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TMI Blog2020 (3) TMI 1310X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gy in not taking physical possession nor paying the compensation after making the award five years or more before the commencement of the Act of 2013 in pending proceedings, providing that they would lapse. The expression where an award has been made, then the proceedings shall continue used in Section 24(1)(b) under the provisions of the Act of 1894 means that proceedings were pending in praesenti as on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013 are not concluded proceedings, and in that context, an exception has been carved out in Section 24(2) - Even if possession has been taken, despite which payment has not been made nor deposited, (for the majority of the land-holdings), then all beneficiaries holding land on the date of notification Under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, are to be paid compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 frowns upon indolence and stupor of the authorities. The expression possession of the land has not been taken or compensation has not been paid indicates a failure on the part of the authorities to take the necessary steps for five years or more in a pending proceeding Under Section 24(1)(b). Section 24(2) sta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct of 2013 does not intend to take away vested rights. This is because there is no specific provision taking away or divesting title to the land, which had originally vested with the State, or divesting the title or interest of beneficiaries or third-party transferees of such land which they had lawfully acquired, through sales or transfers. There is a specific provision made for divesting, nor does the Act of 2013 by necessary intendment, imply such a drastic consequence. Divesting cannot be said to have been intended. The present case involves placement of colon preceding to the Proviso to Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1), which ends with a full stop, and it makes sense and the true meaning where Parliament has placed it. The proviso is part of Section 24(2). It is not permissible to alter the provision and to read it as a proviso to Section 24(1)(b), mainly when it makes sense where Parliament so placed it. To read the proviso as part of Section 24(1)(b), will create repugnancy which the provisions contained in Section 24(1)(b). The window period of 5 years is provided to complete the acquisition proceedings where the award has been passed, and the provisions of the Act of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re-entry or retaining the possession thereafter is unlawful and does not inure for conferring benefits Under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon the principle due to court proceedings or acts of court, no party should suffer. If any interim orders are made during the pendency of the litigation, they are subject to the final decision in the matter. In case the matter is dismissed as without merit, the interim order is automatically dissolved. In case the matter has been filed without any merit, the maxim is attracted commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet, that is, convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. No person ought to have the advantage of his own wrong. In case litigation has been filed frivolously or without any basis, iniquitously in order to delay and by that it is delayed, there is no equity in favour of such a person. Such cases are required to be decided on merits. The courts cannot invalidate acquisitions, which stood concluded. No claims in that regard can be entertained and agitated as they have not been revived. There has to be legal certainty where infrastructure has been created or has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the landowners as on the date of notification for land acquisition Under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. 5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided Under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed Under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount Under Section 31(1). Land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed Under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. 6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b). 7. The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as contemplated Under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rth Batra, Gaurav Agrawal, Avishkar Singhvi, Harsh Parashar, Nipun Katyal, Tanvi Bhatnagar, Rahul Kaushik, Dhruv Surana, R. Anand Padmanabhan, Aravind C., Shashi Bhushan Kumar, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Kamalendra Mishra, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S.K. Rajora, Akhileshwar Jha, Sandya Sharma, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Sagar N. Pahune Patil, S. Lakshmi Iyer, Abhikalp Pratap Singh, Aishwarya Dash, Durgesh Gupta, A.P. Mayee, A. Rajarajan, Sanjeev Kumar Choudhary, Jitesh Malik, Beena, Satish Kumar, Garima Sehgal, Sugandha Sharma, Ram Sankar, Om Prakash Kumar Srivastava, Ashish Chaubey, G. Chitrakala, Maafi, R.K.V. Suhas, R.V. Kameshwaran, Mahesh Thakur, B.S. Srinivas, Vipasha Singh, Sharan Thakur, Siddharth Thakur, Vijay Kumar Pardesi, Shailesh Madiyal, Sudhanshu Parkash, Kartik Anand, Sheffali Chaudhary, Zoheb Hossain, Adeeba Mujahid, Aditi Dani, Ashwin Kumar D.S., Piyush Goyal, Vivek Gurnani, Agni Sen, Sanjeev Menon, Purbita Mitra, A. Jaswanthi, K.V. Vijayakumar, Anandh Kannan, Deepak Goel, Kamal Kumar Pandey, Baldev Atreya, Ajay Kumar Singh, Neelum Goel, Gaurav Yadava, Veena Bansal, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Prashant Bhushan, Omanakuttan K.K., Anannya Ghosh, Abhimanue Shrestha, Pallav Mongia, Abhist ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ara Prasad Sahu, Vishal Arun Mishra, Pawan Kumar, Pranay Kumar M., Binu Tamta, Dhruv Tamta and Pankaj Pandey, Advs. JUDGMENT S.L.P. (C) Nos. 9036-9038, 9798-9799, 17088-17089, 37375, 37372, 16573-16605 of 2016, S.L.P. (C) CC No. 15967 of 2016, Civil Appeal Nos. 19356, 19362, 19361, 19358, 19357, 19360, 19359 of 2017, S.L.P. (C) Nos. 34752-34753 of 2016, 15890 of 2017, Civil Appeal Nos. 19363, 19364, 19412 of 2017, MA 1423 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 12247 of 2016, S.L.P. (C) Nos. 33022, 33127, 33114 of 2017, MA 1787 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 10210 of 2016, MA 1786 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 10207 of 2016, MA 45 of 2018 in Civil Appeal No. 6239 of 2017, S.L.P. (C) No. 16051 of 2019, Diary No. 23842 of 2018, S.L.P. (C) No. 30452 of 2018, Civil Appeal No. 4835 of 2015 and S.L.P. (C) Nos. 30577-30580 of 2015 Arun Mishra, J. 1. The correct interpretation of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, 'the Act of 2013'), is the subject matter of reference to this five Judge Bench of this Court. 2. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Pune Municipal Corporation and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a larger Bench at the earliest. Yet again in State of Haryana v. Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust (Regd.) and Anr. (CA No. 4835 of 2015) referred the matter to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate Bench for consideration of the larger issue. These batch appeals were referred to a five Judge Bench, which after hearing counsel, framed the following questions, which arise for consideration: 1. What is the meaning of the expression paid'/tender' in Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act of 2013') and Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (Act of 1894')? Whether non-deposit of compensation in court Under Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 results into lapse of acquisition Under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. What are the consequences of non-deposit in Court especially when compensation has been tendered and refused Under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 and Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? Whether such persons after refusal can take advantage of their wrong/conduct? 2. Whether the word or' should be read as conjunctive or disjunctive ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y and Mr. Jayant Muthuraj, learned Senior Counsel, Ms. Shashi Kiran, Ms. Rachna Srivastava, Mr. R.M. Bhangade and Mr. Rajesh Mahale, learned Counsel, made their submissions. 9. The learned SG, arguing that this Court should overrule the ratio in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and other judgments which followed it, contended that the Court did not consider the various interpretations of Section 31 of the (repealed) Land Acquisition Act, ( LA Act hereafter). He urged that the provisions of the Act of 2013, vis- -vis the timelines and consequences that would ensue if the acquisition proceeding prolongs, were not examined. He highlighted that Section 24 is a transitional provision and such provisions should be given an interpretation which accords with legislative intent, rather than so as to impose hitherto absent standards, upon past proceedings, or proceedings initiated under the previous regime, but which have not worked themselves out. He urged that there is a presumption in favour of restricted retrospective applicability of any provision in an enactment unless a contrary intention appears. It is submitted that designedly, it is the stage of passing of award Under Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 (which is 1.1.2014). If the award is so made, two contingencies result in complete lapse-: (a) Physical possession of the land has not been taken; or (b) compensation has not been paid . The provision for lapse, per Section 24(2) is, by its nature, a vital provision, inviting serious consequences, in case those contingencies arise. It is the interpretation of these contingencies that requires further consideration. The contingencies ought to be interpreted in a manner which saves the past transactions to the extent they can be saved as it is clearly not the intention of the Act of 2013 to tide over all past transactions. 13. The learned SG argued that the proviso to Section 24(2) further carves out an exception to Section 24(2) viz., in case the award has been made and compensation in respect of majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, no lapsing will take place, but all the beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. 14. Therefore, if only a minority of the claimants are d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f all previous stages prior to non-payment . However, if it can be demonstrated that though-(1) compensation was tendered to all; (2) some of them [for whatever reason] did not take the compensation; and (3) compensation is deposited in case of majority of the land holdings [viz. setting apart the share of such persons and making it available for them to take it], then, neither proceedings would lapse nor the compensation will be required to be determined under the Act of 2013. In substance, therefore, the legal situation would be akin to the one contemplated Under Section 24(1)(b) for all practical purposes. 17. It is submitted that during the drafting of the Bill, the legislative intent and the apprehensions of the stakeholders in the acquisition process is clearly depicted in 31st Report of the 'Standing Committee on Rural Development' while discussing the 'The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011' which was the precursor to the Act of 2013. The learned SG relied on extracts of the Standing Committee Reports, the draft Bill, various comments from government and public agencies and departments and other stakeholders, the stage(s) during ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Both Section 114 (of the Act of 2013) and Section 6 of the 1897 Act clearly point to a narrow interpretation of Section 24 with the object of saving on-going acquisition proceedings as far as possible. The learned SG referred to the provisions of UK's Interpretation Act, 1978; he also relied on Bennion's Statutory Interpretation Bennion's Fifth Edition, (2012) Indian Reprint, which reads as under: Where, on a weighing of the factors, it seems that some retrospective effect was intended, the general presumption against retrospectively indicates that this should be kept to as narrow a compass as will accord with the legislative intention. 20. Reliance was placed on Secretary of State for Social Security v. Tunnicliffe [1991] 2 All ER 712, to the effect that: Parliament is presumed not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions in a manner which is unfair to those concerned in them, unless a contrary intention appears. The learned SG also referred to the later judgment of the House of Lords which dealt with the said question. It is submitted that sitting in a combination of eight judges, in Y ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... award would be taken under the new Act. It was highlighted here, that Parliament clearly intended that the compensation determined under the old Act had to be paid in terms of the new Act, which is Under Section 77. The learned SG submitted that given these aspects, which are expressed in Section 24(1), the non obstante Clause and the following provisions of Section 24(2) have to be interpreted contextually, and in a purposive manner. It was submitted that Parliament did not intend that settled matters should be undone, and whatever had attained finality, in acquisition matters, should not be re-opened. He cited the decisions of this Court reported as Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill (2012) 2 SCC 108; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. State Of Assam and Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 709 @ para 118-121; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC 57 @ para 14-21; D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India and Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 186 para 16-18; Balram Kamanat v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 628 para 24; New India Assurance Co. v. Nulli Nivelle (2008) 3 SCC 279 @ para 51-54; Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ndated by Section 34 was to be paid. 26. The context of Section 24, learned Counsel urged, is to provide for a transitory provision viz. to take care of the pending land acquisition proceedings which are ongoing under the LA Act when the Act of 2013 is brought into force w.e.f. 1.1.2014. The purpose and object of making this provision is to balance the competing rights of public projects vis- -vis holders of the land. The object and purpose was to ensure that where acquisition proceedings under LA Act have reached an advanced stage and investment of public money had already been made, firstly, the lapsing of such ongoing projects should be avoided and secondly as far as possible, the land owners also can, without disturbing the process of acquisition, be given the compensation under the Act of 2013. 27. It was reiterated that the legislature knows about the ground realities faced in land acquisition proceedings. There are very few cases where one or two land parcels are acquired in isolation. Mostly, acquisitions take place of bigger tracts of land involving more than one parcel of land and more than one person entitled to compensation . When Parliament provided for a transi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h a particular situation in light of fact situation emerging in each case. Not treating paid and deposit as synonymous or the deposit so as to keep it available being the next step after pay , would lead to disastrous situations as the acquiring authority may have acquired vast tract of land and may have put substantial portion from it to public use by constructing infrastructural projects. Such a disastrous situation/consequence would never have been anticipated or envisaged by the legislature. Learned Counsel also referred to various Standing Orders, framed as part of the financial code of several States, which provided for procedure to deposit money in the treasury, when landowners refused to accept compensation, or were untraceable, at the time the amount was to be tendered. 31. It is submitted by the learned ASG that this Court should not assume any omission or add or amend words to the statute. It is submitted that plain and unambiguous construction has to be given without addition and substitution of the words. It is submitted that when a literal reading produces an intelligible result it is not open to read words or add words to statute. In support of this proposi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Parliament intentionally used the phrases paid and deposit not in terms of their meanings Under Section 31 so as to avoid the rigours of the said provision and to keep the practical exigencies of land acquisition in mind, more particularly when Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is merely a transitory provision. It was argued that it is a settled canon of interpretation that when the Legislature uses two different phrases, the meaning they carry would be different. Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India, (2002) 3 SCC 722 is relied on. 35. It is submitted that Section 24(1) begins with a non-obstante clause, providing for a limited overriding effect of the LA Act in case of the contingencies mentioned in Section 24(a) and (b). Section 24(1)(a) contemplates that where land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the LA Act but no award was passed till the date the new Act came into force viz. 1.1.2014, acquisition proceedings could continue, however compensation will have to be determined under the Act of 2013. Section 24(1)(b) provides that where an award Under Section 11 of the LA Act has been made, the entire proceedings would continue ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... compensation shall be regarded as paid : if the compensation has been offered to the person interested and such compensation has been deposited in the court where reference Under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies contemplated Under Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. In other words, the compensation may be said to have been paid within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in court and made that amount available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33. 40. It was argued that the conclusion in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) that deposit of the amount of compensation in the Government treasury cannot amount to the said sum (amount of compensation) paid to the landowners or persons interested. This view was taken without dwelling on the legal connotation of the expression paid in Section 24(2). In the process, it has also not taken into account the binding law as held in Dalmia's case and Benares State Bank's case. Though Section 34 of the LA Act was mentioned in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not have been to divest the acquiring authority of the land after the said has been vested free from all encumbrances . In line with the same, it is submitted that the word or may be read as and so as to limit the lapsing only in cases where both, payment has not been made (subject to proviso) and possession has not been taken. 44. Reliance is placed on the judgments reported as Ishwar Singh Bindra v. State of UP 1969 (1) SCR 219, where this Court approved and extracted passages from Maxwell on Interpretation and Stroud's Judicial Dictionary to the effect that generally, the conjunctive and is used in a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of or and that however, sometimes, even in such a connection, it is, by force of its contents, read as or . Similarly, Maxwell accepted that to carry out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions 'or' and 'and' one for the other . Learned Counsel also relied on Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd. (2018) 1 SCC 353 which held that: 38. ....Even otherwise, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ute and very little attention is paid to it by English Courts. ...... When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation. ). Reliance was also placed on Jamshed Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra. 2005 (2) SCC 591. 46. It was argued by Ms. Pinky Anand, learned ASG, that payment of compensation is not a sine qua non for vesting in terms of Section 16 of the old LA Act. It is urged, in this context, that the old Act did not provide any time line for depositing compensation; nor even for taking over of possession. Ordinarily, the repeal provision under the Act of 2013 (Section 114) would prevail; however, Section 24 carves out an important, albeit a limited scope from the repeal clause. Section 24(2) freshly introduces the concept of lapsing, in relation to acquisitions that were initiated under the old Act. Necessarily, lapsing is to be considered as a narrow concept. Supporting the learned SG's argument that or is to be read conjunctively, she highlighted that by reason of Section 16 of the old Act, title vested in the State, upon taking of possession. Divesting under old Act was impermissible. It ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of law that once a property is vested by an Act of legislature, to achieve the laudable object, the same cannot be divested by the enactment of any subsequent general law and vest such property under such law. 48. It was urged that serious consequences arise when condition Nos. (ii) and (iii) are to be read as not conjunctive or disjunctive. The word used to connect these two conditions is or ; if it is not read conjunctively, disastrous consequence leading to absurd result would emanate. Once possession is taken over vesting occurs Under Section 16 of the LA Act. Section 24(2) contains no stipulation that such vesting of title of land stands nullified or divested. If the intention of Parliament was to divest the State of its title that had to be stated in plain and clear language. It was emphasized that the conjunctive use of or in Section 24(2) would have not only momentous consequences to the State, but innocent third parties, who would be exposed to the risk of being divested title to the lands and properties, perfected by them, as allottees or subsequent purchasers. Merely because a person who has received compensation clungs on to the possession of the land and the sam ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n as in the case of certain private persons, in case they re-enter in possession of open land, start cultivation or residing in the house. Lawful possession is deemed to be of the State. A number of decisions that accepted the mode of drawing panchnama by the State consistently to be a mode of taking possession were cited. In Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal 5 this Court observed that preparing a panchnama is sufficient to constitute taking of possession. If acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it would be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing an appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures. Even subsequent utilisation of a portion of acquired land for public purpose was still sufficient to prove taking possession. 51. It is submitted that when the State acquires land and has drawn memorandum of taking possession that is the way the State takes possession of large tract of land acquired, it ought not necessarily to physically occupy such land after forcefully displacing those physically in possession. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ned, should not be placed at a disadvantage, as that would amount to granting a premium for one's wrongdoing, or rank speculation. It is urged, therefore, that it is imperative that the period during which the State or the acquiring authority was prohibited/injuncted by an interim order of the court from taking possession has to be excluded. This principle, submit learned Counsel, is based on settled common law principles. These are in fact Rules of equity, justice and sound logic. In the absence of their being a prohibition in the law these principles would be attracted. The efficacy and binding nature of such common law principles cannot be diminished or whittled down in the absence of any express prohibition in law. Coupled with the aforesaid principle is also a principle of restitution. An interim order passed by the Court merges into the final decision, goes against the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the successful party at the end of the litigation would be justified in being placed in the same place in which it would have been, had the interim order not been passed. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n of large tracts of land in rural parts of the country in the name of development and their transfer to private entrepreneurs, who utilize it to construction of multi-storied complexes, commercial centres and for setting up industrial units. Similarly, large scale acquisitions were made on behalf of companies by invoking the provisions contained in Part VII of the Act. Resultantly, such acquisition led to deprivation of the source of livelihood of land owners, engaged in agricultural operations and other ancillary activities in rural areas. A large number of these people are unaware of, and unable to assert their rights, and secure fair compensation. The unrest and inequity which arose out of these deprivations, impelled the State to enact a modern law, which ensured not only fair compensation, but other rights such as rehabilitation, employment, higher solatium and a guarantee against deprivation of certain kinds of lands. Thus, the Act of 2013 ushered a new regime that starts from a fresh direction. Learned Counsel also relied on Bharat Sewak Samaj v. Lieutnant Governor and Ors., 2012 (12) SCC 675 to say that the provisions of the Act of 1894 were outdated and were misused and w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 24) should be literally construed. Learned Counsel submitted that the objective of new Act must be kept in mind to understand the scope of Sections 11, 11(A), 12, 31 and 34 of the 1894 Act, on the one hand, and provisions of Section of 24 of the Act of 2013 on the other. Furthermore, it was argued that the non-obstante Clause must be allowed to operate with full vigour in its own field. It was stressed that such a provision is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provision or Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause, the enactment following it, will have its full operation of that, the provision indicated in the non-obstante Clause will not be an impediment for the operation of the enactment. Decisions in this regard were cited by counsel. 