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TMI Blog2022 (8) TMI 387X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eference to the other provisions of Chapter XVII. The liability for payment of interest as provided in Section 234B is for default in payment of advance tax. While the definition of assessed tax under Section 234B pertains to tax deducted or collected at source, the pre-conditions of Section 234B, viz. liability to pay advance tax and non- payment or short payment of such tax, have to be satisfied, after which interest can be levied taking into account the assessed tax. Therefore, Section 209 of the Act which relates to the computation of advance tax payable by the assessee cannot be ignored while construing the contents of Section 234B. As we have already held that prior to the financial year 2012-13, the amount of income-tax which is deductible or collectible at source can be reduced by the assessee while calculating advance tax, the Respondent cannot be held to have defaulted in payment of its advance tax liability. There is no doubt that the position has changed since the financial year 2012-13, in view of the proviso to Section 209 (1) (d), pursuant to which if the assessee receives any amount, including the tax deductible at source on such amount, the assessee cannot reduce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... anding Counsel For Respondents : Mr. R. Sivaraman in both WAs COMMON JUDGMENT R.MAHADEVAN, J. Both these appeals are filed by the appellants / Revenue, assailing the separate orders dated 03.01.2018 and 27.11.2017 passed by the learned Judge in the respective writ petitions viz., WP.Nos.14165 of 2009 and 18472 of 2009. 2. As the issues arise for consideration in both the appeals are common, they were taken up for hearing together and disposed of by this common judgment. Facts relating to WA No. 979 of 2018 (WP No. 14165 of 2009) 3.1. The respondent herein, a non-resident company registered in Netherlands, is engaged in the business of dredging and marine contractors. According to them, during the course of such business, in the year 1996, Chennai Port Trust floated a tender for the Break Water Construction at Ennore Port titled Ennore Coal Port Project . The respondent participated in the said tender as a joint venture company along with an Indian company known as Hindustan Construction Company Limited. The bid offered by the respondent was accepted by Chennai Port Trust and the contract was awarded in their favour. For the purpose of execution ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... separately and not in the status as AOP. Thus, the ARR held that the income of the respondent has to be assessed in its own hands and not in the status of joint venture. Pursuant to the said order dated 14.09.2000, the respondent submitted its return of income for the assessment year 2000-2001 on 23.10.2000, by paying self-assessment tax of Rs.1,60,73,205/- under Section 140A. Such return was processed under Section 143 (1) of the Act on 28.03.2002 and the Assessing Officer also accepted the return of income disclosed by the respondent. However, the Assessing Officer concluded that for non-payment of advance tax and deferred advance tax, interest has to be paid under Section 234B and 234C of the Act to the tune of Rs.23,55,882/- and Rs.12,17,545/-. On such demand, the respondent submitted an application for waiver of the interest on 26.02.2003 before the appellant. However, the appellant, without appreciating the background facts of the case, passed an order dated 09.02.2009, rejecting the application of waiver of interest and directed the Assessing Officer to collect interest from the respondent. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed this writ petition to quash the order dat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... come which he earned in India as well as out of India by way of salary. The aggregate income offered by the respondent for various years worked out to Rs.9,45,27,328/-. Considering the application submitted by the respondent, the Settlement Commission, by order dated 16.06.2006, admitted the application. Subsequently, the said application was taken up for final disposal and after hearing both sides, the Commission passed an order dated 05.02.2008 accepting the additional income offered by the respondent herein under Section 245D(4) of the Act. However, while passing the order dated 05.02.2008, the Commission directed the respondent to pay interest under Section 234B on the excess of the assessed tax over and above the advance tax for all the assessment years. 5.3. On receipt of the said order, the respondent filed a Miscellaneous Petition on 31.12.2008 praying to modify the order dated 05.02.2008, stating that he is not liable to pay interest under Section 234B of the Act. The Commission, by order dated 06.07.2009, rejected the said Miscellaneous Petition. Challenging the same, the respondent filed this writ petition, to quash the order dated 06.07.2009 passed by the Settlement ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vision Bench of this Court in the case of Chennai Port Trust v. ITO, TDS VIII [(2012) 25 Taxmann.com 261 (Mad.)] held that there was conflict and confusion persisting till the Advance Ruling Authority passed an order and therefore, the respondent/assessee is not liable to pay interest under Section 234B and 234C of the Act. While so, the learned Judge failed to take note of the fact that the respondent/assessee is now attempting to hide under the smoke screen of confusion and conflict to escape from the consequences of default and from payment of interest. The liability of payment of interest under Section 234B of the Act by the tax payer is towards delay in paying the advance tax. The respondent was fully aware of their obligations to pay advance tax, but they have not chosen to pay. The respondent / assessee was also aware that TDS was not deducted on their total income and therefore, they are liable to pay advance tax. Besides this, they were also aware of the fact that Chennai Port Trust has been deducting tax only to the extent of 2% on payments made to it. However, they deliberately did not make payment of advance tax with an intention to conceal income and evade payment of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Inc., [(2015) 56 Taxmann.com 190] relied on by the learned Judge, an appeal has been filed as against the said Judgment in C.A.No.7325 of 2016 and it was admitted and pending before before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned Judge on the said decisions is not proper. Therefore, the learned Senior Panel Counsel prayed for allowing this appeal. 