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TMI Blog1963 (11) TMI 101X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which we shall call the Rent Reduction Act was, as the name itself indicates, inter alia for reducing the rent payable by ryots in the estates to which it applied, while the later which for shortness may be referred to as the Abolition Act, was for abolishing the estates of intermediaries who were proprietors of the type of estates defined in the Act and for the creation of direct relationship between the ryots in these estates and the Government. 3. The Government of Madras purporting to act under the powers conferred by the Rent Reduction Act appointed a Special Officer to conduct an enquiry as to the precise reduction to be effected in the rent payable to the appellant by persons in cultivation of the lands in the Appellant's Shrotriem and after considering his report directed a reduction of rents by notification dated May 2, 1950. Almost simultaneously proceedings were taken by the Settlement Officer appointed under the Abolition Act for determining whether or not the Shrotriem should be taken over by Government and the officer gave his decision against the appellant. The appellant filed an appeal to the Tribunal constituted under the Abolition Act and the appeal was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uestion which we have to deal with. 7. It would be convenient to take up first the question whether the Shrotriem is an 'estate' within the scope of the Rent Reduction Act and this would turn upon the provisions of that enactment. The preamble to the Rent Reduction Act specifies, inter alia, that it was an Act to provide for the reduction of rents payable by ryots in estates governed by the Madras Estates, Land Act, 1908, approximately to the level of the assessments levied on lands in ryotwari areas in the neighbourhood and for the collection of such rents exclusively by the State Government. In line with it Section 1 (2) of the Act makes provision for the application of the enactment to all estate as defined in Section 3, Clause (2), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. Its second section empowers the State Government to appoint a special officer for any estate or estates for the purpose of recommending fair and equitable rates of rent for the ryoti lands in such estate or estates . After the Special Officer completes the enquiry he determines in accordance with the prescribed procedure the fair and equitable rates of rent payable by the ryot and fixes the amount o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion dealing with 'inams' which runs :-- 3. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context--....... . . . (2) 'Estate' means--. .......... .......... (d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned' among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees . This sub-section is followed by 3 Explanations of which only the first is relevant for the purposes of the present appeal and that runs: Explanation (1)--Where a grant as inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purpose. The contention urged by the appellant in the Courts below and before us was that the Shrotriem did not fall within this definition for the following reasons which are not wholly separate but some of which run into one another: (1) That the gra ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... extent of the lands in the village comprised of dry lands and poramboke which in English measure are of the extent respectively of 585.62 and 101.35 making a total of 686.92 acres. Having regard to the heading of Column 3, this entire extent of 686.92 acres must be taken to be the subject of grant. We shall now set out the details of the Poramboke of 32-7-0 in local measure (corresponding to 101.35) acres on which reliance is placed by learned Counsel for the appellant both for his submission that it was not the entire village that was granted but only certain lands in the village, as also that there was a reservation of certain lands by the grantor. At the bottom of Column 4 the particulars of the Poramboke are given and this is made up of the extents stated of the village site, ponds, vagus, paths and tsavudu (i.e., saline land unfit for cultivation) making a total of 32-7-0 in local measure (101.35 in acres). In this connection reliance is also placed on the entry in column No. 13 where there is a reference to two minor inams covered by separate title deeds, certified copies of the relative Inam Fair Registers being Exs. A3 and A4 and these are claimed to have been excluded fro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in favour of the view that the grant was of a named village oil Thakkellapadu. Learned Counsel drew our attention to the heading in the Register of Inams in the village (Ex. A2) and pointed out that it purported to be a Register of Inams in the village, but obviously no assistance can be derived from the use of the preposition in as it is a well-known form of heading which is equally used even where an entire village is the subject of the grant (Vide e. g. the observations in District Board, Tanjore v. Noor Md., AIR1953SC446 ). 2. Were the entirety of the lands in the village granted, and if not, the nature of the reservation? 14. Closely related to the first point dealt with, and possibly merely another aspect of the same question is whether the entire land of the Village was not the subject of inam under the original grant. We have already pointed out that in Column 3 of Ex. A2 both the dry as well as the Poramboke of a total extent of 686.97 acres--as set out in Columns 4 and 5--is shown as the extent of the inam. That the entirety of the dry lands in the village was granted was not disputed, but the argument was that the Poramboke was not. However, in the face of these ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... egories of land which were listed under the head Poramboke under Column 4 were not merely the extent of the village site, ponds, vagus, and paths which were put to communal use but also 'tsavadu' or saline land unfit for cultivation of the extent of over 50 acres, and that since this land was reserved, the case was not covered by the last part of the first explanation to Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act. What we have stated already, viz. that the entirety of the poramboke of 101.35 acres was the subject of grant, along with the dry land of the extent of 585.62 acres would be sufficient to dispose of this contention. Apart however from the entry in Column 3 read with Columns 4 and 5 on which we have based our conclusion, we might point out that it is unthinkable that the grantor while granting the dry lands in the village, reserved for himself for his enjoyment or for a grant on a future occasion the saline land wholly unfit for cultivation. We consider therefore that there is no substance in this last contention either. 