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TMI Blog2021 (4) TMI 1248X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h 26 referred to the bail orders dated 16-2-2016 and 1-6-2016 for the purpose of establishing that the detenue had not stopped prejudicial activities even after the first incident at Bangalore and had continued with such activities. It is also noted that the bail conditions are likely to be relaxed and that they were not sufficient to prevent the detenu from committing prejudicial activities. Apart from contending that certain pages of the 'bail order' are not available in the documents served together with the grounds of detention, there is no pleading or contention regarding the issue. Even assuming that the case put forth by the detenue is correct, we are unable to find that the non-supply of the 4 pages of the bail order has in any manner affected the right of the detenue to make an effective representation. The detenue also did not make a request for the supply of any document. He also did not raise this issue before the advisory board. For these reasons we reject the contention of the detenue that he was not served with clear copies of all the relied upon documents amongst the documents supplied to him - the communication of grounds, in the facts of the present case, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nstitution. Substantial delay in the execution of the detention order - HELD THAT:- There is absolutely no delay in the disposal of the various representations detailed. Petition disposed off. - WP (Crl.) No. 255 of 2020, WP (Crl.) No. 279 of 2020 and WP (Crl.) No. 280 of 2020 - - - Dated:- 8-4-2021 - A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar And Gopinath P., JJ. For the Appellant : P.A. Augustian, Swathy E.S., M. Ajay and V.P. Prasad, Advs. For the Respondents : Jaishankar V. Nair, CGC, S. Manu, CGC, Addl. Director General of Prosecution and Suvin R. Menon, CGC. JUDGMENT A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Gopinath P., JJ. I do not doubt the right of Parliament and of the executive to place restrictions upon a man's freedom. I fully agree that the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution are not absolute. They are limited. In some cases the limitations are imposed by the Constitution itself. In others, Parliament has been given the power to impose further restrictions and in doing so to confer authority on the executive to carry its purpose into effect. But in every case it is the rights which are fundamental, not the limitations; and it is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder our Constitution: 3. Our Constitution recognises the concept of Liberty-of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. This is borne out in its Preamble. In order to understand the true sense in which the concept of liberty was perceived by the framers of our Constitution, we have to first understand the nature of the Constitution itself. As observed by Granville Austin [Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution; Cornerstone of a Nation] , The Indian Constitution is first and foremost a social document for majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at furthering the goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution by establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement. The core of the commitment to social revolution lies in Parts III and IV, in the fundamental rights and in the Directive Principles of State Policy. Together, they constitute the Conscience of the Constitution. The provisions of Part III and IV have their roots deep in the struggle for independence and they were included in the Constitution in the hope that one day the tree of true liberty would bloom in India. 4. Under our Constitution, therefore, personal l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... principle of protection against arbitrary arrest and detention guaranteed in most democratic republics governed by the rule of law, and recognised by the United Nations under Art. 9 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights to which India is a signatory, the Indian Government entered a reservation to Art. 9 of the ICCPR by making it clear that it takes the position that the provisions of the Article shall be so applied as to be in consonance with the provisions of clauses (3) to (7) of Art. 22 of the Constitution of India [Derek P Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalised Emergency: Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India (2001) 22 Michigan Journal of International Law 311, 27] . 6. Our constitution, while conceding the power of preventive detention, has nevertheless, through clauses (4) to (7) of Art. 22, provided procedural safeguards with a view to protecting the citizen against arbitrary and unjustified invasion of personal liberty, and our courts have zealously tried to uphold and enforce these safeguards [Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v UOI Ors - 1980 (4) SCC 531; UOI v Yumnam Anand M - 2007 (10) SCC 190; Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f an opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person and 'thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public good and social security' [State of Bombay v Atma Ram Vaidya AIR 1951 SC 157; Khudiram Das v State of West Bengal AIR 1975 SC 550] . 9. For an effective communication of the grounds of detention to the detenu, they must be furnished in their entirety. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds, and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. It has to be borne in mind that the primary object of communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu is to enable the detenu, at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation against his detention, and he cannot make an effective representation unless he is also furnished copies of the documents, statements and other mate ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g authority: 11. The detaining authority cannot merely state that he is satisfied that the person is required to be detained; he must go further and state the reasons why he came to be so satisfied on the basis of the material available and scrutinized by him. The supply of reasons is what clothes his 'subjective satisfaction' with the legitimacy that is required of action designed to deprive a person of his/her fundamental right to personal liberty. In its absence, the detenu does not get an effective right of representation against the detention, or an opportunity to show that there were no valid reasons to support the same. It is by now well settled that the subjective satisfaction that informs the decision of the detaining authority is amenable to judicial review in an application for habeas corpus. While the statute may express the confidence of the legislature in an authority entrusted with the power to detain a citizen, the principles integral to the rule of law that inform the exercise of judicial review recognise that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be absolute. Accordingly, if it were found that the order of the detaining authori ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lay leads the court to infer that there was no subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority as regards the need to detain the detenu. However, merely because the execution of the order of detention is delayed, the proposed detenu cannot take advantage of the passage of time and claim that the 'live and proximate link' has snapped, especially when it is found that the delay was on account of his recalcitrant conduct in evading arrest [9Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik v State of Maharashtra Ors 2012 (8) SCC 233; Subhash Popatlal Dave v UOI Ors - 2014 (1) SCC 280] . Manner of consideration of representation: 13. The constitutional right to make a representation under Art. 22(5), by necessary implication, guarantees the constitutional right to a proper consideration of the representation. As regards the manner in which such representations are to be considered by the various authorities it has been clarified that the detaining authority, the appropriate government as well as the advisory board have to independently consider the representation of the detenu. The obligation of the government to consider the representation is different from the obliga ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the representation would vitiate the detention order itself and entitle the detenu to an immediate release from custody. (vii) Whether the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, as regards the need for detention, was based on relevant material and contained reasons that would demonstrate an application of mind by the said authority? 15. W.P.(Crl.) No. 255 of 2020 arises out of an order of detention issued on 31-03-2017 having regard to certain incidents relating to smuggling of cigarettes while W.P.(Crl.) Nos. 279 280 of 2020 are connected, and relate to orders of detention issued against two individuals who are brothers, on 18-07-2019 in relation to certain incidents of smuggling of gold. Since several of the legal issues raised are common to all three cases, we deem it appropriate to dispose these cases by this common judgment. 16. We have heard the submissions of Sri. P.A. Augustian the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(Crl.) No. 255 of 2020, Sri. M. Ajay, the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(Crl.) Nos. 279 280 of 2020, Sri. Jaishankar V. Nair, Sri. Suvesh. R. Menon, Sri Daya Sindhu Sreehari, learned Central Government Counsel for the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... respondent sponsoring authority, for detention of the detenue under the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act. The detaining authority received this proposal on 07-02-2017. The proposal was placed before the screening committee on 22-02-2017 and, on 31-03-2017, Ext. P1 order of detention was issued. It is not disputed that on the date of issuance of Ext. P1 order i.e., 31-03-2017, the detenue was not in India and he remained abroad till he arrived in India on 12/13-07-2020 on which date he was detained and served with the order of detention. The grounds of detention were served on the detenue on 22-07-2020. Although the detenue preferred a representation to the Advisory Board on 07-09-2020, the same was rejected by the Advisory Board on 01-11-2020. Thereafter, through Ext. P11 order dated 01-10-2020 the detaining authority confirmed Ext. P1 order under Section 8(f) of the COFEPOSA Act, and ordered the detention of the detenue for a period of one year with effect from 22-07-2020. This order of detention is challenged on various grounds and is alleged to be in violation of the procedural safeguards incorporated into Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and the provisions of the COFEPO ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eal and genuine apprehension that the petitioner was likely to act in any manner prejudicial to public interest. 21. The learned counsel also refers to the guidelines issued by the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau dated 02-07-2001, regarding the procedural safeguards required to be followed in dealing with matters arising under the COFEPOSA Act, to show that if at all there was an apprehension of the nature contemplated under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, it was the duty of the sponsoring/detaining authority to issue an order of detention, as quickly as possible after the incident which led to the formation of a belief that an order of preventive detention had to be issued in the case on hand. He submits that the guidelines also require the expeditious execution of a detention order and that if the person against whom the order of detention had been issued, was absconding, steps are required to be taken immediately under Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act. He would point out that, in the facts of the present case, a publication as contemplated under Section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act was issued only on 11-07-2017. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the learned Single Judge o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was enacted, there is a real likelihood of some delay being occasioned between the prejudicial activity contemplated in under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act and the making of an order of detention. He placed specific reliance on paragraphs 9 and 10 of the aforesaid judgment to contend that, often a time-consuming investigation would be required before a proposal for an order of detention is initiated. He submits, with reference to the findings in paragraph 10 of the aforesaid judgment, that the courts must make a distinction between delay in making an order of detention and the delay in complying with the procedural safeguards under Articles 22(5) of the Constitution of India. He submits that, on the facts of the instant case, if at all there has been any delay in issuing an order of detention, the same was only on account of the detailed investigation that was required to be carried out before an order of detention was issued. He also placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Malwa Shah v. State of West Bengal (1974) 4 SCC 127 to buttress his contention that delay in issuing the order of detention is not fatal to the order itself. The learned counsel also places ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is concerned, the detenue was neither apprehended nor was there any material, other than the uncorroborated statements of those apprehended, to establish his direct involvement in the transaction. However, the statements recorded from those directly involved with that transaction, and the investigations carried out by the DRI revealed that the detenue was part of an organized smuggling racket involved in the smuggling of cigarettes into India. As already noticed, the modus operandi and the smuggled goods were almost identical to that in the earlier incident at Bangalore where the direct involvement of the detenue was established. We are also persuaded to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the DRI that, in some instances, a detailed investigation may be required before even a proposal is put up for the preventive detention of a person involved in smuggling activity. We therefore hold that there is no culpable delay between the alleged prejudicial activities and the date of issuance of the order of detention as would vitiate the order of detention. The question then arises as to whether there was a substantial delay between the date of the order of detention and the da ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aid delay does not vitiate the order of detention. 28. The further contention that, on account of the delay of nearly 4 years in initiation of prosecution against the detenue, the detention order must fail, also does not pass muster. Indeed, the law laid down in Bhut Nath Mete v. State of W.B. (1974) 1 SCC 645, on which considerable reliance was placed to bolster this contention, does not hold so. That was a case where an order of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 was challenged and the very instances that led to the order of detention were the subject matter of regular criminal prosecution that had resulted in orders of acquittal. It was in these circumstances that it was held: After all, however well-meaning the Government may be, detention power cannot be quietly used to subvert, supplant or to substitute the punitive law of the Penal Code. The immune expedient of throwing into a prison cell one whom the ordinary law would take care of, merely because it is irksome to undertake the inconvenience of proving guilt in Court is unfair abuse. To detain a person after a court has held the charge false is to expose oneself to the criticism of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at this stage that while serving the grounds of detention on the detenu it was clearly indicated that if the detenu wishes to make any representation against the order of detention he may do so to the Lt. Governor of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and to the Central Government and for that purpose he may address it to the Lt. Governor or to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue. It was further stated that if he desires to make any representation to the Advisory Board then he may address to the Chairman, Advisory Board, COFEPOSA State, High Court of Delhi, Sher Shah Road, New Delhi. In the decision of this Court in Gracy [ (1991) 2 SCC 1: 1991 SCC (Cri.) 467] relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, what has been stated by the Court is that if there is one representation by the detenu addressed to the detaining authority then the obligation arises under Article 22(5) of its consideration by the detaining authority independent of the opinion of the Advisory Board in addition to its consideration by the Advisory Board and, therefore, when the representation of the detenu was addressed to the detaining authority and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... resentation having been made by the detenu, the appropriate Government was justified in confirming the order of detention on perusal of record and documents excluding the representation made by the detenu to the Advisory Board. For this alleged failure of the appropriate Government, the order of detention of the appropriate Government is neither rendered unconstitutional nor illegal. Again, in Union of India v. Sneha Khemka, (2004) 2 SCC 570 it was held:- 22. In Gracy [(1991) 2 SCC 1: 1991 SCC (Cri.) 467], the detenu's case was referred to the Central Advisory Board by the Central Government and during the pendency of the reference before it, a representation was made to the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board considered the reference relating to the detenu made by the Central Government and also the detenu's representation submitted to it and opined that there was sufficient cause to justify his preventive detention. The order of the Central Government confirming his detention was passed thereafter. This Court, in the fact situation obtaining therein, held that the detenu has a dual right to get his representation disposed of by the Advisory Board and the de ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upon which the respondents have had a chance to rebut, since this is a matter involving the personal liberty of an individual we have nevertheless attempted to address this issue by referring to the grounds of detention (Ext. P.4). There is a reference to the order on the bail petition in paragraph 26 of Exhibit P4. Thereafter, the detaining authority has, in paragraph 26 referred to the bail orders dated 16-2-2016 and 1-6-2016 for the purpose of establishing that the detenue had not stopped prejudicial activities even after the first incident at Bangalore and had continued with such activities. It is also noted that the bail conditions are likely to be relaxed and that they were not sufficient to prevent the detenu from committing prejudicial activities. Apart from contending that certain pages of the 'bail order' are not available in the