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TMI Blog1986 (11) TMI 394X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rasad Singh, Deputy Collector Gaya, for the settlement of hat in Khizersarai for the year 1977-78. The petitioner along with others participated therein and deposited Rs. 600/- as security money and the bid was knocked down in favour of the petitioner for Rs. 11,501/- only as the highest bidder. It is the petitioner's claim that he later deposited Rs. 5,400/- with the Anchal Adhikari, though, admittedly, no receipt whatsoever was issued by him. It is then averred on behalf of the petitioner that neither any parwana or any toll chart was issued in favour of the petitioner and further no registered lease deed was executed betwixt the respondent State and the petitioner, as required by Rule 7-T of the Bihar Land Reforms Rules, 1951. It is his case that only by virtue of the terms of agreement executed in the Prescribed Form 'P(4)' that the arrears of rent or interest, etc., with regard to such settlement can be made recoverable under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914, (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'). The further case sought to be set up on behalf of the petitioner is that he applied before the Anchal Adhikari for issuance of toll c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e had agreed to abide by the order or instructions of the Officer and that he had agreed to take settlement at Rs. 11,501/-. It is reiterated that the petitioner had in fact continuously collected tolls after the bid was knocked down in his favour. The Anchal Adhikari directed the Circle Inspector to hold an enquiry about the collecting of the tolls and vide his report (Annexure 'C') he clearly held that the petitioner was collecting the same from Khizersarai Bazar ever since 1-4-1977. The other pleadings made on behalf of the petitioner are stoutly controverted and the impugned orders, Annexures 3 and 4, are averred to be legal and unimpeach-able. 4. This writ petition originally came up before my learned Brother Hasan, J. sitting singly. Before him reliance on behalf of the petitioner was sought to be placed on 1980 BBCJ (HC) 344 (supra). Expressing some doubt about the correctness of the view therein the matter was referred to the Division Bench. For somewhat similar reasons the Division Bench referred the case to the larger Bench. That is how it is before us now. 5. Mr. Rana Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, first isolated the words interest in la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion 5 of the Indian Councils Act, 1892, to the passing of this Act. It is hereby enacted as follows : --x x x x x 3. Definitions.-- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context : -- (4) 'movable property' includes growing crops : (6) 'public demand' means any arrear or money mentioned or referred to irr Schedule I, and includes any interest which may, by law, be charge'able thereon up to the date on which a certificate is signed under Part II and Schedule I. 1. Any arrear of revenue which remains due in the following circumstances, namely; xxxxx 2. Any arrear of revenue which is due from a farmer on account of an estate held by him in farm, and is not paid on the latest day of payment fixed under Section 3 of the Bengal Land-revenue Sales Act, 1859 (XI of 1859). 3. Any money which is declared by any law for the time being in force to be recoverable or realizable as an arrear of revenue or land-revenue, or by the process authorized for the recovery of arrears of revenue or of the public revenue or of Government revenue. 4. Any money which is declared by any enactment for the time being in force : -- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a special procedure for enforcing its own demands is resorted to by the State in the interest of public exchequer because it would be impossible to carry on the business of government if its revenues were all to be referable to regular litigation in Civil Courts. There, thus, arises a concept of public demands in the nature of land revenue, rents, taxes, fines and other dues, in respect of which the primal need is a special summary procedure for their recovery where they are not paid or denied. Perhaps the classic example in this context is that of land revenue which is a special feature in India and the modes of its recovery and realisation historically go back to the earliest time. For our purposes it is wholly unnecessary to delve too far down in history and it suffices to notice that under early British rule the customary modes of demand and coercion for the recovery of land revenue both before and subsequent to the permanent settlement were resorted to. One of the earliest statutes in this context is Regulation III of 1774 in the province of Bengal followed by Regulation I of 1801 and Regulation V of 1812. Later public demands other than land revenue also came within the ambi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eans whatever may be specified in Schedule 1. In the result even the broad sweep of public demand is further extended by the statute herein and, in my view, designedly so. In logical essence, this leads to the result that for the purposes of this Act a public demand includes all arrears of revenue or any money due or demand payable which finds place in Schedule I even by reference. It seems patent that the legislature has deliberately not attempted to define public demand or limiting the same. All the arrears of revenue, money or payable demands which the legislature chooses to incorporate in Schedule I become by virtue of the definition under Section 3(6) a public demand of which recovery can be made under the Act. The scheme of the definition under Section 3(6) of the Act and the frame of the articles of the schedule complementary thereto thus become a key to the interpretation of these provisions. 10. Now it needs no great erudition to hold from the 69 sections of the Act that the same is a statute for the special purpose of the recovery of public demands and prescribes a special procedure therefor. In looking at the public demands enumerated in Schedule I one cannot equally ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in which a party is concerned; party having a common interest; pecuniary stake. The learned Advocate-General had rightly and forcefully contended that the word 'interest' employed in Article 7 is to be given its broad dictionary meanings aforesaid. He contended plausibly and, in my view, rightly that the inherent fallacy which underlies the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner is in construing the plain word 'interest' as if it is the legal term of art connoted by the phrase right, title and interest and thereafter equating it therewith. Imbued as we are by legal phraseology, one tends sub-consciously to give a technical legal meaning to an otherwise word of common parlance. The learned Advocate-General rightly highlighted that it is not well warranted to read the word 'interest' when the legislature has deliberately prefixed it with the word 'any' as well in the legalistic sense of a right, title or interest in immovable property. The two concepts are distinct and separate. They are not synonyms and it is uncalled for to read them so. Equally fallacious it is to first read the words any interest as a right, title and interest in land and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the petitioner had deposited security money, had participated in the open auction and the bid was knocked down in his favour. It was even pinpointed that thereafter he claimed to have deposited one half of the bid money and it is common ground that a bid sheet was duly prepared and issued in his favour. The firm concurrent finding of fact by the Certificate Officer and the Appellate Collector is that the petitioner was put in possession of the Hat and had actually exercised that right continuously for well-nigh nine months by making the collection of tolls thereat. In this context would it possibly be said that he did not hold any interest in the Hat and was not liable to the Collector for the bid amount which was a condition of the use and enjoyment of such a Hat? The answer seems to be too plain to call for further elaboration. 