9911796707
TMI Blog1994 (3) TMI 42X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... with annexures thereto and a copy of the agreement of sale dated February 22, 1991. The appropriate authority acting under section 269UD(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, exercised the power to purchase the said property and for the purpose of payment of consideration to the transferors under section 269UF(1) read with section 269UA(b), made certain adjustments after which it arrived at a net figure of sale consideration payable by the Government at Rs. 88,27,441 (rupees eighty-eight lakhs twenty-seven thousand four hundred and forty-one only) as per its order dated May 16, 1991 (annexure "B" to the petition). That order is challenged by filing this petition. In paragraph 26(a) of the petition, the petitioners have prayed that the respondents be directed to give back the land mentioned above at and for the price of Rs. 1,06,60,000 as per the terms and conditions of agreement of sale dated February 22, 1991. It is also prayed that the order dated May 16, 1991, passed by the appropriate authority of the Income-tax Department under section 269UD(1) be quashed and set aside. We make it clear that at the time of hearing of this matter, learned counsel for the petitioners has confined h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e, whether the petitioners have acquiesced or waived their right is a pure question of fact and cannot be gone into in the absence of any pleadings as no affidavit-in-reply is filed by the respondents. As against this, Mr. Shelat, learned counsel appearing for the Depart ment, and Mr. Soparkar, learned counsel appearing for the purchaser of the property at the public auction, vehemently submitted that,--- (i) in the case of C. B. Gautam [1993] 199 ITR 530, the Supreme Court has specifically directed that as far as completed transactions are concerned, viz., where after the order for compulsory purchase under section 269UD of the Income-tax Act was made and possession has been taken over, compensation was paid to the owner of the property and accepted without protest, those transactions shall not be invalidated because of the judgment ; (ii) the petition is also required to be dismissed because the vendors have accepted the decision given by the appropriate authority and have accepted the consideration from the Department. If the petitioners are aggrieved by the said conduct of the vendors, it would be open to them to take appropriate action against vendors, but the present p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ners. At the time of hearing of this matter, the petitioners have produced on record other letters which are referred to in annexure "K". In the first letter dated November 27, 1992, it is specifically mentioned that the public auction of the land in dispute be kept in abeyance because of the recent Supreme Court decision as they were trying to obtain a copy of the said judgment. (g) On April 30, 1993, the petitioners filed Special Civil Application No. 3937 of 1993 challenging the action of the respondents in acquiring the property. The court has issued notice returnable on June 7, 1993. In paragraph 11 of the petition, it is stated that as the auction sale for the land in question was to take place on June 16, 1993, the petitioners withdrew the petition with liberty to file a fresh petition. The petitioners have further stated that they had withdrawn the petition in order not to come in the way of the sale taking place on June 16, 1993, and in the belief that on June 16, 1993, the property would not be sold. It is contended that no offer to purchase the property at the price fixed was received by the Department on June 16, 1993. (h) On July 3, 1993, the petitioners obtained a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 3, 1991, the said property was put to auction sale by the Department. After knowing the fact that the property was put to auction, the petitioners have not bothered to challenge it. This conduct also on the part of the petitioners clearly reveals that the petitioners have accepted that the order dated May 16, 1991, was valid and they have not thought it fit that it required to be challenged till the Supreme Court decided the question in the case of C. B. Gautam v. Union of India [1993] 199 ITR 530. Further, even after the decision of the Supreme Court, the petitioners first challenged the impugned order by filing Special Civil Application No. 3937 of 1993. In that matter, the court had issued notice returnable on June 7, 1993. In seems that the matter was adjourned to June 15, 1993. On that day, the petitioners withdrew the petition and the ground mentioned in paragraph 11 of this petition for withdrawal of the petition is as under : " The petitioner submits that when the Special Civil Application No. 3937 of 1993 came up for hearing, the auction sale was to take place on June 16, 1993. Therefore, on June 15, 1993, when the petition was being heard, in order not to come in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... delay from June, 1991, onwards till the filing of this petition, the petitioners have not bothered to explain it in any manner. Hence, this petition is barred by time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed for filing the petition under article 226 but at the same time, it is well-settled law that it should be filed as early as possible unless prevented by some justifiable reasons. No reasons are pointed out by the petitioners for contending that there was unavoidable delay in filing this petition. Hence, on the ground of delay also no relief is required to be granted to the petitioners. Further, from the aforesaid conduct of the petitioners and the facts stated above, it can be stated that the petitioners have acquiesced and accepted the impugned order passed by the appropriate authority. Therefore, also, it would be just and proper not to grant relief to the petitioners in a petition under article 226. For this purpose, learned advocate, Mr. Soparkar, has rightly relied upon the following paragraph from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Bhan Singh (Major) v. Latafat Ullah Khan, AIR 1978 SC 1814 : " This fact was specifically brough ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that it cannot be held that because of the said directions the petitioners can be precluded from contending that the impugned order is void because it is passed in breach of the principles of natural justice or that the mandatory provisions of sub-section (2) of section 269UD are not followed by the appropriate authority in not communicating the reasoned order to the petitioners. He further submitted that it is well-settled law that in the case of a quasi-judicial order, the authorities are required to follow the principles of natural justice of giving an opportunity of hearing and passing a reasoned order and that too of communicating it. In our view, this contention is without any substance because these very contentions were required to be dealt with by the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has dealt with the same in the judgment. In the judgment, it is specifically mentioned that on behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that there is no provision in Chapter XX-C for any opportunity being given to the intending purchaser or intending vendor of the immovable property concerned to show cause against the compulsory purchase o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it provided is so short as to preclude an enquiry or show cause altogether. In the light of what we have observed above, we are clearly of the view that the requirement of a reasonable opportunity being given to the concerned parties, particularly, the intending purchaser and the intending seller must be read into the provisions of Chapter XX-C. In our opinion, before an order for compulsory purchase is made under section 269UD, the intending purchaser and the intending seller must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against an order for compulsory purchase being made by the appropriate authority concerned. The court held that it may be permissible to record the reasons separately, but the order would be an incomplete order unless either the reasons are incorporated therein or are served separately along with the order on the affected party. The relevant discussion on this aspect is as under : " The recording of reasons which led to the passing of the order is basically intended to serve a two-fold purpose : (1) that the ' party aggrieved ' in the proceeding before the authority acquires knowledge of the reasons and, in a proceeding before the High Court or t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s of sale of immovable property, we consider it necessary to limit the retrospective operation of our judgment in such a manner as not to defeat the acquisitions altogether. " and gave the directions as stated above. In view of the aforesaid clear mandate by the Supreme Court, in our view, in the present case, there is no question of setting aside the impugned order passed on May 16, 1991, as the said order is accepted by the vendors without any protest and is implemented by the authorities in June, 1991. Further, the petitioners have accepted the said order without any protest from June, 1991, till June, 1993. Hence, this petition is required to be rejected on the ground of delay in filing the petition and acquiescence and acceptance of the impugned order by the petitioners and also in view of the directions given by the Supreme Court that in cases where vendors have accepted the impugned order and the order passed by the authority is implemented, the order is not required to be set aside on the ground that hearing was not given to the petitioners or that reasons were not communicated. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to consider the other contentions r ..... 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