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TMI Blog1935 (9) TMI 14X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d subsequently and will be mentioned later, it is convenient to divide the villages we are concerned with in these appeals into two distinct groups, one group consisting of 14 villages and the other of 51 villages. 2. In respect of the first group, the Revenue Officer published draft rent rolls on 21st June, 1924. The method of settlement followed by him was necessarily based on the prevailing system of rent collection in the estate (which differs considerably from that prevailing in other parts of the presidency) known as khostgutta system, the chief incidents of which are : (1) in theory, the landlord is entitled to half the gross produce but (2) in practice however, rent is not collected in kind from each ryot but a single cash demand is fixed annually in respect of the lands in the whole village and a single joint muchilika obtained from the leading ryots. All khost muchilika lands in each village form a single holding over which a rent is annually settled between the zamindar and the ryots according to the estimated gross produce thereon. The settlement of rents on these lands by the Revenue Officer consisted merely of a commutation of grain rents into cash rents and appo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rom khost muchilikas but reversed the officer's decision on the landholder's objection and held that the correct way to arrive at a fair and equitable rent for a holding was to divide the consolidated village rent demand by the estimated extent of ryoti land and not by the actual measured area. 6. The appeals in respect of the other group of villages happened to be heard by a different member, Mr. Mac Michael who in his order dated 7th December, 1925, completely differed from Mr. Raghaviah op both the points. He held that the khost muchilika demand ought to be divided by the actual surveyed area and not by the estimated area mentioned in the muchilika. He also held that the Choppamani lands were included in the khost muchilika. In view of these findings he made an all-round reduction in the money rates fixed by the Revenue Officer. 7. The ryots in the first group of villages abovementioned then filed a petition under Section 172 of the Act for the revision of the order passed by Mr. Raghaviah under Section 171 on 8th October, 1925. The petition was heard by the collective Board consisting of three members who, after overruling the objection that they had no power to r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rned Judges of this Court were referred to but the decision really turns on a construction of certain sections of the statute. The provisions of Chapter XI of the Act, and particularly the sections from 169 to 179 have presented considerable difficulty in interpretation. Several inconsistencies appear between section and section, several anomalies result from a literal construction of the words of some of the sections. Wallace, J., was hampered by the difficultyto reduce to a logical consistency the provisions of Sections 165 to 179 of the Estates Land Act. Tiruvenkatachariar, J., observes. That the drafting of the many sections referred to is by no means happy and the intention of the legislature as it may be inferred from one section seems to be repelled by the language of the other sections relating to the same subject matter. 13. It is well known that the provisions ol Chapter XI of the Madras Estates Land Act are substantially reproduced from the Bengal Tenancy Act but unfortunately modifications have been made in the Madras Act which do not fit into the original scheme according to the Bengal Act and have given rise to much confusion. It is regrettable that in spite o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the final publication of the record of rights under Section 166 (2) either the landholder or the ryots apply for a settlement of rent the local Government may direct the revenue Officer to settle a fair and equitable rent in respect of the land (Section 168 (1)). 17. In settling rents, the officer starts with the existing rent, a rate of rent which, it may be recalled, has been entered in the record of rights (Vide Section 165(e)) and such rent is presumed to be fair and equitable until the contrary is proved. The Revenue Officer first publishes the draft rent roll. Objections made to any entry in the record or omissions therefrom are considered and disposed of by him (Section 169). When all objections are disposed of under Section 169 the Revenue Officer submits the settlement record to the confirming authority appointed by the local Government (who in this case is the District Collector). Section 170, Sub-Section (2): The confirming authority may sanction the settlement with or without amendment, or may return it for revision. (Section 170, Sub-Section 3): After it has been sanctioned by the confirming authority, the settlement record shall be incorporated in the rec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Revenue as the superior Revenue authority under this section and not a little confusion has resulted thereby. The orders passed under Section 171 are given effect to in the manner prescribed under Section 174 which says inter alia that a note of all decisions on appeal under Section 171 shall be made in the record of rights with which the settlement record has been incorporated under Section 170 and such note shall be considered as part of the record. 