7 56. Mr. Divan relied upon the three stages preceding the Act of 2013 to urge that there was no doubt in the mind of Parliament, that lapsing of acquisition proceedings was intended to ensue, in the event compensation were not paid; or possession were not taken, in respect of awards made five years prior to coming into force of the Act of 2013. It was argued that Section 24 should be given a plain and literal construction, exc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ities that payment included deposit with the treasury or some other authority other than the Reference Court, could not have been termed as compliance with the Act of 1894. Here, it was urged that Parliament was acutely alive of the fact that the previous land acquisition regime resulted in injurious and unconscionable delays in payment of compensation. Furthermore, even after awards were made, possession was never taken. This led to a great deal of uncertainty as far as the land owners were concerned because they could not move ahead in their life without compensation nor could they take any steps to acquire new lands or properties. It was precisely to address this mischief, rather a widespread one, that the Parliament wished to enact a bright line approach whereby all acquisitions which did not culminate either in payment of compensation or taking over of possession in respect of awards made five or more years prior to 1.1.2014 had to lapse. It was submitted that Section 24(1) provided a limited window in that it saved some acquisitions, i.e., notably where awards had been made but further proceedings had not been taken or where awards had not been made in both cases less tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der Section 31(2). That apart, it also relied upon Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes v. State of Goa (2011) 11 SCC 506, to say that the State cannot be-in the event of non-acceptance of the compensation by the land owner or its inability to locate the land owner or in the event of a dispute-keep the compensation amount with itself and claim it to be part of same general treasury amount and proceed to utilise it. It was submitted that precisely to deal with this practice, the appeal provided that non-payment of compensation-and in the event of any of the contingencies accruing in Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act, the failure to deposit it with the Reference Court would result in lapse of entire acquisition itself. It was submitted that this interpretation is not only literal but followed the objective and purpose sought to be achieved by the Parliament through the provision. Learned Counsel urged this Court that the literal interpretation in this case would also accrue with an equitable interpretation and ensure that the real benefit of the new law would accrue to land owners deprived of their properties and livelihoods for long periods without payment of compensation. Learned Counsel, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct, the provisions to determine compensation under the Act of 2013 apply. Further, the proviso to Section 24 provides for compensation in terms of the Act of 2013 where the following conditions are fulfilled, firstly an award has been made Under Section 11 of the 1894 Act; and secondly, compensation in respect of the majority of the land holdings has not been paid to the landowners. It was submitted that the majority is required to be reckoned with reference to the award passed under the Act of 1894, and that awards contemplated by the proviso are awards made within the period of five years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 i.e., awards made between 1.1.2009 and 31.12.2013. 62. Learned Counsel stated that the third set of cases is where the land owners do not get any benefit under the Act of 2013 and the acquisition proceeds under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It was argued that these cases are covered by Section 24(1)(b) and to which neither Section 24(2) nor the proviso applies. This covers situations where though an award has been passed five years prior to the commencement of the Act, neither of the conditions for deemed lapsing are present. Mr. Divan urged ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... osit in the treasury. He argued that there was no reason to depart from the Rule of literal interpretation, and the manner of payment, as held in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), is to be strictly in terms of Section 31 of the Act of 1894 as it is an expropriatory legislation. It was contended as to the learned Solicitor General's submission that payment in terms of Section 24 is complied with if the amount is tendered to the landowners, overlooks the obligation of payment in terms of Section 24 is only met if the amount is actually paid to the landowners. On the occurrence of the contingencies mentioned in Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894, it ought to be deposited in the Reference Court as defined Under Section 3(d) of the Act of 1894. He submitted that tendering money is not payment and Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 uses the words 'tender' and 'paid' to convey different meanings and obligations. Mr. Divan argued that the judgments cited by the learned Solicitor General in this regard essentially deal with labour laws, and are inapplicable as these statutes did not contain a provision such as Section 31 of the Act of 1894, which strictly and precisely pre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de jure possession, which in most cases is possession on paper. 11 68. Arguing next regarding the interpretation of the proviso to Section 24, it was stated that the same is to be read as a proviso to Section 24 and not Section 24(1)(b). Mr. Divan submitted that a proviso may in certain cases operate as an independent provision, and the proviso to Section 24 is a stand-alone provision which operates on its own terms. To the extent it is linked to any provision in Section 24, it is linked to Section 24(1)(b) since it permits enhanced compensation (in a particular contingency of non-payment to majority of the landowners) even if an award may have been passed as contemplated in Section 24(1)(b). Mr. Divan placed reliance on the reasons given in the judgment of Delhi Development Authority v. Virendra Lal Bahri, [SLP [C] No. 37375/2016]. 69. All counsel for landowners submitted that there is no valid reason to exclude from the period of 5 years Under Section 24(2), the time during which a landowner had the benefit of an interim order of a court. In support of this argument, it was argued firstly, that Parliament did not expressly exclude such a period in Section 24. Second, wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... been so specified, there would have been no occasion to exclude time. Instead of specifying a particular date, the Legislature in the Act of 2013 prescribed the cut-off point with reference to the commencement of the Act. This method of specifying the cut-off point would not attract the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit . It was argued that the occasion for excluding time would arise only where there is a starting point and a statutory period to complete the task. In such provisions, it may be reasonable to provide for the exclusion of time by appropriate language in the section. Here, where a cut-off date is prescribed and as such there is no starting point and period for completion of the task, the notion of excluding time spent in litigations is an alien concept. It was, therefore, submitted that it is not the court's business to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omit words used in the provisions of an Act, i.e., to fill in an obvious and conscious exclusion of a contingency, or a casus omissus. In support of this submission, learned Counsel relied on decisions of this Court. 12 It was also argued that this Court should not also exclude any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... session is with the citizen, and the compensation is also with the citizen, in such scenarios, the citizen must return the compensation. It was urged that where the State has paid the money by deposit in the Reference Court and the money was lying with the Court, the State may withdraw the money on deemed lapsing. However, if the State were to decide to acquire the land afresh, the compensation already paid may be adjusted; and further since inherent in the notion of lapsing is the requirement for restitution, the State can recover the compensation, inter alia by framing suitable rules. The citizen cannot retain compensation had and received since this would amount to unjust enrichment. It was submitted that where the physical possession as well as compensation are with the State, i.e., where the State has taken possession without paying compensation as required under the Act of 1894, there is no absolute vesting free from all encumbrances as contemplated Under Section 16. In the absence of vesting, the State is required to restore possession to the citizen. 73. Learned Counsel argued that having regard to the unfair working of the Act of 1894, giving effect to the legislative ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s. The important factors to be borne in mind-and to distinguish the phrase paid from deposit , is whether in the court Under Section 31(2) or in the treasury Under Section 31(1). It is urged that an analysis of Sections 17(3A) (3B), 31(1) (2) and Section 28 read with Section 34 of the Act of 1894 shows that these provisions clearly distinguish between tender, paid or deposit whether in the court or the treasury. 76. Learned Counsel argued that three different words used in the same Act, in various provisions of the Act, cannot mean the same. It follows also from the reading of Section 19(1)(c) and (cc). In both these provisions word tender is used in contrast to word paid while word paid is used in contrast to word deposit . The word deposit , wherever used, is in the context of deposit in Court only not treasury. The expression tender payment Under Section 17(3A) and Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 were followed by the words pay it to them . Therefore, tender cannot mean paid . It is urged that these terms fall in Part V of the Act, titled as Payment . The term pay it to them Under Section 31 after tender must mean an additional action or step. When aft ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Sections 17(3A) and (3B), 28, 31, 33 and 34 of the Act of 1894 are a clear pointer that tender is not paid and neither is deposit . Likewise, these provisions frequently use words paid or deposited which shows they are different. Deposit cannot be, therefore, equated with paid as they are more than once separated by word 'or'. 78. It was contended that the scheme of the Act of 1894 was clear and categorical that the amount of compensations when accepted by the beneficiary is deemed to be paid for interest to stop running. The running of interest Under Section 34 denotes non-discharge of obligation to pay, otherwise why pay interest? The deposit in Court may stop running of interest and therefore, may for this purpose be taken to be paid, but when it comes to actual meaning in the above provisions, paid and deposit are invariably separated by the use of word or in between them. Therefore, it is submitted that when Section 24(2) of the New Act uses the phrase compensation has not been paid it uses the terminology of the proviso to Section 34 (proviso) and must have the same meaning has not been paid cannot be read as has not been deposited . If this is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... use creating any kind of exception, or extension of five years in cases of litigating land oustees who may have an interim orders in their favour, stalling the acquisition or payment of compensation. All that the provision says is or compensation has not been paid . The projected policy intent is broad and unencumbered by any exception. This is a clearest indicator of legislative intent to cover all such cases that may cause hardship to the State or may be due to the fault of Court or the litigious land oustee. The intent is clear and therefore, has to be read apart from difficulties or hardships. 80. It is submitted that the State's contention with regard to a differential approach for possession and compensation is irrational and is against the very grain of Section 24(2) and is also unreasonable and discriminatory. It is unreasonable because there are hardly any cases where compensation may have been paid, yet possession may not have been taken. Most of the cases are Under Section 17(1) where possession is invariably taken while compensation remains unpaid as award is not made. By reading word 'or' as 'and', the words or the compensation has not been pai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... provision giving higher benefit because in the cases covered by Section 24(2) compensation has not been paid despite award. Would it be rational to read Section 24(2) in such a manner that deprives it of its value and worth and makes it ineffective. Section 24(2) would become ineffective as a whole because there would be rarest of the rare cases, where both the conditions would be fulfilled. The experience shows in vast majority of cases of acquisition under the old Act, possession is taken while award compensation come much later. This is because Sections 9 17(6) of the Act of 1894 were used in vast majority of acquisitions and the Legislature was aware of it. The law does not compel doing of an act that is impossible. It is emphasized that the principle does not apply as the new Act is not requiring any such performance. The new Act after recognising the past, is providing new solutions, rights and benefits. Section 24(2) by itself does not compel performance of an impossible act. This principle could have been relevant during earlier Act but is hardly relevant for interpreting the scope of Section 24(2) of the New Act. Section 24 clearly postulates that even though the Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... out disturbing the possession of third party who has been given the land. 84. The learned Counsel submit that this Court should base itself on the approach to interpret Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is that it is a savings Clause with an exclusionary deeming provision. It is urged that the words physical possession Under Section 24(2) should be read to reflect the actual state of affairs as on the date when the Act of 2013 came into force, i.e., there was actual physical possession of the land. This would also be the case in relation to the term compensation not paid Under Section 24(2), where compensation would either have had to be paid or deposited in court; and that use of the term or signifies that the two conditions set out above are disjunctive. It is argued that Section 114 consists of two Sections (1) a repeal Clause set out in Section 114(1); and (2) a savings Clause set out in Section 114(2). It is contended that there is a distinction in the manner in which a repealing Clause is construed as compared to the manner in which a savings Clause is construed. While a repealing clause, followed by a new legislation on the same subject-matter would result in a line of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 11, in a manner as if the Act of 1894 had not been repealed. Section 24(1)(a) deals with a situation where no award has been made and in providing for determination of compensation in terms of the Act of 2013 naturally would mean that proceedings under the Act of 1894 would be revived, save and except on the issue of computation of compensation. Having revived proceedings Under Section 24(1), Section 24(2) provides for a deemed lapsing through a non-obstante provision for an award made five years or prior to the date of the commencement of the Act of 2013. This creates a legal fiction which, as held by this Court in J.K. Cotton Spg. Wvg. Mils Ltd. v. Union of India, 1987 Supp SCC 350 is: ...an admission of the non-existence of the fact deemed...The legislature is quite competent to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not really exist. Learned Counsel also placed reliance on the decision of the Constitution Bench in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 603 to the following effect: [l]egal fictions are created only for some definite purpose and referred to the decision East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... possession, it cannot be benefited by its inactions and must restart proceedings under the Act of 2013. In such a case, the compensation paid can always be re-adjusted against compensation determined under the Act of 2013. Arguendo, it is urged that even if Section 114(2) of the Act of 2013 is construed to keep alive the State's vested rights by virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, such rights are limited by Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Thus, while ordinarily the acquisition proceedings that were pending in respect of awards passed under the Act of 1894 would have continued, the legislature by way of a creating a legal fiction, provided for the deemed lapse of these proceedings in respect of which physical possession has not been taken or compensation not paid. Learned Counsel placed reliance on some decisions of this Court. 17 VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary School v. State of Kerala, 2016 (4) SCC 216 where it was held that: ...a vested right can also be taken away by a subsequent enactment if such subsequent enactment specifically provides by express words or by necessary intendment. In other words, in the event of the extinction of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the Government, free from all encumbrances. [(3A) Before taking possession of any land under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (3)- (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Section 31, Sub-section (2), and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of Section 31, Sub-section (2) (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made Under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification Under Section 4, Sub-section (1).] 16. Power to take possession.--When the Collector has made an award Under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed: Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry. The relevant provisions of the Act of 2013 are as follows: 24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1984 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,-- (a) where no award Under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiate ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 013 91. There can no dispute, no two opinions about the fact that provisions of the Act of 2013, were enacted with the object of providing fair compensation and rehabilitating those displaced from their land. The Introduction and Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2013 are extracted hereunder: INTRODUCTION The Land Acquisition Act, LA was a general law relating to acquisition of land for public purposes and also for companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition. The provisions of the said Act was found to be inadequate in addressing certain issues related to the exercise of the statutory powers of the State for involuntary acquisition of private land and property. The Act did not address the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement to the affected persons and their families. There had been multiple amendments to the Land Acquisition Act, LA not only by the Central Government but by the State Governments as well. However, there was growing public concern on land acquisition, especially multi-cropped irrigated land. There was no central law to adequately deal with the issues of rehabilitation and resettl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t upon such land, it is proposed repeal the Land Acquisition Act, LA and to replace it with adequate provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement for the affected persons and their families. 3. There have been multiple amendments to the Land Acquisition Act, LA not only by the Central Government but by the State Governments as well. Further, there has been heightened public concern on land acquisition, especially multi-cropped irrigated land and there is no central law to adequately deal with the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons. As land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement need to be seen as two sides of the same coin, a single integrated law to deal with the issues of land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement has become necessary. Hence the proposed legislation proposes to address concerns of farmers and those whose livelihoods are dependent on the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in a timely and transparent manner. 4. Earlier, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2007 and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2007 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and other assets but also for all those who are affected by such acquisition. The displacement process often poses problems that make it difficult for the affected persons to continue their traditional livelihood activities after resettlement. This requires a careful assessment of the economic disadvantages and the social impact arising out of displacement. There must also be holistic effort aimed at improving the all-round living standards of the affected persons and families. 8. A National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families was formulated in 2003, which came into force with effect from February 2004. Experience gained in implementation of this policy indicates that there are many issues addressed by the policy which need to be reviewed. There should be a clear perception, through a careful quantification of the costs and benefits that will accrue to society at large, of the desirability and justifiability of each project. The adverse impact on affected families-economic, environmental, social and cultural-must be assessed in participatory and transparent manner. A national rehabilitation and resettlement framework thus needs to apply to all ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e increased upto 100 per cent of the total compensation. Where land is acquired for urbanization, 20 per cent of the developed land will be offered to the affected land owners. 14. Comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package for land owners including subsistence allowance, jobs, house, one acre of land in cases of irrigation projects, transportation allowance, and resettlement allowance is proposed. 15. Comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package for livelihood losers, including subsistence allowance, jobs, house, transportation allowance, and resettlement allowance is proposed. 16. Special provisions for Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes have been envisaged by providing additional benefits of 2.5 acres of land or extent of land lost to each affected family; one-time financial assistance of ₹ 50,000/-; twenty-five per cent additional rehabilitation and resettlement benefits for the families settled outside the district; free land for community and social gathering and continuation of reservation in the resettlement area, etc. 17. Twenty-five infrastructural amenities are proposed to be provided in the resettlement area including schools ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... acity building, and provision of public health and community services. Adequate safeguards have been proposed for protecting rights of vulnerable Sections of the displaced persons. 25. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects. The notes on clauses explain the various provisions contained in the Bill. 92. Section 2(2) of the Act of 2013, provides that in the event of acquisition for private companies, consent of 80% of the affected families has to be obtained and for the public-private partnerships, consent of 70% of the affected families is required to be taken. In Section 3(c), the term 'affected family' has been widened, which inter alia includes members of the Schedule Tribes, forest dwellers, and families whose livelihood is dependent on forests or water bodies. A Social Impact Assessment ( SIA ) has to be prepared, as provided in Sections 4 to 9. Special provisions to safeguard food security have been made by prohibiting the acquisition of multi-cropped land except in exceptional circumstances as enumerated in Section 10. Section 11 is akin to Section 4 of the Act of 1894 regarding issuance of preliminary notification. The SIA report lapses in case prelimina ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... quired land remains unutilized for a period of five years. Thus, various departures have been made from the old Land Acquisition Act, in the Act of 2013 relating to Social Impact Assessment, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme, etc. It ensures higher compensation than the old Act; the public purpose has been defined; consent provisions have also been made. The interest of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been adequately protected. Various Committees and Authorities have been constituted. The definition of 'affected families' has been widened. 