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TMI Blog2017 (4) TMI 1478X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the Statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred several times during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights. Merely because the legislation is beneficial and no limitation is prescribed, the rights acquired by persons cannot be ignored lightly and proceedings cannot be initiated after unreasonable delay - Appeal dismissed. - C.A. No. 1250 of 2008 - - - Dated:- 19-4-2017 - S.A. Bobde And L. Nageswara Rao, JJ. JUDGMENT ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Yadav, son of recorded tenant Chanchal Yadav filed a petition for restoration of the disputed land Under Section 3 of the Act. Eventually, after an earlier remand, when the matter was pending in appeal, being Appeal No. 540 of 1978-79, it was dismissed in default on 07.09.1980. It was again restored on 23.12.1980; but again dismissed for default on 23.03.1983. 5. An application for restoration was moved after 16 years on 09.08.1999 and was allowed without notice to the Respondents. Eventually, the Additional Collector on 27.12.2000, allowed the restoration of the disputed land in favour of the Appellants. 6. A Writ Petition filed by the Respondents was dismissed by the learned, Single Judge on 25.03.2004. A Letter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tation itself was removed from the Statute was maintainable. This Court held that there could be no resort to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 even though no period of limitation was prescribed. Accordingly, the Court held that the Claim Petition could not be rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation, after the deletion of Sub-section (3), of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which had provided a period of six months. This view was taken having regard to the purpose of the Statute. We, however, find that the judgment relied on has no application to the present case. It is a settled law where the Statute does not provide for a period of limitation, the provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the view it had taken. It is argued on behalf of the Appellants that power of the Additional Collector for restoration of lands could have been exercised suo motu and since no limitation was prescribed for exercise of such power, the delay in this case may be overlooked. This submission presupposes that where the power can be exercised suo motu, such exercise may be undertaken at any time. The submission is directly contrary to a decision of this Court in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Anr. v. D. Narsing Rao and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 325-326 of 2015) and connected matter reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695 where this Court affirmed the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Paragraph '17' of the judgment reads as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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