9911796707
TMI Blog2015 (2) TMI 1404X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... im for maintenance. In such circumstances, the Magistrate has the power to order monthly payment of maintenance, under Section 20(3) of the Act. Though the words, appropriate lumpsum payment in Section 20(3) of the Act, may suggest to mean that it is a permanent alimony, yet from the reading of the Act, the power of the Magistrate, to order for lumpsum payment, arising out of necessity, including educational, medical expenses and such other need, enumerated in Section 20 of the Act, is not circumscribed. Reading of the Act in entirety makes it clear that the legislature has enumerated certain contingencies and circumstances, in relation to domestic violence and empowered the Court to pass just and proper orders, to redress the grievance of the aggrieved person. From the reading of the Act, it is manifestly clear that the Domestic Violence Act, is independent of other laws. It provides for redressal of all kinds of deprivation or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom, whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household ne ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fe, upto date, shall be paid, within one month, from the date of receipt of the order. Both the Criminal Revision Cases are disposed of. X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ner, which was disgusting to the Wife's parents. For some reasons or the other, Husband has categorically refused to spend any money for the education of the 2nd respondent-Son. One day, when the Wife, requested him to accompany her, for affixing his signature in a document, in the school, he replied to her to take somebody, as Husband and refused to come to the school. Son was not allowed to enter the house and he was sent out. Thus, the petitioner neglected both his Wife and Son. While things stood thus, spouses went to Trichy. The petitioner and in-laws hated respondents. Picking up the frequent quarrels and using unparliamentary words, they caused mental agony. Husband forcibly removed the marriage sacred thread, "Mangalsutra" from the Wife and sent both the respondents out of the house. Left with no other alternative, they started living with her mother, at Coimbatore. 6. While the Husband continuously neglected the respondents, elders negotiated for amicable settlement. A demand of Rs. 1,00,000/- was made for reunion. With great difficulty, the said amount was arranged and given to the petitioner. With that amount, he put up first floor, in the building at Eday ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ving regard to ill-treatment, mental injury, mala fide intention on the part of the Husband, Wife and Son decided to continue to reside at Coimbatore. Thereafter, Husband caused a legal notice. Explaining the sequence of events, a reply notice, dated 12.10.2010, was given. Lateron, Wife came to know that on 14.09.2010, Husband had settled the schedule mentioned properties in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010. 9. Thereafter, Husband threatened the respondents to vacate from the residence at Coimbatore. According to the Wife, Husband's mother, owns property worth crores both in the native place and Coimbatore. They own a rice mill, cattle field and a marriage hall. They are also engaged in providing vessels for various functions. Husband is a landlord and earns not less than Rs. 2 Lakhs per Month. 10. By threatening the respondents, Husband obtained her signature on a receipt, as if payment of Rs. 3,00,000/- was made. Transfer of some of the schedule mentioned properties was made to exert pressure on the Wife, for divorce, at her instance, and one such alleged transfer was made after the complaint given to Thudiyalur Police Station. There are many properties in the name of the Husband. Thu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... have passed +2 examination. He is going to get admission in Engineering College, he said to have secured 70% marks in his Higher Secondary Examination. He himself represented before the Court that he is living with his mother, he is willing to join in V.L.B. Engineering College for which he need Rs. 5 Lakhs Rupees for get into admission in the said college. The second petitioner asserts that his father neglected him and he is not maintained by his father. He further said that his father is running Rice Mill and he is having Agricultural lands and he is capable to advance the said amount. The second petitioner is a budding engineer and forth coming pillar of the country. Already he would have suffered lot due to domestic problems, both physically and mentally inspite of that he likes to continue his studies. His rightful desire must be given due attention and to be executed. As a father the respondent have both moral and legal responsibility to afford the education to his Son. Hence, the respondent is directed to advance an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the 2nd petitioner towards his educational expense and to get admission in the Engineering College. Compliance report and for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o. 34 of 2010, on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore, Mr. P. Raja, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the challenge in this revision is to the order, directing the petitioner to pay a lumpsum payment of 50% of the capitation fees and payment of Rs. 50,000/- to the Son. 17. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner-Husband, alleging domestic violence, D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010 has been filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore, in the year 2010. Miscellaneous Application has been filed after two years. It is his contention that from 2004 onwards, the respondents were living separately and therefore, the averments made in DVA. No. 34 of 2010, filed in the year 2010, alleging domestic violence, are not true. In any event, the averments have to be proved. While that be the case, the learned Judicial Magistrate, ought not to have entertained C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012, filed under Section 23 of the Act, filed after two years. 