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TMI Blog2021 (9) TMI 1156X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r passed by the adjudicating authority on 8.4.2019, i.e., after a delay of 34 days. Therefore, even the certified copy of the order passed by the adjudicating authority was applied beyond the prescribed period of limitation, i.e., beyond 30 days. The certified copy of the order was received by the appellant on 11.04.2019 and the appeal before the NCLAT was preferred on 24.06.2019, i.e., after a delay of 44 days. As the Appellate Tribunal can condone the delay up to a period of 15 days only, the Appellate Tribunal refused to condone the delay which was beyond 15 days from completion of 30 days - it cannot be said that the learned Appellate Tribunal committed any error in not condoning the delay of 44 days, which was beyond the delay of 15 days which cannot be condoned as per Section 61(2) of the IB Code. An identical question came to be considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. VERSUS HILLI MULTIPURPOSE COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [ 2020 (3) TMI 1368 - SUPREME COURT] , where the Constitution Bench has ultimately concluded that the District Forum has no jurisdiction and/or power to extend the time for filing of response to the complai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d the corporate insolvency resolution process against the corporate debtor under the provisions of the IBC. Interim Resolution Professional (for short, IRP ) was appointed. IRP invited the claims from the creditors of the corporate debtor Dunar Foods Limited on or before 17.01.2018; that the appellant herein submitted its claim and also forwarded its claim through courier to IRP as per Form F of the IBC. At this stage it is required to be noted that the appellant herein earlier filed Money Suit against one PD Agro Processors Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as PD Agro ) and the corporate debtor being Commercial Suit No. 11 of 2014 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The High Court vide order dated 11.04.2014 in Notice of Motion 807 of 2014 in CS No. 328 of 2014 injuncted PD Agro and the Corporate Debtor from disposing of, alienating, encumbering, parting with possession of and/or otherwise creating third party rights in respect of its movable/immovable properties/assets; that one FIR No. 216 of 2013 was also lodged against PD Agro and subsequently the same came to be transferred to the Economic Offence Wing, Mumbai for further investigation; that the provisions o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat the Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond 15 days and thereby the appeal is barred by limitation. 4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the learned NCLAT in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation and refusing to condone the delay which was beyond the period of 15 days, which the Appellate Tribunal could have condoned, the appellant National Spot Exchange Limited has preferred the present appeal. 5. Shri Maninder Singh, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellant and Shri Abhishek, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of the IRP. 5.1 Shri Maninder Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted that though the learned Appellate Tribunal may be justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation by holding that the Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond 15 days, it is prayed to exercise the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 5.2 It is submitted that on investigation by the Directorate of Enforcement, it is revealed that PD Agro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... involved, which is due and payable to the appellant herein, which can be said to be a public body which provided an electronic exchange platform which commenced its operations after the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Government of India granted it an exemption under Section 27 of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 to launch one-day forward contracts for buying and selling of commodities and therefore it is prayed to condone the delay in preferring the appeal before the NCLAT, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Heavy reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Chitra Sharma v. Union of India, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 575; Jaiprakash Associates Limited v. IDBI Bank Limited, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 328; and Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mampee Timbers and Hardwares Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2021) 3 SCC 673, in support of his prayer to condone the delay beyond the time prescribed under the IBC, i.e., the delay of 44 days in preferring the appeal before the NCLAT, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 6. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri Abhishek, learned Advocat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 20); Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2007) 2 SCC 230 (paras 29 to 37); Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 (para 16); and The Martin Burn Limited v. The Corporation of Calcutta, reported in AIR 1966 SC 529 (para 14). 6.4 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid decisions and the relevant provisions of the statute, namely, Sub-section (2) of Section 61 of the Code, it is submitted that as such no error has been committed by the learned Appellate Tribunal in not condoning the delay beyond the period of 15 days, over the period of 30 days. It is submitted that as such the learned Appellate Tribunal has acted just in consonance with the provisions of the statute and has followed the statutory provisions strictly. 6.5 Now so far as the prayer on behalf of the appellant to condone the delay beyond the period prescribed under the statute, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is concerned, it is submitted that as observed and held by this Court in the case of Oil Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited, repo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the NCLAT. The appeal preferred before the NCLAT was under Section 61(2) of the IB Code. As per Section 61(2) of the IB Code, the appeal was required to be preferred within a period of thirty days. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed to prefer an appeal was 30 days. However, as per the proviso to Section 61(2) of the Code, the Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of 30 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal, but such period shall not exceed 15 days. Therefore, the Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction at all to condone the delay exceeding 15 days from the period of 30 days, as contemplated under Section 61(2) of the IB Code. Section 61(2) of the IB Code reads as under: Section 61(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal: Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal, but such period shall not exceed fifteen days. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion of these sections meant that to that extent only the provisions of the Limitation Act stood extended and the applicability of the other provisions, by necessary implication stood excluded. 12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are but not thereafter used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase but not thereafter wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result. 8.1 An identical question came to be considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited (supra). The question before the Constitution Bench was, whether the District Forum has the power to extend the time for filing of response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days, as envisa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... observed by a Constitution Bench of this Court that, if there is any hardship, it is for the legislature to amend the law, and that the Court cannot be called upon, to discard the cardinal rule of interpretation for the purpose of mitigating such hardship. If the language of an Act is sufficiently clear, the Court has to give effect to it, however, inequitable or unjust the result may be. The words, dura lex sed lex which mean the law is hard but it is the law. may be used to sum up the situation. Therefore, even if a statutory provision causes hardship to some people, it is not for the Court to amend the law. A legal enactment must be interpreted in its plain and literal sense, as that is the first principle of interpretation. 25. In Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woolen, Cotton Silk Mills Ltd. Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1128, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that, inconvenience is not a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. In Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529, this Court, while dealing with the same issue observed as under: A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vs. Palanisamy (Dead) by Lrs. Ors., 2003(1) SCC 123 (vide para 5) this Court observed: Equitable considerations have no place where the statute contained express provisions . 36. In India House vs. Kishan N. Lalwani, 2003(9) SCC 393 (vide para 7) this Court held that: The period of limitation statutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed from by equitable considerations. (Emphasis supplied) 37. In the present case, while equity is in favour of the respondent-Bank, the law is in favour of the appellant, since we are of the opinion that the impugned order of the High Court is clearly in violation of Section 31 of the RDB Act, and moreover the claim is time-barred in view of Article 136 of the Limitation Act read with Section 24 of the RDB Act. We cannot but comment that it is the Bank itself which is to blame because after its first Execution Petition was dismissed on 23.8.1990 it should have immediately thereafter filed a second Execution Petition, but instead it filed the second Execution Petition only in 1994 which was dismissed on 18.8.1994. Thereafter, again, the Bank waited for 5 years and it was only on 1.4 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ter considering various earlier decisions of this Court on the point and considering the language used in Section 125 [2] of the Electricity Act which provided that delay beyond 120 days is not condonable, this Court has observed and held that it is not condonable and it cannot be condoned, even taking recourse to Article 142 of the Constitution. While observing and holding so in para-16, this Court has observed and held as under:- 16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Association [AIR 1988 SC 1895] [Supra] has ruled that there is no conflict of opinion in Antulay's case [AIR 1988 SC 1531] or in Union Carbide Corporation's case with the principle set-down in Prem Chand Garg Anr. v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996. Be it noted, when there is a statutory command by the legislation as regards limitation and there is the postulate that delay can be condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy as has been held in Union Carbide Corporation's case. As the pronouncement om Chhattisgarh State E ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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