20. Then comes Section 172, the scope of which it is difficult to be certain about. It confers a power on the Board of Revenue expressly by name. Reading Sections 171 and 172 it is tolerably clear that the legislature contemplated two different legal entities functioning under the two sections whereas in fact, we have now the same body functioning under both sections. For the present a consideration of the nature of the powers conferred on the Board of Revenue under the section may be postponed. It may be mentioned, however, that in the second group of cases the power of the Board of Revenue under this section was not invoked and need not therefore be considered. Section 173 comes next and runs thus: 173. (1) Any person aggrie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Sub-Section (3) makes it plain that the right of suit conferred under the section is restricted and limited. Now what is the nature of the relief that can be sought and obtained in a suit under Section 173? Sub-Section (1) implies that the cause of action is furnished by an entry (presumably in the opinion of the person aggrieved, a wrong entry) in a settlement record incorporated ina record of rights or by an omission to settle a rent. That the entry mentioned here is the entry of a rent settled does not admit of much doubt. The antithetical clause omission to settle a rent suggests itBut all doubt is removed by sub-Section 4 of the section which expressly refers to the entry relating to rent. The relief then is in respect of an entry relating to a rent settled or a rent omitted to be settled and the object of the suit is to challenge the correctness of the entry. Sub-Section (3) limits, however, the grounds on which an entry of a rent in a settlement record or an omission to settle a rent may be attacked, to the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) to (f) of that sub-section. The learned Advocate-General who appeared for the appellant contended that Section 173 confers a general o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ly contradictory to the express wording of Sections 176 and 179 which latter section clearly implies that a suit lies for the alteration of entries in the record of rights of rent settled under Sections 168 to 172. Therefore I take it that what a party can sue under Section 173 to have set aside are the original entries in the record-of-rights or any amended entries of these which have been incorporated in the record of rights so long of course as these are of the classes set out in Sub-Section 3(a) to (f). Reilly, J., says at page 491: It is contended that the result of these provisions is that the record of rent lawfully payable, which is made in the record of rights before the settlement of rents is begun, can be questioned by a suit under Section 173, but that the entry of rent finally settled by the Revenue Officer can never be so questioned. That is a very curious result, and it cannot be suggested that any very useful purpose can be served by questioning the lawfully payable rent entered in the record of rights after that rent has been superseded by the settled rent, which must thereafter be treated as correct. At page 493: If only the entry made under Clause (e) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ections 164 to 166. Under Section 173 the entries that are open to question are entries in the settlement record and the incorrectness of an entry made under Clauses (d), (e) and (j) of Section 165 is merely one of the grounds on which the entry of the rent as settled can be questioned. The right to question by suit is limited because the grounds on which such suits can be instituted are only the grounds enumerated in Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 and no others. 26. It is obvious how a wrong entry made under Clause (d), (e) and (j) of Section 165 in respect of a land will have an effect on the correctness of the entry of rent settled in respect of it. Clause (d) relates to particulars whether the land is irrigated, unirrigated or garden land and if irrigated whether double or single crop. A wrong entry of irrigated double crop land as unirrigated land will totally vitiate the rent which must have been settled on that wrong basis. Likewise mistakes in recording irrigation rights under Clause (j). 27. So far as Clause (e) is concerned, it is made up of two parts (i) the rent lawfully payable at the time of the preparation of the record (ii) whether the rent has been permanentl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cer under statutory Rule 18 has to pay attention to the condition of the land and the nature of the soil etc. For this purpose he is invested with power to cut and thrash the crops on any land and to weigh or measure the produce with a view to estimating the capabilities of the soil. Surely matters like these are not within the province of a Civil Court's functions and rightly excluded therefrom. 