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TMI Blog1931 (1) TMI 24X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that decree both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the District Judge, the plaintiff claiming that the damages awarded to him were insufficient and the defendant objecting to the whole decree. It has been found by the District Judge that the village of Chinnamapet is an estate under the Madras Estates Land Act, and that finding has not been disputed before us. It is also not now disputed that the land upon which the defendant planted his casuarina trees is ryoti land. The District Judge found that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in this case and returned the plaint for presentation to a Revenue Court. Against that order the plaintiff now appeals. 2. The only contention which has been urged before us on his behalf is that the defendant, although he has been occupying ryoti land in an estate under the Madras Estates Land Act, is not a ryot because he has not held the land for the purpose of agriculture, and, that being so, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not excluded. It is not suggested that the defendant holds his land for any other purpose than for his casuarina plantation, and, as was decided recently by my learned brother and Wallace, J. in Venugopala ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... essed by Sadasiva Aiyar, J., in Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappareddi I.L.R. (1913) 38 M. 738 : 25 M.L.J. 578, that agriculture is confined to the production of grain crops. I can see no reason why the cultivation in open spaces of such useful products as cotton, jute, flax and hemp should not be agriculture. Indeed, I think agriculture cannot be defined by the nature of the products cultivated but should be defined rather by the circumstances in which the cultivation is carried on. In some cases it has been suggested that agriculture is confined to tillage. I think it can easily be shown that agriculture was carried on in this world before ploughs were invented. In the present day in many places cultivation is done with spades and not with ploughs. But the planting of timber or firewood trees, which are to stand on the land for a considerable number of years forming plantations or woods or forests, appears to me to be opposed to the idea of agriculture, the cultivation of an open space. It is true that for the purpose of growing trees in a plantation it may be necessary first to prepare the land. Later on it may be necessary to protect and water the young plants. Still later it may ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... respect that appears to me to be using the word agriculture in a very loose way. It ignores the first two syllables of that word. It appears to me to be the result rather of stretching than of defining the word. Ramesam, J., also agreed that the growing of timber trees would be included in agriculture. But again with the very greatest respect perhaps I may point out that his view of the matter appears to have been affected by the definition of agriculture in three modern English Acts. To use the definition of a word in one Act and to apply it as the definition of that word in another Act, especially when the second Act is in force in another country and under other conditions, appears to me to be a very dangerous course. That is a road which, I think it is well known, leads to many pitfalls. On the other hand to compare and contrast the definitions of the same word in a number of Acts is often of the greatest use in determining what is the meaning to be attached to the word in one of those Acts. However, so far as the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, it must be remembered that in Devaraja Naicken v. Ammani Animal (1915) 3 L.W. 319, another Bench of this Court, Seshagiri A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n that Act, we find that improvement means with reference to a ryot's holding any work which materially adds to the value of the holding, which is suitable to the holding and consistent with the character thereof . We must remember that the holdings referred to are agricultural holdings and their character is agricultural. That definition goes on to say that improvement shall include (subject to the words I have quoted) certain specified things, and among them is the planting of fruit trees and fruit gardens. But under Section 14 of the Act that kind of improvement may not be made by one class of ryots, non-occupancy ryots, without the permission of the landholder. How could the planting of fruit trees have been provided for specially as an improvement and have been made subject to that restriction if the planting of trees generally was an agricultural purpose, which might be carried out by an ordinary agriculturist? 7. Then we have Section 12 of the Act. In that it is provided among other things that Subject to any rights which by custom or by contract in writing executed by any ryot before the passing of this Act are reserved to the landholder every occupancy ryot shall ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s holding a large plantation of timber trees and cut them down when they matured, the stumps and roots in the land would render it entirely unsuitable for ordinary agricultural purposes until they had been removed, which could often be done only at very great expense. It is no answer, I think, to that argument to say that, if the growing of trees is an agricultural purpose, the land may still be suitable for growing more trees in the spaces between the trees already cut down. I think the meaning of the section is that the landholder can eject a ryot who makes his holding unfit for agricultural purposes generally, not unfit for all agricultural purposes except one, even if the growing of timber were an agricultural purpose. Such a heavy penalty could hardly have been provided if the growing of timber trees were an agricultural purpose at all. With this provision Section 11 of the Act may be compared. 11. These are five indications I find in the Act that agriculture was not meant by the framers of the Act to include the growing of plantations of timber or fuel trees. Mr. Kumaraswamiah has drawn our attention to Section 26 of the Act. There we find mention of a ryot accepting a p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uit should have been brought in a Revenue Court, he dealt with the other aspects of the case, and it is unnecessary to send the defendant's appeal back to the District Court for further hearing. 