18. He further submitted that the very purpose of considering the grant of interim ex-parte order, is to mitigate the circumstances, warranting any protection or other orders, to be considered, under Secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ated 15.06.2012, the petitioner is not legally bound to pay any maintenance. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the direction to pay Rs. 50,000/- to Son, with liberty to utilise the same, for other personal expenses, is wholly untenable. According to him, directions ordered lack statutory support. 22. Referring to Section 23(2) of the Act, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that even taking it for granted, an application filed after two years, under Section 23 of the Act, praying for an interim ex parte orders, could be entertained, according to him, an ex parte order, can be passed only on the basis of an affidavit, in such form, as may be prescribed and in the absence of satisfying the mandatory requirement of filing of an affidavit, the lower Court has erroneously considered C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2012 and passed an ex parte interim order, which has been modified on appeal. 23. According to the learned counsel, when the statute contemplates a procedure to be done in a particular manner, the same ought to have been followed. In the absence of an affidavit, petition in C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2012, ou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g the same, interim directions were granted. 27. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that initially, rent was collected by the respondents, from the house at Edayarpalayam, upto 2009. Thereafter, the Husband's brother, is collecting the rent. First respondent-wife's father, died in the year 2010. Prior to his death, out of love and affection, he extended financial assistance and thereafter, the respondents were literally starving. Earlier, with the little contributions from her father, she was managing the educational expenses. 28. As dutiful mother, she wanted to provide the best education to her Son and thus, admitted in Sri Krishna College of Technology at Coimbatore. Thus, at the time, when there was necessity to meet the educational expenses and maintenance, C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010 was filed in 2012, setting out the reasons, for the interim reliefs, sought for. 29. Referring to the definitions "Monetary Reliefs", under Section 2(k) and "Economic Abuse" under Section 3(d)(iv) and the power of the learned Judicial Magistrate, under Section 23, learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... year, Son has been sent out of the College and his education is disrupted. Though only a sum of Rs. 5,000/- has been ordered as maintenance, considering the costs of living, price index, etc., learned counsel for the respondents seek for appropriate revision. 35. Both the learned counsel have relied on case laws, in support of their contentions. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 36. The Protection of Women from Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005,, 2005 (Act 43 of 2005), is enacted to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution, who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. As per Section 2(f), "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. 37. Monetary relief is defined under Section 2(k), which means, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mmitted by the respondent: Provided that where a decree for any amount as compensation or damages has been passed by any court in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid or payable in pursuance of the order made by the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the amount payable under such decree and the decree shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or any other law for the time being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if any, left after such set off. (3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto. (4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the court. (5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under subsection (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing." 40. Section 17 deals with the right to reside in a shared household, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... latives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides; (d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same; (e) restraining the respondent froth renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman. (2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions or pass any other direction which he may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person. (3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic violence. (4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and shall be dealt with accordingly. (5) While passing ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the period specified in the order under sub-section (1). (6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make payment in terms of the order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent. 21. Custody orders:- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the application for protection order or for any other relief under this Act grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child or children by the respondent: Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any visit of the respondent may be harmful to the interests of the child or children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit. 22. Compensation orders: In addition to other reliefs as may be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ....... and Others .......COMPLAINANT VERSUS Ms. ................ and Others...RESPONDENT AFFIDAVIT I, ............., W/o Mr. .........., R/o. ........... D/o Mr. ..........., R/o. ...................., presently residing at .......... ............. do hereby solemnly affirm and declare on oath as under: 1. That I am the Applicant in the accompanying Application for ........ filed for myself and for my daughter/Son. 2. That I am the natural guardian of....... 3. That being conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case I am competent to swear this affidavit. 