9. Mr. A.P. Srinivas, learned senior panel counsel for the appellants in W.A.No.2811 of 2021, submitted that the respondent/assessee is an employee in India earning income from India and also from abroad. The respondent did not disclose the income earned in foreign countries for the block period in question. Ultimately, he filed an application before the Income Tax Settlement Commission and disclosed his income for the assessment years from 1996-1997 to 2005-2006 and the Settlement Commission directed him to pay the tax together with interest. The respondent/assessee filed a miscellaneous application to modify the order relating to interest under Section 234B. The said application was rejected by the Settlement Commission on the ground that the Settlement Commission can only rectify a mistake, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .............. 8. This clause categorically uses the expression 'deductible or collectible at source' and it is this clause which is incorporated by the Uttranchal High Court in the said judgment (supra) in the manner already pointed above. The scheme of the Act in respect of non-residents is clear. Section 195 of the Act puts an obligation on the payer, i.e., any person responsible for paying to a non-resident, to deduct income-tax at source at the rates in force from such payments excluding those incomes which are chargeable under the head 'salaries'. Therefore, the entire tax is to be deducted at source which is payable on such payments made by the payee to the non-resident. Section 201 of the Act lays down the consequences of failure to deduct or pay. These consequences include not only the liability to pay the amount which such a person was required to deduct at source from the payments made to a non-resident but also penalties etc., Once it is found that the liability was that of the payer and the said payer has defaulted in deducting the tax at source, the Department is not remedy-less and, therefore, can take action against the payer under the pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l in W.A 979/2018 arises out of decision on a waiver application before the appellant and the appeal in W.A 2811/2021 arises out of decision in a miscellaneous petition before the Income Tax Settlement Commission to rectify the mistakes. Both the appeals carry a common question of law viz., whether interest is to be paid under Section 234B of the Act, when no advance tax is payable by the assessee and when the deductor/ the employer abroad, had not deducted tax at source, but has subsequently paid the tax with interest and whether the assessee/payee can be charged with interest?. The Learned Judge has colossally considered the Judgments in (i) Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage (P) Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax, [(2007) 293 ITR 226 (SC)], (ii) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Emilio Ruiz Berdejo Ors [(2010) 320 ITR 0190 (Bombay)], (iii) Director of Income Tax v. Jacabs Civil Incorporated [(2011) 330 ITR 0578 (Delhi)], (iv) Chennai Port Trust v. Income Tax Officer [(2012) 25 taxmann.com 261 (Mad)] (v) CIT v. Sedco Forex International Drilling Company Ltd [(2003) 264 ITR 320 (Uttaranchal)] and referred to the judgments in (vi) DIT (Internation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h case, be reduced by the aforesaid amount of income-tax which would be deductible or collectible at source during the said financial year under any provision of this Act from any income, if the person responsible for deducting tax has paid or credited such income without deduction of tax or it has been received or debited by the person responsible for collecting tax without collection of such tax. 15. Notes to the memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill, 2012 are as under: Liability to pay advance tax in case of non- deduction of tax Under the existing provisions of section 209 of the Income-tax Act, the amount of advance tax payable is computed by reducing the amount of income-tax which would be deductible or collectible during the financial year from income- tax on estimated income. Therefore, in cases where the assessee receives or pays any amount (on which the tax was deductible or collectible) without deduction or collection of tax, it has been held by courts that he is not liable to pay advance tax to the extent the tax is deductible or collectible from such amount. In order to make an assessee liable for payment of advance tax in respect of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for the exception, the specified processed minerals and ores would have been covered by the words minerals and ores . It also indicates that only the minerals and ores subjected to the process of cutting and polishing would be entitled to the benefit of Section 80-HHC meaning thereby that all other species of processed minerals and ores would continue to be covered by the general exclusion applicable to the generic class. The 1991 amendment to Section 80-HHC thus conclusively demonstrates that the words minerals and ores must be construed widely and in an unrestricted manner. As has been held in Municipal Committee v. Manilal [(1967) 2 SCR 100 : AIR 1967 SC 1201] and Pappu Sweets and Biscuits v. Commr. of Trade Tax [(1998) 7 SCC 228] subsequent legislation may be looked into to fix the proper interpretation to be put on the statutory provisions as they stood earlier. The benefit