14. In my opinion the present appeal should be allowed with costs and the decree of the District Munsif restored. In the District Court each party should bear his own costs. C.V. Ananthakrishna Iyer, J. 15. I agree. The plaintiff filed the original suit to recover possession of six acres of land which he described in paragraph 6 of the plaint as poramboke land of the village of Chhinamapet. He also claimed damages from the defendant. The village of Chinnamapet belongs to the plaintiff. In 1911 the plaintiff had granted, in favour of the defendant, an ijara to be in force for a term of eight years--Ex. A. Under that document, the defendant was practically to represent the plaintiff in respect of the plaintiff's rights in that village during the eight years, and this defendant was authorised under that document to grant puttahs to ryots and to do all other things that would have to be done by the plaintiff but for the ijara. After the expiry of the period, the defendant surre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tiff has preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal against the order passed by the learned District Judge. 16. For the purpose of disposing of this appeal it is necessary only to consider the question whether assuming the land to be ryoti land, the defendant holds the land for purposes of agriculture . As was held in Venugopala Rice Mill v. Rajah of Pitlapuram I.L.R. (1929) 53 M. 367 : 59 M.L.J. 74 if by agreement between the parties, a ryoti land is no longer held for agricultural purposes but is held for non-agricultural purposes, then, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the rights of the parties thereto would not be ousted by the Estates Land Act. Therefore, the argument in second appeal really centred on the question whether letting land for rearing casuarina trees is letting it for agricultural purposes . This leads naturally to the discussion as to what exactly is the meaning to be attacked to the expression agricultural purposes occurring in the Act. Our attention was drawn to various definitions of the term agriculture which learned Judges have given on various occasions. In Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan I.L.R. (1901) 24 M. 421 Shephar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for cattle were lands let for agricultural purposes, in the absence of a definition of the word agriculture in that Act. Sadasiva Aiyar, J., had occasion to consider the definition of agriculture in two cases, Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappareddi I.L.R. (1913) 38 M. 738 : 25 M.L.J. 578 and Seshayya v. Rajah of Pittapur (1916)31MLJ214 . In Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappareddi I.L.R. (1913) 38 M. 738 : 25 M.L.J. 578 the question that had to be considered was whether land leased for pasture for cattle was land let for agricultural purposes within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. In deciding the question in the negative the learned Judge observed at page 741 as follows: The ordinary meaning of 'agriculture' is the raising of annual or periodical grain crops through the operation of ploughing, sowing, etc. 18. He reiterated the same definition in the later case in Seshayya v. Rajah of Pittapur (1916)31MLJ214 . In Maharaja, of Venkatagiri v. Ram Reddi (1916)31MLJ211 Sir John Wallis, C.J., and Phillips, JJ, had to consider the same question as regards Lands let for pasture. These learned Judges agreed with the decision in the prior case in Rajah of Venkatagi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ar, J. When this question came later on for discussion before this Court in Panadai Pathan v. Ramaswami Chetty I.L.R. (1922) 45 M. 710 Spencer and Ramesam, JJ., found themselves unable to agree with the definitions given by Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., and Sadasiva Aiyar, J. I am not now, however, concerned with the definition given by the learned Judges in the case in Panadai Pathan v. Ramaswami Chetty I.L.R. (1922) 45 M. 710. In this connection, reference may be made to a discussion of this question of agriculture and husbandry generally in Duncan Keir v. Thomas Gillespie (1919) 7 Tax Cases 473 : 57 S.L.R. 73. However, general definitions given in dictionaries would be of use only when there is nothing to the contrary in the context of any particular provision of law which the Courts have to construe. Pronouncements by Courts on other provisions of other Acts, however useful, would not be decisive as authority when we have to construe the provisions of a quite different Act, In several of the English Statutes, viz., Agricultural Holdings Act, Agricultural Rates Act, and other similar Acts, the Legislature has chosen to enlarge the meaning of the term agriculture , as it thought fi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nition of improvement mentioned above is meaningless. If one is, however, at liberty (I have my doubts whether one is) to look into other Acts passed by the Madras Legislature, one may refer to Section 4 of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act (I of 1900) where the word improvement is made to include other things also, namely timber trees and other useful trees ; and in the recently enacted Malabar Tenancy Act (XIV of 1930) the definition of the word improvement given in the Compensation Act (I of 1900) is taken to be the definition for the purpose of the new Act also. Again, while the planting of fruit trees and fruit gardens is included in the term improvement we have not got anything to indicate that the planting of trees as such (irrespectively of fruit bearing) should be considered to be an improvement . Section 12 of the Act, as I read it, is strongly against the argument of the learned advocate for the respondent. It speaks of trees planted by the ryot after the passing of the Act, and enacts that the ryot is entitled to the same. If a ryot entitled to use the land for agricultural purposes would be entitled to plant trees as coming within the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent. The Court observed at page 267 as follows: Of course we are unable to distinguish between the income derived from the sale of paddy which is grown on land and the income derived from the sale of timber cut in a forest; but the profits earned from the sale of paddy would be assessable to Income Tax but for the special exemption given to that income in the Income Tax Act by reason of its being agricultural income. There is no such exemption in the case of income derived from the sale of timber. 21. Therefore when there was no definition of the word agriculture, the Court held that planting trees on land could not be said to be operation by way of agriculture. In the case before us, we have got this extra indication, as I said, viz., the Legislature has specifically said in so many words that agriculture includes horticulture . That being so, it seems to me that it would not, in this Act, include other operations which in the widest sense of the term might otherwise be taken to come under the same. The question whether the raising of casuarina trees in using lands for agricultural purposes came up for decision before this Court though not in connection with the Madras Es ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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