4. That the Deponent had been living with the Respondent/s at................. since......... to.............. 5. That the details provided in the present application for the grant of relief under section (s).........have been entered into by me/at my instructions. 6. That the contents of the application have been read over, explained to me in English/Hindi/any other local language (Please specify............................) 7. That the contents to the said application may be read as part of this, affidavit and are not repeated herein for the sake of brevity. 8. That the applicant apprehends rep ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... soever, orders were passed by the High Court, directing release of truck and the goods. That was the only prayer in the writ petition and on the above facts, the Supreme Court, observed that it was unfortunate that the High Court has given no reason whatsoever in support of its order and by virtue of the same, the main relief itself has been granted. 46. First of all, in State of U.P. v. Private Secretaries and Personal Assistants' Brotherhood, High Court, Allahabad (supra), facts could not be deduced from the judgment. Secondly, it is the general principle of law, to be followed in judicial proceedings. But there is no hard and fast rule that in given circumstances, no interim order, which has the effect of granting the main relief, cannot be granted at all. For instance, in a suit for injunction, not to demolish a building or not to interfere with the possession and enjoyment, removal of an alleged encroachment, without due process of law and in such other cases, where protective interim orders are prayed for, Courts cannot simply postpone the hearing of the interim applications, till the disposal of the suits and allow demolition of the building or interference with possess ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o, and along with any other reliefs, available under the Act. After considering Sections 20 and 26 of the Act and the decisions relating to Interpretation of Statutes in Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit and Others v. State of Maharashtra 2001 (2) SCR 654 : AIR 2001 SC 1980 : (2001) 4 SCC 534 : LNIND 2001 SC 761 and J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan and Another, 2003 (2) SCR 933 : AIR 2003 SC 1405 : (2003) 5 SCC 134 : LNIND 2003 SC 322, the Chhattisgarh High Court held that there was no illegality or infirmity in the order of the trial Court, in awarding maintenance to the persons aggrieved of domestic violence and it observed as follows: "Section 26 of the Act says that relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in addition to and along with any other relief which the aggrieved person may seek in any legal proceeding before a civil court, family court or a criminal court. Relief of maintenance to Wife and children is available to the effected party under his entitlement and liability of the person against whom relief is claimed under Section 125 of the Code, when such person is unable to maintain herself and the person against whom relief is claimed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute." 49. Decision in Rajesh Kurre v. Safurabai (supra) case only affirms the intention of the Legislature, engrafted in Sections 20 and 26 of the Act, which enables the Court to grant maintenance or lumpsum payment, dehors, Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Family Courts Act, 1984 and any other Act, relating to award of maintenance. 50. In Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat AIR 1986 SC 984 : (1985) 4 SCC 337 : LNIND 1985 SC 328 : (1986) 1 MLJ (Crl.) 12, the question considered by the Apex Court, was whether a magistrate before whom an application is made under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can pass an interim order directing the person against whom the application is made under that section to pay reasonable maintenance to the applicant concerned pending disposal of the application. In the abovesaid judgment, Wife, filed an appli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... may have no means to subsist until the final order is passed. There is no room for the apprehension that the recognition of such implied power would lead to the passing of interim orders in a large number of cases where the liability to pay maintenance may not exist. It is quite possible that such contingency may arise in a few cases but the prejudice Caused thereby to the person against whom it is made is minimal as it can be set right quickly after hearing both the parties. The magistrate, may, however, insist upon an affidavit being filed by or on behalf of the applicant concerned stating the grounds in support of the claim for interim maintenance to satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case for making such an order. Such an order may also be made in an appropriate case ex parte pending service of notice of the application subject to any modification or even an order of cancellation that may be passed after the respondent is heard. If a civil court can pass such interim orders on affidavits, there is no reason why a magistrate should not rely on them for the purpose of issuing directions regarding payment of interim maintenance. The affidavit may be treated as supplying p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt of the Miscellaneous Petition. As stated supra, in the averments to the said Miscellaneous Petition, the respondents have prayed the Court below to treat the averments in the main petition in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, as part and parcel of C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012, filed for interim orders. At the time of hearing of C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012, there was no objection in writing that the respondents have not filed any affidavit. Even before the appellate Court, the said contention has not been raised. 53. