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TMI Blog1931 (1) TMI 24X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... quent mesne profits to be fixed later. Against that decree both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the District Judge, the plaintiff claiming that the damages awarded to him were insufficient and the defendant objecting to the whole decree. It has been found by the District Judge that the village of Chinnamapet is an "estate" under the Madras Estates Land Act, and that finding has not been disputed before us. It is also not now disputed that the land upon which the defendant planted his casuarina trees is ryoti land. The District Judge found that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in this case and returned the plaint for presentation to a Revenue Court. Against that order the plaintiff now appeals. 2. The only contention which has been urged before us on his behalf is that the defendant, although he has been occupying ryoti land in an "estate" under the Madras Estates Land Act, is not a ryot because he has not held the land for the purpose of agriculture, and, that being so, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not excluded. It is not suggested that the defendant holds his land for any other purpose than for his casuarina plantation, and, as was dec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f luxury. That appears to me to be too narrow an interpretation. Still less do I agree with the opinion expressed by Sadasiva Aiyar, J., in Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappareddi I.L.R. (1913) 38 M. 738 : 25 M.L.J. 578, that agriculture is confined to the production of grain crops. I can see no reason why the cultivation in open spaces of such useful products as cotton, jute, flax and hemp should not be agriculture. Indeed, I think agriculture cannot be defined by the nature of the products cultivated but should be defined rather by the circumstances in which the cultivation is carried on. In some cases it has been suggested that agriculture is confined to tillage. I think it can easily be shown that agriculture was carried on in this world before ploughs were invented. In the present day in many places cultivation is done with spades and not with ploughs. But the planting of timber or firewood trees, which are to stand on the land for a considerable number of years forming plantations or woods or forests, appears to me to be opposed to the idea of agriculture, the cultivation of an open space. It is true that for the purpose of growing trees in a plantation it may be necessary first ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the defendant. Spencer, J., went so far in that case as to say that agriculture includes horticulture, arboriculture and sylviculture. If I may say so with great respect that appears to me to be using the word "agriculture" in a very loose way. It ignores the first two syllables of that word. It appears to me to be the result rather of stretching than of defining the word. Ramesam, J., also agreed that the growing of timber trees would be included in agriculture. But again with the very greatest respect perhaps I may point out that his view of the matter appears to have been affected by the definition of "agriculture" in three modern English Acts. To use the definition of a word in one Act and to apply it as the definition of that word in another Act, especially when the second Act is in force in another country and under other conditions, appears to me to be a very dangerous course. That is a road which, I think it is well known, leads to many pitfalls. On the other hand to compare and contrast the definitions of the same word in a number of Acts is often of the greatest use in determining what is the meaning to be attached to the word in one of those Acts. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Act appears to me to be a very strong indication that the growing of timber or fuel trees is not an agricultural purpose within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. 6. Then, if we look at the definition of "improvement" in that Act, we find that improvement means with reference to a ryot's holding "any work which materially adds to the value of the holding, which is suitable to the holding and consistent with the character thereof". We must remember that the holdings referred to are agricultural holdings and their character is agricultural. That definition goes on to say that "improvement" shall include (subject to the words I have quoted) certain specified things, and among them is the planting of fruit trees and fruit gardens. But under Section 14 of the Act that kind of improvement may not be made by one class of ryots, non-occupancy ryots, without the permission of the landholder. How could the planting of fruit trees have been provided for specially as an improvement and have been made subject to that restriction if the planting of trees generally was an agricultural purpose, which might be carried out by an ordinary agriculturist? ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... paired the value of the holding for agricultural purposes and rendered it substantially unfit for such purposes. I take it that "agricultural purposes" in that section means agricultural purposes generally. It cannot be doubted that, if a ryot grew on his holding a large plantation of timber trees and cut them down when they matured, the stumps and roots in the land would render it entirely unsuitable for ordinary agricultural purposes until they had been removed, which could often be done only at very great expense. It is no answer, I think, to that argument to say that, if the growing of trees is an agricultural purpose, the land may still be suitable for growing more trees in the spaces between the trees already cut down. I think the meaning of the section is that the landholder can eject a ryot who makes his holding unfit for agricultural purposes generally, not unfit for all agricultural purposes except one, even if the growing of timber were an agricultural purpose. Such a heavy penalty could hardly have been provided if the growing of timber trees were an agricultural purpose at all. With this provision Section 11 of the Act may be compared. 11. These are five ind ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... award of damages, maintaining that he was entitled to something more. But Mr. Srinivasa Aiyar has informed us that, after the weary course this lengthy litigation has run he does not wish to proceed with that appeal any further. So far as the defendant is concerned, although the learned District Judge found in his favour that the suit should have been brought in a Revenue Court, he dealt with the other aspects of the case, and it is unnecessary to send the defendant's appeal back to the District Court for further hearing. 14. In my opinion the present appeal should be allowed with costs and the decree of the District Munsif restored. In the District Court each party should bear his own costs. C.V. Ananthakrishna Iyer, J. 15. I agree. The plaintiff filed the original suit to recover possession of six acres of land which he described in paragraph 6 of the plaint as poramboke land of the village of Chhinamapet. He also claimed damages from the defendant. The village of Chinnamapet belongs to the plaintiff. In 1911 the plaintiff had granted, in favour of the defendant, an ijara to be in force for a term of eight years--Ex. A. Under that document, the defendant was practically to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urpose would be letting lands "for agricultural purposes" within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. He came to the conclusion that it was, and accordingly reversed the decision of the Trial Court, and directed the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court, holding that only Revenue Courts have jurisdiction in the matter. The plaintiff has preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal against the order passed by the learned District Judge. 