of Section 80-HHC has been extended by the amendment to a specific kind of mineral and was introduced for the first time in 1991. If we were to hold that the word minerals in sub-section (2)(b) never included processed minerals then the 1991 amendment excepting processed minerals from the exclusionar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the assessee while calculating advance tax, the Respondent cannot be held to have defaulted in payment of its advance tax liability. We uphold the view adopted in the impugned judgement of the Delhi High Court in Civil Appeal No. 1262 of 2016 as well as by the Madras High Court in the Madras Fertilizers case (supra), that the Revenue is not remediless and there are provisions in the Act enabling the Revenue to proceed against the payer who has defaulted in deducting tax at source. There is no doubt that the position has changed since the financial year 2012-13, in view of the proviso to Section 209 (1) (d), pursuant to which if the assessee receives any amount, including the tax deductible at source on such amount, the assessee cannot reduce such tax while computing its advance tax liability. 21. As we have dealt with the submissions relating to Section 209 and Section 234B of the Act, we do not deem it necessary to deal with other contentions that have been raised on behalf of the Revenue. We have not dealt with the facts of each case before us, in view of our interpretation of the provisions of the Act germane to the question of law herein. 22. Accordingly, the Appeals ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Board. The application for waiver of interest was filed on 26.02.2003, when the Notification in F.NO400/234/95-IT(B) dated 23-5-1996 issued under Section 119 of the Act was in force. As per the above notification, the Chief Commissioner and the Director General of Income Tax may reduce or waive the interest charged under Section 234A or Section 234B or Section 234C of the Act in the classes of cases or classes of Income specified in paragraph 2 of the order for the period and to the extent the Chief Commissioner of Income tax/Director General of Income Tax deems fit. The relevant clause that has been relied upon by the assessee is clause 2 (e), which reads as follows: (e) Where a return of income could not be filed by the assessee due to unavoidable circumstances and such return of income is filed voluntarily by the assessee or his legal heirs without detection by the Assessing Officer. 16. A clarification was issued by way order in F.NO400/234/95-IT(B) dated 30.01.1997, wherein, paragraph No.2 of the order dated 23-05-1996 has been clarified as follows:- 2. In partial modification of this para of the Order, the Central Board of Direct Taxes has decided that there s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in so far as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in N.Haridas Co. V. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and another, (2008) 296 ITR 246 (Mad) is concerned, it was passed in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In that case, waiver/reduction of interest was sought on the ground that the tax, which was required to be paid under the Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme 1997, could not be paid, in time, by the Managing Partner, even though, he had made a declaration as required, since, he was diagnosed with blood cancer, and to which, he succumbed shortly thereafter. 12.3. Furthermore, what is not evident upon a perusal of the said judgment as to the what were the contents of the order of the Chief Commissioner, whereby, the request for waiver/reduction of interest was rejected. It appears that the order was perfunctory, which is why, the Division Bench in paragraph 7 observed that the impugned order of the Chief Commissioner merely observed that the condition prescribed in Notification dated 23.05.1996 was not satisfied. 12.4. We may indicate herein that the notification/circular dated 23.05.1996 precedes the circular in issue, i.e., Circular dated 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an be entertained. The notifications lay down the substantive law. It is only if the case of the assessee falls in any of the categories mentioned therein, an application can be entertained. As per the notification dated 23-05-1996, the reason of unavoidable circumstances was available to the assessee in clause 2 (e) when waiver is sought under any of or all the provisions referred above. The said notification was superseded by the notification dated 26-06-2006, whereby the reason of unavoidable circumstances was excluded from applicability, when waiver is sought under Sections 234B and 234C, which, in the view of this Court, is not clarificatory as it introduces a new condition taking away a vested right under the earlier notification. In fact, the notifications are beneficial legislations. Hence, it can be applied only to cases, where an application is filed after 26.06.2006. Though the notification claims to be superseding the earlier notifications, the fact that it states in paragraph 4 that if an application has been rejected earlier, it can be reopened to grant any relief and if any relief granted cannot be undone by this notification, fortifies our view that a right once ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later. 30. We would also like to point out, for the sake of completeness, that where a benefit is conferred by a legislation, the rule against a retrospective construction is different. If a legislation confers a benefit on some persons but without inflicting a corresponding detriment on some other person or on the public generally, and where to confer such benefit appears to have been the legislators' object, then the presumption would be that such a legislation, giving it a purposive construction, would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect. This exactly is the justification to treat procedural provisions as retrospective. In Govt. of India v. Indian Tobacco Assn.