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no specific ground in the present Memorandum of Grounds of revision filed by the husband. On the aspect, as to whether, any separate application is required for appropriate orders, under Section 23 of the Act, for granting interim orders, in P. Chandrasekara Pillai v. Valsala Chandran 2007 Crl.L.J. 2328 : LNIND 2007 KER 153, at Paragraph 11, the Kerala High Court, held as follows: "11. I am unable to understand the provisions of Section 23 as compulsorily insisting on any separate application for interim order under Section 23. An application referred to in Section 23(2) is obviously an application u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence. Sub-section 2 of section 23 read with the Rule 7 clearly shows that there is no requirement of filing a separate application for interim relief under section 23 of the said act. Apart from these two provisions, subsection 2 of section 28 of the said Act provides that the court is empowered to lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under section 12 or an application under sub-section 2 of section 23 of the said Act. Therefore, there is no requirement of filing a separate application for grant of interim relief under section 23 of the said Act. However, while considering the question of granting the ex-parte ad-interim or interim relief the learned Magistrate will have to consider the nature of the reliefs sought in the main application under section 12(1) of the said Act in as much as an interim relief under section 23 of the said Act can be granted in aid of the final relief sought in the main application. On the basis of an affidavit in Form III prescribed by the Rules, in a given case, learned magistrate can grant ex-parte ad-interim relief. However, before granting an interim rel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the Act. That be the legal position, an application filed under Section 23 of the Act, cannot be dismissed, for not filing an affidavit. 60. Section 23 of the Act starts with the opening sentence, "in any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems "just and proper". "Judicial Dictionary - K.J. Aiyer: Just. The term 'just' is derived from the Latin word Justus. It has various meanings which are often governed by the context. The word 'just' may apply in nearly all of its senses, either to ethics of law, denoting something which is morally right and fair and sometimes that which is right and fair according to positive law. It can-notes reasonableness and something conforming to rectitude and justice, something equitable and fair. (Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 50, p. 1100). Words and Phrases, West Publishing Co, Vol. 23, p. 438, the true meaning of the word 'just' states in these terms: 'the word 'just' is derived from the Lain 'Justus' which is from the Latin jus, which means a right and more technically, a legal right-a law. Thus 'jus dicere' was to pronou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d such relief may include, but not limited to, (a) the loss of earnings; (b) the medical expenses; (c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and (d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force. 63. In S.R. Batra v. Tarun Batra AIR 2007 SC 1118 : (2007) 3 SCC 169, the Supreme Court held that under Section 17 of the Act, for the right to residence in a shared household, residence order could be passed. 64. In a given case, at the time of filing of application, under Section 12 of the Act, the aggrieved person may reside in the shared household. There would not be any apprehension of sending her out of the shared household. Lateron, if the conduct of the respondents, give rise to a reasonable likelihood or genuine apprehension in the mind of the aggrieved person of restricting or prohibiting her from residing at the shared household, and at that stage, she may prefer to seek for an interim ex-parte order, unde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntion of the petitioner that lumpsum payment can be awarded, only at the time of final disposal of the main application filed under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, has to be accepted, then the aggrieved person, who is in dire necessity to meet the medical expenses to herself or her child/children, educational expenses to the children, would be put to irreparable hardship. 70. Events that may happen, during the stage of the proceedings under Section 12 of the Act, cannot be foreseen. Out of necessity, if the prayer for medical or educational expenses, for the child or wife, as the case may be, is sought for, by way of an interim order, under Section 23 of the Act and if the Court has to decline such prayers, holding that it can be granted only at the time of final disposal of the application filed under Section 12 of the Act, then the aggrieved person and her child/children, would be left without any financial support and there would be a deprivation of her right to live with dignity and that would amount to violation of human rights. At this juncture, this Court deems it fit to reproduce the words of the Apex Court in Savitri v. Govind Singh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e is a good means of finding out its meaning and key to its understanding. Since it usually states the object and the intention of the Legislature in passing the enactment, it may legitimately be consulted to solve any ambiguity, or to fix the meaning of words which may have more than one, or to keep the effect of the Act within its real scope wherever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt. Where the language and object, and scope of the enactment are not open to doubt, the preamble cannot either restrict or extend the enacting part. (ii) In Nairin v. University of St. Andrews 1909 AC 147, it is held that, "Unless there is any ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice." (iii) In Samrao v. District Magistrate, Thana AIR 1952 SC 324, the Apex Court held that, "It is the duty of the Courts to give effect to the mea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rent from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended, Where, within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined." (viii) In Collector of Customs, Baroda v. Digvijaysinghji Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., Jamnagar, AIR 1961 SC 1549 : LNIND 