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TMI Blog2021 (9) TMI 378X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct and the Sessions Court shall decide the appeal of the accused unmindful of any of these observations. Such appeal shall be taken up for hearing only after the amount is deposited by the accused as provided in this order. Petition disposed off. - Crl.Petn. No.19/2021 - - - Dated:- 2-9-2021 - HON BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. AKIL KURESHI For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rajib Saha, Advocate, Ms. Rajashree Purkayastha, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. S. Debnath, Addl. P.P. JUDGMENT ORDER (ORAL) Petitioner original complainant of a cheque bouncing case has challenged an order dated 23.02.2021 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar on an application filed by the petitioner in an appeal filed by the respondent No.1 the original accused. 2. Brief facts are as under: The case of the petitioner is that the respondent No.1 had borrowed certain sums of money from the petitioner from time to time and in discharge of the debt, the respondent No.1 had issued a cheque dated 30.07.2015 for a sum of ₹ 7,57,640/-. This cheque being presented for realization was returned on the ground that the balance in the account was insufficient. The petitio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bmitted that merely because the appeal was ripe for hearing, would not be a ground for refusing to exercise power under Section 148 of the Act. He lastly pointed out that the order for suspension of sentence was passed without a notice to the petitioner. He drew my attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S. Deswal others vrs. Virender Gandhi another dated 08-01-2020 in which in context of Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act it was observed that the said provision should receive purposive interpretation. 5. I have heard learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. S. Debnath who has drawn my attention to the relevant statutory provisions. Learned advocate Mr. K.K. Roy who has entered appearance on behalf of respondent No.1 has remained consistently absent on several occasions in the past and also today. I, therefore, did not have the benefit of his arguments. 6. In my view, the learned Sessions Judge committed a serious error in rejecting the application of the petitioner by the impugned order. Firstly, there was no delay on part of the petitioner in moving such an application. As noted, service of admission of the appea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant. 9. In terms of sub-section (1) of Section 148 thus in an appeal by the drawer against the conviction under Section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court which shall be in addition to any interim compensation which may have been paid under Section 143-A which is the power of the trial Court. As per sub-section (2) of Section 148 the amount would be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order unless extended by the Court up to a maximum of thirty days. The appellate Court may also release the amount in favour of the drawee of the cheque pending the appeal. 10. As pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner this provision came up for consideration before Supreme Court in case of Surinder Singh Deswal (supra). In the context of the use of the word may in sub-section (1), the Supreme Court had made following observations: 9. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the Appellants that even considering ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e appeals and obtaining stay in the proceedings, an injustice was caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in the court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque and having observed that such delay has compromised the sanctity of the cheque transactions, the Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and also Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 11. The provisions of Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, therefore, had to be activated as desired by the legislature. The appellate Court on its own could have issued such a direction without the petitioner having moved an application for such purpose. Even if the appellate Court omitted to do so and admitted the appeal which in the present case happened without notice to the petitioner, that cannot be the ground for refusing the application of the petitioner for such purpose. Subsection (1) of Section 148 does not provide that the order for depositing the amount can be made only at the time or before admission ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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