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TMI Blog1952 (5) TMI 29X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ncorporated under the Indian Companies Act having its registered office at Delhi and its head office at 2 Royal Exchange Place, Calcutta. The respondent is the Chairman, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, having his office at 20/1, Gurusaday Dutt Boad, Ballygunge, Calcutta, within the jurisdiction of this Court. 3. The case of the petitioner is that one A.C. Kakkar is an employee of the petitioner and Mr. Kakkar represented the employees of several other banks in certain proceedings in connection with industrial disputes between those banks and their employees before the respondent, sitting as Chairman of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dehra Dun between 7-5-1951 and 19-5-1951. Neither the petitioner Bank nor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itting hold at Naini Tal but confirmed the order made by him on 19-5-1951. This order of confirmation was made on 9-6-1951 but was communicated to the petitioner on or about 9-7-1951, and subsequently by a letter dated 10-7-1951 the respondent called upon the petitioner to pay to Mr. Kakkar the expenses ordered to be paid by him. The petitioner thereupon moved this Court and obtained a Rule Nisi. 4. Mr. Sitaram Banerjee who appears for the opposite party has contended that the petitioner's proper remedy is to appeal from the decision of the Tribunal under Section 7, Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (Act 48 of 1950) and its remedy is not by way of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is submitted ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... adan Gopal, 50 Cal. W.N. 296 in support of hi: proposition that a stranger can appeal. But the, case does not support that proposition. In that case one of the appellants was a defendant and., the other was the next friend of the deity till sometime of the suit and then he was removed by an order of Court. This contention of Mr. Banerjee therefore fails. 7. The question that therefore falls for determination is whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief in this application under Article 226 of the Constitution. I am of the view that the petitioner is so entitled. Section 11(7), Industrial Disputes Act, is in the following terms: Subject to the rules made under this Act, the costs of and incidental to any proceeding before a Tr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aking order or in other words an order which on the face of it sets out the reasons for making the order, such an order can be quashed by certiorari if the reasons are bad in law. See R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex Parts Shaw (1952) l ALL E. R. 122. 10. Now a stranger to a proceeding can be [made liable to pay the costs only under certain special circumstances. When a proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court, costs have been directed to be paid by a stranger to the proceeding. Thus, for example, if a person not a party uses the name of a man of straw as plaintiff or uses the name of another as a blind for himself such conduct is an abuse of the process of the Court and that person can be ordered to pay ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ding to modified rates adopted by me direct that the Union representatives would be paid by their banks concerned, single second class fare both ways from their place of duty to Dehra Dun and back as well as Diem allowance at the rate of ₹ 5 (five) per day for the days they attended the proceedings of the Tribunal at Dehra Dun. 14. The names of the representatives are then set out and the respondent later on states in the order that these representatives should be treated as on duty for the days they attended at Dehra Dan. 15. The petitioner has been directed by this order to pay the railway fares and 13 days' allowance. 16. The Union which has been formed for the purpose of collective bargaining is for the benefit of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed to pay the expenses of Mr. Eakkar in the present case does not commend to me as a sound exercise of the discretion. It is a capricious exercise of the power. 17. Not only there has been no judicial exercise of the discretion but the Order dated 19th May 1951 appears to have been passed in violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. There cannot be any doubt that the Tribunal was acting judicially or quasi-judicially in determining the liability for costs and yet no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to put forward its case and to be heard in the matter. 18. In dealing with the question as to the circumstances under which an order for costs can be made against a stranger to a suit a Full Bench of the Allah ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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