9911796707
TMI Blog1983 (11) TMI 336X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . 17 of 1973 it was further escalated to ₹ 1.50 per hundred end further by Punjab Act No. 13 of 1974 the tee was raised from ₹ 1.50 to ₹ 2.25 per hundred. This enhancement was challenged in this Court in M/s. Hanuman Dall General Mills, Hissar v. State of Haryana AIR 197B P H 1 and the increase to ₹ 2.25 P. per hundred was struck down and the market fee was allowed to be maintained at the original rate of ₹ 1.50 per hundred. The Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Board went in appeal the Supreme Court but meanwhile by Act No. 14 of 1976, the market tee was raised afresh from ₹ 1.50 to ₹ 2.20 per hundred but the Market Committees in Punjab were directed to charge the market fee at the rate of ₹ 2.00 per hundred with effect from the 23rd of August, 1975 only. However, in the year 1978 by Punjab Ordinance No. 2 of 1978 followed by Punjab Act No. 22 of 1978 maximum market fee leviable was again raised from ₹ 2.20 to ₹ 3.00 per hundred. This enhancement was inter alia challenged directly by the dealers of Punjab before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. By their exhaustive judgment in Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the respondent-State and the Punjab State Agricultural Market Board and the Market Committee of Maur, the factual position is not at all controverted. The core of the stand herein that under the Rules, the writ petitioners were entitled to recover the market fee paid by them from the next purchaser and since they had done so they were not in law or equity entitled to the refund of the said amount. In any case the petitioners by the impugned Act are only put to proof that in fact they have not recovered the enhanced market fee from the nest purchaser, in order to substantiate their claim. In sum, the stand of the respondents is that the writ petitioners cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich themselves by first having recovered the enhanced market fee from the next purchaser and thereafter, lay claim for a refund of the same from the respective Market Committees. Both the constitutional validity and the equity of Section 23-A is sought to be maintained. 6. Since the whole controversy here n revolves centrifugally round the provisions of the recently inserted S. 23-A of the Act, it is apt to quote it at the very outset:-- In the principal Act, after Section 23. the following ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uld lie for the refund of whole or any part of excess market fee retained by the Committees and no Court shall enforce any decree or order directing such refund. 6A. The whole gravamen of the attack herein primarily levelled by Mr. R. L. Batta on behalf of the writ petitioners is that the impugned provisions of the afore-quoted Section 23-A, in essence seeks to validate the levy of market fee at ₹ 3/- per hundred despite the judgment in Kewai Krishan Puri's case AIR 1980 SC 1008(supra) holding to the contrary and sustaining the same to the extent of ₹ 2/- per hundred only. It was sought to be submitted that the retention of this excess fee by Market Committees in practical effect is nothing but a validation of the same at the nothing but a validation of the same at the rate of ₹ 3/- per hundred. On this premise, the contention is that such validation is sought to be effected without in any way removing the basic infirmities in the Act enhancing the fee to ₹ 3/- per hundred or affecting the foundation of the final Court's judgment in Kewal Krishan Puri's case which must continue to held the field. In sum, the argument that Section 23-A is a bla ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onducted within the market yards and to preserve the records of the market fee collected and subsequently to de sit it with the Committees. 8. In the light of the aforesaid statutory scheme, the actual effect that has arisen is that the licensees by virtue of the invalidated enhancement had collected ₹ 3/- per hundred as market fee, as middlemen having recovered the same amount from the next purchasers. The final Court having held in Kewal grishan Puri's case AIR 1980 SC 1008) (supra) that enhancement beyond ₹ 2/- was not valid, the result was 'that the licensees having charged ₹ 3/- per hundred and deposited the same with the Market Committees and this having reimbursed the amount from the next purchasers nevertheless claimed the right to refund of the difference of Re. 1/- of unauthorised market fee from the Market Committees. In essence the practical question mw as who is to keep the unauthorised collection of excess market fee above the upheld rate of ₹ 2/- per hundred? Whether the same should be retained by public bodies, like the Market Committees or refunded to middlemen traders as unjust enrichment who in fact had actually recovered the sa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... they were entitled to keep them, but not where they had, in turn,. collected from elsewhere. It would be hard to leave every agriculturist to the a suit or other legal proceeding for recovery of negligible sums which cumulatively amount to colossal amounts, Many a little makes a mickle. It is plain from the above that even on a prima facie consideration of the matter, their Lordships have set their face against refund to licensees where they had in turn collected the excess fee from else where or from next purchasers. The directions given by them were primarily for the avoidance of what could become a misappropriation of the unauthorised collection of enhanced market fee from millions of unknown purchasers who could hardly be identified or come forward to claim the paltry amounts. It appears to me that the present Act in essence statutorily effects the same larger purpose. It primarily provides that where the excess market fee had b m deposited with the Committees by the licensees who had reimbursed themselves from next purchasers then such Committees should retain the amount against any refund to middlemen. Allowing the same would merely be an unjust enrichment of the licensee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... disagreed from. 13. In view of the aforementioned considerations and precedent we have no hesitation in holding that Section 23-A, when viewed in the larger perspective is not a provision validating the collection of market fee at Re. 3/- per hundred but is merely intended for the retaining of such excess fee by Market Committee and to prevent its refund as unjust enrichment to middlemen licensees. As was said earlier in plain language the provisions only determine as to who is to keep this unauthorised collection of market fee from myriad of purchasers who could no longer come forward to claim them back. Both equity and in law, the mandate of the statute that the excess market should remain with Market Committees appears to us as unquestionable. 14. The somewhat tall grievance attempted to be made out on behalf of the writ petitioners with regard to placing of onus of proof pertaining to the recovery of market fee from next purchasers appears to be equally untenable. Herein it is again necessary to recall that under Rule 29, the licensees are expressly authorised to realise the same from their next purchasers. Mr. Bhagirath Dass was. therefore, eminently right in pointing ou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ss market tee where the same has been recovered from next purchasers. Once the substantive right of refund is validly taken away then it would follow that the procedural rights of preferring a suit or executing a decree would fall with the same. This seems to be well settled from the authoritative decision in State of Orissa v. Bhupindra Kumar AIR 1962 SC 945 which has been repeatedly affirmed thereafter. Consequently if the substantive right to refund is held to be validly abrogated the bar to procedural remedy cannot be deemed as an intrusion into the judicial field. This contention must, therefore, be also rejected. 17. Before parting with this judgment we must notice that though the conceded position before us is that the Market Committees also cannot recover the excess market fee remaining in the hands of the licensees yet the cases of adjustment, bank guarantees, stay orders or interim orders during the pendency of the long drawn out proceedings stand on a different footing. These interim orders would inevitably merge into the final orders and are, therefore, primarily governed by the same. Orders of this nature were only transitory and at best can imply that the licensees ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