93. Undoubtedly the Act of 2013 has provided safeguards, in the form of higher compensation and provisions for rehabilitation, which are necessary. In that light, the court has to interpret its provisions, to give full and meaningful effect to the legislative intent keeping in mind the language and tenor of the provisions, it is not for the court to legislate. The Court can only iron out creases to clear ambiguity. The intended benefit should not be taken away. At the same time, since the Act of 2013, envisages lapse of acquisitions notified (and in many cases, completed by the issuance of the award) due to indolence an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e. There are twin requirements for the lapse; firstly, physical possession has not been taken and, secondly, compensation has not been paid. In case, possession has been taken but compensation has been paid, there is no lapse of the proceedings. The question which is to be decided is whether the conditions are cumulative, i.e. both are to be fulfilled, for lapsing of acquisition proceedings, or the conditions are in the alternative ( either/or ). According to the State and acquiring agencies, in a situation where possession has been taken, and compensation is not paid, there is no lapse: also in case where compensation has been paid, but possession not taken in a proceeding pending as on 1.1.2014, there is no lapse. Sine qua non is that proceeding must be pending. They argue that the word or used in phrase 'the physical possession of the land has been not taken, or the compensation has not been paid', has to be interpreted as and as two negative requirements qualify it. Furthermore, argues the State when two negative conditions are connected by or, they are construed as cumulative, the word or is to be read as nor or and. Naturally, the landowners argue to the c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In other words, a tenant (other than a permanent tenant) cultivating the lands personally would become the purchaser of the lands on April 1, 1957, if on that date neither an application Under Section 29 read with Section 31 nor an application Under Section 29 read with Section 14 was pending. If an application either Under Section 29 read with Section 31 or Under Section 29 read with Section 14 was pending April 1, 1957, the tenant would become the purchaser on the postponed date , that is to say, when the application would be finally rejected. But if the application be finally allowed, the tenant would not become the purchaser. The expression an application in the proviso means not only an application Under Section 31 but also an application Under Section 29 read with Section 14. If an application of either type was pending on April 1, 1957, the tenant could not become the purchaser on that elate. Now, on April 1, 1957, the application filed by Respondent No. 1 Under Section 29 read with Section 31 was pending. Consequently, the Appellant could not be deemed to have purchased the lands on April 1, 1957. The decision of this Court in The Punjab Produce and Trading Co. Ltd. v ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat in Brown Co. v. Harrison (1927) All ER Rep 195 pp, the provisions contained in Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 came up for consideration before the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the word or in Article IV, Rule 2 (q), must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. It has been observed that quite commonly collation of the words or can be meant in conjunctive sense and certainly where the disjunctive use of the word, leads to repugnance or absurdity. 99. In this Court's considered view, as regards the collation of the words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and this logically flows from the Act of 1894 read with the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Any other interpretation would entail illogical results. That apart, if the Rule of interpretation with respect to two negative conditions qualified by or is used, then or should be read as nor or and . Brown Co. v. Harrison (supra), ruled thus, about the interpretation of two negative conditions connected by the word or : .....I think it quite commonly and grammatically can have a conjunctiv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... criminal case, I find the conclusion and the reasoning reassuring. 101. In M/s. Ranchhoddas Atmaram and Anr. v. The Union of India and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 935, a Constitution Bench of this Court observed that if there are two negative conditions, the expression or has to be read as conjunctive and conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled. It was observed: (13) It is clear that if the words form an affirmative sentence, then the condition of one of the clauses only need be fulfilled. In such a case, or really means either or. In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary one of the meanings of the word or is given as A particle co-ordinating two (or more) words, phrases or clauses between which there is an alternative. It is also there stated, The alternative expressed by or is emphasised by prefixing the first member or adding after the last, the associated adv. EITHER. So, even without either, or alone creates an alternative. If, therefore, the sentence before us is an affirmative one, then we get two alternatives, any one of which may be chosen without the other being considered at all. In such a case it must be held that a penalty exceeding ₹ 1,000 can b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ' one for the other. 103. In Joint Director of Mines Safety v. Tandur and Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd. (1987) 3 SCC 308, and was read disjunctively considering the legislative intent. In Samee Khan (supra), the term and was construed as or to carry out the legislative intention. In Mobilox Innovations Private Limited (supra), similar observations were made. In Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. L.R. (1928) 1 KB 561, it has been laid down that sometimes word or read as and and vice versa, but does not do so unless it becomes necessary because or does not generally mean and and and does not generally mean or . 104. In R.M.D.C. (supra) the definition Under Section 2(1)(d) came up for consideration. The qualifying Clause consisted of two parts separated from each other by the disjunctive word or . Both parts of the qualifying Clause indicated that each of the five kinds of prize competitions that they qualified were of a gambling nature. The court held considering the apparent intention of the legislature, it has perforce to read the word or as and . In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. AIR 1963 SC 1638, this Cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... manner alone that their representation can be adequately secured. 105. In Prof. Yashpal (supra), the word or occurring in the expression established or incorporated was read as and so that the State enactment did not come in conflict with the Central legislation and create any hindrance or obstacle in the working of the latter. This Court has observed: 59. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi has also submitted that insofar as private universities are concerned, the word or occurring in the expression established or incorporated in Sections 2(f), 22 and 23 of the UGC Act should be read as and. He has submitted that the normal meaning of the word established is to bring into existence. In order to avoid the situation which has been created by the impugned enactment where over 112 universities have come into existence within a short period of one year of which many do not have any kind of infrastructure or teaching facility, it will be in consonance with the constitutional scheme that only after establishment of the basic requisites of a university (classrooms, library, laboratory, offices, and hostel facility, etc.) that it should be incorporated and conferred a juristic personal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible. The Court observed thus: 27. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court that the permanent seat of the High Court is at Allahabad is not quite sound. The order states that the High Court shall sit as the new High Court and the judges and Division Bench thereof shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint. The word or cannot be read as and . If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, they are bound to be construed in their ordinary sense. The mere fact that the results of a statute may be unjust does not entitle a court to refuse to give it effect. If there are two different interpretations of the words in an Act, the Court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things. If the inconvenience is an absurd inconvenience, by reading an enactment in its ordinary sense, whereas if it is read in a manner in which it is capable, though not in an ordinary sense, there would not be any inconvenience at all; there would be reason why on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , it is stated at p. 135: And has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of or . Sometimes, however, even in such a connection, it is, by force of a context, read as or. While dealing with the topic 'OR is read as AND, and vice versa', Stroud says in Vol. 3, at p. 2009: You will find it said in some cases that 'or' means 'and'; but 'or' never does mean 'and'. Similarly, in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., pp. 229-30, it has been accepted that to carry out the intention of the legislature, it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions 'or' and 'and' one for the other. The word or is normally disjunctive and and is normally conjunctive, but at times they are read as vice versa. As Scrutton, L.J. said in Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co., LR (1928) 1 KB 561, 568: You do sometimes read or as and in a statute .... But you do not do it unless you are obliged, because or does not generally mean and and and does not generally mean or. As Lord Halsbury L.C. observed in Mersey ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rmed or laid out for carriage traffic unless such road shall be forty feet wide, or for the purposes of foot traffic, unless such road be of the width of twenty feet, or unless such streets respectively shall be open at both ends. The question is whether that word or should be read in the disjunctive or conjunctive, or perhaps read as either and or nor: I think it means nor; that is to say, that the two things comprised in the prohibition are both prohibited, and not merely prohibited in the alternative. If the sense which I attribute to the word is right, it would have been more strictly grammatical to have written nor instead of or. But I think that the meaning of the enactment is that the road must be of the width specified, and that no road shall be allowed unless it is of the width specified, nor unless it is open at both ends. That seems to me to be the object of the statute, which was passed for sanitary purposes, and also for the purpose of comfort and traffic. It was contended that the object of the provision is sanitary only, and that if a street is forty feet wide, or if however narrow, it is open at both ends, good ventilation is secured. But a very long ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is, in our opinion, a penal provision-to punish the acquiring authority for its lethargy in not taking physical possession nor paying the compensation after making the award five years or more before the commencement of the Act of 2013 in pending proceedings, providing that they would lapse. The expression where an award has been made, then the proceedings shall continue used in Section 24(1)(b) under the provisions of the Act of 1894 means that proceedings were pending in praesenti as on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013 are not concluded proceedings, and in that context, an exception has been carved out in Section 24(2). 113. Even if possession has been taken, despite which payment has not been made nor deposited, (for the majority of the land-holdings), then all beneficiaries holding land on the date of notification Under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, are to be paid compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 frowns upon indolence and stupor of the authorities. The expression possession of the land has not been taken or compensation has not been paid indicates a failure on the part of the authorities to take the necessary s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m the date of the publication of the declaration Under Section 6 and if no award is made within two years, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall lapse. The period of two year excludes any period during which interim order granted by the Court was in operation. Once an award is made and possession is taken, by virtue of Section 16, land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Vesting of land is automatic on the happening of the two exigencies of passing award and taking possession, as provided in Section 16. Once possession is taken Under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the owner of the land loses title to it, and the Government becomes the absolute owner of the land. 116. Payment of compensation under the Act of 1894 is provided for by Section 31 of the Act, which is to be after passing of the award Under Section 11. The exception, is in case of urgency Under Section 17, is where it has to be tendered before taking possession. Once an award has been passed, the Collector is bound to tender the payment of compensation to the persons interested entitled to it, as found in the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by the contingencie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... been vested in the State Under Section 16, in case of failure to pay the compensation Under Section 31(1) to deposit Under Section 31(2), compensation has to be paid along with interest, and due to non-compliance of Section 31, there is no lapse of acquisition. The same spirit has been carried forward in the Act of 2013 by providing in Section 24(2). Once possession has been taken though the payment has not been made, the compensation has to be paid along with interest as envisaged Under Section 34, and in a case, payment has been made, possession has not been taken, there is no lapse Under Section 24(2). In a case where possession has been taken under the Act of 1894 as provided by Section 16 or 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances, if compensation is not paid, there is no divesting there will be no lapse as compensation carries interest @ 9% or @ 15% as envisaged Under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. Proviso to Section 24(2) makes some wholesome provision in case the amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, in such an event, not only those persons but all the beneficiaries, though for minority of holding compensati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act of 2013 has to be paid to all beneficiaries as on the date of notification Under Section 4 issued under the Act of 1894. There is nothing in the Statement of Objects and Reasons making specific reference to non-payment of compensation where an award has been made, and possession has been taken. While interpreting the provisions of an Act, the court to consider the objects and reasons of the legislature, which the legislature had in mind also emphasised that once vesting is complete, there is no divesting as held in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate 1958 SCR 1156, thus: (9) A little careful consideration will show, however, that the expression any person occurring in the third part of the definition Clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must relate to (i) employment or non-employment or (ii) terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person; these necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in respect of whom the employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a dispute between employers and workme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not been paid are unrelated and carry different consequences under the Act of 1894. As already discussed above, these conditions are merely exclusive conditions and cannot be used as alternative conditions. There is a catena of cases where compensation has been paid, but possession has not been taken due to one reason or the other for no fault of authorities or otherwise, and there are cases where possession is taken, but compensation has not been paid. 124. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is to be given full effect. Section 24(2) has been carved out as an exception to the otherwise general applicability of the provisions contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and Section 24(1)(a) and (b) apply to the proceedings which are pending. Sub-section (2) is an exception to Sub-section (1) which reads: Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) where an award has been made, but possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid, an exception has been carved in Section 24 where an award has been passed, but no steps have been taken to take the possession nor payment of compensation has been made in pending proceedings Under Section 24(1). The provision h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s by its very nature an enabling one and has to be interpreted as such. In the present case, it is made to take care of the period between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, i.e., between the date of the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act and the date of the commencement of the Act. Since some awards might have been made by the Collector and the reference Court during the said interregnum, the legislature did not want to deprive the awardees concerned either of the newly conferred benefit of Section 23(1-A) or of the increased benefit Under Sections 23(2) and 28. The second object was to enable the Collector and the Court to give the said benefits in the proceedings pending before them where they had not made awards. The only limitation that was placed on the power of the Collector in this behalf was that he should not reopen the awards already made by him in proceedings which were pending before him on 30-4-1982 to give the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to such awardees. This was as stated earlier, for two reasons. If the said awards are pending before the reference Court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, viz., 24-9-1984, the reference Court would be able to give t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dings that were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act it is necessary to read Section 23(1-A) along with the transitional provisions contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. 126. For interpretation of repeal and saving clauses, reliance has been placed on Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd. 2004 (7) SCC 288 thus: 70. Section 85 of the 1996 Act repeals the 1940 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 85 provides for a non-obstante clause. Clause (a) of the said Sub-section provides for saving Clause stating that the provisions of the said enactments shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced before the said Act came into force. Thus, those arbitral proceedings which were commenced before coming into force of the 1996 Act are saved and the provisions of the 1996 Act would apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after the said Act came into force. Even for the said limited purpose, it is necessary to find out as to what is meant by commencement of arbitral proceedings for the purpose of the 1996 Act where for also necessity of reference to Section 21 would arise. The court is to interpret the r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ides for commencement of arbitral proceedings from the date on which a request to refer a particular dispute is received by the Respondent. .... *** 109. To sum up, in this case, the question concerns interpretation of transitional provisions; that Section 85(2)(a) emphasises the concept of commencement whereas Section 48 of the 1940 Act emphasised the concept of reference ; that Section 85(2)(a) provides for implied repeal; that the scheme of the 1940 Act is different from the 1996 Act; that the word reference in Section 48 of the old Act had different meanings in different contexts; and for the said reasons, I am of the view that while interpreting Section 85(2)(a) in the context of the question raised in this appeal, one cannot rely only on Section 21 of the 1996 Act. 127. Under Section 48 of the Act of 1894, withdrawal of the land acquisition proceedings was permissible only if the possession has not been taken Under Section 16 or 17(1). Section 48(1) is extracted hereunder: 48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed.- (1) Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remained unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions. Again, in C. Padma and Ors. v. Dy. Secretary and Ors. (1997) 2 SCC 627, this Court stated that: 4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published Under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (for short the Act ) in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Ras ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ame to be surrendered to the Government for resumption. The lands then were allotted to SRVS Ltd., 5th Respondent which is also a subsidiary amalgamated company of the original company. Therefore, the public purpose for which acquisition was made was substituted for another public purpose. Moreover, the question stood finally settled 32 years ago and hence the writ petition cannot be entertained after three decades on the ground that either original purpose was not public purpose or the land cannot be used for any other purpose. 6. Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was right in refusing to entertain the writ petition. The decision in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 335 thus: 9. ...There is no explanation whatsoever for the inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions. Merely because full enhanced compensation amount was not paid to the Respondents, that itself was not a ground to condone the delay and laches in filing the writ petition. In our view, the High Court was also not right in ordering restoration of land to the Respondents on the ground that the land acquired was not used for which it had been acquire ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not be cooperative in taking possession of the land. *** *************** ************ 40. In Narayan Bhagde case one of the arguments raised by the landowner was that as per the communication of the Commissioner the land was still with the landowner and possession thereof had not been taken. The Bench observed that the letter was based on a misconception as the landowner had re-entered the acquired land immediately after its possession had been taken by the Government ignoring the scenario that he stood divested of the possession, Under Section 16 of the Act. This Court observed as under: (Narayan Bhagde case, SCC p. 712, para 29) 29. ... This was plainly erroneous view, for the legal position is clear that even if the Appellant entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment after the land was actually taken possession of and became vested in the Government, such act on the part of the Appellant did not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. To our mind, therefore, even assuming that the Appellant had re-entered the land on account of the various interim ord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value. *** 24. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the Appellants have failed to make out a case for issue of a mandamus to the Respondents to release the acquired land in their favour. In the result, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs. 129. Section 31 of the Act of 1894 is in pari materia with the provisions Section 77 of the Act of 2013; Section 34 (of the Act of 1894) is pari materia with Section 80 of the Act of 2013. Section 77 of the Act of 2013 deals with payment of compensation or deposit of the same in the Authority. Section 77 is reproduced hereunder: 77. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Authority.-(1) On making an award Under Section 30, the Collector shall tender payment of the compens ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d. The award amount has to be paid @ 9% per annum for the first year and after that @ 15% per annum. 