1961 SC 172, the Supreme Court, held that "It is one of the well-established rules of construction is that if the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declare the intention of the Legislature. It is equally well settled principle of construction that where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system." (ix) In State of W.B. v. Union of India AIR ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... doubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there." (xv) In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal AIR 2003 SC 1543 : (2003) 2 SCC 577 : LNIND 2003 SC 112, the Supreme Court held as follows: "35. In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom. In E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC 123, a Division Bench of this Court observed: 37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pretation is concerned, it is settled that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it is to be read with the clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise also, any addition/subtraction of a word is not permissible. In other words, it is not proper to use a sense, which is different from what the word used ordinarily conveys. The duty of the Court is not to fill up the gap by stretching a word used. It is also settled that a provision is to be read as a whole and while interpreting, the intention and object of the legislation have to be looked upon. However, each case depends upon the facts of its own." (xix) In Indian Dental Association, Kerala v. Union of India 2004 (1) Kant. LJ 282, the Court held that, "The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used", for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are them ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... thetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional." (xxii) In Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (supra), it is further held that, "It is equally well-settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors." (xxiii) In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh AIR 2005 SC 294 : (2005) 10 SCC 437 : LNIND 2004 SC 1208, the Supreme Court held that, "12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rovide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest. 19. In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. (1977) 2 SCC 273 it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation." (xxiv) In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 3517 : (2006) 2 SCC 670 LNIND 2006 SC 92, the Supreme Court held that, "12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous." (xxv) In A.N. Roy Commissioner of Police v. Suresh Sham Singh AIR 2006 SC 2677 : (2006) 5 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... conclusion that there is any omission in the words used, it cannot make up the deficiency, where the wording as it exists is clear and unambiguous. While the courts can adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislative or the rule-making authority, it cannot set at naught the legislative intent clearly expressed in a statute or the rules." (xxix) In T.N. State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission AIR 2007 SC 1711 : (2007) 7 SCC 636 : LNIND 2007 SC 509, the Supreme Court held that, "Resort can be had to the legislative intent for the purpose of interpreting a provision of law, when the language employed by the legislature is doubtful or susceptible of meanings more than one. However, when the language is plain and explicit and does not admit of any doubtful interpretation, the Supreme Court cannot, by reference to an assumed legislative intent expand the meaning of an expression employed by the legislature and therein include such category of persons as the legislature has not chosen to do." (xxx) In Visitor Amu v. K.S. Misra (2007) 8 SCC 594 : LNIND 2007 SC 1039, the Supreme Court held that, "It is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court held that, "39. .....It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is determinative factor of legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. 40. In Ganga Prasad Verma (Dr.) v. State of Bihar 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 192, it has been held that: (SCC p. 195, para 5) "5. Where the language of the Act is clear and explicit, the court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature." (xxxiv) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 SCC 653 : LNIND 2010 SC 277 : (2010) 2 MLJ (Crl.) 779, the Supreme Court held that, "179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... : (2010) 2 SCC 513 : LNIND 2010 SC 95 : (2010) 2 MLJ 801, it is held that, "6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Stamps (1899) AC 99, and it is held as follows: "The word "include" is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include." (ii) In the case of V.F. and G. Insurance Co. v. Fraser and Ross,AIR 1960 SC 971 : LNIND 1960 SC 151, the Apex Court observed that when expression "means' is used, generally the definition is exhaustive. (iii) In the case of State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha AIR 1960 SC 610, it was observed that "it is obvious that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be treated as restricted in any sense" (iv) In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad AIR 1972 SC 168 : (1971) 3 SCC 550 : LNIND 1971 SC 375 : (1973) 1 MLJ 4, at Paragraph 4, the Supreme Court, considered as to how, the word "include" in the statute, should be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , v. Coop. Bank Employees Union, AIR 2007 SC 2320 : (2007) 4 SCC 685 : LNIND 2007 SC 374 : 2007-II-LLJ-825, the Apex Court observed as follows: "On the other hand, when the word "includes" is used in the definition, the legislature does not intend to restrict the definition; makes the definition enumerative but not exhaustive. That is to say, the term defined will retain its ordinary meaning but its scope would be extended to bring within it matters, which in its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise. Therefore, the use of the word "means" followed by the word "includes" in Section 2(bb) of the ID Act is clearly