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TMI Blog1990 (5) TMI 250X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... applications for grant of probate and letters of will ! annexed. 2. It will be worthwhile to advert to the Legislative history concerning the prescriptions for limitation for applications. It cannot be said that the earliest statutes governing limitations did provide for limitations for applications. M. Srinivasan, J. in Sakunthala v. Minor Vijaylakshmi (T.O.S. No. 23 of 1985 and Applns. Nos. 181 of 1988 and 2693 of 1989, Judgment dated 26-9-1989 - concisely reported in 1989 TNJ J 333 had occasion to touch the Legislative history on this aspect and it would be worthwhile to extract, as follows, paragraph 9 of the judgment of the learned Judge, wherein this aspect is the subject matter of recapitulation: The earliest of the statutes of Limitation was Act XIV of 1859 passed by the Legislative Council of India and received the Assent of the Governor-General on 5th May, 1859. That came into operation in 1862. Before that, there was one Code of Laws for the Courts established by Royal Charter in the Presidency-towns, and a separate Code for the Company's Courts in each of the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay. The anomaly of having different Codes was done away ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nch with Morris, J. in the following terms: But the preamble to the Act distinctly shows that it is not intended lo apply to all, but to certain, applications lo Courts; and an examination of the 3rd division of Schedule II, which deals with applications, shows that every article therein contained. No. 178 only excepted, specifically relates to some case pending or already decided. Article 178 must be construed with reference to the wording of the other articles, and can relate only to applications ejusdem generis, and therefore not to such an application as the one now before us. We find this principle has already been enunciated in this Court on the original side in the case of Govind Chunder Goswami v. Rungunmancy, I.L.R.(1881) Cal 60. It is to be observed, that in the previous Limitation Act, XIV of 1859 ami IX of 1871, no such article as this article (No. 178), was included, and under those Acts no question of limitation could have arisen in respect of an application for probate. It may fairly be presumed that, had the Legislature intended to apply for the first time a period of limitation to such applications, there would have been some provision in regard to them similar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fect an application under Act XXVII of 1860 for a certificate to collect debts to the estate of a deceased person. The judgment of Turner, C.J. in the pronouncement runs as follows: It is argued that no other applications except in suits are dealt with by the Act. If we are to hold that Article 178 applies to all applications for which no period of limitation is provided, it would lead to most inconvenient results. Such a limitation could not have been intended to apply to an application for probate, an application under the Religious Endowments Act, an application for the appointment of new trustees, C. Hence we feel ourselves at liberty to follow the rulings in In re Ishan Chunder Row, I.L.R.(1881) Cal 707 and Raj Manek Bai v. Manekji Kavasji, I.L.R.(1883) Bom 213, at least so far as to hold that Article 178 does not apply to applications for certificates to collect debts. The order of the Judge is set aside and the case remanded that he may pass a fresh order. Costs will abide and follow the result. 6. In Ganamuthu Upadasi v. Vana Koil Filial Nadan, I.L.R.(1894) Mad 379, Muttusami Ayyar, J. dealt with the question of applicability of Art. 178 of Schedule II of the Limi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the subsequent amendment in 1940 whereby Arts. 158 and 176 were made applicable to certain proceedings under Arbitration Act did not alter the position. 8. The views expressed in the above pronouncements on the basis that the principle of ejusdem generis applied, may not survive in view of the categoric pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Kerala State Electricity Board v. T. P. Kunhaliumma, [1977]1SCR996 , which took note of the change brought about by the Limitation Act, 1963. In that case, the respondent before the Supreme Court filed a petition under Sections 10 and 16(5) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 read with S. 51 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 claiming compensation against the Kerala State Electricity Board for trees standing on the property of the respondent, cut and removed for the purpose of laying electric line. As against the compensation assessed by the Board, the respondent claimed enhancement by filing a petition before the District Judge, under S. 16(3) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. The Board amongst other contentions, contended that the petition was barred by time under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The respondent answered that the sa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er this particular title while the intention is to refer to the Court of the District Judge. The Telegraph Act in Section 16 contains intrinsic evidence that the District Judge is mentioned there as the Court of the District Judge. Section 16(4) of the Telegraph Act requires payment into the Court of the District Judge such amount as the telegraph authority deems sufficient if any dispute arises as to the persons entitled to receive compensation. Again, in Section 34 of the Telegraph Act reference is made to payment of Court-fees and issue of processes both of which suggest that the ordinary machinery of a Court of Civil Jurisdiction is being made available for the settlement of these disputes. Section 3(15) of the General Clauses Act states that the District Judge in any Act of the Central Legislature means the Judge of a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction other than the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, unless there is anything repugnant in the context. In the Telegraph Act there is nothing in the context to suggest that the reference to the District Judge is not intended as a reference to the District Court which seems to be the meaning i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t throw any light. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court, in that pronouncement, had no occasion to deal with the present proposition. 10. Now let us advert to the definition of the expressions 'applicant' and 'application' found in Ss. 2(a) and 2(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963; 2(a) 'applicant' includes - (i) a petitioner; (ii) any person from or through whom an applicant derives his right to apply; (iii) any person whose estate is represented by the applicant as executor, administrator or other representative; (b)'application' includes a petition . The definitions are inclusive. They do not expatriate the meanings that should be annexed to the expressions as such. We must find out what 'application' could legitimately and in the legal sense mean. The definition in Section 2(a) and 2(b) may not by themselves be helpful to decide this crucial aspect. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary some of the meanings annexed to the expression 'application' are: the action of putting a thing to another ; the bringing of anything to bear practically upon another ; and the action of making an appeal, request or petition to a p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ngs in any Court of civil jurisdiction. What is the meaning to be given to the word 'proceedings'? The word 'Proceedings', in its compendium, will certainly take in applications. The scope of 'Proceedings' itself has been considered by pronouncements of this Court. In Ramanathan Chettiar In re, AIR 1942 Mad 390, Venkataraman, Rao, J. observed as follows: The words 'suit or proceeding' have been interpreted in various senses in different statutes according to the intent and scope of the statute, sometimes in a narrow sense and sometimes in a wide sense. The word 'suit' in a narrow sense is confined to a litigation initiated in a trial Court and ending with a decree or a final order passed by it. In this sense it would not include execution proceedings or proceedings in appeal. But in a wide sense it has been interpreted as comprehending the entire litigation commencing from the initiation of the litigation in the trial Court up to the state when the ultimate decision is reached in the final Court of appeal or as revision. In this view it would include execution proceedings in appeal as continuation of the suit. The word 'proceeding& ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... meaning to be annexed to the term 'proceeding' and held that the very action of calling upon a dealer by the compounding of the Madras General Sales Tax Act 1 of 1959 is a proceeding under that Act, since it is a step in aid or action taken by the concerned authority in the whole process of assessing the dealer on his turnover and hence, a Revision would lie against such notice. 14. Tek Chand, J. of the High Court of Punjab Haryana in Workmen of M/s. Bali Singh v. M/s. Bali Singh while construing the word 'proceeding' in S. 93 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, (1966), observed as follows (at p 149 of AIR): Even if inclusive definition was not given of the word 'proceeding' in Section 93, in its general acceptation also, it is a term of wide amplitude; and means a prescribed course of action for enforcing or protecting a legal right and further embracing the requisite steps to be taken whether procedural or substantive. Proceeding also means forms in which relief is sought before Courts of Law or before other bodies or authorities determining rights and liabilities and in which actions are brought and defended and the manner of conducting them and t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a proceeding, or in other words, in an application filed for grant of probate or letters of administration, no right is asserted or claimed by the applicant. The applicant only seeks recognition of the Court to perform a duty. Probate or letter of Administration issued by a competent Court is conclusive proof of the legal character throughout the world. An assessment of the relevant provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 does not convey a meaning that by the Proceedings filed for grant of probate or letters of administration, no rights of the applicant are settled or secured in the legal sense. The author of the testament has cast the duty with regard to the administration of his estate, and the applicant for probate or letters of administration only seeks the permission of the Court to perform that duty. There is only a seeking of recognition from the Court to perform the duty. That duty is only moral and it is not legal. There is no law which compels the applicant to file the proceedings for probate or letters of administration. With a view to discharge the moral duty, the applicant seeks recognition from the Court to perform the duty. It will be legitimate to conclude th ..... 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