1990 (5) TMI 250 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings for grant of probate or letters of administration.
2. Legislative history concerning limitation for applications.
3. Judicial interpretations of Article 137 and its predecessors.
4. Supreme Court's stance on the applicability of Article 137 to applications under special laws.
5. Definition and scope of "application" and "applicant" under the Limitation Act, 1963.
6. Nature of proceedings for grant of probate or letters of administration.
7. Recurring right to apply and its impact on limitation.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings for grant of probate or letters of administration:
The central question addressed is whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to proceedings for the grant of probate or letters of administration. Article 137 specifies a three-year limitation period for "any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Division," starting when the right to apply accrues. The Court concluded that Article 137 does not apply to such proceedings, as these do not constitute "applications" within the meaning of the Article.

2. Legislative history concerning limitation for applications:
The judgment traces the legislative history of limitation statutes, starting with Act XIV of 1859, which did not initially provide for limitations on applications. Subsequent Acts, such as Act IX of 1871 and Act XV of 1877, introduced limitations for certain applications, but courts historically interpreted these limitations narrowly, often restricting them to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure.

3. Judicial interpretations of Article 137 and its predecessors:
Historical judicial interpretations, such as those in Ishan Chunder Roy (1881), Bai Manek Bai (1883), and Janaki v. Kasavalu (1885), consistently held that residuary articles like Article 178 of the 1877 Act did not apply to applications for probate or letters of administration. These interpretations relied on the principle of ejusdem generis, limiting the scope of such articles to applications under the Civil Procedure Code.

4. Supreme Court's stance on the applicability of Article 137 to applications under special laws:
The judgment references the Supreme Court decision in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T. P. Kunhaliumma, which broadened the interpretation of Article 137 to include applications under special laws, not just the Civil Procedure Code. However, the Court noted that this decision did not specifically address whether proceedings for probate or letters of administration fall under Article 137.

5. Definition and scope of "application" and "applicant" under the Limitation Act, 1963:
The definitions of "applicant" and "application" in Sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963, are inclusive and cover petitions and persons deriving rights through the applicant. However, the Court emphasized that these definitions alone are insufficient to determine whether proceedings for probate or letters of administration qualify as "applications" under Article 137.

6. Nature of proceedings for grant of probate or letters of administration:
The Court highlighted that proceedings for probate or letters of administration are not actions to settle or secure rights but rather seek the Court's recognition to perform a duty imposed by a will. This duty is moral rather than legal, as there is no compulsion to file for probate or letters of administration. Consequently, such proceedings do not fit the legal definition of an "application" under Article 137.

7. Recurring right to apply and its impact on limitation:
The Court acknowledged the argument that the right to apply for probate or letters of administration is a recurring one, making it inappropriate to impose a limitation period under Article 137. This view aligns with previous judgments, such as Ramanand Thakur and Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani, which recognized the recurring nature of the right to apply.

Conclusion:
The Court held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply to proceedings for the grant of probate or letters of administration, with or without the will annexed. However, it noted that delays in such proceedings could raise suspicions about the genuineness of the will, which is a matter for the Court to consider on a case-by-case basis. The matters were remitted to the single Judge for further proceedings on merits.