indicative of the legislative intent to make the definition exhaustive and would cover only those banking companies which fall within the purview of the definition and no other." (vii) In Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State of Gujarat AIR 2008 SC 1246 : (2008) 5 SCC 449 : LNIND 2008 SC 254 : (2008) 2 MLJ 1043, the Apex Court has observed that in such a case, the use of word 'includes' indicates an intention to enlarge the meaning of the word used in the Statute. (viii) In Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. v. Ashok Iron Wo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r intent and purpose. Let me consider some of the decisions, on purposive construction of the statutes. (i) In Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 284, the Supreme Court explained, as to how, the rules, which are legislative in character, to be interpreted. At Paragraph 3, it held as follows: "3. Since the rules are legislative in character, they must harmoniously be interpreted as a connected whole giving life and force to each word, phrase and rule and no part thereof should be rendered nugatory or a surplusage. Resort to iron out the creases could be had only when the construction of the relevant rule, phrase or word Would lead to unintended absurd results." (ii) In United Bank of India, Calcutta v. Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 2957 : (2000) 7 SCC 357 : (2001) 1 MLJ 100, in regard to purposive interpretation, the Supreme Court extracted, what Justice Frankfurter observed, which is as follows: "Legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the langu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.' 'If, said Brett L.J. 'the inconvenience is not only great, but what I may call an absurd inconvenience, by reading an enactment in its ordinary sense, whereas if you read it in a manner in which it is capable though not its ordinary sense, there would not be any inconvenience at all, there would be reason why you should not read it according to its ordinary grammatical meaning." 65. Even a construction which would make the provisions more effective and workable must be adopted and to see if it is possible to be done without doing too much violence of the language used. 66. Every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. 67. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurdity or anomalous results which could not have b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o unjust results which the Legislature never intended. The golden rule of giving undue importance to grammatical and literal meaning of late gave place to 'rule of legislative intent'. The world over, the principle of interpretation according to the legislative intent is accepted to be more logical. 28. When the law to be applied in a given case prescribes interpretation of statute, the Court has to ascertain the facts and then interpret the law to apply to such facts. Interpretation cannot be in a vacuum or in relation to hypothetical facts. It is the function of the legislature to say what shall be the law and it is only the Court to say what the law is. 29. In JT Registrar of Co-op. Societies v. T.A. Kuttappan (2000) 6 SCC 127, Associated Timber Industries v. Central Bank of India (2000) 7 SCC 73, Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank (2000) 4 SCC 406, K. Duraiswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 2 SCC 538, Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424, Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu AIR 1979 SC 193, Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1988 SC 1883 and Indian Handicrafts v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 589, this court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion such as its legislative history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of the legislation, the object sought to be achieved and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to the other possible interpretation ". 32. In Keher Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), it was held: "During the last several years, the 'golden rule' has been given a go-by. We now look for the 'intention' of the legislature or the 'purpose' of the statute. First we examine the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation on hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word, every section and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We took at the mischiefs which the legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole situation and not j ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ctment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. (See District Mining Officer and Others v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. and Another JT 2001 (6) SC 183). 34. It is also well settled that to arrive at the intention of the legislation depending on the objects for which the enactment is made, the Court can resort to historical, contextual and purposive interpretation leaving textual interpretation aside. ... 36. More often than not, literal interpretation of a statute or a provision of a statute results in absurdity. Therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions, the Courts should keep in mind the objectives or purpose for which statute has been enacted. Justice Frankfurter of U.S. Supreme Court in an article titled as Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (47 Columbia Law Reports 527), observed that, "legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an adequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the ai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mpose on the respondent, obligations relating to the discharge of rent and other payments, having regard to the financial needs and resources of the parties. 78. Monetary reliefs, that can be granted, under Section 12 of the Act, is to meet the expenses, incurred and losses suffered, by the aggrieved person and her child, as result of domestic violence and such reliefs may include, but not limited to only to, (a) the loss of earnings; (b) the medical expenses; (c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and (d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force. 