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TMI Blog2020 (1) TMI 1446X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cord that the Respondent was unable to approach the courtoflaw in time on account of any social or financial disability. Had such been the case, he ought to have availed free legal aid and should have ventilated his grievances in a timely manner. Instead, he seems to be under the assumption that the termination order is illegal, that he consequently has a right to be reinstated, and that he can agitate the same at his own sweetwill. Neither of these three assumptions are true. The impugned order delivered by the learned Single Judge on 05.04.2007 as well as the order dated 29.04.2016 of the Division Bench upholding it, are set aside - Petition dismissed. - CIVIL APPEAL NO. 852 OF 2020 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 36253 of 2016] WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 204 OF 2020 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 2014 of 2017] - - - Dated:- 30-1-2020 - S. A. BOBDE, CJI., B.R. GAVAI AND SURYA KANT, JJ. JUDGMENT Leave granted. 2. Uttar Pradesh Power Corp. Ltd. (hereinafter, UPPCL ) has preferred this appeal, assailing an order dated 29.04.2016 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) which in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... editiously. (emphasis supplied) 6. After the initial round of litigation in which Shyam Behari Lal had obtained relief from the High Court in 1989, the present Respondent also filed WP No. 7897 of 1990 in July, 1990, impugning the order dated 07.11.1978 terminating his services. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad summarily allowed the Respondent s writ petition on 05.04.2007 on the premise that the matter was squarely covered by the decision of the High Court dated 26.10.1989 in Shyam Behari Lal s case. 7. The aggrieved UPPCL preferred Special Appeal No. 643 of 2007 which was dismissed by a Division Bench vide the impugned order dated 29.04.2016. Although the Court noted that the order of 1989 relied upon by the learned Single Judge had been setaside by this Court and during fresh consideration of the matter a coordinate Bench had held Shyam Behari Lal s case being devoid of any merit; yet it laid emphasis on the equitable considerations which were pressed into aid in Shyam Behari Lal s case for his resultant continuation in service. The Division Bench, thus, dismissed UPPCL s appeal and held as follows: The case of the respondent is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ners of its previous decision in Shyam Behari Lal s case. The reliedupon judgment dated 30.05.1997 determined unequivocally that there was no merit in the writ petition and that Shyam Behari Lal s claim was liable to be dismissed . It was only on account of pending litigation and interim directions of courts that Shyam Behari Lal had spent 17 years in employment of UPPCL. Paying heed to these equitable considerations, and not as a matter of any legal right, the High Court urged the employer to sympathetically consider his case for retention in employment. This conclusion of the High Court was not appealed by any party and has undoubtedly attained finality. Hence, it is clear in law that Shyam Behari Lal s termination was legal, and that he had no right of continuation in service, let alone reinstatement as sought in the present case. The only question which thus survives is whether the Respondent, Ram Gopal, could seek parity? 13. At the outset, it is apparent that Shyam Behari Lal and Ram Gopal share little similarity. Whereas the former had remained in service for over seventeen years (except a brief period between August to November in 1978) and had fought his case tooth and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... low things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters ... 16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fencesitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu v. State of Kerala (2009) 2 SCC 479, this Court observed thus: 17. It is also well-settled principle of law that delay defeats equity . It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L S) 226] ). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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