documents served together with the grounds of detention, there is no pleading or contention regarding the issue. Even assuming that the case put forth by the detenue is correct, we are unable to find that the non-supply of the 4 pages of the bail order has in any manner affected the right of the detenue to make an effective representation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... detained on 12-07-2020 and Ext. P1 order of detention was served on him on 13-07-2020. In Ext. P11 order, the detention is seen confirmed for a period of one year from 22-07-2020. It is stated that this was on account of the fact that on account of the COVID-19 pandemic the detenue was undergoing quarantine for the period from 12/13-07-2020 to 22-07-2020 and therefore that the period of detention should be counted from 22-07-2020. We are of the opinion that the detenue having been detained in terms of Ext. P1 order of detention, on 12-07-2020, the period of one year has to be counted with effect from 12-07-2020 and not from 22-07-2020 as stated in Ext. P11 order. W.P.(Crl.) Nos. 279 280 of 2020: 34. The facts relevant for a disposal of both the above writ petitions are that, on 25-12-2018, one Muhammed Shan arrived at Kannur International airport from Abu Dhabi. It was found that he had smuggled gold by concealing the same inside some electrical appliances. It is stated that, together with another person named Bhakthavalsalan, one Abdussameem was waiting outside to receive the aforesaid Muhammed Shan and that Abdussameem had, on coming to know that the aforesaid Muhamme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upon documents/material was disposed on 13-7-2020 by Ext. P11 communication in W.P.(Crl.) No. 280/2020 stating that, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ankit Ashok Jalan v. Union of India and others AIR 2020 SC 1936, the request would be considered after the matter was disposed by the Advisory Board. Following the procedure before the Advisory Board, which rejected the representation of Abdussameem, the request for documents was rejected by Ext. P13 in W.P.(Crl.) No. 280/2020. Abdussameem, thereafter, preferred Ext. P14 representation dated 11-8-2020 before the Central Government seeking revocation of his detention order. A similar representation was made before the detaining authority as well. Ext. P14 representation was rejected by an order dated 31-8-2020 and Ext. P15 representation was rejected by an order dated 26-8-2020. In the meanwhile, following the report of the Advisory Board, the order of detention was confirmed for a period of one year in the case of Abdussameem by Ext. P16 order dated 20-8-2020. 36. Insofar as the case of Faisal is concerned, he had also requested for further materials and documents in order to make effective representations, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he detenue Faisal is concerned, the representation submitted before the advisory board should have been considered independently by the detaining authority as well. Lastly, it is contended that the failure of the Central Government to consider the requests made for information, independently of the detaining authority, vitiates the order of detention. We now proceed to examine each of these contentions. 38. In support of his contention that the non-supply of documents has vitiated the order of detention, the learned counsel has referred to the following judgments viz. (i) State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya AIR 1951 SC 157 , where the Supreme Court held that, apart from the right to receive the grounds of detention, the detenu detained under Preventive Detention Law has the right to ask for materials to enable him to make an effective representation. It was held that even if one of the two rights, i.e. first the right to be served with the grounds of detention and then the right to receive copies of documents requested for, was violated, the detention order would be vitiated; (ii) Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra and others AIR 1962 SC 911, where the Supreme Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ient to enable him to make a representation; (x ) Beevi Kunju K.A. and another v. Union of India and others 2020 KHC 167, where it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that non-supply of certain video footage, which was relied upon by the detaining authority, vitiates the order of detention (This decision is relied on to buttress the contention that non-supply of copy of the electronic media, which contains the visual and other details contained in the report of the C-DAC, vitiates the order of detention); (xi) Sophia Gulam Mohd. Bham v. State of Maharashtra and others (1999) 6 SCC 593, where again it was held that non-supply of material documents vitiates the order of detention in as much as non-supply affects the right to make a proper and effective representation; (xii) Thakor Mulchandani v. Assistant Secretary to Govt. of Maharashtra (1982) 3 SCC 321, where it was held that even if the materials not supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention were those referred to in the statements given by the detenu himself, the detenue had a right obtain such materials; (xiii) Powanammal v. State of TamilNadu and Another (1999) 2 SCC 413, where it was hel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der clearly shows that the detaining authority had not relied on any material other than those already supplied to the detenues. He would refer to J. Abdul Hakeem v. State of TamilNadu (2005) 7 SCC 70, Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran (supra) Batcha (supra) to buttress his contention. 40. Our reading of the voluminous precedents leads us to conclude that the law regarding supply of documents requires no re-iteration at our hands. Our summation of the law at the inception of this judgment shows that it is well settled that the detenue has the right to receive all the relied upon documents and also such other documents that may be necessary to enable him to make a proper and effective representation against the order of detention. That said, the question as to whether there was, in fact, a failure to supply any relied upon document is a matter to be determined on a case-to-case basis. Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya (supra) holds that once the documents are referred to in the grounds of detention it becomes the bounden duty of the detaining authority to supply the same to the detenu as part of the grounds and that there is no particular charm in the expressions relied on , refe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... named USBSTORE01 which contains the report of the CDAC. A reading of the same paragraph also shows that the report was put to Abdusameem and that he had answered with reference to the contents of that report. A reading of paragraph xxx in the grounds of detention, in both the cases, suggests that the detaining authority had placed considerable reliance on the contents of the report and had noticed and accepted the conclusions drawn by the sponsoring authority regarding the activities of the detenues. We cannot but hold that, the non-supply of a copy of the report in electronic form, that would have enabled the detenues to view it before making a representation, clearly vitiates the order of detention in both these cases. In holding so, we are fortified by the decision in Beevi Kunju (supra). b) The other materials sought for, especially the details regarding any order issued against Riyas Mujib who are alleged to be part of the same syndicate, retraction statements (if any) in respect of statements given under Section 108 of the Customs Act, and the non-supply of documents clearly shown to be illegible, has also, in our opinion, affected the right of the detenue to make an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... UOI) and Others (2006) 7 SCC 337, Syed Farooq Mohammad v. Union of India (UOI) and Others (1990) 3 SCC 537, Meena Jayendra Thakur v. Union of India (UOI) and Others (1999) 8 SCC 177 and Mukesh Tikaji Bora v. Union of India (UOI) and Others (2007) 9 SCC 28) the learned counsel contends that the alleged delay in the execution of the order of detention against the aforesaid Faisal and Abdussameem was not fatal to the detention order in the facts and circumstances of the case. He submits that both the DRI and the State Police had taken steps under Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act to secure the arrest and detention of the aforesaid persons. In response to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there were clear lapses in the execution of the orders of detention since both the detenues were available at their house, he submits that Kartarey and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1976) 1 SCC 172 and K.T.M.S. Abdul Cader and others v. The Union of India (AIR) 1977 Mad 386 are authorities for the proposition that to be an absconder, it is not necessary that a person should have run away from his home, and that it is sufficient if he hides himself to evade the pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... question. Here, on the facts of these cases, although the allegations that led to the order of detention are in relation to syndicated and organised smuggling of gold, we find the delay in execution of the detention order unjustified, more so when the detaining authority itself did not mention the fact of the detention order in its counter affidavit filed before the Magistrate while opposing the application for relaxation of bail conditions filed by the detenu concerned. It is also significant that while the detaining authority refers to the steps allegedly taken by the police authorities in the State to arrest the detenus, there is no explanation offered for the admitted service of summons on the detenus at their residential address. We are at a loss to understand why the detention orders could not have been executed, by apprehending the detenus much earlier, if indeed the object of the whole exercise was to prevent them from engaging in prejudicial acts in future. The cavalier attitude of the detaining authority in the instant cases cannot be countenanced and, at any rate, cannot justify the continued detention of the detenus concerned. 45. The learned counsel next contends t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on not to communicate the representation to the specially empowered officer by email. 46. The learned Central Government Counsel contends that there is absolutely no delay in the consideration of any representation, in these cases. In so far as Faisal, the detenu in W.P.(Crl.) 279/2020, is concerned, the representation dated 22-7-2020 submitted by him was received by the detaining authority on 30-7-2020. The comments of the sponsoring authority were sought by the detaining authority on the same day. The sponsoring authority had responded to the detaining authority on 5-8-2020 and the detaining authority had disposed the representation on 6-8-2020. The representation dated 18-8-2020 seeking parole addressed to the detaining authority was received on 19-8-2020. Comments were sought from the Jail Superintendent on 20-8-2020. The comments were received on 23-8-2020. The detaining authority rejected the request on 25-8-2020 and this was intimated to the respective parties on 26-8-2020. In so far as Abdusameem, the detenu in W.P.(Cri.) 280/2020, is concerned, the request for copies of documents dated 1.7.2020 was sent to the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) and to the sponsoring authority b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ention can only be rejected in the light of our findings on the same issue in W.P.(Cri.) No. 255 of 2020. 49. The contention that the failure of the Central Government to consider the requests made for information, immediately after the grounds of detention were served on the detenus, and independently of the detaining authority vitiates the order of detention is only to be rejected. Abdulla Kunhi (supra) on which considerable reliance has been placed to buttress this contention certainly does not hold so. It is true that in Abdulla Kunhi (supra) and in Raziya v. State of Kerala (2004) 2 SCC 621 which is the other decision relied upon to further this contention, it has been held that the right to make a representation to the advisory board and to the central government are distinct and independent rights and the opinion of the advisory board need not detain the government from exercising its power to revoke an order of detention. While this proposition cannot be doubted, it does not appear to us that the decision lays down a proposition that whenever request for information is made by the detenue to the detaining authority, the central government must independently c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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