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TMI Blog2003 (4) TMI 611X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e. 3. By Section 12(i) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 (in short 'the Amendment Act') operative from 1.7.2002, amendments were made to Section 115 of the Code. In all these appeals, the concerned High Courts held that because of amended Section 115, the revision filed before them was not maintainable, as had an order been passed in favour of the party applying for revision, same would not have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding. 4. It has been contended by learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court went wrong in disposing of the revision applications as not maintainable, on several grounds. They are (i) the amended provisions do not apply to petitions which were admitted before the amendment, (ii) appeals and revisions stand on a parallel footing and are vested rights in the appellant/applicant, as the case may be, and as such the amended provisions would not have any application, and (iii) the applications for injunction and the like which form subject matter of the revisions relate to the expression 'other proceeding' and even if the amended provisions apply disposal of the revision would have meant final dismissal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ade. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. Explanation: In this section, the expression "Any case which has been decided: includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding." Section 115 (after Amendment): (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears - (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested. (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or order proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the su ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... xercise of power. 10. Even after the amendments in 1976, in 1999 and prior to the amendment in 1976, the revision power was exercisable in a case where the order or the decree, as the case may be, was not appealable. 11. Sub-section (2) which was introduced by the Old Amendment Act and retained even after present amendment, provides that the High Court shall not interfere where the order or the decree is appealable in courts subordinate to the High Court. 12. It is interesting to note that the Law Commission of India had recommended deletion of Section 115. In the Law Commission's opinion, provisions of Section 115 are analogous to provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short 'the Constitution') and the litigants would not be prejudiced in any way if the entire Section is deleted. The Joint Committee of the Parliament discussed these recommendations and only thought it proper to make certain modifications in the Section. That led to amendment to Section 115 by Old Amendment Act. The deliberations of the Committee are reflected in the following words: "The Committee, however, feel; that, in addition to the restrictions contained in Sec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nuation of the original proceedings and the provisions applied at the time of institution of the suit are to be operative even in respect of the appeals. That is because there is a vested right in the litigant to avail the remedy of an appeal. As was observed in K. Eapen Chako v. The Provident Investment Company (P) Ltd. (AIR 1976 SC 2610) only in cases where vested rights are involved, a legislation has to be interpreted to mean as one affecting such right to be prospectively operative. The right of appeal is only by statute. It is necessary part of the procedure in an action, but "the right of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the courts below. It seems to this paramount, right, part of the progress of the inferior tribunal." (Per Westbury See: AG v. SILLEM 33 J.Ex 209). The appeal, strictly so called, is one in which the question is, whether the order of the Court from which the appeal is brought was right on the materials which that Court had before it" (Per Lord Devuil Ponnamal v. Arunogam 1905 AC 390). The right of appeal, where it exists, as a matter of substance and not of procedure (Colonial Sugar Refini ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (1997)6SCC312 ) The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner, Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction take up deficiencies which are left there. (See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr., [1998]2SCR56 ). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 943 (HL). Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans (1910) AC 445 (HL), quote ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC 1966 AC 557 where at p. 557 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges". 24. It is then true that, "When the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but do to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius accidunt." "But," on the other hand," it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom" (See Fenton v. Hampton 11 Moo P.C. 345). A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... so worded as to include every case which may arise, but it is sufficient if they apply to those things which most frequently happen. All legislation proceeds upon the principle of providing for the ordinary course of things, and to this principle frequent reference is to be found, in the reports, in answer to arguments, often speciously advanced, that the words of an Act cannot have a particular meaning, because in a certain contingency that meaning might work a result of which nobody would approve. In Miller v. Salomons 7 Exch. 475 it was argued that Parliament could not have intended that a Jew, before sitting in the House of Commons, must use the words "on the true faith of a Christian," prescribed in the oath of abjuration of 6 Geo. 3, c. 53, because any person, refusing to take the same oath when tendered by two justices, would, under the 1 Geo. 1, st.2, c.13, be deemed to be a polish recusant, and would be liable to penalties as such; and to enforce these provisions against a Jew, it was said, would be the merest tyranny. But Baron Parke thus replied to this argument:- "If in the vast majority of possible cases - in all of ordinary occurrence - the law is in n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dment Act. A new Sub-section (3) has been added in Section 115 by the Amendment Act which states that revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court. 31. In Section 2, the expressions 'decree' and 'order' have been defined in Clauses (2) and (14) respectively. It is to be noted that it matters little that the judgment is styled as an "order". If, in fact, it fulfils the conditions of the definition under Section 2(2), it is a decree and becomes appealable. Orders that are not appealable are, generally speaking, those which are proconsul i.e. interlocutory or incidental orders regulating proceedings but not deciding any of the matters of controversy in the suit. Order 43 deals with the "appeals from orders". These appeals lie under Section 104 of the Code. The said Section deals with appeals from orders and specifies the orders from which appeals can lie. Sub-section (2) of Section 104 says that no appeal shall lie form any order passed in appeal under the said Section. Section 104 and Order 43 Rule I contain a full list of appealable orders. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... party seeking revision under Section 115 of the Code. In Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. 2000(119)ELT257(SC) , it was observed that if a provision of statute is unconditionally omitted without a saying clause in favour of pending proceedings all action must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not been granted before the omission goes into effect there is no scope for granting it afterwards. There is modification of this position by application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act or by making special provisions. Operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the past largely depends on the saying applicable. In a case where a particular provision in the statute is omitted and in its place another provision dealing with the same contingency is introduced without a saying clause in favour of pending proceedings, then it can be reasonably inferred that the intention of the legislature is that the pending proceedings shall continue but a fresh proceeding for the same purpose may be initiated under the new provision. 34. In view of what has been stated above the inevitable conclusion is that the High Courts were right ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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