79. Monetary relief that can be granted, under Section 20 of the Act, should be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed. Reverting to the case on hand, at the time of filing of an application, under Section 12 of the Act, Son was studying in Standard 11th in Vithya Vikash School, Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ence Act, 2005, which reads as follows: "Domestic violence is undoubtedly a human rights issue and serious deterrent to development. The Vienna Accord of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (1995) have acknowledged this. The United Nations Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in its General Recommendation No. XII (1989), has recommended that State parties should act to protect women against violence of any kind especially that occurring within the family. 2. The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the public domain. Presently, where a woman is subjected to cruelty by her Husband or its relatives, it is an offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The Civil law does not however address this phenomenon in its entirety. 3. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a law keeping in view the rights guaranteed under articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution to provide for a remedy under the civil law which is intended to protect the woman from bring victims of domes ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rious provisions contained in the Bill." 85. In Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shafi AIR 2001 SC 2984 : (2001) 8 SCC 540 : LNIND 2001 SC 2393, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 8, held as follows: "For interpreting a particular provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" is not harmonious construction." 86. In R.S. Pillai v. M.L. Peratchi 2000 (4) CTC 543 : LNIND 2000 MAD 657 : (2000) 3 MLJ 61, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e understood with due regard that the object of the legislation also. The word employed in the Statute will acquire meaning and content depending upon the context in which they are used. The word should not be torn out by the context and by interpretation, it would make another provision Otiose/redundant and such interpretation should not be adopted." 89. Guidance can be taken from the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and Others v. Basant Nahata AIR 2005 SC 3401 : (2005) 12 SCC 77 : LNIND 2005 SC 681, that preamble, statement of objects and reasons and other provisions of the statute can be taken into account if they provide good means for finding out the meaning of the offending provision, in case of vagueness or ambiguity when the language of provision is capable of giving more than one meaning but not in the case of use of any expression which is incapable being given any precise meaning. 90. In State of Maharashtra v. Marwagee F. Desai and Others AIR 2002 SC 456 : (2002) 2 SCC 318 : LNIND 2001 SC 2858, at para 11 the Supreme Court held that "true intent of the legislature shall have to be gathered and deciphered in its proper spirit having due reg ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... loss of earnings; (b) the medical expenses; (c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and (d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force. 93. One of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that lumpsum payment can be ordered, only at the time of final disposal of the main petition, under Section 12 of the Act and not under Section 23 of the Act. As stated supra, Section 23 starts with the opening sentence, "In any proceeding before him, under this Act" which means that if the Magistrate is satisfied, he may grant an ex parte order, on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person, under Sections 18 to 22, against the respondent. 94. Though Mr. P. Raja, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, was filed in the year 2010 and when the same was pending for two years, application filed under Sec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the society. Intention is manifestly clear that there should be not only protection and also prevention. Right to Equality guaranteed, under Article 14 and Right to Live under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, are the goals sought to be achieved. Taking note of the fact that Civil Law does not address the aspect of domestic violence, against a woman, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, has been enacted with an aim to protect and to amolierate further domestic violence and to ensure the constitutional rights, under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It is a beneficial and social welfare legislation. Let me consider some of the decisions, where the Supreme Court has explained, as to how, a beneficial legislation has to be interpreted. (i) In Jeewanlal Ltd. and Others v. Appellate Authority 1984 Ind. Law SC 198, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "In construing a social welfare legislation, the court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction; and if a section is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act, and is more beneficial to the persons in whose intere ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they should have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." (iv) In Edukanti Kistamma v. S. Venkatareddy AIR 2010 SC 313 : (2010) 1 SCC 756 : LNIND 2009 SC 2064 : (2010) 2 MLJ 713, while dealing with beneficial legislation, which requires interpretation to advance social and economic justice and enforcement of constitutional directives, at Paragraph 26, the Apex Court, held as follows: "The Act 1950, being the beneficial legislation requires interpretation to advance social and economic justice and enforce the constitutional directives and not to deprive a person of his right to property. The statutory provisions should not be construed in favour of such deprivation. Interpretation of a beneficial legislation with a narrow pedantic approach is not justified. In case, there is any doubt, the court should interpret a beneficial legislation in favour of the beneficiaries and not otherwise as it would be against the legislative intent. For the purpose of interpretation of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... psum payment" in Section 20(3) of the Act, may suggest to mean that it is a permanent alimony, yet from the reading of the Act, the power of the Magistrate, to order for lumpsum payment, arising out of necessity, including educational, medical expenses and such other need, enumerated in Section 20 of the Act, is not circumscribed. 