TMI Blog1939 (2) TMI 16X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... objection aforesaid is dated and was presented on 4th January 1932. At the foot of it are the words: "(Sd). Bohra Tara Chand. Through Asharfi Lal, Pleader, Agra." On the margin the Land Acquisition Officer wrote: Give a date 15 days hence and inform parties that I will hear legal objections on that date and will also record any evidence in support of them if the parties wish to produce. 3. Below this order we find "18th January 1932 fixed," and this is admittedly in the handwriting of the Land Acquisition Officer's clerk, Sharafat Husain, and immediately below this there is the signature of Bohra Tara Chand. Babu Asharfi Lal and Sharafat Husain were both examined by the District Judge. B. Asharfi Lal was admittedly the plaintiff's counsel; and he says that he drafted the objection and then the plaintiff faired it out. After witness had signed the objection the plaintiff took it away; he wanted to save counsel's fee by presenting the objection in person. Witness says that he does not necessarily get his client's signature on an application after signing, "(Sd.) so and so;" the signature "may be made in my clerk's presence.&qu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion, the obvious place for his signature was at the bottom of the paper to the left of B. Asharfi Lal's signature, where there was sufficient space. We think it is improbable--though of course not impossible--that he would have appended his signature an inch or two up the margin. Moreover, having presented the objection himself, it is highly probable that the plaintiff would have waited to obtain, an order of the Court fixing a date, and it will be observed that the words "18th January 1932 fixed.," and the signature of the plaintiff appear to be in the same ink--a fact which suggests that, after Sharafat Husain had written the date, he handed the pen to the plaintiff. The latter's signature is immediately below the date, which farther suggests that there was a connexion between the writing of the date and the appending of his signature. There is nothing to indicate that Sharafat Husain was acting in collusion with the Sabha, and no specific questions were put to him in cross-examination with a view to elicit the fact of such collusion. It appears that on 18th January 1932, it was realized that no notice had been issued to the Sabha, and so a notice was sent that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e case with which we are dealing states that the land was required for a public purpose, whereas in fact it was required for the Sabha, which the Government presumably regarded as a company. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant pleads that a declaration under Section 6(3) will not be conclusive if it is materially defective in form or if the provisions of the Act were not complied with prior to the publication of such declaration. Apart from the defect in the declaration he pleads in the first place that the Land Acquisition Officer acted illegally in not giving the plaintiff an opportunity of being heard in support of his objection. With this matter we have already dealt and have found against the plaintiff. Then learned Counsel argues that in various other respects the provisions of the Act were violated. He points out that in the notification under Section 4--as also of course in the declaration under Section 6--it was stated that the land was needed for a public purpose, in which case title would vest in the Government, whereas admittedly the land was required for the Sabha, which was regarded as a company within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the Act, and the compensati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sions of the Land Acquisition Act had been complied with. But they were not. 9. In Manick Chand Mehta v. Corporation of Calcutta A.I.R.(1921) Cal. 159, the owner of a certain property applied under Section 45, Specific Relief Act, to restrain the Corporation and the Improvement Trust from taking further steps in the proceedings then pending before the Acquisition Collector in the acquisition of the said property by the Corporation under a notification in terms of Section 6, Land Acquisition Act. At page 923 Greaves J. observed: ...as regards Section 4, Evidence Act, and Section 6 (3), Land Acquisition Act, the fact that the declaration may be conclusive as to the land being needed for a public purpose does not, I think, in any way debar me from enquiring into the validity of the steps which led up to that declaration. 10. The declaration with which we are concerned is printed at page 49 of our paper-book in F.A. No. 14 of 1934. It begins by saying that the lands designated below are required for a public purpose. Admittedly the land was not required "for a public purpose" as this term is used in the Act; but we are referred to the column headed "For what purpose ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the land was being required for a company. He says: All that is necessary to be proved in case of : inquisition of land for a company is that the work for which the land is to be acquired is likely to prove useful to the public [vide Clause (b) of Section 40]. In the present case land is being acquired for the establishment of an up-to-date dairy farm. This includes the providing of pasturages, the growing of fodder and corns, the construction of sheds and buildings and improving of the breed of milk cattle, and as a consequence the uplift of neighbouring villages, the finding of good market for their milk, the supplying of pasteurized milk and milk products to the city and cantonment of Agra and other towns. It is hardly necessary to add that the land of dairies the Radha Swami Satsang Sabha is establishing are rare in India and the useful purpose which such dairy is likely to serve to the public is a self-evident truth requiring no comments. 