[(2005) 7 SCC 3 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial error, whether in the statement of the common law or in the interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not invariably, such an Act contains a Preamble, and also the word declared as well as the word enacted . But the use of the words it is declared is not conclusive that the Act is declaratory for these words may, at times, be used to introduced new rules of law and the Act in the latter case will only be amending the law and will not necessarily be retrospective. In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is to explain an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended. The language shall be deemed always to have meant is declaratory, and is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uire it, retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability otherwise than as regards matters of procedure. The general rule as stated by Halsbury in Vol. 36 of the Laws of England (3rd Edn.) and reiterated in several decisions of this Court as well as English courts is that all statutes other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence are prima facie prospective and retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to affect, alter or destroy an existing right or create a new liability or obligation unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only. (emphasis supplied) 36. In CIT v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. [AIR 1961 SC 1633 : (1962) 1 SCR 788], this Court held that as the liability to pay tax is computed according to the law in force at the beginning of the assessment year i.e. the first day of April, any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Delhi Rent Control Act, was no longer maintainable. 31. While adjudicating the aforesaid dispute, this Court held as under: (Ambalal case [ Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amrit Lal and Co., (2001) 8 SCC 397] , SCC pp. 409-10 415, paras 24-27 34-36 ) 24. We may quote here Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897: 6. Effect of repeal.- Where this Act, or any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inal.] under the repealed statute would not be affected by the repealing statute. We may hasten to clarify here, mere existence of a right not being acquired or accrued , on the date of the repeal would not get protection of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. 27. At the most, such a provision can be said to be granting a privilege to the landlord to seek intervention of the Controller for eviction of the tenant under the statute. Such a privilege is not a benefit vested in general but is a benefit granted and may be enforced by approaching the Controller in the manner prescribed under the statute. On filing the petition of eviction of the tenant the privilege accrued with the landlord is not effected by repeal of the Act in view of Section 6(c) and the pending proceeding is saved under Section 6(e) of the Act. *** 34. Thus we find Section 6 of the General Clauses Act covers a wider filed and saves a wide range or proceedings referred to in its various clauses. We find two sets of cases, one where Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is applicable and the other where it is not applicable. 35. In cases where Section 6 is not applicable, the courts have to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t would be pertinent to mention, that a right of appeal can be availed of only when it is expressly conferred. When such a right is conferred, its parameters are also laid down. A right of appeal may be absolute i.e. without any limitations. Or, it may be a limited right. The above position is understandable, from a perusal of the unamended and amended Section 15-Z of the SEBI Act. Under the unamended Section 15-Z, the appellate remedy to the High Court, against an order passed by the Securities Appellate Tribunal, was circumscribed by the words on any question of fact or law arising out of such order . The amended Section 15-Z, while altering the appellate forum from the High Court to the Supreme Court, curtailed and restricted the scope of the appeal, against an order passed by the Securities Appellate Tribunal, by expressing that the remedy could be availed of on any question of law arising out of such order . It is, therefore apparent, that the right to appeal, is available in different packages, and that, the amendment to Section 15-Z, varied the scope of the second appeal provided under the SEBI Act. 39. As illustrated above, an appellate remedy is available in dif ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder the appellate right was limited to, any question of law arising out of such order . Accordingly, by the amendment, the earlier appellate package stands reduced, because under the amended Section 15-Z, it is not open to an appellant, to agitate an appeal on facts. That being the position, it is not possible for us to accept the contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, that the amendment to Section 15-Z of the SEBI Act, envisages only an amendment of the forum, where the second appeal would lie. In our considered view, the amendment to Section 15-Z of the SEBI Act, having reduced the appellate package, adversely affected the vested appellate right of the litigant concerned. The right of appeal being a vested right, the appellate package, as was available at the commencement of the proceedings, would continue to vest in the parties engaged in a lis, till the eventual culmination of the proceedings. Obviously, that would be subject to an amendment expressly or impliedly, providing to the contrary. Section 32 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Act, 2002, which has been extracted in para 13 hereinabove reveals, that the re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ation Co. Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1633] , this Court held that as the liability to pay tax is computed according to the law in force at the beginning of the assessment year i.e. the first day of April, any change in law affecting tax liability after that date though made during the currency of the assessment year, unless specifically made retrospective, does not apply to the assessment for that year. Answer to the reference 37. When we examine the insertion of the proviso in Section 113 of the Act, keeping in view the aforesaid principles, our irresistible conclusion is that the intention of the legislature was to make it prospective in nature. This proviso cannot be treated as declaratory/statutory or curative in nature. *** Reasons in support 39. The first and foremost poser is as to whether it was possible to make the block assessment with the addition of levy of surcharge, in the absence of proviso to Section 113? In Suresh N. Gupta [CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, (2008) 4 SCC 362] itself, it was acknowledged and admitted that the position prior to the amendment of Section 113 of the Act whereby the proviso was added, whether surcharge was payable in resp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sions raised by the learned counsel for the assessee also needs to be noticed. The learned counsel for the assessee submits that it is well settled that subordinate legislation ordinarily is not retrospective unless there are clear indication to the same. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in State of Jharkhand v. Shiv KarampalSahu [State of Jharkhand v. Shiv KarampalSahu, (2009) 11 SCC 453 : (2009) 2 SCC (L S) 640] . In para 17, following has been stated: (SCC pp. 459-60 ) 17. Ordinarily, a subordinate legislation should not be construed to be retrospective in operation. The Circular Letter dated 7-5-2003 was given a prospective effect. The father of the respondent died on 19-5-2000. There is nothing to show that even the Circular dated 9-8-2000 had been given retrospective effect. In any view of the matter, as the State of Jharkhand in the Circular Letter dated 7-5-2003 adopted the earlier circular letters issued by the State of Bihar only in respect of cases where death had occurred after 15-10-2000 i.e. the date from which the State of Jharkhand came into being, the High Court [Shiv KampalSahu v. State of Jharkhand, 2005 SCC OnLineJhar 507 : (2006) 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n such a right in clause (e) evidently means the right which has been adverted to in clause (c). The plain consequence of clause (c) and clause (e), when read together is twofold : first, the right which has accrued on the date of the institution of the consumer complaint under the 1986 Act (the repealing law) is preserved; and second, the enforcement of the right through the instrument of a legal proceeding or remedy will not be affected by the repeal. 83. Having stated the above position, we need to harmonise it with the principle that the right to a forum is not an accrued right, as discussed in Part C of this judgment. Simply put, while Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act protects the pending legal proceedings for the enforcement of an accrued right from the effect of a repeal, this does not mean that the legal proceedings at a particular forum are saved from the effects from the repeal. The question whether the pending legal proceedings are required to be transferred to the newly created forum by virtue of the repeal would still persist. As discussed, this Court in New India Assurance [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, (1975) 2 SCC 840] and Maria Cristi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sent them in the new forum to which their cases would stand transferred. 87. It would be difficult to attribute to Parliament, whose purpose in enacting the 2019 Act was to protect and support consumers with an intent that would lead to financial hardship, uncertainty and expense in the conduct of consumer litigation. Ironically, the objection which has been raised in the present case to the continued exercise of jurisdiction by Ncdrc in regard to the consumer complaint filed by the appellant is by the developer who is the respondent herein. It is a developer who opposed the continuation of the proceedings before Ncdrc on the ground that under the new consumer legislation the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction exercisable by Ncdrc have been enhanced and the complaint filed by the appellant which was validly instituted under the erstwhile law should be transferred to Scdrc. Such a course of action will result in thousands of cases being transferred across the country, from Ncdrc to Scdrcs and from Scdrcs to the District Commission. F. Summation 91. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that proceedings instituted before the commencement of the 2019 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Judgment and Decree passed in the suit for possession does not suffer from any illegality. 22. The conspicuous and irresistible conclusion that could be drawn upon reading of the above cases, are that the law as applicable on the date of the application must be applied. In the present case, the appellant had the right to apply for waiver as per the notification dated 23-05-1996 by invoking clause 2 (e) which empowered an assessee to apply for waiver, when the return could not be filed for unavoidable reasons , when the application was filed in 2003. Once the applicant was found eligible to apply on the date of application, his application cannot be thrown out as not maintainable because of a subsequent notification. It is one thing to say that the relief is discretionary and another to state that the application is not maintainable. The subsequent notification will not affect the consideration of the applications pending on merit. Such an interpretation would not be against the law laid down by the Apex Court, but would also be arbitrary. Therefore, the contention of the revenue on this ground is rejected. Insofar as the merit is concerned, we have already seen that the leg ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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