31. What the Civil Court is empowered to do in a suit under Section 173 is detailed in Sub-Section 4. In cases (a) and (b) if it finds the entry is incorrect it shall declare that no rent is payable or direct that the Collector shall fix a fair and equitable rent. Here again though the intention is clear, the wording is unhappy. The provision is not to be understood as implying a choice open to the Court between the two alternatives in every case. In case (b) i.e., if it finds that the land is not liable to the payment of rent, it shall declare that no rent is payable. Likewise in case (a) if it finds that the relation of land-holder and ryot does not exist. On the other hand if there has been an omission to settle a rent on the ground that the relation of land-holder and ryot does ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... had been given due weight, namely, (1) that the Jeroyiti lands were much more extensive than he ever guessed and (2) that certain Choppamani lands were held by tenants, who for one reason or another had never actually paid any rent for them. 36. Though there is an attempt in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint to bring the case within Section 173 Sub-Section (3) Clauses (d) and (e), the attempt has not been successful as the plaintiff has no real grievance against the entry of the rent lawfully payable at the time the record was prepared under Section 165 (e). 37. In this view it is unnecessary to deal with a subsidiary argument on behalf of the respondent based on the definition of 'rent' in the Act, viz., that even the entry under Clause (e) of Section 165 can be attacked only in respect of the cesses which form part of the rent according to the definition and not in respect of the amount or rate of rent. 38. The plaintiff's suits which fall into the second group mentioned at the opening not being really based on any of the grounds on which a suit is permitted by Sub-Clause (3) of Section 173, are not maintainable under that section and Section 179 operates as a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on the merits 3o not matter. In the second case the decision must be on the merits. 42. If the plaintiff is confined to the final prayer in the plaint there can be no doubt that the suits are not for a declaration simpliciter that the order of the Board of Revenue dated 22nd June, 1926, is without jurisdiction. And as it has already been held that treated as suits under Section 173 they are not maintainable it follows the suits must fail. 43. But as an allegation has been made in paragraph 9 of the plaint that the Full Board has acted without jurisdiction, the maintainability of the suit as if it were a suit for a declaration of the invalidity of the Board of Revenue's order may now be examined. 44. The learned Advocate-General impeached the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue to act in the manner it did on the following grounds: (a) Order under Section 171 by any appellate authority cannot be revised under Section 172 as Section 171 is not mentioned in Section 172. (b) The Board of Revenue has no power of revision under Section 172 in cases where' it has itself acted under Section 171 as the appellate tribunal. (c) Ass uming the Board of Revenue can act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g authority itself. Even the High Court has not got that power. ...It is in effect a re-hearing of the appeal or rather a hearing of an appeal against its own decision in appeal. Such a power is not inherent in a Court and it is open to grave doubt whether it is possessed by the Board of Revenue when it acts as a Civil Court. 49. Here Wallace, J., is assuming that the Board of Revenue acts as a Civil Court but the assumption was definitely negatived by the Full Bench to which Wallace, J., made the reference and no arguments based on ordinarily accepted notions can prevail against an interpretation which flows from the wording of the section. Moreover a subsequent extraneous event, namely, the prescribing of the Board of Revenue as the appellate authority under Section 171 ought not in strictness to be taken into account in interpreting Section 172 as it stands. Supposing under Section 171 the Local Government appoints not the Board but some special officer as the appellate authority, would the Board of Revenue then have the power to revise the order of such special officer? If it has, (and it has been shown that Section 174 supports the conclusion) then equally it would have po ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... move in two ways, by revision on the merits under Section 172 or by a suit under Section 173, while the successful party may be defeated without remedy by a revision under Section 172 after the limitation period for a suit under Section 173 has expired. 50. Pakenham Walsh, J., In Zamindarini of Mandasa v. Ryots of Mandasa Zamindari (1932) 65 M.L.J. 423 : I.L.R. 56 Mad. 579 also refers to this aspect at page 612. 51. It cannot be denied that all these considerations force one to the conclusion that the power of the Board of Revenue under that section was intended to be exercised by directing a revision in the sense of a retrial i.e., a re-settlement. 52. Such a course may be found desirable and expedient because the settlement has been found to be unsatisfactory in the actual working of it; or because the settlement proceeded on fundamentally wrong principles or because as in this case, there have been conflicting decisions on appeal resulting in marked inequalities in the rent settled. Revision then takes on a much wider meaning than it has when used in describing the power of a superior Court to interfere with the orders of a subordinate Court. In Chapter XI itself, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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