132. Since the Act of 1894 never provide for the lapse in case the compensation amount was not deposited, non-deposit carried higher interest. The provisions under the new Act are identical: there is no lapse of any acquisition proceeding by non-compliance with Section 77. Interpreting or Under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 disjunctively, would result in an anomalous situation-because, once compensation has been paid to the landowner, there is no provision for its refund. It was fairly conceded on behalf of the landowners that they must return the compensation in the case of lapse if possession has not been taken. In case possession is with the landowner and compensation has been paid, according to landowners' submission, there is deemed lapse Under Section 24(2) by reading the word or disjunctively. It would then be open to the State Government to withdraw the money deposited in the Reference Court. It was also submitted that it is inherent in the notion of lapse that the State may recover the compensation on the ground of restitution. In our opinion, the submissions ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r deposited in court as envisaged Under Section 31(2) from the date of taking possession, the interest for the first year is 9% and thereafter 15% per annum follows. The effect of vesting, under no circumstance, is taken away due to non-compliance of Section 31(1) or 31(2) as the case may be as the payment is secured along with interest under the provisions of Section 34 read with Section 31. The State cannot be asked to restore possession once taken but in case it fails to make deposit Under Section 31(3) or otherwise with respect to majority of the landholdings, in that exigency, all the beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4 shall be entitled to higher compensation under the Act of 2013 and there would be no lapse in that case. 134. The landowners had complained that in some cases, under various schemes, close to 80% of the compensation amount was not handed over to the concerned Collector. It was also submitted that in some of the schemes, 50% beneficiaries, for whose benefit the land had been acquired, had not paid even a single rupee. Since this Court is not deciding individual cases here, what is the effect of the interpretation of the law, in the li ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... riginal owner by mere cancellation of the notification. 15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made Under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration Under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award Under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ernment for the land to be acquired for any eventuality discovered by either Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act. 93. The only question that would remain is that of the estimation of the compensation. In our considered view, even if the compensation is not paid or is short of 80%, the acquisition would not suffer. One could imagine the unreasonableness of the situation. Now suppose, there is state of emergency as contemplated in Section 17(2) of the Act and the compensation is not given, could the whole acquisition come to a naught? It would entail serious consequences. *** 95. Further, in a judgment of this Court in Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1 a similar view was reported. That was a case under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1987, under which the acquisition was made using Section 17 of the Act. The Court took the view that once the possession was taken Under Section 17 of the Act, the Government could not withdraw from that position Under Section 18 and even the provisions of Section 11-A were not attracted. That was of course a case where the award was not passed Under Section 11-A after taking of the possession. A clear-cut ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 this Court held that once possession had been taken Under Section 17(1) and the land vested in the Government then the Government could not withdraw from acquisition Under Section 48 and the provisions of Section 11A were not attracted and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings would not lapse on failure to make an award within the period prescribed therein. It was further held that non-compliance of Section 17(3-A), regarding part payment of compensation before taking possession, would also not render the possession illegal and entitle the Government to withdraw from acquisition. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by this Court in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31. In view of the aforesaid ratio it follows that the provisions of Section 11-A are not attracted in the present case and even if it be assumed that the award has not been passed within the stipulated period, the acquisition of land does not come to an end. 138. In Awadh Bihari Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 31, question was raised with respect to the laps ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cumbrances. As seen from the judgment dated 23-8-1982 of the High Court in WP No. 3416 of 1978, taking possession of the Appellants' land along with land of others by the Collector on 10-7-1978 Under Section 17(1) is, in fact, made the basis for its holding that invoking of urgency Clause to dispense with Section 5-A enquiry was made by the Government mechanically. No doubt, when the High Court took the view that acquisition of the land concerned Under Section 17 of the Act was made pursuant to an order of the Government without application of its mind in the matter of making Section 5-A not to apply, it was open to it to set aside or quash the subsequent acquisition proceedings except Section 4(1) notification which had followed and restore the ownership of the land to the Appellants' land if it had to order fresh enquiry on the basis of Section 4(1) notification. Such a setting aside or quashing was inevitable because the acquisition proceedings had been completed Under Section 17 and the land had vested in the State Government, inasmuch as, without setting aside that vesting of the land in the State Government and restoring the land to the Appellant-owners, that land was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani, (2009) 1 SCC 714, this Court while dealing with a similar issue held as under (SCC p. 719, para 17) 17. ... The expression 'may' used in the opening words of Section 5 is not directory, as has been sought to be argued, but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit a marriage under the Act between two Hindus. Section 7 of the 1955 Act is to be read along with Section 5 in that a Hindu marriage, as understood Under Section 5, could be solemnised according to the ceremonies indicated therein. 25. The law on this issue can be summarised to the effect that in order to declare a provision mandatory, the test to be applied is as to whether non-compliance with the provision could render the entire proceedings invalid or not. Whether the provision is mandatory or directory, depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language for which the intent is clothed. The issue is to be examined having regard to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provisions in question. The Court may find out as to what would be the consequence which would flow from construing it in one way or the other and as to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... esent enjoyment, e.g. when I own and occupy Blackacre. But an interest may be vested, even where it does not carry a right to immediate possession if it does confer a fixed right of taking possession in the future. George Whitecross Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence 305 (CW. Paton David P. Derham eds., 4th ed. 1972). A future interest is vested if it meets two requirements: first, that there be no condition precedent to the interest's becoming a present estate other than the natural expiration of those estates that are prior to it in possession; and second, that it be theoretically possible to identify who would get the right to possession if the interest should become a present estate at any time. Thomas F. Bergin 8. Paul C. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 66-67 (2d ed. 1984). 144. In Webster's Dictionary, 'vested' is defined as: vested adj. [pp. of vest] 1. Clothed; robed, especially in church vestments. 2. in law, fixed; settled; absolute; not contingent upon anything: as, a vested interest. 145. In State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram 1996 (7) JT 118, it has been observed that once possession is taken and the award has been pas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as been passed and possession has been taken, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances. This Court held thus: 2. This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court made on 25-4-1996 in LPA No. 437 of 1996. Notification Under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (for short, 'the Act') was published on 1-6-1976. Declaration Under Section 6 of the Act was published on 16-2-1977. The award was passed on 3-7-1981. Thereafter, the reference also become final. The Petitioner has challenged the notification, the declaration, and the award as illegal. It contends that the award does not come in the way of the Petitioner in filing the writ petition on 21-1-1994. The High Court has dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of laches. 147. A similar view has been taken in Market Committee v. Krishan Murari (1996) 1 SCC 311 and Puttu Lal (dead) by L.Rs. v. State of U.P. and Anr. (1996) 3 SCC 99. The concept of 'vesting' was also considered in The Fruit Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust 1957 SCR 01. Once vesting takes place, and is with possession, after which a person who remains in poss ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ries or third-party transferees of such land which they had lawfully acquired, through sales or transfers. There is a specific provision made for divesting, nor does the Act of 2013 by necessary intendment, imply such a drastic consequence. Divesting cannot be said to have been intended. Here, the decision in VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary School v. State of Kerala (2016) 4 SCC 216 is relevant; it was observed as follows by this Court: 21. In our considered view, the above principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Garikapati case will have full application while considering the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the fifth Respondent claiming a vested right by relying upon unamended Rule 7-A(3). Principles (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) of the said judgment are apposite to the case on hand. When we make a comprehensive reference to the above principles, it can be said that for the legal pursuit of a remedy it must be shown that the various stages of such remedy are formed into a chain or rather as series of it, which are connected by an intrinsic unity which can be called as one proceeding, that such vested right, if any, should have its origin in a proc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the legislative intent, particularly when it has provided for the lapse of the proceedings. It has to be interpreted in the light of provisions made in Sections 24 and 114 of the Act of 2013 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, what it protects and to what extent it takes away the rights of the parties. Undoubtedly, Section 24(2) has retroactive operation with respect to the acquisitions initiated under the Act of 1894 and which are not completed by taking possession nor compensation has been paid in spite of lapse of 5 years and proceedings are kept pending due to lethargy of the officials. The drastic consequences follow by the provisions contained in Section 24(2) in such cases. 152. For considering the legislative intent, Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edition (2012) has been referred to, in which it has been observed: Where, on a weighing of the factors, it seems that some retrospective effect was intended, the general presumption against retrospectively indicates that this should be kept to as narrow a compass as will accord with the legislative intention. Principle against doubtful penalisation. It is a general principle of legal policy that no one shou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fundamental and of long standing. It is reflected in the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. It is protected by Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd. 8969). The Rule also applies, but with less force, outside the criminal sphere. It is again expressed in maxims, lex prospicit non respicit and omnis nova constitutio futuris temporibus formam imponere debet non praeteritis. The French Civil Code provides that La loi ne dipose que pour l'avenir; elle n'a point d'effet retroactif: ..... But both these passages draw attention to an important point, that the exception only applies where application of it would not cause unfairness or injustice. This is consistent with the general Rule or presumption which is itself based on considerations of fairness and justice, as shown by the passage in Maxwell quoted, ante, p. 494C-E, and recently emphasised by Staughton LJ in Secretary of State for Social Security v. Tunnicliffe (1991) 2 All E.R. 712, 724: In my judgment the true principle is that Parliament is presumed not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ecretary of State for Defence (1988) A.C 755, 802C-D) or such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed., p. 215] (3) if the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only (In re Athlumney, at p. 552). (4) If the statute does have some retrospective operation on the basis of the above principles, it is not to be construed as having greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary (Lauri v. Renad, at p. 421) or than is necessary to give effect either to its clear language or to its manifest purpose (Arnold v. Central Electricity Generating Board (1988) A.C 228, 275. The absence of express limiting words cannot be used as a basis for implying retrospective operation. That would reverse the true presumption. A necessary and distinct implication typically arises in the context of a statute that, by repealing a previous statute, would leave a lacuna in the law if the new statute were not to be construed as having retrospective effect: see, e.g., Food C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bear in mind that by the common law, upon such a division of the parish of Upton St. Leonard's, any settlement already acquired in that parish would have been lost: see Reg v. Tipton Inhabitants 3; Dorking Union v. St. Saviour's Union. The purpose and effect of par. 1 of Article xxxi is to get rid of this difficulty and preserve the settlements that have been already acquired before the commencement of the Order. The purpose and effect of par. 2 is in like manner to preserve a status of irremovability that has been acquired at that date; and the question raised in this case is whether par. 3 of the Article is to be construed in all its generality as applicable to acts or circumstances which have been done or occurred completely in the past and before the commencement of the Order, so as to create or confer a settlement where none existed before, or whether, as the Appellants contend, it is to be construed as supplemental to pars 1 and 2 and limited to the cases where persons are in process of acquiring a settlement or status of irremovability so as to preserve their inchoate rights. If the words in par. 3 are construed without limitation, then, the residence of the pauper a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... had acted who were not, under the statutes, the right Commissioners to make the charge, provided that it was made by the Commissioners for the parish or place in which the person charged ordinarily resided. That the Section was retrospective in effect was not disputed by Sir Robert Finlay, but he argued that the retrospective operation is limited by the language of the Section and does not extend to a charge made in respect of profits derived from foreign possessions or securities Under Section 108 of the Income Tax Act, 1842. In support of this argument he relied upon the express reference in the first Sub-section of Section 32 to Section 106, and Section 146 of the Income Tax Act, 1842, upon the omission of any reference in this Sub-section to Section 108, and upon the repeal in Sub-section 2 of Section 32 of Section 108. He contended that if the Legislature had meant to include Section 108 in the first Sub-section it would have referred to it in express berms and would not merely have repealed it by the second sub-section. In the first Sub-section mention is made of other Sections of the Income Tax Acts, but not of Section 108. It must be taken, he argued, that Parliament had in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... estion whether a particular statute operates prospectively only or has retrospective operation also will have to be determined on the basis of the effect it has on existing rights and obligations, whether it creates new obligations or imposes new duties or levies new liabilities in relation to past transactions. For that purpose it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the legislature as indicated in the statute itself. 158. In Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors., (supra), this Court has observed that the Rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to the accrued right. This Court, while dealing with retrospectivity of a statute, observed that retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or harsh; otherwise, it runs the risk of being struck down for being unconstitutional. Following observations have been made: 15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute Law, 7th Edn.), it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by nece ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... id that in order to avail the benefit in the assessment years after 1-4-2005, balconies should be removed though these were permitted earlier? Holding so would lead to absurd results as one cannot expect an Assessee to comply with a condition that was not a part of the statute when the housing project was approved. We, thus, find that the only way to resolve the issue would be to hold that Clause (d) is to be treated as inextricably linked with the approval and construction of the housing project and an Assessee cannot be called upon to comply with the said condition when it was not in contemplation either of the Assessee or even the legislature, when the housing project was accorded approval by the local authorities. 26. Having regard to the above, let us take note of the special features which appear in these cases: 26.1. In the present case, the approval of the housing project, its scope, definition and conditions, are all decided by and are dependent on the provisions of the relevant DC Rules. In contrast, the judgment in Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. CIT, (1980) 1 SCC 139 was concerned with income tax only. 26.2. The position of law and the rights accrued prior ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r 2000 sq ft, whichever is less. 160. This Court in Jawarharmal (supra) and Rai Ramkrishna (supra), has considered the practical realities before analysing the extent of retrospective operation of the statute. Several decisions were cited in regard to conflict of interest (which are referred to in the footnote hereafter 21 ) and it was urged that the Rule of construction that is to be adopted is one of purposive interpretation. In re: Legislative History of Act of 2013 161. The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011 (Bill No. 77 of 2011) was introduced in the Parliament. The provisions of Section 24, as introduced in the said Bill, read as under: 24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case where a notification Under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, LA was issued before the commencement of this Act but the award Under Section 11 thereof has not been made before such commencement, the process shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government shall initiate the process for acquisition of land afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Where possession of land has not been taken, regardles ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... jects is not adversely impacted. 164. Debates in the Lok Sabha on 29.8.2013, were referred to during the hearings, to cite various reasons given in respect of the question why effect should be given retrospectively in cases where acquisition has not been completed. Shri Jairam Ramesh, Minister concerned at the relevant time, replied to debate about the retrospective part with respect to Section 24 thus: ... The hon'ble member has also raised question about retrospective clause. This is about Section 24 under which it has been provided that if the award has not been passed under the previous law than the new law will be applicable. Secondly, if the award has been passed and no compensation has been given and no physical possession has been taken the new law will be applicable. The third situation where this Clause will be applicable is when award has been passed but farmer has not been given more than 50 per cent compensation which will entail enforcement of this law. The hon'ble member and several others have raised this apprehension that this Act will ultimately give vast powers to the bureaucracy. In regard to this apprehension I would like to say that we have fixed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means the law is hard but it is the law , stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, inconvenience is not a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. In Re: proviso to Section 24(2) 167. In reference to the question whether the proviso is part of Section 24(2) or Section 24(1), it was submitted on behalf of the acquiring authorities and the States that the proviso needs to be read along with the main provision of Section 24(2) and cannot be read with Section 24(1)(b). It was pointed out that this Court has taken the view in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh and Ors., (2018) 14 SCC 161 that the proviso should be read as part of Section 24 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ndowners that the proviso does not refer to the main factors of lapse Under Section 24(2). The proviso is not an exemption from lapsing if it is read as part of Section 24(2), then the absurd consequences would follow. The proviso is in accord with Section 24(1)(b) and has to be read as part of it. Reliance has been placed on D.D.A. v. Virendra Lal Bahri and Ors. (supra). It was submitted that the proviso could not have been intended to be part of Section 24(2) dealing with lapsing of acquisition where the subject-matter of the proviso is wholly unrelated to physical possession of the land, but only relating to compensation not being deposited. It was also submitted that if the proviso is read with Section 24(2), arbitrary results will follow. The proviso would be arbitrary and liable to be struck down Under Article 14 of the Constitution. In case notification Under Section 4 applies only to a single plot of land or single owner, the conditions of Section 24(2) are not fulfilled acquisition would lapse, and in a case where several pieces of land have been acquired, if compensation in respect of majority landholdings has not been deposited, such acquisition will not lapse, but only ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ase where possession has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid, in such a case proviso becomes operative in given exigency of not depositing amount with respect to majority of landholdings. 172. A reading of Section 24(2) shows that in case possession has been taken even if the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall not lapse. In case payment has not been made nor deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings in the accounts of the beneficiaries, then all the beneficiaries specified in the notification Under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall get the enhanced compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013. Section 24(2) not only deals with failure to take physical possession but also failure to make payment of compensation. If both things have not been done, there is lapse of the acquisition proceeding. But where payment has been made though possession has been taken or payment has been made to some of the persons but not to all, and it has also not been deposited as envisaged in the proviso, in that event all beneficiaries (under the same award) shall get higher compensation. This is because once possession is been taken, there can be no l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ompensation follows Under Section 24(1)(a). Section 24(2) deals with the award having been made five years or before the commencement of the new Act. The legislative history also indicates/it was intended that five years' period should be adequate to make payment of compensation and to take possession. In that spirit, the proviso has been carved out as part of Section 24(2). Thus when Parliament has placed it at a particular place, by a process of reasoning, there can be no lifting and relocation of the provision. To bodily lift it would be an impermissible exercise. Unless it produces absurd results and does not fit in the scheme of the Act and the provisions to which it is attached such an interpretation, doing violence to the express provision, is not a legitimate interpretative exercise. There is no need to add it as the proviso to Section 24(1)(b) as it has not been done by the legislature, and it makes sense where it has been placed. It need not be lifted. (b) Punctuation used in Section 24(2): 174. Parliament has used the full stop (.) after Section 24(1) and colon (:) after Section 24(2). It cannot be gainsaid that punctuation plays a vital role, particularly ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ill end with a colon, which is never done to end a provision. Certain decisions have been referred to saying that importance and weightage are to be given to punctuation marks. The earlier view was that punctuations were added by the proof readers, and the Acts passed by Parliament did not contain any punctuation. However, it was submitted that in the past century, the English courts realised that the drafts placed before the Parliament also carry punctuations and, thus, it is important to give meaning to the same. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation has this to say regarding punctuation marks: 16.8 Punctuation is a part of an Act and may be considered in construing a provision. It is usually of little weight, however, since the sense of an Act should be the same with or without its punctuation. ... Although punctuation may be considered, it will generally be of little use since the sense of an Act should be the same with or without it. Punctuation is a device not for making meaning, but for making meaning plain. Its purpose is to denote the steps that ought to be made in oral reading and to point out the sense. The meaning of a well-crafted legislative proposition shoul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... terial assistance in determining the legislative intention.... In Aswini Kumar Ghose (supra) stated that: Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute, and very little attention is paid to it by English courts. Cockburn, C.J. said in Stephenson v. Taylor: On the Parliament Roll there is no punctuation and we therefore are not bound by that in the printed copies. It seems, however, that in the Vellum copies printed since 1850 there are some cases of punctuation, and when they occur they can be looked upon as a sort of contemporanea expositio. When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation. I need not deny that punctuation may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text. ********* ******* 77. The High Court has rejected the contention of the Petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh on two grounds. In the first place it has been said that the comma was no part of the Act. That the orthodox view of earlier English Judges was that punctuation formed no part of the s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ve and having regard to the use of the word other I have no hesitation in holding, in agreement with the High Court, that what the non obstante Clause intended to exclude or supersede was not the whole of the Indian Bar Councils Act but to exclude or supersede that Act and any other law only insofar as they or either of them purported to regulate the conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of advocates of a High Court might be permitted to practise in that High Court and that the comma, if it may at all be looked at, must be disregarded as being contrary to this plain meaning of the statute. 179. In Jamshed N. Guzdar (supra) this Court held that: 42. The general jurisdiction of the High Courts is dealt with in Entry 11-A under the caption administration of justice , which has a wide meaning and includes administration of civil as well as criminal justice. The expression administration of justice has been used without any qualification or limitation wide enough to include the powers and jurisdiction of all the courts except the Supreme Court. The semicolon (;) after the words administration of justice in Entry 11-A has significance and meaning. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ana High Court in Rajinder Singh v. Kultar Singh AIR 1980 P H 1, touching the same topic stated thus: (AIR p. 1) So far as the High Courts are concerned, the topic of jurisdiction and powers in general is not separately mentioned in any of the entries of List I, but 'administration of justice' as a distinct topic finds a place in Entry 3 of List II (now Entry 11-A of List III). The expression 'administration of justice' occurring in Entry 3 of List II of the VIIth Schedule has to be construed in its widest sense so as to give power to the State Legislature to legislate on all matters relating to administration of justice. After the words 'administration of justice' in Entry 3 there is a semicolon, and this punctuation cannot be discarded as being inappropriate. The punctuation has been put with a definite object of making this topic as distinct and not having relation only to the topic that follows thereafter. Under Entry 78 of List I, the topic of jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts is not dealt with. Under Entry 3 of List II the State Legislature can confer jurisdiction and powers or restrict or withdraw the jurisdiction and powers already ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... merely cleaned, graded, sorted or dried. For example, if the potatoes are cleaned, graded, sorted or dried, they will remain agricultural produce but in case raw potato is subjected to a process and converted into chips for human consumption it would cease to be agricultural produce for the purposes of the Entry Tax Act. The words such produce in the second part do not refer to the produce which has already been excluded from the agricultural or horticultural produce but refer to such other agricultural produce which has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process for being made fit for human consumption. The other judgment cited was State of Gujarat v. Reliance Industries Ltd. (2017) 16 SCC 28 With respect to 'Full Stop' and 'Colon', Vepa P. Sarathi in the Interpretation of Statutes, Fifth Edition discussed the issue thus: The Stop.-The most important punctuation mark is the period or full stop. It has to be placed at the end of a complete sentence which is neither exclamatory nor interrogatory. Of course, in legislative drafting exclamatory or interrogative sentences will not occur. An incomplete sentence should however end with a dash. It sh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich the expression is used and the consequences necessarily following upon the acceptance of any particular interpretation of the provision, the contravention of which is visited by penal consequences. 182. The present case involves placement of colon preceding to the Proviso to Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1), which ends with a full stop, and it makes sense and the true meaning where Parliament has placed it. The proviso is part of Section 24(2). It is not permissible to alter the provision and to read it as a proviso to Section 24(1)(b), mainly when it makes sense where Parliament so placed it. To read the proviso as part of Section 24(1)(b), will create repugnancy which the provisions contained in Section 24(1)(b). The window period of 5 years is provided to complete the acquisition proceedings where the award has been passed, and the provisions of the Act of 1894 shall be applied as if it has not been repealed. Section 24(2) starts with a non-obstante clause; it plainly is notwithstanding Section 24(1), and the proviso to Section 24(2) enlarges the scope of Section 24(2). When the window period has been provided Under Section 24(1)(b), i.e., Section 24(2) and its provis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... even if the award has been passed within 5 years and the compensation amount has not been deposited with respect to such an award passed in the window period, higher compensation to follow if it is not deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings would amount to re-writing the statute. The provision of Section 24(1)(a) is clear if an award has not been passed, higher compensation to follow. No lapse is provided. In case award has been passed within the window period of Section 24(1)(b), inter alia, the provisions for compensation would be that of the Act of 1894. The only exception to Section 24(1) is created by the non-obstante Clause in Section 24(2) by providing that in case the requisite steps have not been taken for 5 years or more, then there is lapse as a negative condition. The proviso contemplates higher compensation, in case compensation has not been paid, and the amount has not been deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings, to all the beneficiaries under the Act of 2013, who were holding land on the date of notification Under Section 4. If the proviso is added, Section 24(1)(b) will destroy the very provision of Section 24(1)(b) providing proceedi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a few-and, in effect, is similar to Section 28A of the Act of 1894-in case the obligation to pay or deposit has not been discharged and there is no arrangement of money to discharge the obligation either by paying or depositing in the Reference Court and, if permissible, in the treasury. Section 24(2) saves land which has been vested in the State, once award has been passed and possession of land. However, in case compensation has not been deposited with respect to majority of landowners, in any given award, all beneficiaries have to be paid higher compensation under the new Act. 188. It was urged that Section 24(1) and 24(2) deal with different subjects. It was submitted that Section 24(1) deals with compensation, whereas Section 24(2) deals with the lapsing of the acquisition. We are unable to accept the submission. Section 24(2) also deals with payment of compensation and taking of possession. Section 24(1)(a) is concerning a situation where no award has been made, higher compensation under the new Act to follow. In Section 24(1)(b) where the award is made (at the time of coming into force of the new Act) further proceedings would be under the new law; subject to Section 24( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder Section 24(1)(b), the old regime prevails. The proviso is an exception to Section 24(2) and in part the new regime for payment of higher compensation in case of default for 5 years or more after award. In re: Proviso to be read as part of provision it is appended 190. A proviso has to be construed as a part of the Clause to which it is appended. A proviso is added to a principal provision to which it is attached. It does not enlarge the enactment. In case the provision is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso cannot prevail. Though in absolute terms of a later Act. Its placement has been considered, and purpose has been considered in the following decisions. It was observed in State of Rajasthan v. Leela Jain and Ors. that 1965 (1) SCR 276: 14. ...So far as a general principle of construction of a proviso is concerned, it has been broadly stated that the function of a proviso is to limit the main part of the Section and carve out something which but for the proviso would have been within the operative part. .... Similarly, this Court in Sales-tax Officer, Circle 1, Jabalpur v. Hanuman Prasad 1967 (1) SCR 831 stated that: 5. .... It is well-recognised that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... section, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the Section as the proviso speaks the latter intention of the makers. (d) Where the Section is doubtful, a proviso may be used as a guide to its interpretation: but when it is clear, a proviso cannot imply the existence of words of which there is no trace in the section. (e) The proviso is subordinate to the main section. (f) A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for compelling reasons. (g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of abundant caution. (h) A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it into general harmony with the terms of Section should prevail. (i) When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one. (j) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision. *** 35. A very apt description and extent of a proviso was given by Lord Loreburn in Rhondda Urban District Council v. Taff Vale Railway Co., 1909 AC 253, where it was pointed out that insertion of a proviso by the draftsman is not always strictly adhered to its legitimate use an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nstruction, is to except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within it; and such a proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of an enactment when it can be fairly and properly construed without attributing to it that effect. R. v. Dibdin, 1910 P 57 (CA), held as under: The fallacy of the proposed method of interpretation is not far to seek. It sins against the fundamental Rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. It treats it as if it were an independent enacting Clause instead of being dependent on the main enactment. The courts ... have refused to be led astray by arguments such as those which have been addressed to us, which depend solely on taking words absolutely in their strict literal sense, disregarding the fundamental consideration that they are appearing in the proviso. 193. Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai 1966 (1) SCR 367, considered the effect of a proviso and said that its function is to except or qualify something enacted in the substantive clause, which but for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ttorney-General, the effect of the savings is much wider, and it applies to such cases as come within the words of the proviso, whenever the Act is extended to new areas. 194. In Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan Nagar and Ors. (1985) 2 SCC 279, the view taken in Bhojraj (supra) was affirmed and applied. It was observed that provisos are often added not as exceptions or qualifications to the main enactment but as savings clauses, in which case they will not be construed as controlled by the section. In Madhu Gopal v. VI Additional District Judge and Ors. 1988 (4) SCC 644 this Court has laid down that in any event, it is a well-settled principle of construction that unless clearly indicated, a proviso would not take away substantive rights given by the Section or the sub-section. In The King v. Dominion Engineering Co. Ltd. AIR (34) 1947 PC 94, it was held that where a Section of an enactment contains two provisions and the second proviso is repugnant in any way to the first, the second proviso must prevail for it stands last in the enactment and speaks the last intention of the makers. The following observations were made: (7) Proviso 2 qualifies the main enactment in the matter of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re award is made but compensation is not deposited in respect of majority of the landowners in a notification (for acquisition) [i.e. proviso to Section 24(2)] compensation is payable in terms of the new Act, i.e., Act of 2013. 197. For the aforesaid reasons, considering the placement of the proviso, semi-colon having been used at the end of Section 24(2), considering the interpretation of Section 24(1)(b) and the repugnancy which would be caused in case the proviso is lifted which is not permissible and particularly when we read the word 'or' as 'nor' in Section 24(2), it has to be placed where the legislature has legislated it, it has not been wrongly placed as part of Section 24(2) but is intended for beneficial results of higher compensation for one and all where there is no lapse, but amount not deposited as required. Higher compensation is contemplated by the Act of 2013, which intention is fully carried forward by the placement and interpretation. In re: What is the meaning to be given to the word paid used in Section 24(2) and deposited used in the proviso to Section 24(2) 198. Connected with this issue are questions like what is the consequ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... compensation has been offered/tendered Under Section 31(1), the acquiring authority cannot be penalized for non-payment as the amount has remained unpaid due to refusal to accept, by the landowner and Collector is prevented from making the payment. Thus, the word 'paid' used in Section 24(2) cannot be said to include within its ken 'deposit' Under Section 31(2). For that special provision has been carved out in the proviso to Section 24(2), which deals with the amount to be deposited in the account of beneficiaries. Two different expressions have been used in Section 24. In the main part of Section 24, the word 'paid' and in its proviso 'deposited' have been used. 201. The consequence of non-deposit of the amount has been dealt with in Section 34 of the Act of 1894. As per Section 24(2), if the amount has not been paid nor possession has been taken, it provides for lapse. Whereas the proviso indicates amount has not been deposited with respect to a majority of land holdings in a case initiated under the Act of 1894 for 5 years or more. The period of five years need not have been specified in the proviso as it is part of Section 24(2) and has to b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... paid. However, in case the deposit is made without tendering it to the person interested, the liability to pay the interest Under Section 34, shall continue. Even assuming deposit in the Reference Court is taken to be mandatory, in that case too interest has to follow as specified in Section 34. However, acquisition proceeding cannot lapse due to non-deposit. 204. The concept of deposit is different and quite apart from the word paid , due to which, lapse is provided in Section 24 of Act of 2013. In the case of non-deposit for the majority of landholdings, higher compensation would follow as such word paid cannot include in its ambit word deposited . To hold otherwise would be contrary to provisions contained in Section 24(2) and its proviso carrying different consequences. It is provided in Section 34 of Act of 1894, in case payment has not been tendered or paid, nor deposited the interest has to be paid as specified therein. In Section 24(2) also lapse is provided in case amount has not been paid and possession has not been taken. 205. In our considered opinion, there is a breach of obligation to deposit even if it is taken that amount to be deposited in the reference ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... amount is deposited in the court, it is on behalf of the beneficiary. The submission overlooks the form in which it used to be deposited in the treasury too, that amount is also credited in the treasury payable to the beneficiary specified in his name with land details, date of award, etc. 208. There is another reason why this Court holds that such an interpretation is reasonable and in tune with Parliamentary intent. Under the old regime, it was open to the Collector to fix a convenient date or dates for announcement of award, and tender payment. In the event of refusal by the landowner to receive, or in other cases, such as absence of the true owner, or in case of dispute as to who was to receive it, no doubt, the statute provided that the amount was to be deposited with the court: as it does today, Under Section 77. Yet, neither during the time when the Act of 1894 was in operation, nor under the Act of 2013, the entire acquisition does not lapse for non-deposit of the compensation amount in court. This is a significant aspect which none of the previous decisions have noticed. Thus, it would be incorrect to imply that failure to deposit compensation [in court, Under Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. It will be clear that two kinds of punishment are subject to the conditions of the proviso, namely, discharge or dismissal. Any other kind of punishment is not within the proviso. Further the proviso lays down two conditions, namely, (i) payment of wages for one month and (ii) making of an application by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken. It is not disputed before us that when the proviso lays down the conditions as to payment of one month's wages, all that the employer is required to do in order to carry out that condition is to tender the wages to the employee. But if the employee chooses not to accept the wages he cannot come forward and say that there has been no payment of wages to him by the employer. Therefore, though Section 33 speaks of payment of one month's wages it can only mean that the employer has tendered the wages and that would amount to payment, for otherwise a workman could always make the Section unworkable by refusing ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in sub- Section and its proviso, if the meaning were to be the same. The Court cannot add or subtract any word in the statute and has to give plain and literal meaning and when compensation has not been paid Under Section 24(2), it cannot mean compensation has not been deposited as used in the proviso. While interpreting the statutory provisions, addition or subtraction in the legislation is not permissible. It is not open to the court to either add or subtract a word. There cannot be any departure from the words of law, as observed in legal maxim A Verbis Legis Non Est. Recedendum . In Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edition) by Justice G.P. Singh, plethora of decisions have been referred. There is a conscious omission of the word deposit in Section 24(2), which has been used in the proviso. Parliament cannot be said to have used the different words carrying the same meaning in the same provision, whereas words paid and deposited carry a totally different meaning. Payment is actually made to the landowner and deposit is made in the court, that is not the payment made to the landowner. It may be discharge of liability of payment of interest and not more than tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... opt a purposive interpretation if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of Parliament's purpose or policy . For a modern statement of the rule, one may refer to the speech of LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALE in a case where he said: Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under the Rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible to apply 'the golden rule' of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further . The Rules stated above have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court ....... 216. The same work also notes that when two di ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Paramjeet Singh Pathak v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322: AIR 2007 SC 168 different view was taken therefore in Zenith Steel Tubes v. SICOM Ltd., (2008) 1 SCC 533 : AIR 2008 SC 451 case referred to a larger Bench; D.L.F. Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana, 2003 AIR SCW 1046, p. 1057 : AIR 2003 SC 1648 : (2003) 5 SCC 622 (The expressions 'at his own cost' and 'at its cost,' used in one Section given different meanings) 217. In Privy Council decisions in Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moore PC 1 and Lord Howard de Walden v. IRC and Anr. (1948) 2 AER 825 following observations have been made: ... we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction, makeup deficiencies which are left there. ... It is contrary to all Rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is necessary to do so. Similarly, it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words of the statute. Speaking briefly the court cannot reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. 218. In V.L.S. Finance Ltd. (supra) this Court obse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t to it. Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous, it is not for the Judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral. In controversial matters such as are involved in industrial relations, there is room for differences of opinion as to what is expedient, what is just and what is morally justifiable. Under our Constitution it is Parliament's opinion on these matters that is paramount. In the same judgment, it is further observed: (WLR p. 157 F) ... But if this be the case it is for Parliament, not for the judiciary, to decide whether any changes should be made to the law as stated in the Acts.... *** 67. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the omission of the word only from Section 2(2) indicates that applicability of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is not limited to the arbitrations that take place in India. We are also unable to accept that Section 2(2) would make Part I applicable even to arbitrations which take place outs ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 5 was intended to convey the same meaning as the word description in Section 6. In its popular sense, the expression distinct matters would connote something different from distinct categories . Two transactions might be of the same description, but all the same, they might be distinct. If A sells Black-acre to X and mortgages White-acre to Y, the transactions fall under different categories, and they are also distinct matters. But if A mortgages Black-acre to X and mortgages White-acre to Y, the two transactions fall under the same category, but they would certainly be distinct matters. If the intention of the legislature was that the expression 'distinct matters' in Section 5 should be understood not in its popular sense but narrowly as meaning different categories in the Schedule, nothing would have been easier than to say so. When two words of different import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to maintain that they are used in the same sense, and the conclusion must follow that the expression distinct matters in Section 5 and descriptions in Section 6 have different connotations. 