earlier orders. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioners filed a A revision before the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, New Delhi, which was dismissed on 6/7/1973. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... puted that the Magistrate has powers to dismiss a complaint and discharge the accused when the complainant is absent. In Ram Prasad Maitra v. Emperor, 1928 A.I.R. - Cal. 569 a division bench of the Calcutta High Court had to consider the question whether the Sessions judge was justified in directing the complaint to be sent back to the Magistrate for further enquiry when the complaint was dismissed under section 203 of Criminal Procedure Code. Answering the question in the negative, it was observed : ...... In a case like this, where the complainant does not choose to be present, he cannot be heard afterwards to say that the matter should be sent back to the Magistrate for further enquiry... This Judgment indirectly recognises the power in a Magistrate to dismiss a complaint for default. We agree with this conclusion. Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code enables a Magistrate to discharge the accused when the complainant is absent and when the conditions laid down in the said section are satisfied. Section 256(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code enables a Magistrate to acquit the accused if the complainant does not appear. Thus, the order of dismis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t for non-appearance of the complainant or his discharge or acquittal on the same ground is a final order and in the absence of any specific provision in the Code, a Magistrate cannot exercise any inherent jurisdiction. For our purpose, this matter is now concluded by a judgment of this Court in the case of Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 125. We may usefully quote the following passage at page 126 : ....... Even if the Magistrate had any jurisdiction to re-call this order, it could have been done by another judicial order after giving reasons that he was satisfied that a case was made out for re-calling the order. We, however, need not dilate on this point because there is absolutely no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1908 (which applies to this case) empowering a Magistrate to review or re-call an order passed by him. Code of Criminal Procedure does contain a provision for inherent powers, namely, Section 561-A which, however, confers these powers on the High Court and the High Court alone. Unlike Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code, the subordinate criminal courts have no inherent powers. In these circumstances, therefor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... expressed his helplessness because of the earlier order of the High Court binding on him and had allowed the revision on that ground, we could have understood the reasoning behind it. He got rid of the effect of this Court's Judgment by observing that a decision by this Court cannot be treated as a sort of legislation by Parliament and thus overlooked the binding nature of the law declared by this Court, mandating under Article 141, every Courts subordinate to this Court to accept it. The High Court could have if it had examined the matter, corrected the error into which the Sessions Judge fell. The sweep of Article 141 of the Constitution, so far as the Judgments of this Court are concerned, came up for consideration before this Court recently in Shenoy and Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, [1985] (2) S.C.C. 512 to which one of us was a party. It is not necessary to refer to the facts of that case, in detail. Suffice it to say that the contention that the law laid down by this Court in an appeal filed by the State would not bind the other parties against whom the State of Karnataka did not file appeals from a common Judgment, was repelled by this Court in the followin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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