14. The concluding portion of his report reads as follows: Submitted to the Collector with the recommendation that purposes for which the land is being acquired for the Sabha (company) are purposes likely to prove useful to the publ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er Section 4 of the Act in the Gazette. The powers referred to in Section 38(1) are those provided in Section 4(2) of the Act. Section 4(1) deals with the notification and it imposes a duty on the Provincial Government to publish the notification. Under Section 38(1) no such duty will be imposed upon an officer of a company. Alternately, it is contended by learned Counsel for the plaintiff that no notification at sill under Section 4 of the Act is required when land is being acquired for a company. We do not think that there is any force in this plea, for otherwise there would be no meaning in the word "thereupon" in Sub-section (2) of Section 4, which shows that the officer of the company can only exercise his powers after A notification has been published. When land is being acquired for a company, then under Sections 39 and 40, the Provincial Government has to satisfy itself after enquiry that the conditions laid down in Section 40 are being fulfilled. It will then give its consent; and after an agreement has been entered into, Sections 6 to 37 will be put in force. Admittedly, an agreement was entered into in the present case and no attempt has been made to show that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r Section 40(1) of the; Act that some "work" was to be constructed and we must and do assume that it did SO' satisfy itself after an enquiry and that the word "etc." was intended to include buildings and sheds. In Ezra v. Secy. Of State (1903) 30 Cal. 36 certain land of the plaintiff was acquired under the-Land Acquisition Act and the plaintiff sued to have it declared that all the proceedings taken by the Provincial Government in the-matter of such acquisition should be declared void and of no force or effect and to obtain a mandatory injunction restraining, the Government as well as the Bank of" Bengal, for whom the land purported to bet-acquired, from taking any steps whatsoever towards taking possession of the said premises. Various contentions were raised before the High Court of Calcutta, which it is not necessary for us to mention, but at p. 77 the learned Judges observed: There is no definition of a public purpose in the Act nor any limitation regarding that is likely to prove useful to the public. For obvious reasons both matters are left to the absolute discretion of the Local Government.... 20. That case went in appeal to the Privy Council ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he other hand, all the parties wore aware that the land was being acquired for the Satsang Sabha and therefore the defect in the declaration will not vitiate the acquisition proceedings. As regards the alleged defects and illegality of procedure, we are of opinion that they cannot be pleaded at this stage and that, in any case, none of them has been established. 21. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff pleads, however, that there was in fact no society registrable under Act 21 of 1860 and therefore the land is not liable to acquisition. In this connexion we must consider F.A. No. 14 of 1934. The Court below has given a declaration to the effect that "defendant 1 is not a society nor a company, and its registration under Act 21 of 1860 was not proper." The learned Judge finds that in fact there was no association or society at all and that "substantially defendant 1 is identical with one and only one human being." Defendant 1 in F.A. No. 14 of 1934 seeks to have this declaration set aside. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff concedes that the declaration cannot stand unless other relief is granted to him, but he pleads that upon the lower Court's finding--which h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ant 1 pleads that the Satsang Sabha is not only a society for the diffusion of useful knowledge, but is also a charitable institution within the technical and legal meaning of this term and in this connexion he refers us to In Re Foveaux; Cross v. London Antivivisection Society (1895) 2 Ch. D. 501, Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel (1891) A.C. 531 and Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. J.F. Yorkshire Agriculture Society (1928) 1 K.B. 611. It is unnecessary for us to consider these authorities, inasmuch as foamed counsel for the plaintiff concedes that the objects, as set out in the Sabha's Memorandum of Association and bye-laws -the bona fides of which he does not impeach--are of a "charitable" nature within the legal meaning of that term; but he pleads that defendant 1 is not a society registrable under the Act and also that it Is not a charitable society, because there is no trust vesting the property in the Sabha. In Secy. of State v. Akbar Ali, it was held by a Bench of this Court that where a declaration has been issued under Section 6, Land Acquisition Act, stating that certain land in required for a "public purpose," a Cour ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Act duly followed, but the Sabha was prima facie registrable. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff however pleads that the Sabha is not a charitable society for the reason that there is no trust whereby the property vests in the Sabha; all the property, according to him, vests in the Satsang Guru. Thus the land was acquired for the extension of a dairy farm belonging to a single individual, and this cannot be done under the Act. Learned Counsel founds this argument upon two grounds. In the first place, he points out that, according to the constitution and bye-laws, the mandates of the Sant Sat Guru are paramount, and he has the power to dissolve the Sabha at will. In the second place,1 he relies very strongly on the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chhotabhai v. Jnan Chandra Basak. In that case certain members of the Radhaswami religion sued for a declaration the substantial effect of which was that a so-called, Radhaswami Trust created in 1904 was not a legal and valid trust and that, if it was, it was not a trust created or existing for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature" so as to make Act 14 of 1920 applicable thereto: All the partie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... haracter: of trust property, but he now does not contest the-proposition that defendant 1 cannot be a charitable society if the property vests exclusively in the guru and unless there is some sort of trust, actual or constructive, vesting the property in the society. It appears that in 1910 there was a schism, the ultimate result of which was that two sects, of the Radha Swami faith came into being, one being the Swami Bagh sect, which was the parent body having its centre at Allahabad and the other being the Dayal Bagh sect, which was the dissentient body having its centre at Agra. Sir Anand Sarup was the Satsang Guru at Agra at the time of the litigation which gave rise to the appeal before the Privy Council, and he was examined as a witness. His evidence in that suit has been brought on the record of the present suit, having apparently been accepted by both parties, and it is printed at p. 37 of our paper-book in F.A. No. 14 of 1934. In this statement this witness said that offerings are not made to the Sant Sat Guru personally, but he accepts therh as representative of Radha Swami Dayal and he is accountable therefore to the Sat Sangis who are all interested in such offerings. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g among the beneficiaries. This contention is based mainly on bye-law No. 18 and the evidence of Sir Anand Sarup in the previous case. Learned Counsel also draws our attention to the fact that D.W. Daulat Ram was not cross-examined with a view to elicit from him that the profits went to the guru and not to the Sabha. We do not think it necessary to express any opinion as to whether the character of the property with which the Dayal Bagh Sabha is concerned is or is not distinguishable from the character of the property of the Radhaswami Satsang Sabha before the schism with which their Lordships of the Privy Council were concerned, and our reason for this is that we feel ourselves compelled to live effect to the alternative plea of learned Counsel for defendant 1 that it is too late now to entertain the contention that the property belongs exclusively to the guru find does not vest in the Sabha. It will be observed that it is nowhere stated in the plaint that defendant 1 was not a charitable society for the reason that the property did not vest in it, but in the guru. In para. 10 of the plaint it was alleged that defendant 1, which is in essence and mainly a religious society holding ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rd to plead that the land was being acquired for the extension of a dairy farm which, along with all the other property with which the Dayal Bagh Sabha is concerned, vests exclusively in the guru and that, on this ground, the Sabha cannot be held to be a charitable society. 36. There remains F.A. No. 48 of 1934, which is an appeal by the Secretary of State for India in respect to costs. The learned Judge of the lower Court directed this defendant to pay his own costs on the ground that he was "found to be wrong." Whatever justification the lower Court may or may not have had for its reasoning, the fact remains that this defendant was responsible for the publication of a defective declaration under Section 6(3), Land Acquisition Act, and this defect has led to much controversy and much expenditure of time. We are of opinion that when land is being acquired for a company, it is not correct for the declaration to state that it is being acquired for a public purpose, even though work is to be constructed on it which is likely to prove useful to the public. The opening declaration should state in clear terms that the land is needed, or is likely to be needed, for a company. H ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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