222. In Commissioner of Income ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... making the payment even if the amount has been deposited in the treasury under the Rules framed Under Section 55 or under the Standing Orders, that would carry the interest as envisaged Under Section 34, but acquisition would not lapse on such deposit being made in the treasury. In case amount has been tendered and the landowner has refused to receive it, it cannot be said that the liability arising from non-payment of the amount is that of lapse of acquisition. Interest would follow in such a case also due to non-deposit of the amount. Equally, when the landowner does not accept the amount, but seeks a reference for higher compensation, there can be no question of such individual stating that he was not paid the amount (he was determined to be entitled to by the collector). In such case, the landowner would be entitled to the compensation determined by the Reference court. In re: Rules framed Under Section 55 and the Standing Orders issued by State Governments 225. It was urged on behalf of acquiring Authorities that various State Governments have framed Rules Under Section 55 of the Act of 1894 and/or have issued the Standing Orders/instructions with respect to the Gov ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e also been framed Under Section 55 of the Act of 1894, dealing with the deposit. Rule 9 provides that in case reference is not sought Under Section 18, the amount has to be deposited in treasury. Rule 9 is extracted hereunder: 9. In giving notice of the award Under Section 12(2) and tendering payment Under Section 31(1), to such of the persons interested as were not present personally or by their representatives when the award was made, the Collector shall require them to appear personally or by representatives by a certain date, to receive payment of the compensation awarded to them intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them, if they fail to appear. If they do not appear and do not apply for a reference to the Civil Court Under Section 18, he shall, after any further endeavour to secure their attendance or make payment that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid into the WW as revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are respectively due, and vouched for in the form prescribed or approved by Government from time to time. He shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, specifying the Treasury in which the deposits have been made ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ficer shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, specifying the treasury in which the deposit has been made. When the payees ultimately claim payment of sums placed in deposit, the amounts will be paid to them in the same manner as ordinary revenue deposit. The officer should, as far as possible, arrange to make the payments due in or near the village to which the payee belong in order that the number of undisbursed sums to be placed in deposits on account of non-attendance may be reduced to a minimum. Whenever payment is claimed through a representative whether before or after deposit of the amount awarded, such representative, must have legal authority for receiving the compensation on behalf of his principal. Sub-para (V) of the above made it clear that payment is credited to the treasury when a person who is served with a notice Under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894, is not present and the award is passed. When a notice is given to receive the payment of compensation and in case they fail to appear, the amount has to be paid to the treasury as revenue deposit payable to the landowner. 229. Rules and the Standing Orders are binding on the concerned Author ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct. It has further been observed that test is actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right. Following observations have been made: 5. From this material it is argued that the principles of natural justice were violated because the right of the Appellant to have his own evidence recorded was denied to him and further that the material which was gathered behind his back was used in determining his guilt. In support of these contentions a number of rulings are cited chief among which are State of Bombay v. Narul Latif Khan, (1965) 3 SCR 135; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sri C.S. Sharma, (1967) 3 SCR 848 and Union of India v. T.R. Varma, (1958) SCR 499. There is no doubt that if the principles of natural justice are violated, and there is a gross case, this Court would interfere by striking down the order of dismissal, but there are cases and cases. We have to look to what actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right. Here the question was a simple one, viz. whether the measurement book prepared for the contract work had been properly scrutinised and checked by the Appellant or not. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that Shri Mukherjee was appointed as an Enquiry Officer under the 1969 Rules. It is, however true that the Appellant was not questioned by the Enquiry Officer Under Rule 8(19) which provided as follows: The enquiring authority may, after the member of the services closes his case and shall if the member of the service has not examined himself generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the member of the service to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It may be noticed straight away that this provision is akin to Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 and Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973. It is now well established that mere non-examination or defective examination Under Section 342 of the 1898 Code is not a ground for interference unless prejudice is established, vide, K.C. Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin, AIR 1956 SC 24; Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta v. State of W.B., AIR 1969 SC 381 We are similarly of the view that failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(19) of the 1969 Rules does not vitiate the enquiry unless the delinquent officer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en as to 'stating the facts.' It cannot be supposed that the Appellant must at all cost state all the facts on which he bases his appeal. He has to state the facts, not the evidence: and the facts may depend on evidence yet to be obtained, and may not be fully or sufficiently known at the time when the notice of appeal is given. All things, considered, it seems to me that the section, in so far as the 'grounds' and 'facts' are concerned, must be construed as directory only: that is, as desiring information to be given about them. It is not to be supposed that an appeal should fail altogether simply because the grounds are not indicated, or the facts stated. Even if it is wanting in not giving them, it is not fatal. The defects can be remedied later, either before or at the hearing of the appeal, so long as an opportunity is afforded of dealing with them. 234. In Belvedere Court Management Ltd. v. Frogmore Developments Ltd. (1996) 3 W.L.R. 1008 at p. 1032, a distinction was made between essential and supportive provisions. The following observations are pertinent: By way of final comment I would add that I am strongly attracted to the view that legislat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ame time who have no control over the performance of the duty, such provision should be treated as a directory one. Where, however, a provision of law prescribes that a certain act has to be done in a particular manner by a person in order to acquire a right and it is coupled with another provision which confers an immunity on another when such act is not done in that manner, the former has to be regarded as a mandatory one. A procedural Rule ordinarily should not be construed as mandatory if the defect in the act done in pursuance of it can be cured by permitting appropriate rectification to be carried out at a subsequent stage unless by according such permission to rectify the error later on, another Rule would be contravened. Whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow. 236. Similarly, in Ram Deen Maurya (Dr.) v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2009) 6 SCC 735 this Court observed that non-compliance with the directory ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was passed, we do not think that it is a case for us to interfere at this stage. 239. In D-Block Ashok Nagar (Sahibabad) Plot Holders' Assn. v. State of U.P. (1997) 10 SCC 77, it was observed that liability to pay interest Under Section 34 arises from the date of taking possession. 240. It was argued that in fact in many cases, reference was sought as such the amounts being deposited in the treasury were not valid. Reference was sought for higher compensation and landowners had declined to accept the compensation for no good reason they could have received it under protest reserving their right to seek the reference and in case compensation was not paid or deposited, they could have claimed it along with interest as envisaged Under Section 34. 241. It is clear that once land is acquired, award passed and possession has been taken, it has vested in the State. It had been allotted to beneficiaries. A considerable infrastructure could have been developed and a third-party interest had also intervened. The land would have been given by the acquiring authorities to the beneficiaries from whose schemes the land had been acquired and they have developed immense infrastructure ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... claims. In case such landowners were interested in questioning the proceedings of taking possession or mode of deposit with the treasury, such a challenge was permissible within the time available with them to do so. They cannot wake from deep slumber and raise such claims in order to defeat the acquisition validly made. In our opinion, the law never contemplates-nor permits-misuse much less gross abuse of its provisions to reopen all the acquisitions made after 1984, and it is the duty of the court to examine the details of such claims. There are several litigations before us where landowners, having lost the challenge to the validity of acquisition proceedings and after having sought enhancement of the amount in the reference succeeding in it nevertheless are seeking relief arguing about lapse of acquisition after several rounds of litigation. 243. The expression used in Section 24(1)(b) is 'where an award Under Section 11 has been made , then 'such proceedings shall continue' under the provisions of the said Act of 1894 as if the said Act has not been repealed'. The expression proceedings shall continue indicates that proceedings are pending at the time; it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 894 and the expression physical possession used in Section 24(2). As a matter of fact, what was contemplated under the Act of 1894, by taking the possession meant only physical possession of the land. Taking over the possession under the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of the land. When the State Government acquires land and drawns up a memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On the large chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired. The Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if any further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which in possession of the State. The possession of trespasser always inures for th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er is one entering or remaining on land in another's possession without a privilege to do so created by possessor's consent, express or implied, or by law. Keesecker v. G.M. Mckelvey Co., 42 N.E. 2d 223, 226, 227, 68 Ohio App. 505. 249. One who enters or remains in possession on land of another without a privilege to do so, is also treated as a trespasser. On the strength of Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in S.M. Yaqub v. T.N. Basu AIR 1949 Pat 146, Mitra, has referred to the observation that the possession should not be confused with occupation. A person may be in actual possession of the property without occupying it for a considerable time. The person who has a right to utilise the whole in any way he likes. Possession in part is good enough to infer that the person is in possession of the rest. Learned Author has referred to Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, Ed. 1969, so as to explain what constitutes possession. There are three requisites of possession. First, there must be actual or potential physical control. Secondly, the physical control is not possession unless accompanied by intention hence if a thing is put into the hand of a sleeping perso ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 274, this Court observed that possession implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves the power of control and intent to control. Possession is annexed to right of property. 13. Possession is a polymorphous term which may have different meanings in different contexts. It is impossible to work out a completely logical and precise definition of possession uniformly applicable to all situations in the contexts of all statutes. Dias and Hughes in their book on Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever suffered from too much theorising it is that of possession. Much of this difficulty and confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond's Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 1966) caused by the fact that possession is not purely a legal concept. Possession, implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves power of control and intent to control. (See Dias and Hughes, ibid.) 14. According to Pollock and Wright, when a person is in such a relation to a thing that, so far as regards the thing, he can assume, exercise or resume manual c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Act. 253. Under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, vesting of title in the Government, in the land took place immediately upon taking possession. Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894, the acquired land became the property of the State without any condition or limitation either as to title or possession. Absolute title thus vested in the State. 254. This Court in V. Chandrasekaran and Anr. v. Administrative Officer and Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 133 dealt with the concept of vesting under the Act of 1894. The facts of the said case indicated that the Appellants and the officials of the State and Development Board connived with each other to enable the Appellant to grab/encroach upon the public land, which was acquired and falsified the documents so as to construct flats thereon. Considering the gravamen of the fraud, the Chief Secretary of the State was directed to trace out such officials and to take suitable action against each of them. It was also held by this Court that alienation of land subsequent to notification Under Section 4(1) is void and no title passes on the basis of such sale deed. This Court held that once land vested in the State free from all encumbrances, it ca ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad and Ors. 2011 (12) SCC 695, the concept of vesting was considered. This Court observed that vesting means an absolute and indefeasible right. Vesting, in general sense, means vesting in possession. Vesting may include vesting of interest too. This Court observed thus: 38. Vesting means having obtained an absolute and indefeasible right. It refers to and is used for transfer or conveyance. Vesting in the general sense, means vesting in possession. However, vesting does not necessarily and always means possession but includes vesting of interest as well. Vesting may mean vesting in title, vesting in possession or vesting in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it is used in a particular provision of the Act. The word vest has different shades, taking colour from the context in which it is used. It does not necessarily mean absolute vesting in every situation and is capable of bearing the meaning of a limited vesting, being limited, in title as well as duration. Thus, the word vest clothes varied colours from the context and situation in which the word came to be used in the statute. T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... chardson v. Robertson, (1862) 6 LT 75 thus: 8. It is no doubt true that Section 220 provides that any drain which vests in the Corporation is a municipal drain and shall be under the control of the Corporation. In this context, the question arises as to what meaning is required to assign to the word vest occurring in Section 220 of the Act? In Richardson v. Robertson 6 LT at p. 78, it was observed by Lord Cranworth as under: (LT p. 78) The word 'vest' is a word, at least, of ambiguous import. Prima facie 'vesting' in possession is the more natural meaning. The expressions 'investiture' -- 'clothing' -- and whatever else be the explanation as to the origin of the word, point prima facie rather to the enjoyment than to the obtaining of a right. But I am willing to accede to the argument that was pressed at the Bar, that by long usage 'vesting' originally means the having obtained an absolute and indefeasible right, as contradistinguished from the not having so obtained it. But it cannot be disputed that the word 'vesting' may mean, and often does mean, that which is its primary etymological signification, namely, vesting in poss ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast Rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable Rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the Appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tnesses and getting their signatures on such document. (v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3-A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken. 262. In State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and Ors., (supra), this Court dealt with the effect of vesting on possession and mode of taking it and opined thus: 9. It is well-settled law that publication of the declaration Under Section 6 gives conclusiveness to public purpose. Award was made on 26-9-1986 and for Survey No. 2/11 award was made on 31-8-1990. Possession having already been undertaken on 24-11-1981, it stands vested in the State Under Section 16 of the Act free from all encumbrances and thereby the Government acquired absolute title to the land. The initial award having been made within two years Under Section 11 of the Act, the fact that subsequent award was made on 31-8-1990 does not render the initial award invalid. It is also to be seen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nstitution and intends to establish a public school and that since other land was available, the Government would have acquired some other land leaving the acquired land for the Appellant. In the counter-affidavit filed in the High Court, it was stated that apart from the acquired land, the Appellant also owned 482 canals 19 marlas of land. Thereby, it is seen that the Appellant is not disabled to proceed with the continuation of the educational institution which it seeks to establish. It is then contended that an opportunity may be given to the Appellant to make a representation to the State Government. We find that it is not necessary for us to give any such liberty since acquisition process has already been completed. 264. In P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka and Ors., (2005) 12 SCC 489, with respect of mode of possession, this Court laid down as under: 6. Moreover, the Hon'ble Minister who passed the order of denotification of the lands in question sought to make a distinction between symbolic possession and actual possession and proceed to pass the order on the basis of his understanding of the law that symbolic possession did not amount to actual possession, and t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... anchnama. [Vide Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) (2009) 10 SCC 501.] 86. It is not in dispute that the panchnama has not been questioned in any proceedings by any of the Appellants. Though it is stated that Chanakyapuri Cooperative Society was in possession at one stage and Shri Venkateshawar Enterprises was given possession by the owners and possession was also given to Golden Hill Construction Corporation and thereafter it was given to the purchasers, the fact remains that the owners are not in possession. In view of the same, the finding of the High Court that the possession was taken by the State legally and validly through a panchnama is absolutely correct and deserves to be upheld. 266. In M. Venkatesh and Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority, etc. (2015) 17 SCC 1, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has opined that one of the modes of taking possession is by drawing panchnama. The Court observed: 17. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in Ajay Krishan Shinghal v. Union of India (1996) 10 SCC 721, Mahavir v. Rural Institute (1995) 5 SCC 335, Gian Chand v. Gopala (1995) 2 SCC 528, Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (2008 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... SCC 106, it was again a case relating to mining. The decision is of no avail. The decision in Ramesh Bejoy Sharma v. Pashupati Rai (1979) 4 SCC 27 related to khas possession and physical possession of the tenant with which we are not concerned in the instant case, and the decision has no relevance so as to determine the expression. In the instant case, we are not dealing with the question, what are the rights to be conferred on the actual cultivators under revenue laws? 269. Karanpura Development Co. v. Union of India (1988) Supp. SCC 488, was again a case of mines. In Larsen Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387, this Court relied upon Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (supra), Balmokand Khatri Educational Industrial Trust (supra) and held that drawing of Panchnama is sufficient to take possession and acquisition was held to be valid. 270. The decision in Velaxan Kumar (supra) cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly. The Court considered the photographs also to hold that the possession was not taken. Photographs cannot evidence as to whether possession was taken or not. Drawing of a Panchnama is an accepted mode of taking possession. Even afte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . When the land is vacant and is lying open, it is presumed to be that of the owner by this Court as held in Kashi Bai v. Sudha Rani Ghose AIR 1958 SC 434. Mere re-entry on Government land once it is acquired and vests absolutely in the State (under the Act of 1894) does not confer, any right to it and Section 24(2) does not have the effect of divesting the land once it vests in the State. 273. In Maria Margadia Sequeria v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria 2012 (5) SCC 370, approving a decision of this Court, this Court clarified what amounts to possession in law and held: Possession is flexible term and is not necessarily restricted to mere actual possession of the property. The legal conception of possession may be in various forms. The two elements of possession are the corpus and the animus. A person though in physical possession may not be in possession in the eye of law, if the animus be lacking. On the contrary, to be in possession, it is not necessary that one must be in actual physical contact. To gain the complete idea of possession, one must consider (i) the person possessing, (ii) the things possessed and, (iii) the persons excluded from possession. A man may hold an obj ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... akes effect immediately. 30. Another striking feature of the case is that all the actions had been taken in a comprehensive manner. The Collector in his certificate of possession dated 16th November, 1984 stated that the possession had been taken over in respect of the entire land; the details of the land and the area thereof had also been mentioned in the certificate of possession; even NTPC in its letter dated 24th February, 1986 stated that possession had not been delivered only in respect of land situated in four villages mentioned therein. Indisputably NTPC got possession over 10.215 acres of land. It raised constructions thereover. It is difficult to comprehend that if the NTPC had paid 80% of the total compensation as provided for under Sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Act, out of 65.713 acres of land it had obtained possession only in respect of about 10.215 acres of land and still for such a long time it kept mum. Ex-facie, therefore, it is difficult to accept that merely symbolic possession had been taken. 275. In V. Chandrasekaran and Anr. v. Administrative Officer and Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 133, the land was acquired and possession was handed over to the authorit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upra) and Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra), with regard to mode of taking possession. We hold that drawing of Panchnama of taking possession is the mode of taking possession in land acquisition cases, thereupon land vests in the State and any re-entry or retaining the possession thereafter is unlawful and does not inure for conferring benefits Under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. In Re Question No. 5: the effect of interim order of Court 278. On behalf of acquiring authorities, it was submitted that period spent during the interim stay or injunction by which Authorities have not been able to take possession or to make payment, has to be excluded from computing the period of 5 years or more as provided in Section 24(2). It was submitted that in case authorities are restrained by interim order passed by the court in a pending litigation, the land acquisition cannot lapse by including the period for which interim stay order preventing the Authorities from taking action has operated. Reliance has been placed on the principles contained in maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit . It was also submitted even in the absence of the provisions specifically excluding the period of in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pon the preserves of the legislature. Where Under Section 24 cut-off date is prescribed and there is no starting point and period for completion of task, the notion of excluding time spent in litigations is an alien concept to the provisions. The court must assume that the old law was oppressive and unjust and such introduction of exclusion of time may create complication in the working of the statute. It was also submitted that common law principles can be excluded by the legislature by express or implied implication in the statute itself. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon Union of India v. SICOM Ltd. (2009) 2 SCC 121. It was submitted on behalf of landowners that no provision had been enacted by issuing any ordinance and later amending the law, for providing for exclusion of the time spent on interim order Under Section 24(2), but Ordinance lapsed. The legislature could have amended the provisions as such the court cannot exclude the period. 282. Before we go to various rival submissions, the pivotal question for consideration is the interpretation of Section 24 and aims and objectives of the Act of 2013. Section 24 contemplates that the proceedings initiated under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the provisions if it was not possible for authorities for any reason not attributable to them or the Government to take requisite steps, the period has to be excluded. The Minister concerned Shri Jairam Ramesh in answer to the debate quoted above has made it clear that time limit of five years has been fixed for the Authorities to take action. If we do not exclude the period of interim order, the very spirit of the provision will be violated. 283. With respect to fixation of period is five years for the executive Authorities to take the requisite steps, Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and Ors. (supra) observed that what the legislature is in effect telling the executive is that they ought to have put their house in order and completed the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time after the pronouncement of award. Not having done so even after a leeway of five years, would cross the limits of legislative tolerance, after which the whole proceeding would be deemed to have lapsed. Thus, it is apparent from the decision of Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and Ors. (supra), which is relied upon by the landowners, that time limit is fixed for the ex ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ation Under Section 4 (of the Act of 1894) shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. That also intends to give benefits to all the concerned. Payment of compensation too has to be made. Possession of land holdings is to be taken in terms of the notification Under Section 4 and declaration Under Section 6 and payment has to be made to the beneficiaries. In case payment has not been made to the landowners nor is possession taken, there is a lapse. In case compensation has not been deposited within 5 years with respect to majority of land holdings, then all the beneficiaries are entitled for higher compensation under the Act of 2013. 287. In the opinion of this Court it is not the intendment of the Act of 2013 that those who have litigated should get benefits of higher compensation as contemplated Under Section 24 benefit is conferred on all beneficiaries. It is not intended by the provisions that in piecemeal the persons who have litigated and have obtained the interim order should get the benefits of the provisions of the Act of 2013. Those who have accepted the compensation within 5 years and handed over the possession too, are to be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n has been taken, but compensation has not been paid or deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries would be entitled for higher compensation only to that extent, the provisions of Section 114 of the Act of 2013, would be superseded but it would not obliterate the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which deals with effect of repeal except as provided in Section 24(2) and its proviso. 288. It was submitted on behalf of acquiring authorities that principle of casus omissus is not necessarily applicable in all the cases. Reliance has been placed on Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 K.B. 481, in which following observations have been made: The question for decision in this case is whether we are at liberty to extend the ordinary meaning of burden so as to include a contingent burden of the kind I have described. Now this Court has already held that this Sub-section is to be liberally construed so as to give effect to the governing principles embodied in the legislation (Winchester Court Ld. v. Miller); and I think we should do the same. Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t has itself to assess the amount of the increase. It has to say how much the tenant should pay in respect of the transfer of this burden to the landlord. It should do this by asking what a willing tenant would agree to pay and a willing landlord would agree to accept in respect of it. Just as in the earlier cases the courts were able to assess the value of the fair wear and tear clause, and of a cooker. So they can assess the value of the hot water Clause and translate it fairly in terms of rent; and what applies to hot water applies also to the removal of refuse and so forth. I agree that the appeal should be allowed, and with the order proposed by Asquith LJ. 289. Reliance was also placed on M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa (1961) 2 SCR 295, in which this Court observed that where the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, which is not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. In Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... both these notifications must be regarded as limited only to such duty of excise. But the Respondents contended that the expression duty of excise was one of large amplitude and in the absence of any restrictive or limitative words indicating that it was intended to refer only to duty of excise leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, it must be held to cover all duties of excise whether leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or under any other enactment. The Respondents sought to support this contention by pointing out that whenever the Central Government wanted to confine the exemption granted under a notification to the duty of excise leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, the Central Government made its intention abundantly clear by using appropriate words of limitation such as duty of excise leviable ... Under Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or duty of excise leviable ... under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or duty of excise leviable ... under the said Act as in the Notification No. CER-8(3)/55-C.E. dated September 17, 1955, Notification No. 255/77-C.E. dated July 20, 1977, Notification No. CER- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... absence of these words does not absolve us from the obligation to interpret the expression duty of excise in these notifications. We have still to construe this expression -- what is its meaning and import -- and that has to be done bearing in mind the context in which it occurs. We have already pointed out that these notifications having been issued Under Rule 8(1), the expression duty of excise in these notifications must bear the same meaning which it has in Rule 8(1) and that meaning clearly is -- excise duty payable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 as envisaged in Rule 2 Clause (v). It cannot in the circumstances bear an extended meaning so as to include special excise duty and auxiliary excise duty. 292. Relying on State of U.P. and Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation and Ors., (1979) 3 SCC 229 it was submitted that whether a piece of legislation has spent itself or exhausted in operation are matters of law and no such rights exist in a citizen to ask for a declaration that the law has been impliedly repealed on any such ground. In extreme and clear cases, no doubt, an antiquated law may be said to have become obsolete and, more so, if it is a penal law ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted by any court. In the same Act, the proviso to Section 19(7) in the context of limitation for publication of declaration Under Section 19(1) and the Explanation to Section 69(2) for working out the market value of the land in the context of delay between preliminary notification Under Section 11 and the date of the award, specifically provide that the period or periods during which the acquisition proceedings were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court be excluded in computing the relevant period. In that view of the matter, it can be safely concluded that the legislature has consciously omitted to extend the period of five years indicated in Section 24(2) even if the proceedings had been delayed on account of an order of stay or injunction granted by a court of law or for any reason. Such casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court in view of law on the subject elaborately discussed by this Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N. (2002) 3 SCC 533. 12. Even in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, the legislature had brought about amendment in Section 6 through an Amendment Act of 1984 to add Explanation 1 for the purpose of excluding the per ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cheme of land acquisition. It is observed that authorities may wait in the proceedings till the interim order is vacated. 298. In our considered opinion, litigation which initiated by the landowners has to be decided on its own merits and the benefits of Section 24(2) should not be available to the litigants. In case there is no interim order, they can get the benefits they are entitled to, not otherwise as a result of fruit of litigation, delays and dilatory tactics and some time it may be wholly frivolous pleas and forged documents as observed in V. Chandrasekaran (supra) mentioned above. 299. In Abhey Ram (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421, this Court considered the extended meaning of words stay of the action or proceedings . It was observed that any type of orders passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the Authorities to proceed further. This Court observed thus: 9. Therefore, the reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. Union of India, 37 (1989) DLT 150 (Del) DB, are obvious with reference to the quashing of the publication of the declaration Under Section 6 vis- -vis the writ Petitioners therein. The question that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 6 of the Act. It was observed as under: 72. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted in one of the matters of the landowners would put complete restraint on the Respondents to have proceeded further to issue notification Under Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued the said notification during the period when the stay was operative, then obviously they may have been hauled up for committing contempt of court. The language employed in the interim orders of stay is also such that it had completely restrained the Respondents from proceeding further in the matter by issuing declaration/notification Under Section 6 of the Act. 301. In Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti (1990) 1 SCC 593, this Court considered the provision where tenant would not be entitled to the protection of Section 39. If the suit had prolonged beyond ten years, then the tenant would be entitled to such protection. The interpretation suggested was not accepted by this Court as that would encourage the tenant to protract the litigation. This Court frowned upon obtaining of fruits by protracting the litigation on the ground of public policy. This Court observed thus: 17. It was argued that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ies on the date of the suit or adjudication of the suit unless such a legislation is retrospective and a court of appeal cannot take into consideration a new law brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered because the rights of the parties in an appeal are determined under the law in force on the date of the suit. However, the position in law would be different in the matters which relate to procedural law, but so far as substantive rights of parties are concerned, they remain unaffected by the amendment in the enactment. We are, therefore, of the view that where a repeal of provisions of an enactment is followed by fresh legislation by an amending Act, such legislation is prospective in operation and does not affect substantive or vested rights of the parties unless made retrospective either expressly or by necessary intendment. We are further of the view that there is a presumption against the retrospective operation of a statute and further a statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary, but an amending Act which affects the procedure is presumed to be retrospective unless the amending ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uting limitation would be the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. The complainant or the prosecuting agency would be entirely left at the mercy of the Magistrate, who may take cognizance after the limitation period because of several reasons; systemic or otherwise. It cannot be the intention of the legislature to throw a diligent complainant out of the court in this manner. Besides, it must be noted that the complainant approaches the court for redressal of his grievance. He wants action to be taken against the perpetrators of crime. The courts functioning under the criminal justice system are created for this purpose. It would be unreasonable to take the view that delay caused by the court in taking cognizance of a case would deny justice to a diligent complainant. Such an interpretation of Section 468 Code of Criminal Procedure would be unsustainable and would render it unconstitutional. It is well settled that a court of law would interpret a provision which would help to sustain the validity of the law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than applying a doctrine which would make the provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution. (U.P ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y to adopt delaying tactics to postpone the disbursement of claims and consequently earn more interest. Due to such delay, the owner would get huge amount of interest though ultimately, he may not get a penny out of principal amount on the final settlement of claims. It would amount to conferring unjust benefit on the owners which can never be the intention of the Parliament. We do not agree with the interpretation given by the High Court and hold that the interest accruing under the Coal Act is the money paid to the Commissioner in relation to the coal mine and the same has to be utilized by the Commissioner in meeting the claims of the creditors and discharging other liabilities in accordance with the provisions of the Coal Act. 307. It may not be doubtful conduct to file frivolous litigation and obtain stay; but benefit of Section 24(2) should not be conferred on those who prevented the taking of possession or payment of compensation, for the period spent during the stay. 308. In Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. (supra), this Court considered the question of casus omissus and observed thus: 12. The rival pleas regarding rewriting of statute and casus omissus need caref ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder v. Government of T.N., AIR 1980 Mad 251 was rendered on 22-6-1979, i.e., much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration Under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case. 309. There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition that casus omissus cannot be applied by the court and in case of clear necessity, the court has to interpret the law, if the provision of law is misused and subjected to abuse of process of law. It is for the legislature to amend, modify and repeal a law, if deemed necessary. Because of the above-mentioned interpretation of the provisions of Section 24 itself, we are unable to accept the submission made. We are not apply ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... law principle which was existing on the date of coming into force of the Constitution of India must yield to a statutory provision. To achieve the same purpose, Parliament as also the State Legislatures inserted provisions in various statutes, some of which have been referred to hereinbefore, providing that the statutory dues shall be the first charge over the properties of the taxpayer. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in a series of judgments. 311. There is no doubt that common law principles have to be weighed upon the statutory provision and latter has to prevail, but the statutory provision itself makes it clear that in the instant matter such period has to be excluded, thus, the principles of common law also apply with full force. In Mary Angel and Ors. v. State of T.N. 1999 (5) SCC 209, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius came to be considered by this Court. It was held that maxim needs to be applied when its application having regard to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice. This Court observed: 19. Further, for the Rule of interpretation on the basis of the maxim expressio unius ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder no circumstances, be presented to the Registrar to save the period of limitation. The election petition could be presented in the open court upto 4.15 p.m. i.e., working hours of the court. The Chief Justice had passed the order that court shall not sit for the rest after 3.15 p.m. Thus, the petition filed the next day was held to be within time. In Mohammed Gazi v. State of M.P. and Ors. 2000 (4) SCC 342., the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit came up for consideration along with maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia -the law does not compel a man to perform act which is not possible. Following observations had been made: 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit -- an act of the court shall prejudice no man, shall be applicable. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense, which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia -- the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and its administration are understood to disclaim as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... x non cogit ad impossibilia applied, and Lindley, L.J., said: 'We have to do with implied obligations, and I am not aware of any case in which an obligation to pay damages is ever cast by implication upon a person for not doing that which is rendered impossible by causes beyond his control.' 315. In HUDA and Anr. v. Dr. Babeswar Kanhar and Anr. (2005) 1 SCC 191, this Court considered the general principle that a party prevented from doing an act by some circumstances beyond his control, can do so at the first subsequent opportunity as held in Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami Reddi ILR (1899) 22 Mad 179. In Dr. Babeswar Kanhar (supra), it was observed thus: 5. What is stipulated in Clause 4 of the letter dated 30-10-2001 is a communication regarding refusal to accept the allotment. This was done on 28-11-2001. Respondent 1 cannot be put to a loss for the closure of the office of HUDA on 1-12-2001 and 2-12-2001 and the postal holiday on 30-11-2001. In fact, he had no control over these matters. Even the logic of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, can be pressed into service. Apart from the said Section and various provisions in various other Acts, there is the gene ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to do that which one cannot possibly perform. Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him. Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance of the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening impossibility caused by the act of God. (See Broom's Legal Maxims 10th Edn. At pp. 162-163 and Craies on Statute Law 6th Edn. at p. 268). 317. In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement (2005) 4 SCC 530, the legal maxim impotentia excusat legem has been applied to hold that law does not compel a man to do that which cannot possibly be performed. Though the maxim with respect to the impossibility of performance may not be strictly applicable, however, the effect of the court's order, for the time being, made the Authorities ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wrong. He may not plead in his own interest a self created necessity (Kish v. Taylor, (1911) 1 K.B. 625, per Fletcher Moulton I.J. at page 634). Thus an Act which authorised justices to discharge apprentice from his indenture in certain circumstances on the master's appearance before them justified a discharge in his wilful absence. It would have been unreasonable to have construed the Act in such a way that the master derived an advantage from his own obstinacy (Ditton's Case (1701) 2 Salk. 490) 321. In G.T.C. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1998) 3 SCC 376, it was observed that while vacating stay, it is the court's duty to account for the period of delay and to settle equities. It is not the gain which can be conferred. In Jaipur Municipal Corporation v. C.L. Mishra (2005) 8 SCC 423, it has been observed that interim order merges in the final order, and it cannot have an independent existence, cannot survive beyond final decision. In Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P. (1992) 2 SCC 620, reliance was placed on Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. C.I.T. (1980) 2 SCC 191. It was held that no one could be permitted to suffer from the act of the court and in case an int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ge thereof, and ultimately the petition is found to be without any merit and is dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralized. 323. In Karnataka Rare Earth and Anr. v. Senior Geologist, Department of Mines Geology (2004) 2 SCC 783, this Court observed that maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit requires that the party should be placed in the same position but for the court's order which is ultimately found to be not sustainable which has resulted in one party gaining advantage which otherwise would not have earned and the other party has suffered but for the orders of the court. The successful party can demand the delivery of benefit earned by the other party, or make restitution for what it has lost. This Court observed: 10. In x x x x the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit and held that the doctrine was not confined in its application only to such acts of the court which were erroneous; the doctrine is applicable to all such acts as to which it can be held that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In A.R. Antulay (supra), this Court observed that it is a settled principle that an act of the court shall prejudice no man. This maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon justice and good sense and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. No man can be denied his rights. In India, a delay occurs due to procedural wrangles. In A.R. Antulay (supra), this Court observed: 102. This being the apex court, no litigant has any opportunity of approaching any higher forum to question its decisions. Lord Buckmaster in Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normadin, 1917 AC 170 (sic) stated: All Rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice. It is, therefore, essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose. This Court in State of Gujarat v. Ramprakash P. Puri, (1970) 2 SCR 875, reiterated the position by saying: [SCC p. 159: SCC (Cri.) p. 31, para 8] Procedure has been described to be a handmaid and not a mistress of law, intended to subserve and facilitate the cause of justice and not to govern or obstruct it. Like all Rules of procedure, this Rule demands a construct ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e. Party has to be vigilant about the right, but the ratio cannot be applied. In the opinion, the ratio in the decision cannot be applied for the purpose of interpretation of Section 24(2). 327. There can be no doubt that when parties are before court, the final decision has to prevail, and they succeed or fail based on the merits of their relative cases. Neither can be permitted to take shelter under the cover of court's order to put the other party in a disadvantageous position. If one has enjoyed under the court's cover, that period cannot be included towards inaction of the authorities to take requisite steps Under Section 24. The State authorities would have acted but for the court's order. In fact, the occasion for the Petitioners to approach the court in those cases, was that the State or acquiring bodies were taking their properties. Ultimately case had to stand on its merit in the challenge to the acquisition or compensation, and no right or advantage could therefore be conferred (or accrue) Under Section 24(2) in such situations. 328. The argument of the landowners was that on the one hand, the court should not discern a casus omissus and in effect, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o that effect. It was held that the Rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterious would not be applicable in the context of the legislative provision in the Tariff Acts of 1909, 1913 and 1922, as the relevant provision therein (in the 1930 Act) was merely declaratory in nature and not in derogation of existing law. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. National Tobacco Company of India Ltd. (1972) 2 SCC 560, this Court held that the Rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterious: is subservient to the basic principle that courts must endeavour to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose, and then adopt a Rule of construction which effectuates rather than one that may defeat these. 