16. For the purpose of disposing of this appeal it is necessary only to consider the question whether assuming the land to be ryoti land, the defendant holds the land for "purposes of agriculture". As was held in Venugopala Rice Mill v. Rajah of Pitlapuram I.L.R. (1929) 53 M. 367 : 59 M.L.J. 74 if by agreement between the parties, a ryoti land is no longer held for agricultural purposes but is held for non-agricultural purposes, then, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the rights of the parties thereto would not be ousted by the Estates Land Act. Therefore, the argument in second appeal really centred on the question whether letting "land for rearing casuarina trees" is letting ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as not an agricultural lease, was not one to which he was inclined to adhere, after hearing further arguments upon the question. In King-Emperor v. Alexander Allan I.L.R. (1901) 25 M. 627 Davies and Moore, JJ., referred to various dictionaries as to the definition of the word "agriculture". They referred to the Oxford Dictionary by Dr. Murray, and held in connection with a case arising under the Madras District Municipalities Act, that lands let for pasture for cattle were lands let for agricultural purposes, in the absence of a definition of the word "agriculture" in that Act. Sadasiva Aiyar, J., had occasion to consider the definition of "agriculture" in two cases, Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappareddi I.L.R. (1913) 38 M. 738 : 25 M.L.J. 578 and Seshayya v. Rajah of Pittapur (1916)31MLJ214 . In Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappareddi I.L.R. (1913) 38 M. 738 : 25 M.L.J. 578 the question that had to be considered was whether land leased for pasture for cattle was land "let for agricultural purposes within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act." In deciding the question in the negative the learned Judge observed at page 741 as follows: The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... meaning of the word "agriculture", all that we find is that "agriculture" means "field cultivation" and "cultivation" is said to be "tillage or breaking up the soil". There is nothing in the definition of "agriculture" given in the dictionaries which I have been able to consult, which restricts its application to cases of production of those things only which are fit for human consumption for man or beast as described by Bhashyam Aiyangar, J. Nor do I find anything which restricts its meaning to the raising of "grain crops" as mentioned by Sadasiva Aiyar, J. When this question came later on for discussion before this Court in Panadai Pathan v. Ramaswami Chetty I.L.R. (1922) 45 M. 710 Spencer and Ramesam, JJ., found themselves unable to agree with the definitions given by Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., and Sadasiva Aiyar, J. I am not now, however, concerned with the definition given by the learned Judges in the case in Panadai Pathan v. Ramaswami Chetty I.L.R. (1922) 45 M. 710. In this connection, reference may be made to a discussion of this question of "agriculture" and "husbandry" generally in Dunc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inclusion of these words specifically in Section 3 (1) of the Act. There is the legal maxim--expressio unis exclusio alterius--that is, the specific inclusion of one necessarily implies the exclusion of others; so that in the absence of any other indication afforded by the Act, this one circumstance is, I think, of so great a significance that the contention of the learned advocate for the respondent on this point could not, in the circumstances, be upheld. But are there any further indications in the Act? Now the definition of the word "improvement" in Section 3, Clause (4), Sub-clause (f) refers to the planting of "fruit trees and, fruit gardens". If agriculture includes the planting of fruit trees and fruit gardens, the definition of "improvement" mentioned above is meaningless. If one is, however, at liberty (I have my doubts whether one is) to look into other Acts passed by the Madras Legislature, one may refer to Section 4 of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act (I of 1900) where the word "improvement" is made to include other things also, namely "timber trees and other useful trees"; and in the recently ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the word "agriculture" for the purposes of this Act. I do not propose to attempt a positive definition of the word "agriculture". It is enough for the disposal of this case to say that letting lands for rearing casuarina trees does not come within the scope of "agriculture" as the term is used in the Madras Estates Land Act. As I said, it is not safe to draw any sort of conclusive inference from the meaning of the word "agriculture" used in one Act, when we have to construe another Act; but, so far as they go, the observations in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Manavedan Tirumalpad I.L.R. (1930) 54 M. 21 : 59 M.L.J. 265-a case that arose under the Income Tax Act--seem to support the contention of the appellant in the present case. 20. The question there was whether, under the Income Tax Act, amounts received from the sale of timber trees were income liable to Income Tax assessment. The Court observed at page 267 as follows: Of course we are unable to distinguish between the income derived from the sale of paddy which is grown on land and the income derived from the sale of timber cut in a forest; but the profits earned from the sa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Pathan v. Ramaswami Chetty I.L.R. (1922) 45 M. 710 concludes this case. I have already remarked that the learned judges in the case in Panadai Pathan v. Ramaswami Chetty I.L.R. (1922) 45 M. 710 referred to the definition of the term "agriculture" given in some English Statutes. All learned Judges are agreed that the word has to be construed with reference to the context, and, for reasons I have already given, it seems to me that the indications given not only by the definition (rather description) of the word "agriculture" but by the other provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, to which my learned brother has elaborately referred, lead us to the conclusion that the contention of the learned advocate for the respondent should not be upheld by us. There is a decision in Vellaypppa Chetty v. Subramaniam Chetty I.L.R. (1926) 50 M. 482 : 51 M.L.J. 880 where Devadoss and Wallace, JJ., had to consider the question whether cocoanut trees would be "improvements" within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. The learned Judges held that they were not improvements, though they held so with great hesitation. The exact question is not before us. The questi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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