17. It would therefore follow that the learned Judges of the High Court were right in holding that the notification by Government under the Rent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upheld the second contention he proceeded also to deal with the question on the merits, and so doing decided against the plaintiff affirming the conclusion reached by the Settlement Officer in the enquiry under Section 9 of the Abolition Act. 21. When the matter was taken up on appeal to the High Court the learned Judges arrived at the same conclusion as the trial Judge on the 2nd point viz., the validity of the dismissal of the appeal by the Tribunal. They, however, held that the result of the dismissal being invalid was that the appeal should be considered as still pending before the Tribunal, not having been properly disposed of. Besides, they held that on a construction of the provisions of the Abolition Act the jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether or not the shrotriem was an 'inam estate' was exclusively that of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal on appeal and that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to determine it. On this finding they dismissed the appeal. 22. It was submitted to us on behalf of the appellant that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in holding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to determine his compl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ;--the main term used in the Act--to indicate the tenure or holding that is being 'abolished' and converted into 'Ryotwari'. 'Estate' is defined to mean a zamindari or an under-tenure or an inam estate'. In this case we are not concerned with the first two types of land holding but with the last, with 'inam estates' and that term is defined in Section 2(7) of the Abolition Act as meaning an estate within the meaning of Section 3, Clause (2) (d), of the Estates Land Act, but does not include an inam village which became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936 . Section 5 provides for the appointment and functions of Settlement Officers and Section 8 for the constitution of Tribunals. Section 9 which is the important provision in the present context has a heading which reads: 'Determination of inam estate.' Section 9 provides : 9. (1) As soon as may be after the passing of the Act, the Settlement Officer may suo motu and shall, on application, enquire and determine whether any inam village in his jurisdiction is an inam estate or not. (2) Before holding the inquiry, the Settlement Officer shall ca ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... st the ouster of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, but this presumption could be over-borne, and what is relied on by the respondents in this connection is the combined effect of the several provisions in Section 9. In the first place, Sub-section (1) authorises the Settlement Officer to enquire and determine whether any inam village is an inam estate. Sub-sections (2) and (3) prescribe the procedure to be followed in this enquiry and determination which includes the giving of an opportunity to every one interested in the result of the enquiry for participating in it by leading evidence in support of his contention. It does not stop there but by Sub-section (4)(a) provides for an appeal from the decision of the Settlement Officer to a Tribunal. In this connection the nature of the Tribunal set up to hear the appeals is also not without significance. Section 8 (2) enacts: 8. (2) Each Tribunal shall consist of three members; one of them (who shall be its Chairman) shall be a District Judge or an officer eligible to be appointed as a District Judge, an other shall be a Subordinate Judge or an officer eligible to be appointed as a Subordinate Judge; and the third shall ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ection 9(1), the aggrieved party had a right either to appeal to the Tribunal within the time prescribed or challenge it by a suit in Civil Court within the period of limitation which might be applicable to such suits under the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. If this were so, as there might conceivably be more than one party having a similar interest and raising a similar contention who might all feel aggrieved by the decision of a Settlement Officer, it would mean that one party might file a suit, while another resorted to the Tribunal by way of appeal. This result would be sufficient to demonstrate the impossibility of accepting the construction for which the appellant contends. The very provision setting up an hierarchy of judicial tribunals for the determination of the question on which the applicability of the Act depends, is Sufficient in most cases for inferring that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the same matter is barred. In addition we have the provision in Section 9(4)(c) read with Section 9(6) to which we have adverted. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that to the extent of the question stated in Section 9(1), the jurisdicti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. Lord Esher formulated the point thus in The Queen v. The Commissioner for Special purposes of the Income Tax (1888) 21 QBD 313 When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o decide the issue, for until he holds that this condition is satisfied, he cannot enter on the further enquiry which is the one which by Section 9(1) of the Act he is directed to conduct. On the terms of Section 9(1) the property in question being an inam village is assumed as a fact on the existence of which the competency of the Settlement Officer to determine the matter within his jurisdiction rests and as there are no words in the statute empowering him to decide finally the former, he cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on this preliminary condition to his jurisdiction. Any determination by him of this question, therefore, is (subject to the result of an appeal to the Tribunal) binding on the parties only for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act, but no further. The correctness of that finding may be questioned in any subsequent legal proceeding in the ordinary courts of the land where the question might arise for decision. The determination by him of the second question whether the main village is an inam estate is, however, within his exclusive jurisdiction and in regard to it the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is clearly barred. In this ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... efinition, as it then stood.--as already seen--a grant was brought within the terms of the definition of an estate only where the grant was of the land revenue or of the melvaram alone to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof. It was this definition that was altered by an amendment effected in 1936. It was submitted by the appellant that the grant in the present case was of the entire interest in the land and not of the melvaram alone and that such an inam, even though it be of an entire village, was not brought within the provisions of the Abolition Act. (2) The decision of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal was impugned as incompetent for the reason that whereas Section 8 provided for a tribunal consisting of three members, in the present case the appeal was heard and disposed of only by two. The Madras High Court had held in Kama Umi Isa Ammal v. Ramakadamban. AIR1953Mad129 that such a decision of the tribunal was null and void and therefore would not amount to a dismissal of the appeal by the tribunal. So far as the second point was concerned, the learned Judges accepted as correct the view of the Madras High Court in the decision referred to and held that the order of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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