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TMI Blog2003 (3) TMI 780X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nate the land in dispute. Suit No. 1586 of 1992 was filed by the petitioner in the trial court, wherein application for interim relief under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called C.P.C.) was also filed for restraining the defendant respondent No. 3 to alienate the property. After receiving the notice of the Court, subsequent to passing of the ex parte interim order, respondent No. 3 appeared in the Court on 18.8.1992 and made a similar application that the petitioner be also restrained from alienating any part of the land. On 18.8.1992 the trial court passed an order restraining the parties in the suit, the petitioner and other sons, including respondent No. 3, from selling the property or any part thereof to any other person till the decision of the suit. The respondent No. 3 alienated his undivided share in the land in dispute on 19.8,1992 and 27.8.1992, executing sale deeds in favour of the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, the petitioner-plaintiff filed an application to implead respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 in her suit and further prayed to initiate the proceeding under the provisions of Order XXXIX, Rule 2A. C.P ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ayala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami and Ors. [1966]1SCR628 ; and Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh AIR 1990 SC 845. 8. Hon'ble Apex Court held as under : Equally it is settled law that a coparcener has no right to sell his undivided share in the joint family property and any sale of undivided and specified items does not bind the other coparceners. Since the specific properties were purchased prior to the institution of the suit for partition, though the appellants have no right to equities, it could be said that the respective share to which their principal alienor was entitled would be allottable to them as a special case. Therefore, in view of the above, even if the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 have been put in possession of the land as it was not legally permissible for them to take possession thereof, it may be presumed that they had taken possession illegally, and without any authority of law. 9. Admittedly, there was an order dated 18.8.1992, for both the parties not to alienate any part of the property in dispute. Respondent No. 3 had executed two sale deeds in favour of respondent Nos. 4 to 6. It is settled legal proposition that sale deeds so executed are a nullity ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt dealt with a case of disobedience of an injunction passed under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code, wherein the contention was raised that the proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A cannot be initiated and no punishment can be imposed for disobedience of the order because the civil court, which granted the injunction, had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Apex Court rejected the contention holding that a party aggrieved of the order has a right to ask the Court to vacate the injunction pointing out to it that it had no jurisdiction to approach the higher court for setting aside that order, but so long the order remains in force, the party cannot be permitted to disobey it or avoid punishment for disobedience on any ground, including that the Court had no Jurisdiction, even if ultimately the Court comes to the conclusion that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The party, who willingly disobeys the order and acts in violation of such an injunction, runs the risk for facing the consequence of punishment. 13. In Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan AIR1998SC2765 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of the power under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Justice P. N. Bhagwati (As His Lordship then was) held that the punishment for breach of interim injunction could not be set arise even on the ground that the injunction was ultimately vacated by the appellate court. In Rachhpal Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh, a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held that if an interim injunction had been passed and is alleged to have been violated and application for initiating contempt proceeding under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A has been filed but during its pendency the suit itself is withdrawn, the Court may not be justified to pass order of punishment at that stage. Thus, it made a distinction from the above referred Gujarat High Court's decision in Thakorlal Parshottamdas (supra) that contempt proceedings should be initiated when the interim injunction is in operation. 16. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari [1961]1SCR728 , observed that the purpose of such proceedings is for the enforcement or effectuation of an order of execution. Similarly, in Sitarami v. Ganesh Das AIR1973All449 , the Court held as under : The purpose of Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, Civil P. C. is to enf ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ced reliance upon the judgment of the Privy Council in Eastern Trust Co. v. Makenzie Mann Co. Ltd. AIR 1915 PC 106, wherein it had been observed as under : An injunction, although subsequently discharged because the plaintiffs case failed, must be obeyed while it lasts........... This Court had taken a similar view in Magna v. Rustam. 18. Thus, it is evident from the above discussion that the proceedings are analogous to the proceedings under the Act, 1971. The only distinction is that as the Legislature, in its wisdom, has enacted a special provision enacting the provisions of Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, it would prevail over the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. Though the High Court, by virtue of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, 1971, can initiate the contempt proceeding even for disobedience of the injunction order granted by the civil court, but the exercise of such power is discretionary and generally does not require to be exercised in view of the special power conferred upon the civil court itself as held by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Dr. Bimal Chandra Sen v. Mrs. Kamla Mathur. 19. In Andre Paul Terence Ambard v Attorney Genera ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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