101. The primary duty of the Court, while construing the provisions of the Act is to adopt a constructive approach subject to that it should not do violence to the language of the provisions and is not contrary to attempted objective of the enactment. 102. The word 'compensation' according to dictionary, means 'compensating or being compensated, thing given in recompense'. In legal sense it may constitute actual loss or expected loss and may extend to physical, mental or even emotional suffering, insult or injury or loss. 103. When the Domestic Violence Act, | vests jurisdiction with the Court to award compensation, it has to be construed widely, enabling the Court to determine the compensation, for any damage or suffering by the aggrieved person, which in law, is otherwise included in the widening meaning of the word, "compen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f an aggrieved person or on her behalf a Protection Officer or a service provider requests the person in charge of a shelter home to provide shelter to her, such person in charge of the shelter home shall provide shelter to the aggrieved person in the shelter home. 7. Duties of medical facilities: If an aggrieved person or, on her behalf a Protection Officer or a service provider requests the person in charge of a medical facility to provide any medical aid to her, such person in charge of the medical facility shall provide medical aid to the aggrieved person in the medical facility. ... 9. Duties and functions of Protection Officers: (1) It shall be the duty of the Protection Officer- (a) to assist the Magistrate in the discharge of his functions under this Act; (b) to make a domestic incident report to the Magistrate, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, upon receipt of a complaint of domestic violence and forward copies thereof to the police officer in charge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction domestic violence is alleged to have been committed and to the service providers in that area; (c) to make an application in s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erson medically examined and forward a copy of the medical report to the Protection Officer and the police station within the local limits of which the domestic violence took place; (c) ensure that the aggrieved person is provided shelter in a shelter home, if she 30 requires and forward a report of the lodging of the aggrieved person in the shelter home to the police station within the local limits of which the domestic violence took place. (3) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any service provider or any member of the service provider who is, or who is deemed to be, acting or purporting to act under this Act, for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in the exercise of powers or discharge or functions under this Act towards the prevention of the commission of domestic violence. 11. Duties of Government: The Central Government and every State Government, shall take all measures to ensure that- (a) the provisions of this Act are given wide publicity through public media including the television, radio and the print media at regular intervals; (b) the Central Government and State Government officers including the police ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d the petitioner to pay 50% of the capitation fees within two days of filing the proof of fees structure before the trial Court. The appellate Court has also directed the balance of 50% of the capitation fees to be paid by the husband and on production of the admission letter, before the trial Court. In addition to the above, the appellate Court has directed Rs. 50,000/- to be paid to the son, with liberty to utilise the same, for his other personal expenses. Monthly maintenance of Rs. 5,000/- for the son has been ordered to be deposited on or before, every 5th day of the English Calendar Month, in the personal account of the son, till the disposal of D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010. 110. Though, Mr. K. Thilageswaran, learned counsel for the respondents has sought for upward revision of the maintenance amount ordered by the appellate Court, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner/husband, as regards the denial of the prayer for maintenance of Rs. 10,000/- each, by the learned Magistrate, no appeal has been filed by the respondents. Had the respondents filed an appeal against the denial, the appellate Court, would have considered the said prayer. In the absence of any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society, which means further economic abuse. 115. The Act empowers the Magistrate to pass Protection Orders in favour of the aggrieved person to prevent the respondent from committing domestic violence in future also. For the expenses already incurred and the loss suffered, monetary relief can be granted. 116. In any event, directions issued to pay capitation fee in two instalments cannot be sustained in the light of the Tamilnadu Educational Institutions Prohibition of Collection at Capitation Fee Act, 1992. As per the definition and in the light of the decisions of the Apex Court, as to how, the statute has to be interpreted, the petitioner is obligated to compensate the expenses incurred, and loss suffered. As stated supra, as per section 2(k) of the Act, petitioner is bound to bear the expenses and loss suffered, at any stage of any proceeding. 117. As per the memorandum dated 15.12.2014 of Shri Krishna College of Technology, Kovaipudur, Coimbatore, the 4th respondent, the total educational expenses/fees for the course, is Rs. 4,24,500/-. In the light of the statutory provisions and considering the expenses already incur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
