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TMI Blog2015 (1) TMI 1449X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sition Officer more than five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It is also admitted position that compensation so awarded has neither been paid to the landowners/persons interested nor deposited in the court. The deposit of compensation amount in the government treasury is of no avail and cannot be held to be equivalent to compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested. The physical possession of the land belonging to the appellants have neither been taken by the respondents nor compensation paid to them even though the award was passed on 06.08.2007, and more than five years have lapsed prior to date on which the Act of 2013 came into force. Therefore, the conditions mentioned in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 are satisfied in this case for allowing the plea of the appellants that the land acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 - The said legal principle laid down by this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation with regard to the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, with all fours are applicable to the fact situation in respect of the land covered in these appeals for granting t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... every acre of land transferred by the land owners to Punjab Urban Development Authority (PUDA), the land owners will be given back approximately 1000 square yards after development and the land owners were advised not to sell their land. Therefore, the appellants objected to the said notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act, as the same was violative of the principles of promissory estoppel. The said objections were not decided by the Land Acquisition Officer. Thereafter, on 02.02.2001, the notification under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was published. 3. The appellants filed writ petition No. 5512 of 2001 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh alleging inter alia that respondent no. 1 has started acquiring the land without complying with the provisions and in utter violation of the Act of 1995 therefore the acquisition proceedings are bad in law and liable to be quashed. 4. The High Court vide order dated 19.04.2011 dismissed writ petition No. 5512 of 2001 along with batch matters in CWP No. 4981 of 2001. Hence, the present appeal. 5. It has been contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the L.A. Act has been replaced by the Act of 2013, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the Treasury. It has been contended that in view of the above, the case of the appellants is squarely covered under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Therefore, the appellants have filed the applications. 8. On the other hand, it has been contended by the learned Solicitor General Mr. Ranjit Kumar for the respondents that the issue involved in these appeals relates to the prayer for re-allotment of the land on the premise that certain other housing societies/institutions were re-alloted the acquired land. Therefore, it is no ground for the claim of the appellants to dispose of the appeal in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as it is not sustainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be rejected. 9. Further it has been contended that physical possession of the entire extent of the acquired land except 102 acres of the land involved in these appeals were not taken by the respondent no.2-PUDA (now GMADA) on 17.05.2001 because of the interim order passed by both the High Court and this Court. The possession of the land covered by the above batch of appeals could not be taken as stay orders passed by the High Court in writ petitions filed by the land owners were in force. 10. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... possession and handing it over to the beneficiary Department is the recording of a Panchnama which can in itself constitute evidence of the fact that possession had been taken and the land had vested absolutely in the Government. 12. Further, it is contended that this Court while granting special leave to appeal directed to maintain status quo with regard to possession. As is held by this Court in a catena of judgments including Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Lichho Devi and Ors.[(1997) 7 SCC 430], and Bailamma Ors. v. Poornaprajna House Building Cooperative Society Ors.[(2006) 2 SCC 416], while dealing with cases under Section 11-A of the L.A. Act which also speaks of 'lapse' of acquisition proceedings, if no award is made within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration, once an order of stay is obtained and the Government and the Collector are prevented from taking any further action pursuant to the declaration they cannot be faulted for the delay. Similarly, the authorities cannot be faulted for not taking physical possession of the land covered in the present appeals in as much as it is not that the authorities had on their own volition ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (the petitioners), however, that fact will have to be kept in mind while deciding the issues which cover the whole acquisition process, which acquisition is for the purpose of development of 25 million sq m of land. The High Court has also noticed this aspect. We have mentioned this aspect only with a limited objective of showing that the criticism against the whole scheme which would invalidate the acquisition would be difficult to be accepted, particularly in this case, in view of the fact that majority of the landowners have parted with possession, taken the compensation and thus, the whole scheme has progressed to a substantial level, wherefrom it will be extremely difficult now to turn back to square one. With reference to the above decision, he has further contended that in the above circumstances, Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 cannot be applicable to the fact situation in the present appeals and the above applications deserve to be dismissed in the interest of justice and also public interest. 15. We have carefully gone through the legal submissions made by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants with respect to the application filed under Section 24(2) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and possession of the land is not taken or compensation has not been paid. The legal fiction under Section 24(2) comes into operation as soon as conditions stated therein are satisfied. The applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act being subject to Section 24(2), there is no merit in the contention of the Corporation. 17. Further, this Court vide its order dated 05.09.2011 requested the State Government to consider the submissions of the appellants regarding the re- allotment of the acquired land without admitting any right in the appellants and place the issue before the State Government for its consideration. Therefore, the learned Solicitor General contends that this Court found reasonable ground for its interference in the matter and granted leave for the same to be re-examined and reconsidered. The above contention is not tenable in law particularly having regard to the fact that after the above said date leave was granted by this Court by allowing the Special Leave Petition that means this Court has to consider the case of the appellants on merits. However, this does not deprive th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ement of compensation. The appellants therein have accepted the compensation in the year 2001 itself after the passing of the award and their possession have been taken in the year 2001 itself by the authorities concerned. Whereas in the present batch of appeals the appellants are still in possession and they have not accepted any compensation for their acquired land. Secondly, the impugned judgment in the present appeals is two years after passing of the impugned order in C.A. No.331 of 2014. Therefore, the impugned judgment of C.A. No. 331 of 2014 is totally different from the impugned judgment in the present batch of matters and are in no way connected to each other. 20. After referring to the aforesaid decisions with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, we are of the view that physical possession of the land belonging to the appellants have neither been taken by the respondents nor compensation paid to them even though the award was passed on 06.08.2007, and more than five years have lapsed prior to date on which the Act of 2013 came into force. Therefore, the conditions mentioned in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 are satisfied in this case for allowi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. 25.In construing the articles of the Constitution we must bear in mind certain cardinal rules of construction. It has been said in Hough v. Windus [1884] 12 Q.B.D. 224, that statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested right. The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so constructed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed [Leeds and County Bank Ltd. v. Walker (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 84; Moon v. Durden (1848) 2 Ex. 22; 76 R.R. 479. The following observation of Rankin C.J. in Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin (supra) at page 520 is also apposite and helpful : Unless the contrary can be shown the provision which takes away the jurisdiction is itself subject to the implied saving of the litigant's right. In Janardan Reddy v. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on pending proceedings, the approach of the courts in England is that the same are unaffected by the changers in the law so far as they relate to the determination of the substantive rights and in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary intention in an amending enactment, the substantive rights of the parties to an action fall to the determined by the law as it existed when the action was commenced and this is so whether the law is change before the hearing of the case at the first instance or while an appeal is pending (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para 922).' 28. From the aforesaid decisions the legal position that emerges is that when a repeal of an enactment is followed by a fresh legislation such legislation does not effect the substantive rights of the parties on the date of suit or adjudication of suit unless such a legislation is retrospective and a court of appeal cannot take into consideration a new law brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered because the rights of the parties in an appeal are determined under the law in force on the date of suit. However, the position in law would be different in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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