13. This matter then deserves examination from another refreshing angle. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no interest whatsoever in the land can be created except by a duly executed and registered deed, is itself utterly untenable. Undoubtedly, a lease for land creates an impeccable interest in the said land. It is unneces ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for removing something from it, namely, a part of the produce of the soil. It is plain from the above that a profits a prendre is somewhat lower than a lease of an immovable property. Therefore, if a lease, which is a much more substantive interest in land can exist by oral agreement and delivery for period of a year or less, plainly enough profits a prendre for a year or less can doubly be so created by agreement and delivery. Even a legal interest for a year or less either by way of a lease or profits a prendre in land can well be created without the requirement of a formally executed deed and registration thereof. To contend in abstract, that no interest in land whatsoever can be created without the aforesaid formalities is itself plainly untenable. 15. Now, apart from the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, the larger aspect is that Article 7 of the Schedule is not to be myopically construed in isolation but in the larger mosaic of the other articles in which it stands entirely embedded. The learned Advocate General rightly drew our attention to the widely couched language employed in this article and even the more so in the preceding Articles 1 to 3. It was poin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... error to first read Article 7 as confined to holding any interest in land alone and then to invoke all the strictest provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act therefor. Plainly enough the phrase any interest in land, pasturage, forest-rights, fisheries or the like has to be construed as a whole and not confined to its opening part as any interest in land alone. Article 7 is expressly mandated to cover any interest in pasturage, forest-rights, fisheries or the like as well apart from land stricto sensu. However what appears to be a clue to the interpretation and indicative of the width of the provision of the words or the like is advisedly inserted by the legislature herein and coupled with other things at the end of the article. Plainly enough the enumeration herein is not exhaustive but merely illustrative. It names four things as an illustration and the rest are left wide open by the phrase or the like . This leaves room for the widest play of similarities. But even if it be read restrictively as ejusdem generis, it would qualify each of the four categories and not land alone. The ejusdem generis rule would be equally applicable to things akin to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... et no recovery can be made by the Collector from him, on the admitted ground that no formal registered deed was executed betwixt the parties. Any suit by the collector to recover the amount must also necessarily fail for identical reasons. The end result is that the petitioner would be legally entitled to defalcate the amounts of tolls which have been found to have been collected by him. The construction advocated on behalf of the petitioner would lead to the result that if the settlee of a Hat, Bazar and Mela can delay and later decline execution of a registered deed, then despite the collection of tolls by him, the Collector cannot recover the same either under the Act or by way of a suit. A construction that would lead to such an anomalous and, if I may say so, mischievous result is not to be easily adhered to. Indeed it was pointed out on behalf of the respondent State that this is the usual result ensuing from the view taken in ILR (1958) Pat 302 (supra). 20. Now before adverting to precedent a strong note of caution, however, must be sounded. Whatever has been said above is in the narrow context of the question whether the demand by the Collector is recoverable as a public ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and as such immovable property. A somewhat similar view with regard to the licence and the right to cut trees in the forest again fell for consideration before their Lordships in Smt. Shantabai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 532. Therein also it was held that unregistered documents granting the petitioner a right to cut trees in forest land and the subsequent stoppage from doing so on the vesting of the forest in the State gave rise to no infraction of fundamental right which could possibly be enforced under Article 32 before the final Court. Both these cases cannot in any way advance the case of the petitioner because no issue whatsoever of the maintainability of the writ petition or the infraction of any fundamental or legal rights arises herein. Yet again the reliance by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the Full Bench judgment in Chetlal Sao v. The State of Bihar 1986 BBCJ (HC) 109 : (AIR 1986 Pat 267) is equally misconceived. The issues therein were meticulously formulated and precisely answered and the question before us was not even remotely before the Full Bench in that case. What was held therein was that a writ of mandamus would not be maintainable in the absenc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uly registered between the parties, it would follow that no recovery under Article 7 of Schedule 1 could be made. With the deepest deference to the learned Judges and in the light of the exhaustive discussion earlier, I am constrained to hold that the said judgment does not lay down the law correctly and has, consequently, to be overruled. 22. Once the judgment in S.A. Mannan's case (ILR (1958) Pat 302) (supra) was rendered, it seems, it was not thereafter questioned and was routinely followed by single Benches and Division Benches thereafter. This was so done also in Shri Prabhunath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1980 BBCJ (HC) 344. Indeed one of the learned Judges of the Division Bench, S. Narain, J., contented himself by observing that it was conceded by the learned advocate for the State that the case is covered by the ratio of the decision in S.A. Mannan v. State of Bihar (ILR (1958) Pat 302) (supra). My learned brother, N.P. Singh, J., with some elaboration rightly observed as under : -- The grant of right to collect tolls from a hat, in my view, stands on a different footing than grant of a right to catch fish or to cut standing timber trees which were held in the afore ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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