TMI Blog2008 (4) TMI 182X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... M. S. Syali with Ms. Mahua C. Kalra for the respondent. JUDGMENT The judgment of the court was delivered by MADAN B. LOKUR J.— The Revenue is aggrieved by an order dated March 10, 2006, passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench "A" in I. T. A. No. 3032/Del/2001 in respect of the assessment year 1990-91. 2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we admit this appeal and frame the following substantial question of law for consideration: "Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the orders passed under section 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are invalid and barred by time having been passed beyond a reasonable period ?" 3. Filing of paper books is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Tribunal. 8. The consequence of the assessee being treated as an assessee in default is that it is liable to pay interest on the tax that it should have deducted at source and the assessee may also be liable to penalty. As mentioned above, the question whether interest has been paid or not does not survive because the admitted position is that the assessee had paid the interest. The apprehension of the assessee is only with regard to penalty that may be imposed under section 271C of the Act as also under section 221 of the Act. 9. The Tribunal came to the conclusion, with which we agree, that the initiation of proceeding against the assessee in treating it as in default, were not initiated within a reasonable period of time by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g the assessment or for completing the task on hand. 15. In Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. [1988] 70 STC 122 (SC) the question that arose before the court (and which has been stated on page 130 of the report) is whether an order of assessment under section 11(3) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, or section 28(3) of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973, could now be completed or it would be barred by limitation. In that case, the assessment proceedings had been unduly delayed and the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that for completing the assessment proceedings there is no period of limitation prescribed and that would depend upon the facts of each case. Considering the facts of the case, the Supreme Court gave a direction ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nable period as accepted under section 153 of the Act, though for completion of assessment proceedings. The provisions of reassessment are under sections 147 and 148 of the Act and they are on a completely different footing and, therefore, do not merit consideration for the purpose of this case. 19. Even though the period of three years would be a reasonable period as prescribed by section 153 of the Act for completion of proceedings, we have been told that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has, in a series of decisions, some of which have been mentioned in the order which is under challenge before us, taken the view that four years would be a reasonable period of time for initiating action, in a case where no limitation is prescribed. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... did not at all arise because the assessee had itself admitted its liability and it voluntarily paid the tax and interest on that amount. Again, we are not in agreement with learned counsel for the Revenue in this regard. 24. It appears that the assessee paid the tax voluntarily as well as interest thereon but the acceptance of the liability by the assessee would not by itself extend the period of limitation nor would it extend the reasonable time that is postulated by the scheme of the Income-tax Act. The assessee cannot be put, in a sense, in a worse position merely because it has admitted its liability. If the assessee had denied its liability, the question that would have arisen would be whether the Revenue could have initiated proc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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