330. In Karnataka State v. Union of India (1977) 4 SCC 608, the Court observed that: Before the principle can be applied at all the Court must find an express mode of doing something that is provided in a statute, which, by its necessary implication, could exclude the doing of that very thing and not something else in some other way. Far from this being the case here, as the discussion above has shown, the Constitution makers intended to cover the making of provisions by Parliament for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssio unius est exclusio alterius , ... has been considered in the decision rendered by the Queen's Bench in the case of Dean v. Wiesengrund (1955) 2 QBD 120. The Court considered the said maxim and held that after all it is more than an aid to construction and has little, if any, weight where it is possible to account for the exclusio unius on grounds other than intention to effect the exclusio alterius . Thereafter, the Court referred to the following passage from the case of Colquhoon v. Brooks (1887) 19 QBD 400 wherein the Court called for its approval- The maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' has been pressed upon us. I agree with what is said in the Court below by Wills J, about this maxim. It is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes of documents. The exclusio is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application having regard to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice. In my opinion, the application of the maxim here would lead to inconsistency and injustice, and would make Section 14(1) of the Act of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld have inherent powers apart from the express provisions of law which are necessary for the proper discharge of duties. 331. For all these reasons, it is held that the omission to expressly enact a provision, that excludes the period during which any interim order was operative, preventing the State from taking possession of acquired land, or from giving effect to the award, in a particular case or cases, cannot result in the inclusion of such period or periods for the purpose of reckoning the period of 5 years. Also, merely because timelines are indicated, with the consequence of lapsing, Under Sections 19 and 69 of the Act of 2013, per se does not mean that omission to factor such time (of subsistence of interim orders) has any special legislative intent. This Court notices, in this context, that even under the new Act (nor was it so under the 1894 Act) no provision has been enacted, for lapse of the entire acquisition, for non-payment of compensation within a specified time; nor has any such provision been made regarding possession. Furthermore, non-compliance with payment and deposit provisions (Under Section 77) only results in higher interest pay-outs Under Section 80. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ern Coal Field (supra) thus: 26. In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this submission. The word restitution in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution of decree or order of the court or in direct consequence of a decree or order (see Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P., 1984 Supp SCC 505) In law, the term restitution is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; and (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another. (See Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edn., p. 1315). The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari Joseph M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that restitution is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging of something which has been taken and at times referring to compensation for the injury done: Often, the result under either meaning of the term would be the same. ... Unjust impoverishment, as well as unjust enrichment, is a ground for restitution. If the Defenda ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d that the principle of restitution is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust benefit. The Court observed: 61. The concept of restitution is virtually a common law principle, and it is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust benefit. The core of the concept lies in the conscience of the court, which prevents a party from retaining money or some benefit derived from another, which it has received by way of an erroneous decree of the court. Such remedy in English Law is generally different from a remedy in contract or in tort and falls within the third category of common law remedy, which is called quasi-contract or restitution. 62. If we analyze the concept of restitution, one thing emerges clearly that the obligation to restitute lies on the person or the authority that has received unjust enrichment or unjust benefit (see Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 9, p. 434). 334. In A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam (2012) 6 SCC 430, it was stated that restitutionary jurisdiction is inherent in every court, to neutralize the advantage of litigation. A person on the right side of the law should not be d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... will be exercised under inherent powers, where the case did not strictly fall within the ambit of Section 144. Section 144 opens with the words: 144. Application for restitution.--(1) Where and insofar as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose .... The instant case may not strictly fall within the terms of Section 144, but the aggrieved party in such a case can appeal to the larger and general powers of restitution inherent in every court. 173. This Court in Marshall Sons Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. observed as under: (SCC pp. 326-27, para 4) 4. From the narration of the facts, though it appears to us, prima facie, that a decree in favor of the Appellant is not being executed for some reason or the other, we do not think it proper at this stage to direct the Respondent to deliver the possession to the Appellant since the suit filed by the Respondent is still pending. It is true that proceedings are dragged on for a long time on one count or the other and, on occasion, become highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity at every stage, pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rve that one of the [main] reasons for overflowing of court dockets is the frivolous litigation in which the courts are engaged by the litigants and which is dragged on for as long as possible. Even if these litigants ultimately lose the lis, they become the real victors and have the last laugh. This class of people who perpetuate illegal acts by obtaining stays and injunctions from the courts must be made to pay the sufferer not only the entire illegal gains made by them as costs to the person deprived of his right but also must be burdened with exemplary costs. The faith of people in judiciary can only be sustained if the persons on the right side of the law do not feel that even if they keep fighting for justice in the court and ultimately win, they would turn out to be a fool since winning a case after 20 or 30 years would make the wrongdoer as real gainer, who had reaped the benefits for all those years. Thus, it becomes the duty of the courts to see that such wrongdoers are discouraged at every step, and even if they succeed in prolonging the litigation due to their money power, ultimately, they must suffer the costs of all these years' long litigation. Despite the settle ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aining the stay. After the dismissal of the lis, the party concerned is relegated to the position which existed prior to the filing of the petition in the court which had granted the stay. Grant of stay does not automatically amount to extension of a statutory protection. There are other decisions as well, which iterate and apply the same principle. 27 335. A wrong-doer or in the present context, a litigant who takes his chances, cannot be permitted to gain by delaying tactics. It is the duty of the judicial system to discourage undue enrichment or drawing of undue advantage, by using the court as a tool. In Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437, it was observed that courts should be careful in neutralizing the effect of consequential orders passed pursuant to interim orders. Such directions are necessary to check the rising trend among the litigants to secure reliefs as an interim measure and avoid adjudication of the case on merits. Thus, the restitutionary principle recognizes and gives shape to the idea that advantages secured by a litigant, on account of orders of court, at his behest, should not be perpetuated; this would encourage t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t to be invoked on the basis of void transactions, and by the persons who have purchased on the basis of power of attorney or otherwise, they cannot claim the benefit Under Section 24 as is apparent from proviso to Section 24(2) and the decision in Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 2019 (13) SCALE 698. 338. This Court is cognizant that Section 24 is used for submitting various claims, by way of filing applications in the pending proceedings either before the High Court or this Court. There are cases in which in the first round of litigation where the challenge to acquisition proceedings has failed, validity has been upheld, and possession has been taken after passing of the award. It is contended that drawing of panchnama was not the permissible mode to take possession, and actual physical possession remains with such landowners/purchasers/power of attorney holders as such benefit of Section 24 should be given to them notwithstanding the fact that they have withdrawn the compensation also. 339. This Court is cognizant of cases where reference was sought for enhancement of compensation, money was deposited in the treasury, enhancement was made, and possession was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on has lapsed, and the land is given back to them. In case any infrastructure is existing, the State Government should acquire the land afresh after following the process of Act of 2013. Earlier, injustice was done to landowners, as observed in various decisions mentioned above. We should not disturb the decisions of this Court and are bound to follow the law laid down in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and the principle of stare decisis. 340. By and large, concluded cases are being questioned by way of invoking the provisions contained in Section 24. In our considered opinion, the legality of concluded cases cannot be questioned under the guise of Section 24(2) as it does not envisage or confer any such right to question the proceedings and the acquisitions have been concluded long back, or in several rounds of litigation as mentioned above, rights of the parties have been settled. 341. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, was repealed in the year 1999; thereafter, claims were raised. After repeal, it was claimed that actual physical possession has not been taken by the State Government as such repeal has the effect of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... authorities could the very next day dispossess him from the same by simply serving a notice Under Section 10(5). It would, in that view, be an academic exercise for any owner or person in possession to find fault with his dispossession on the ground that no notice Under Section 10(5) had been served upon him. 16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile landowner on 7-12-1991 as is alleged in the present case, any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcibly taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation, the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right Under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a license to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure. It is clear from the aforesaid decision that such claims cannot be entertained, and any such dispute raised belatedly was repelled by this Court. 342. Section 24(2) is sought to be used as an umbrella so as to question the concluded proceedings in which possession has been taken, development has been made, and compensation has been deposited, but may be due to refusal, it has not been collected. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings cannot be made within the parameters of Section 24(2) once panchnama had been drawn of taking possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possession is that of the trespasser. The legality of the proceedings cannot be challenged belatedly, and the right to challenge cannot be revived by virtue of the provisions of Section 24(2). Section 24(2) only contemplates lethargy/inaction of the authorities to act for five years or more. It is very easy to lay a claim that physical possession was not taken, with respect to open land. Yet, once vesting takes place, possession is presumed to be that of the owner, i.e., the State Government and land has been transferre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... etime in the year 1978, and the writ Petitioners chose to approach the Court only in the years 1982-83. Had they raised this objection at the proper time and if it were found to be true and acceptable, the opportunity could have been given to the Government to comply with the said requirement. Having kept quiet for a number of years, the Petitioners cannot raise this contention in writ petitions filed at a stage when the awards were about to be passed. 346. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 11 SCC 501, this Court observed, with respect to delay and laches that: 29. It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers Under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification Under Section 4(1) and declaration Under Section 6. But it should be exercised by taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed, and possession was taken, the Court should not have ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2. On 19-12-2005 the Appellants filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking quashing of the acquisition proceedings which was decided by the High Court on 3-12-2010 directing redetermination of compensation. The said order was set aside by this Court on 16-10-2012 in State of U.P. v. Jasveer Singh [Civil Appeal No. 7535 of 2012, order dated 16-10-2012 (SC)]. It was observed that: After considering the pros and cons, without entering into serious controversies and making any comment on the merit of the case, we are of the considered opinion that in view of the judgment and order of this Court dated 26-11-2010, which was passed in the presence of the counsel for both the parties, the High Court ought not to have heard the matter at all. Thus, the judgment and order impugned before us have lost its sanctity. Therefore, the same is hereby set aside. However, in order to meet the ends of justice, we remand the case to the High Court to hear the writ petition afresh expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of the certified copy of the order before the Hon'ble Chief Justice. The matter may be assigned to any particular Bench by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich appeals are being allowed by order of the date, we see no reason to entertain the writ petition. 47. Although various submissions on merits challenging the entire acquisition proceedings have been raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, we have taken the view that the writ petition is highly barred by laches, we do not find it necessary to enter into the submissions raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners on merits. 348. In Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (2008) 4 SCC 695, the writ petition was filed after taking possession and award has become final. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In Larsen Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (1998) 4 SCC 387, in the absence of a challenge to the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time, the challenge was repelled. Delay was also fatal in Haryana State Handloom and Handicrafts Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v. Jain School Society (2003) 12 SCC 538. The writ petition was filed after two years to question the declaration Under Section 6 and was dismissed on the ground of delay in Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur v. Bheru Lal and Ors. (200 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 351. In Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop. Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd. (2007) 9 SCC 109, this Court observed that if delay has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost or rendered unavailable, would be fatal. It was held that the time limit of 6 months prescribed Under Section 10(4A) of the I.D. Act, 1947 and should not be interpreted to revive stale and dead claims, it would not be possible to defend such claims due to lapse of time and due to material evidence having been lost or rendered unavailable. The lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would be fatal. It will be illogical to hold that the amendment to the Act inserting Section 10(4A) should be interpreted as reviving all stale and dead claims. This Court observed thus: 29. This Court while dealing with Sections 10(1)(c) and (d) of the I.D. Act, has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , no time for applying to the Court in terms of Sub-section (3) is fixed by the statute. But since the application is to the Court, though under a special enactment, Article 137, the residuary Article of the Limitation Act, 1963, would be attracted and the application has to be made within three years of the application for making a reference or the expiry of 90 days after the application. The position is settled by the decision of this Court in Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, (1997) 11 SCC 412. It was held: (SCC p. 414, para 3) 3. Admittedly, the cause of action for seeking a reference had arisen on the date of service of the award Under Section 12(2) of the Act. Within 90 days from the date of the service of the notice, the Respondents made the application requesting the Deputy Commissioner to refer the cases to the civil Court Under Section 18. Under the amended Sub-section (3)(a) of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, within 90 days from 1-9-1970, make a reference Under Section 18 to the civil Court, which he failed to do. Consequently, by operation of Sub-section 3(b) with the expiry of the aforestated 90 days, the cause of action had accrued to the R ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y when land has been acquired long back. It is the duty of the Court to preserve the legal certainty, as observed in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India and Ors. (2012) 6 SCC 613. The landowners had urged that since the Act of 2013 creates new situations, which are beneficial to their interests, the question of delay or laches does not arise. This Court is of the opinion that the said contention is without merits. As held earlier, the doctrine of laches would always preclude an indolent party, who chooses not to approach the court, or having approached the court, allows an adverse decision to become final, to re-agitate the issue of acquisition of his holding. Doing so, especially in cases, where the title has vested with the State, and thereafter with subsequent interests, would be contrary to public policy. In A.P. State Financial Corporation v. Garware Rolling Mill (1994) 2 SCC 647, this Court observed that equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade the law. There is no dearth of talent left in longing for the undue advantage of the wholesome provisions of Section 24(2) on the basis of wrong interpretatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ection 24. It does not intend to divest the State of possession (of the land), title to which has been vested in the State. It only intends to give higher compensation in case the obligation of depositing of compensation has not been fulfilled with regard to the majority of holdings. A fresh cause of action in Section 24 has been given if for five years or more possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In case possession has been taken and compensation has not been deposited with respect to the majority of landholdings, higher compensation to all incumbents follows, as mentioned above. Section 24 does not confer a new cause of action to challenge the acquisition proceedings or the methodology adopted for the deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of reference court, in that case, interest or higher compensation, as the case may be, can follow. In our considered opinion, Section 24 is applicable to pending proceedings, not to the concluded proceedings and the legality of the concluded proceedings, cannot be questioned. Such a challenge does not lie within the ambit of the deemed lapse Under Section 24. The lapse Under Section 24(2) is due to inaction or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ived. There is no revival of the barred claims by operation of law. Thus, stale and dead claims cannot be permitted to be canvassed on the pretext of enactment of Section 24. In exceptional cases, when in fact, the payment has not been made, but possession has been taken, the remedy lies elsewhere if the case is not covered by the proviso. It is the Court to consider it independently not Under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. 360. It was submitted that Section 101 provides for return of unutilized land under the Act of 2013. Section 101 provides that in case land is not utilized for five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government. Section 101 reads as under: 101. Return of unutilized land.--When any land, acquired under this Act remains unutilized for a period of five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013. 2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided Under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed. 3. The word 'or' used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as 'nor' or as 'and'. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings Under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse. 4. The expression 'paid' in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition. Let the matters be placed before appropriate Bench for consideration on merits. 1 [1994] 1 A.C. 486, where it was held that: The Rule that a person should not be held liable or punished for conduct not criminal when committed is fundamental and of long standing. It is reflected in the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. It is protected by Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd. 8969). The Rule also applies, but with less force, outside the criminal sphere. It is again expressed in maxims, lex prospicit non respicit and omnis nova constitutio futuris temporibus formam imponere debet non praeteritis. The French Civil Code provides that La loi ne dispose que pour l'avenir; elle n'a point d'effe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iation (supra) at para 14; State of Haryana v. Vinod Oil and General Mills 2014 (15) SCC 410 at para 21; Sita Ram v. State of Haryana (2015) 3 SCC 597 at paras 19, 21; Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 347 at paras 8, 9, 12; Velaxan Kumar v. Union of India 2015 (4) SCC 325 at paras 15, 16, 17 (hereafter Velaxan ); Karnail Kaur v. State of Punjab (2015) 3 SCC 206 at paras 17, 18, 23; Rajive Chowdhrie HUF v. State (NCT) of Delhi (2015) 3 SCC 541 at para 1; Competent Automobiles Co. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 2015 SC 3186 at para 4; Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Jagjit Singh AIR 2015 SC 2683 at para 3; Karan Singh v. State of Haryana 2014 (5) SCC 738 at para 5; Shashi Gupta and Ors. v. State of Haryana 2016 (13) SCC 380 at para 5; Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh (2016) 16 SCC 258 at para 1 (hereafter Sukhbir ). 9 Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill 2011-introduced in Lok Sabha on 05.07.2011; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2013 as passed by the Lok Sabha on 29.08.2013 and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303; Balwant Singh and Ors. v. Anand Kumar Sharma and Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 433; Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., AIR 2003 SC 511; Chandrika Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 2004 SC 2036; M/s. Rubber House v. Excellsior Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1160; B.S. Khurana and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 679; State of Haryana and Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133; and Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani @ Gullipili Pavani, (2009) 1 SCC 714 21 Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108 @ 19-21; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. State of Assam and Ors., (1989) 3 SCC 709 @ para 118-121; C.I.T. v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 @ para 14-21; D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India and Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 186 @ para 16-18; Balram Kamanat v. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 628 para 24; New India Assurance Co. v. Nulli Nivelle, (2008) 3 SCC 279 @ Para 51-54; Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4 SCC 720 Para 41 42.; Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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